OUR NAYY AND 
THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 



OUR NAVY 

AND 

THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 



BY 



GARDNER W. ALLEN 




BOSTON, NEW YORK, AND CHICAGO 
HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY 
dbc fiitocrsibc prcstf, Cambnbfle 
W05 









15 !905 
. . inifiu entry 

l-hAr. Kb, '90S I 

as \c, no; I 
/ o9 Z7(* 
COPY b. 



COPYRIGHT 1905 BY GARDNER W. ALLEN 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 



Published February iqos 



TO 

THE MEMORY OF 

MY FATHER 

JOSEPH HENRY ALLEN 



PREFACE 

The relations of the United States with the Barbary 
powers a century ago form an interesting and roman- 
tic episode in American history which has never before 
been presented as a complete story. While the pic- 
turesque exploits of Preble and Decatur are familiar, 
other adventures of American seamen and consuls 
among the pirates of the Mediterranean have escaped 
notice, or are barely mentioned in most histories. It 
has been necessary to explore original records for 
many of the details. The various events, scattered 
over a period of about forty years, are here brought 
together. 

In the search for material many have given greatly 
appreciated assistance. The writer acknowledges espe- 
cially his indebtedness to the officials of the Navy 
Department, the Library of Congress, the Boston 
Public Library, and the Massachusetts Historical So- 
ciety. He is under particular obligations to Professor 
Albert Bushnell Hart of Harvard University, to 
Charles W. Stewart, Esq., Superintendent of Library 
and Naval War Records, Navy Department, and to 
Worthington C. Ford, Esq., Chief of Division of 
Manuscripts, Library of Congress. 

GARDNER W. ALLEN. 
Boston, 
January, 1905. 



CONTENTS 

I. White Slavery in the Barbary States ... 1 

II. American Captives in Barbary .... 13 

III. First Negotiations 25 

IV. Peace with Algiers 4:) 

V. Peace with Tripoli and Tunis 59 

VI. The Voyage of the George Washington to 

Constantinople 75 

VII. War with Tripoli 88 

VIII. The Second Year of the War .... 105 

IX. Operations before Tripoli in the Summer of 1803 125 

X. The Loss of the Philadelphia .... 138 

XL The Destruction of the Philadelphia . . . 158 

XII. Commodore Preble before Tripoli . . . 185 

XIII. The Winter of 1S04-1S05 213 

XIV. The Capture of Derne 227 

XV. Peace with Tripoli 240 

XVI. Further Trouble with the Barbary States . 267 
XVII. War with Algiers — Final Peace .... 2S1 

APPENDIX 

I. Sources of Information 305 

IL Treaties :'.ll 

III. Squadrons .'!2.'i 

IN'. Officers in Commodore Preble's Squadron . . 326 

\V. The Crew of the Intrepid, February 16, 1804 . 330 

VI. Casualties in Commodore Prekle's Squadron . . 332 

VII. The Dey's Letter to President Madison and Reply 335 

Index oil 



ILLUSTRATIONS 

Explosion of the Intrepid . Frontispiece (see p. 208) 
From an engraving in The Port Folio (Dec, 1810), in- 
scribed as follows: "Blowing Up of the Fire ship Intrepid 
commanded by Capt. Somers in the Harbour of Tri- 
poli on the night of the 4th Sepr., 1804. Before the 
Intrepid had gained her Destined situation she was 
suddenly boarded by 100 Tripolines, when the Gallant 
Somers and Heroes of his Party (Lieuts. Wadsworth 
and Israel and 10 men) observed themselves surrounded 
by 3 Gun-boats, and no prospect of Escape, determined 
at once to prefer Death and the Destruction of the En- 
emy to Captivity & a torturing Slavery, put a Match 
to train leading directly to the Magazine, which at once 
blew the whole into the Air." 

Map of the Mediterranean 1 

William Eaton 62 

From The Polyanthos (May, 1807). Engraved by 
Snyder from a portrait by Doyle. 

William Bainbridge 7G 

From the Analectic Magazine (1813). Engraved by 
D. Edwin from a portrait by G. Stuart. 

Richard Dale 92 

From the National Portrait Gallery (1839). Engraved 
by R. W. Dodson from a drawing by J. B. Longacre, 
after a portrait by J. Wood. 

The Enterprise and the Tripoli . . . .96 

From The Naval Temple (1K10). Engraved from a 
picture by M. Cornd. "Capt. Sterrett in the Schr. En- 
terprise paying tribute to Tripoli, August 1801." 

Edward Preble. ...... 138 

From The Polyanthos (Feb., 180G). Engraved by 
S. Harris. 



xii ILLUSTRATIONS 

Stephen Decatur 166 

From the Aualectic Magazine (June, 1813). Engraved 
by D. Edwin from a portrait by G. Stuart. 

Destruction of the Philadelphia . . . 172 
From an engraving in Waldo's Life of Decatur (1S-!L>), 
inscribed : " The Blowing up of the Frigate Phil- 
adelphia. The U. S. Frigate Philadelphia, while block- 
ading the harbour of Tripoli, strikes upon a rock. In 
this situation she surrenders. Com. Decatur obtains 
leave to attempt to recover or destroy her, & with 70 
volunteers sails for the ship. He reaches her & though 
moored under the Bashaw's Batteries & surrounded by 
his Navy, he with his men rush on board & boldly attack 
& conquer the crew of near 1000 men. Finding her 
recovery impossible, they set her on fire, which soon 
produces a terrible explosion, while Decatur & his crew 
safely escape from the harbour, amid a tremendous fire 
from the enemies' batteries & ships." 

Map of Tripoli 186 

Showing details of the battle of Aug. 3, 1804. Based 
on the plan drawn by Midshipman F. C. de Krafft in 
1804 and published in Record of U. S. Naval Institute, 
No. 7 (1879). 

Fight of the Gunboats 192 

From an engraving in Waldo's Decatur, inscribed : 
" Decatur avenging the murder of bis brother. Com. 
Decatur, whilst bearing a prize from the harbour, hears 
of the treacherous murder of his brother by a Turk (the 
Turk having surrendered), in a moment changes his 
course, and with 10 men for his crew seeks his enemy 
— rushes on board — and after a desperate struggle 
with numbers far superior, kills the Turk — captures 
his enemy's boat — & again retreats from the harbour." 

Preble's Squadron attacking Tripoli . . . 194 
Battle of Aug. 3, 1804. From the painting by Corne, 
1805, at the Naval Academy, Annapolis. 

Richard Somers 210 

This silhouette is reproduced, with the kind permission 
of the author, from Absegami: Annals of Eyren Haven 



ILLUSTRATIONS xiii 

and Atlantic City, 1G09 to 1904, by Alfred M. Heston. 
Published by the author, Atlantic City, N. J., 1904. 
Mr. Heston says : " The late Dr. J. B. Somers, of 
this county, a near relative of Commander Somers, 
informed me that the only portrait of the hero now 
extant is a silhouette with his signature underneath." 

John Rodgers 224 

From The Polyanthos (Oct., 1S13). Engraved by John 
K. Smith from a portrait by Henry Williams. 

Decatur's Squadron off Algiers .... 286 
.June 30, 1815. From The Naval Temple. Engraved 
by N. Jocelin. 

Squadron of Commodore Bainbridge . . 292 
Homeward hound from Gibraltar, Oct. 6, 1S15. From 
The Naval Temple. Drawn by M. Corne", engraved by 
W. S. Leney. 



OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY 
CORSAIRS 

CHAPTER I 
WHITE SLAVERY IN THE BARBARY STATES 

Along the northern coast of Africa, between the 
Mediterranean and the Sahara, stretching from the 
Atlantic to Egypt, a distance of two thousand miles, 
lie the Barbary States. They are Morocco, Algeria, 
Tunis, and Tripoli, with the unimportant Barca on the 
east, generally included in Tripoli. Of these Algeria, 
formerly called by the name of its capital Algiers, and 
now a colony of France, was the most powerful and 
aggressive in the days of piracy. 

Barbary is in the latitude of our Southern States, 
and is blessed with a mild climate and fertile soil. 
The coast is high and rocky from the Straits of Gib- 
raltar to Cape Bon ; beyond that it is low, the water 
is shoal, and reefs extend far off shore. Most of the 
harbors are very open and exposed to the north. A 
strong current sets in from the Atlantic and sweeps 
along the African coast. From September to April 
frequent and severe gales blow, making naval opera- 
tions difficult and dangerous, especially for sailing- 
vessels. Off the coast of Tunis and Tripoli and also 
about Malta and Sicily, the prevailing winds are north- 
erly and northwesterly, and often have the force of 
hurricanes. In the spring violent easterly gales, called 






2 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARA CORSAIRS 

levanters, are common. In the summer the weather 
is generally mild, but even then gales are not infre- 
quent. 1 These facts have a bearing on the history of 
this region. 

With its advantages of situation and climate, Bar- 
bary should have been a civilized and progressive 
country. Its Mohammedan population, however, con- 
sisting of Moors, Arabs, Berbers, Kabyles, and Turks, 
decided the character of the civilization. There were 
also many Jews in Barbary. The cities were built with 
extremely narrow streets, dark, and very dirty. The 
houses were generally of one story, and the flat terraced 
roofs approached so closely to each other that long dis- 
tances could be traversed, passing from roof to roof. 
A century ago the population of the city of Algiers 
is believed to have been somewhere between fifty and 
a hundred thousand ; Tunis was larger and Tripoli 
smaller. 

There had been piracy in the Mediterranean from 
the earliest times, and for centuries it was pursued 
by Christians and Moslems alike. The captives were 
reduced to slavery, and the condition of the Christian 
slaves in Barbary excited sympathy throughout Eu- 
rope. In 1199 was founded in Paris the " Order of 
the Holy Trinity and Redemption of Captives." The 
members, called Fathers of the Redemption or Mathu- 
rins, from the Church of St. Mathurin, devoted their 
lives to the ransom of captives and the mitigation of 
their plight. Missions were established and hospitals 
maintained in Barbary. 2 

During the later Middle Ages the relations between 
the Barbary powers and the Christian nations were 

1 Morris, pp. .">. 6. See Appendix I for authorities. 

2 Pooh-, pp. 251-255. 



WHITE SLAVERY IN THE BARBART STATES 3 

amicable. They traded together and made enlight- 
ened treaties. But with the dawn of the sixteenth cen- 
tury appears a change in the conditions, and hence- 
forth a state of chronic warfare between Christians 
and Moors. Then began the period of activity of the 
Barbary corsairs which lasted about three hundred 
years. This was chiefly the result of the conquest of 
Granada in 1492, which was followed by the exodus 
of thousands of Moriscos who passed over to Africa 
and not only greatly swelled the numbers in Barbary, 
but carried with them a hatred of the Spanish and 
a thirst for vengeance which early found vent in 
piratical raids along the Spanish coast. 1 

The first of the great corsairs were the brothers 
Horuk and Khair-ed-Din Barbarossa, natives of Lesbos, 
who had in youth joined a gang of pii*ates in the east 
Mediterranean. Not finding free scope for his ambi- 
tion so near the sultan's fleet, Horuk determined to 
try his fortune on the Barbary coast. He first went to 
Tunis in 1504, which he made his base. From Tunis 
and later from other ports he cruised with brilliant 
though not uninterrupted success, making many cap- 
tures and collecting a strong fleet. 2 

In 1509 a Spanish expedition under Cardinal 
Ximenes captured Oran, which was held by Spain for 
two centuries. The Spaniards also took Algiers the 
next year, but held only the small island, just off 
shore, from which the city takes its name, and which 
they fortified. This stronghold, called Penon de Alger, 
completely controlled the harbor and greatly interfered 
with the movements of the corsairs. The island was 
afterwards connected with the city by a causeway. In 
1516 Horuk Barbarossa went to Algiers, having been 

1 Poole, pp. 7. 8. 2 Ibid. ch. iii. 



4 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

appealed to by Sheik Salim for assistance in driving 
the Spanish from the Penon. Instead, he murdered 
the sheik, set himself up in his place, and soon had 
control of nearly the whole counti'y. In 1518, while 
retreating from an overwhelming Spanish force, sent 
against him from Oran, Horuk was overtaken and 
killed, desperately fighting at bay. 1 The Spanish 
might now have seized Algiers and put an end to its 
piracy once for all, but the opportunity was stupidly 
neglected. 2 

Khair-ed-Din Barbarossa succeeded his brother, and 
began by putting Algiers under the protection of the 
sultan at Constantinople, who made him governor- 
general and sent him a guard of two thousand janiza- 
ries. In this way he greatly strengthened his power, 
and finally, about 1530, was able to force the surren- 
der of the Peiion de Alger. Soon after this, he was 
given command of the Ottoman navy, and in 1534 
captured Tunis, adding it to the sultan's dominions. 
The next year, however, the Emperor Charles V led 
an expedition for the conquest of Tunis in six hundred 
ships commanded by Andrea Doria, the Genoese 
admiral. The Goletta, or port of Tunis, was taken 
and the city besieged. When Barbarossa came out 
to meet the emperor, thousands of Christian slaves 
escaped from the citadel and closed the gates of the 
city behind him. In the encounter which followed, 
he was defeated and put to flight. The city was then 
taken and sacked by the Spanish. Thirty thousand 
men, women, and children were massacred and ten 
thousand carried away as slaves. Tunis was held by 

1 Poole, eh. iv ; Prescott, Ferdinand and Isabella (Philadelphia, 
187.°.), iii, pp. :;i4-:^2,327. 

2 Poole, p. 53. 



WHITE SLAVERY IN THE BARBARY STATES 5 

the Spaniards about five years. Khair-ed-Din de- 
parted from Barbary and did not return. 1 

In 1541 Charles V led another great armada across 
the sea, this time against Algiers. Hernando Cortes 
was one of his captains, and Andrea Doria commanded 
the fleet. Many non-combatants, including ladies, 
accompanied the expedition to witness the emperor's 
triumph. It was late in the season, and Doria, fearful 
of the gales that sweep the Barbary coast, counseled 
postponement, but was unheeded. Algiers was held 
by Hasan Aga with a small force. On the second day 
after landing, the army, without shelter, was drenched 
by a heavy rain and the next day a terrific hurricane 
wrecked the fleet at anchor. Over a hundred and 
fifty vessels were lost, and the sailors who succeeded 
in getting ashore were killed by the Arabs. Mean- 
while the army was in the greatest distress, the stores 
not having been landed, and it was now necessary 
to undertake a three days' march to the bay where 
Doria had brought the remnant of the fleet. Many 
perished from starvation and exposure, and thousands 
were slain, or captured and enslaved. At last the 
emperor succeeded in reembarking the survivors and 
returned to Spain after one of the most disastrous 
defeats in history. 2 

The power of the Barbary States was now at its 
height. Khair-ed-Din was followed by a number of 
other famous corsairs, but with the decline of the 
naval supremacy of the Ottomans after their defeat 
at Lepanto in 1571, they degenerated into a race of 

1 Poole, eh. v, viii ; Robertson, Charles V (Philadelphia, lS7-~>), ii, 
pp. ^:;7-242. 

- Poole, ch. xi ; Robertson, ii, pp. 347-352 ; Armstrong-, Charles V 
(London, 1902), ii, ch. i. 



6 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

petty pirates who continued to infest the Mediter- 
ranean until their extermination in the nineteenth cen- 
tury. Many of them were European renegades, and 
they devoted themselves more exclusively to piratical 
cruising, while the civil government fell into the hands 
of the Turks. Until 1671 the rulers of Algiers were 
appointed by the sultan or under his control, but 
from that time a dey was elected by the janizaries 
from their own number, and any common soldier was 
eligible. The dey had despotic power, but was likely 
at any time to be deposed and assassinated. Few deys 
died a natural death ; they followed each other in 
rapid succession, and it was a long story of anarchy 
and bloodshed. In Tunis after 1705 the ruler, called 
bey, was elected by the soldiery. Tripoli became par- 
tially independent of the sultan in 1714 and was 
ruled by a pasha. Morocco was, and still continues 
to be, a sovereign power governed by a sherif or 
emperor, now usually called sultan, who is an abso- 
lute monarch. The Morocco pirates generally cruised 
in the Atlantic, and Sallee was their chief port, but, 
owing to its shallow harbor, their vessels were built 
small and light, so that their operations were on a 
smaller scale. They became unusually active toward 
the end of the eighteenth century. 1 

In 1609 the final expulsion of the Moriscos from 
Spain greatly recruited the strength of the Barbary 
States. The corsairs not only scoured the sea, but 
often raided the coasts of Italy, Spain, and the various 
Mediterranean islands, sometimes advancing consider- 
able distances inland, robbing houses and villages and 
carrying off the inhabitants into slavery. As late as 
1798 an expedition from Tunis landed on an island 
1 Poole, eh. xv ; also pp. 22, 262, note. 



WHITE SLAVERY IN THE BARBARY STATES 7 

off the coast of Sardinia and kidnapped nearly a thou- 
sand people, mostly women and children. Many of the 
pirates of the seventeenth century grew immensely 
and rapidly rich upon the plunder thus seized and the 
ransom of their captives. 1 With increasing boldness 
they extended their piracies into the ocean and along 
the European coast as far as the North Sea and even 
to Iceland. They ravaged the shores of England and 
Ireland, and seizing unsuspecting inhabitants bore 
them away into captivity. 2 Later, when better pro- 
tection was afforded on the coast, that is after 1636, 
" those pirates still continued to take prizes in the 
ocean ; and carrying their English captives to France, 
drove them in chains overland to Marseille, to ship them 
thence, with greater safety, for slaves to Algiers." 3 

England sent expeditions against Algiers in 1620 
and against Sallee in 1637, which succeeded in liber- 
ating a number of slaves, and in 1655 Cromwell sent 
a fleet under Admiral Blake which chastised both Al- 
giers and Tunis. The Algerines made several treaties 
with England, but quickly broke them. In 1661 the 
Dutch Admiral de Ruyter succeeded in releasing sev- 
eral hundred captives ; and in 1682 and the following- 
year the French under Duquesne bombarded Algiers, 
inflicting severe punishment. 4 

After this there were various demonstrations from 
time to time, but no serious attempt was made to sub- 
due the pirates until 1775, when another great naval 
and military armament for the reduction of Algiers 
was fitted out in Spain under the command of Count 



1 Poole pp. 201-20.-, ; Eaton, p. 100. 

2 Poole, ]>. 233 ; Sumner, p. 36. 

8 Carte, History of England (London, 1747), iv, 
4 Sunnier, pp. :»G-4G. 



231. 



8 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

O'Reilly. This expedition is of interest to us from the 
fact that Joshua Barney, later a gallant figure in our 
naval annals, took part in it. At that time a boy of 
sixteen, he was returning from the Mediterranean in 
command of a ship bound for Baltimore. On putting 
into Alicante he was impressed into the Spanish serv- 
ice with many other foreign shipmasters whose vessels 
were required as transports for the thirty thousand 
soldiers. The fleet of nearly four hundred vessels was 
commanded by Admiral de Castijon. Owing to mis- 
management, disagreement between O'Reilly and Cas- 
tijon and lack of support on the part of the navy, the 
expedition ended in defeat and disaster. 1 

Besides these warlike measures the redemption of 
slaves was procured with money raised by missions, 
contributions, and collections. Individuals and fami- 
lies sometimes impoverished themselves to ransom 
friends and relatives. The slaves sometimes attempted 
to escape, but generally without success, and when 
discovered were cruelly punished. Many remarkable 
escapes, however, are recorded. Among the captives 
at different times were some famous men, such as 
Cervantes, Vincent de Paul, and Arago the French 
astronomer. Cervantes made repeated attempts to 
escape and was finally ransomed. 2 

In the sixteenth century the vessels of the corsairs 
were called galleys, galleots, or brigantines, according 
to the size, the latter being the smallest, with twelve 
or fourteen banks of oars, each oar handled by one 
man. The typical galley was about one hundred and 
fifty feet long with fifty-four benches or banks, twenty- 
seven oars on a side, each pulled by from four to six 

1 Memoir of Commodore Joshua Barney (Boston, 1832), pp. 23-25. 

2 Sumner, pp. 1G-18, 46-07. 



WHITE SLAVERY IN THE BARBARY STATES 9 

men. The galleots were small galleys. The large gal- 
leys carried two hundred and seventy or more rowers, 
who with the officers, crew, and soldiers made a total 
of about four hundred. They were rigged with two 
masts and lateen sails which were spread when run- 
ning before the wind. The galley slaves who manned 
the oars were chained to the benches day and night, 
perhaps for six months at a time. On the bridge 
between the two rows of benches stood two boatswains 
with long whips, with which they scourged the bare 
backs of the rowers. During a long chase these 
wretches would be compelled to pull ten, twelve, or 
even twenty hours at a stretch. When one fell from 
exhaustion he was directly pitched overboard. This 
slavery might last many years, or for life. This de- 
scription applies to Christian galleys as well as to 
those of the corsairs of Barbary. The latter were 
manned by Christian slaves, the former by Moorish 
slaves or Christian convicts. Birth and rank gave no 
immunity ; a Knight of Malta might be chained along- 
side any vile scoundrel in the galley of an Algerine 
admiral, who, if captured, would be forced to man the 
oar of the victor. 1 

With the seventeenth century sail-power came more 
into use. Larger and heavier square-rigged vessels 
were built, and longer voyages on the ocean were then 
undertaken. These vessels were called galleon, po- 
lacca, caravel, galleasse, etc., according to size and 
other characteristics ; the last named was lateen rigged 
and a cross between the galley and the galleon. 2 

William Eaton, United States consul at Tunis, 
writing of the corsairs in 1799, says : " Their mode 
of attack is uniformly boarding. For this their ves- 

1 Poole, ch. xvi. 2 Ibid. ch. xvii. 



10 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

sels are peculiarly constructed. Their long lateen 
yards drop on board the enemy and afford a safe and 
easy conveyance for the men who man them for this 
purpose ; but being always crowded with men, they 
throw them in from all points of the rigging and from 
all quarters of the decks, having their sabres grasped 
between their teeth and their loaded pistols in their 
belts, that they may have the free use of their hands 
in scaling the gunnels or netting of their enemy. In 
this mode of attack they are very active and very des- 
perate. . . . Proper defenses against them are high 
nettings with chains sufficiently strong to prevent 
their being cut away, buckshot plentifully adminis- 
tered from muskets or blunderbusses, and lances. 
But it is always best to keep them at a distance, 
that advantage may be taken of their ignorance at 



manoeuvring:. 



1 



With the decline of the galley there was still occu- 
pation for the slaves ; in fact by far the larger num- 
ber had always been employed on shore. Their lot, 
while not so wretched as that of the galley slaves, was 
still bad enough. When captives were brought in, 
some were reserved by the dey for his own or the 
government service, while others were taken to the 
slave market and sold at public auction. The treat- 
ment of the slaves depended chiefly upon the dispo- 
sition of their master ; sometimes they had an easy 
time, but more commonly it was a hard, rough life. 
They did every kind of household drudgery and farm 
work. Next to the loss of freedom, the hardest thing 
to bear, no doubt, for the proud and sensitive, was the 
menial position, the contemptuous treatment by a bar- 
barian master and punishment for trivial or uninten- 

1 Eaton, pp. 92, 93. 



WHITE SLAVERY IN THE BARBARY STATES 11 

tional offense. The government slaves had the heavi- 
est labor, especially quarrying stone and dragging it 
to the city on trucks. At night they were locked up 
in the bagnios, or prisons. They had some privileges, 
however, and a few were allowed to keep taverns fre- 
quented by renegades and soldiers, and by this meaus 
might save enough to purchase their freedom. 1 Ac- 
cording to some accounts the treatment of slaves in 
Barbary was very commonly mild and humane. 2 

The attitude of Europe towards the Barbary States 
was cowardly and dishonorable from first to last. The 
action of the stronger powers was prompted largely by 
policy. In order to injure their enemies and to crush 
the commercial competition of their weak neighbors, 
they were willing to bribe and subsidize the corsairs, 
submitting to the indignity and dishonor of being 
tributary nations and encouraging a system of ruthless 
piracy and slavery. For two hundred and thirty years 
England sent consuls to Algiers who were forced to 
endure every insult and, if showing the least spirit, 
were recalled at the dictation of the dey and more 
obsequious substitutes sent with presents and friendly 
or apologetic letters. As late as the nineteenth cen- 
tury a Danish and a French consul were thrown into 
prison and made to labor with the slaves because of 
delay in paying tribute. 3 

There were English slaves in Algiers in 181G, when 
eighteen were liberated by Lord Exmouth ; 4 although 
these had presumably been captured under the flags 
of other nations. Even after Exmouth' s bombardment 
the insolence of the dey continued until the French 

1 Poole, ch. xviii. 

2 Sumner, pp. 119-129; Shaler, p. 77; Noah, p. 368. 
8 Poole, ch. xix. 4 Ibid. p. 299. 



12 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

conquest of 1830. In 1825 Sweden, Denmark, Portu- 
gal, and Naples were still paying annual tribute. 1 In 
1817 Tunisian pirates cruised in the English Channel 
and North Sea and captured vessels from Hamburg 
and other Hanse towns. 2 

1 Shaler, p. 39. 

2 Niles's Register, vol. xii, p. 334; vol. xiii, pp. 41, 95, 219. 



CHAPTER II 
AMERICAN CAPTIVES IN BARBARY 

We have records of American victims of the Barbary 
pirates during the colonial period. Two ships from 
Plymouth were seized in 1G25 in the English Channel 
and taken into Sallee. Several cases from Boston and 
neighboring- towns are mentioned, some of whom were 
ransomed and some died in slavery. Among them was 
Dr. Daniel Mason, a graduate of Harvard College, 
who sailed from Charlestown in 1678, was taken into 
Algiers, and never returned. 1 

But the real beginning of our troubles came after 
the peace of 1783, as soon as the pirates of the Medi- 
terranean had learned to recognize the new flag as 
that of a young, weak power likely to fall an easy 
prey to their cruisers. 

In October, 1784, the American brig Betsey, Captain 
James Erving, bound to Teneriffe, was captured by 
a corsair of Morocco and taken into Tangier. The crew 
were not enslaved, and after being held six months 
were released with the vessel. The emperor of Morocco 
expressed a wish for friendly relations with the United 
States, and gave orders that no other American ves- 
sels should be molested until there should be time to 
hear from Congress on the subject of negotiations for 
peace. 2 ^ 

July 25, 1785, the schooner Maria of Boston, 
Captain Isaac Stevens, bound to Cadiz, was captured 

1 Sumner, pp. 07-70. 2 Blyth, pp. 41-43. *"- — ^_ 






14 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

off Cape St. Vincent by an Algerine xebec of four- 
teen guns, and on the 30th of the same month the 
ship Dauphin of Philadelphia, Captain Richard 
O'Brien, was taken about fifty leagues west of Lisbon. 
Both vessels with their crews, numbering twenty-one 
in all, were carried into Algiers. James L. Cathcart, 
a seaman on the Maria, says : " I understood the 
Spanish language, which they all spoke, and was the 
only person on board who had any knowledge of the 
Barbary States. . . . We were welcomed on board 
[the xebec] by the Rais, or Captain, a venerable old 
Arab, who . . . informed me that they were a cruiser 
of Algiers, that they had come through the Straits in 
consequence of their having concluded a peace with 
Spain and of the arrival of a British consul, Charles 
Logie, who informed them that they might take all 
such vessels that had not passports of a particular 
cut." After much ill treatment and hardship they 
arrived at Algiers August 4. They were stripped, 
given filthy rags to wear, and marched through the 
streets. Later they were taken before the dey, Mo- 
hammed by name, and were put to work at various 
sorts of labor. 1 

The captives, soon after their arrival, addressed an 
appealing letter to the American consul at Cadiz set- 
ting forth their condition, stripped of their clothes 
and treated with barbarity ; and they besought the 
consul's influence in obtaining for them an allowance 
for extra supplies and an early ransom. A second 
letter, written six months later by O'Brien to a com- 
mercial house of Lisbon, reports their being well pro- 
vided for by the French and Spanish consuls. This 
was in consequence of the intercession in their behalf 
1 Blyth, p. 47 ; Nav. Chron. p. 37 ; Cathcart, I, cli. i. 



AMERICAN CAPTIVES IN BARBARY 15 

of the United States ministers, Jefferson and Car- 
michael, at the courts of Versailles and Madrid. The 
captains had their own table and each had a small iron 
ring on one leg as a badge of slavery. The men worked 
at various trades and were allowed fifteen ounces of 
bread daily. 1 

After making peace with Spain, Algiers went to 
war with Portugal, and the latter power kept the Straits 
of Gibraltar closed against Algerine cruisers, so that 
American vessels in the Atlantic were safe from the 
corsairs. Few Americans entered the Mediterranean, 
and those that did were generally protected by the 
Dutch, Portuguese, or Spanish cruisers. Sometimes 
Americans had forged or purchased passes, so that 
the Algerines could not distinguish them from English 
vessels, with which they dared not interfere. These 
passes were given to the vessels of nations having 
treaties with Algiers. They were inscribed with Arabic 
characters, and the corsairs tested their genuineness 
by means of a stick with notches corresponding to 
engraved figures on the margin of the pass. 2 

In 1793 a truce for one year between Portugal and 
Algiers was suddenly concluded through the influence 
of the English consul at Algiers, for the express pur- 
pose, as it is alleged, of allowing the Algerines to 
cruise against Americans. In consequence of this, 
four frigates, three xebecs, and a brig, comprising 
nearly the whole cruising strength of the Algerine 

1 Blyth, pp. 48, 51, 52. Several other captures of Americans at about 
the same time, some of whom escaped, are reported by Blyth (pp. 42, 
41. 59, 62), but apparently on unreliable authority, as they are not 
accounted for in the returns of captives finally liberated. See also 
Boston Independent Chronicle, Oct. 20, 1785, April 27, 178G, Oct. 16, 
1788 ; Amer. Museum, viii (Phila., 171*0), appendix iv, pp. 4, 28. 

2 Carey, p. 34. 



16 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

navy, passed through the Straits in search of prey. 
Eleven American vessels with one hundred and nine 
officers and men were captured in October and No- 
vember, 1793, and taken into Algiers. After this the 
courts of Lisbon and Madrid, for the protection of 
their trade with the United States, granted convoys to 
American vessels homeward bound to a certain lati- 
tude where they were beyond the reach of the pirates. 1 

October 8, 1793, the first of these later captures 
of Americans were made, — the ships Thomas and 
Hope and the schooner Despatch, and on the 11th 
the brigs George, Olive Branch, and Jane were taken, 
followed the next day by the schooner Jay. On the 
18th the ship Minerva, Captain John McShane, of 
Philadelphia, was captured off Gibraltar by a xebec 
of twenty guns, and on the 23d the ship President, 
Captain William Penrose, also of Philadelphia, was 
taken off Cadiz. The last two victims were the brigs 
Polly of Newburyport and Minerva of New York, the 
latter being captured November 23. 2 

Letters from McShane and Penrose describe their 
capture and captivity. The President, within a few 
hours' sail of Cadiz, fell in with a xebec of sixteen 
guns under Spanish colors and showed her American 
flag. When within gunshot the xebec hauled down 
her Spanish colors and hoisted the Algerine flag. 
They lowered a boat, boarded the President, and at 
once proceeded to loot the ship. They threw the crew 
down and stripped them of all their clothes, fighting 
savagely among themselves over the booty. The Ameri- 
cans were afterwards given a few dirty rags to put on. 

1 Nav. Chron. pp. 40-51 ; Carey, pp. 34, 35 ; Stephens, p. f>S. 

2 Nav. Chron. p. 53 ; St. Pap. x, p. 338 ; Stephens, p. (59 ; Foss, 
pp. 71-75. 



AMERICAN CAPTIVES IN BARBARY 17 

They were tumbled and kicked into the boat, taken 
aboard the pirate, and brought before the commander, 
Rais Mahomet, an infirm old man described as " an 
emaciated, loathsome figure." Nearly one hundred and 
fifty Algerines were crowded into this small vessel, 
which was filthy in the extreme and swarming with 
vermin. They arrived at Algiers October 30 and were 
ordered to the Bagnio Baleck. 1 

The narrative of John Foss, seaman on the brig 
Polly of Newburyport, bound for Cadiz, is interesting. 
October 25, 1793, the Polly was overhauled by a 
brig flying the British flag. " When she came near 
enough to make us hear, she hailed us in English, 
asked from whence we came and were bound, which 
was immediately answered by Captain Bayley. The 
man who hailed us was dressed in the Christian habit 
and he was the only person we could yet see on her 
deck. By this time the Brig was under our stern ; we 
then saw several men jump upon her poop to hall aft 
the main sheet and saw by their dress and their long 
beard that they were Moors or Algerines. Our feel- 
ings at this unwelcome sight are more easily imagined 
than described. She then hove too under our lee, when 
we heard a most terrible shouting, clapping of hands, 
huzzaing, &c, and saw a great number of men rise up 
with their heads above the gunnel, drest in the Turk- 
ish habit like them we saw on the poop. They im- 
mediately hoisted out a large launch and about one 
hundred of the Pirates jumped on board, all armed, 
some with Scimitres and Pistols, others with pikes, 
spears, lances, knives, &c. They manned about 20 

1 Carey, pp. 37, 39 ; Stephens, pp. 244-24S. See also letters of Cap- 
tains Newman and Smith of the Thomas and I'olly in Mrs.E. V.Smith's 
History of Newhuryport (1854), pp. 146, 147. 



18 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBAKY CORSAIRS 

oars and rowed alongside. As soon as they came on 
board onr vessel they made signs for us all to go for- 
ward, assuring us in several languages that if we did 
not obey their commands they would immediately 
massacre us all. They then went below into the cabin, 
steerage and every place where they could get below 
deck and broke open all the Trunks and Chests there 
were on board, and plundered all our bedding, cloath- 
ing, books, Charts, Quadrants and every moveable 
article that did not consist of the Cargo or furniture. 
They then came on deck and stripped the cloathes 
off our backs, all except a shirt and pair of drawers." 
The prisoners were then transferred to the corsair, 
where they found three of the crew of the ship Hope 
of New York, which had been captured several days 
before. 1 

They arrived at Algiers November 1, and were 
landed and " conducted to the Dey's palace by a guard, 
and as we passed through the streets our ears were 
stunned with the shouts, clapping of hands, and other 
acclamations of joy from the inhabitants, thanking 
God for their great success and victories over so many 
Christian dogs and unbelievers." The dey at this 
time was Hasan Pasha, his predecessor, Mohammed, 
having 1 died in 1791. When brought before him he 
" told us he had sent several times to our Government, 
entreating them to negociate with him for a peace and 
had never received any satisfactory answer from 
them. And that he was determined never to make a 
peace with the United States, in his reign, as they had 
so often neglected his requests and treated him with 
disdain, adding, ' Now I have got you, you Christian 
dogs, you shall eat stones.' He then picked out four 
1 Foss, pp. 3-9. 



AMERICAN CAPTIVES IN BARBARY 19 

boys to wait upon himself . . . and then ordered the 
rest of us to be conducted to the prison Bilic. When 
we arrived there we found several other Americans " 
and about six hundred Christian slaves of other na- 
tionalities "with wretched habits, dejected counte- 
nances and chains on their legs." After their names 
had been entered in the prison book, each man was 
given a blanket, a scanty supply of coarse clothing, 
and a small loaf of black, sour bread. They spent 
the night wrapped in their blankets on the stone 
floor. 1 

On the day after their arrival the captives were 
loaded with chains of twenty-five to forty pounds in 
weight fastened to a ring about the ankle, the other 
end being bound around the waist. They were then 
put at various sorts of labor. When there were no 
foreign vessels in port and there was no chance of 
escape, the slaves were relieved of their chains while 
at work, unless they were kept on as punishment for 
some misdemeanor. Many were employed in rigging 
and fitting out cruisers, discharging prizes, transport- 
ing the cargoes and other goods about the city, which, 
on account of the extreme narrowness of the streets, 
could be carried only by means of poles on their 
shoulders. Blocks of stone were carried from the 
mole to a new mosque the dey was building ; these 
were suspended from wooden frames borne by four 
men, and for any but the strongest the load was ex- 
cessive. Others were employed in blasting rocks in 
the mountains. Fragments weighing from twenty to 
forty tons were rolled down to the bottom of the 
mountain and placed upon heavy carts or sleds. These 
were drawn by teams of two hundred or more men to 
1 Foss. pp. 13-17. 



20 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

a quay about two miles distant, whence they were 
transported on scows to the mole for the construction 
of a breakwater. This labor occupied the largest 
number of the slaves and was the severest that was 
imposed upon them ; and they were cruelly beaten 
and driven by their overseers. 1 

There were about twelve hundred Christian slaves 
in Algiers at this time. Those in the government 
employ, as all the Americans seem to have been, wore 
an iron ring on the ankle, which was the badge of 
public service and protected the wearer from insult 
and abuse by the Turkish soldiers. Their daily ration 
was three small loaves of black bread with a little 
vinegar. The bagnio in which they were confined at 
night is thus described by Cathcart : " The Bagnio 
Belique is an oblong hollow square, 140 feet in length 
and 60 in breadth, is three stories high and may be 
about 50 feet high to the top of the terrace. . . . 
The lower story has no grating and is converted into 
taverns which are kept by the Christian slaves, who 
pay their rent and very high duties for permission to 
sell liquors and provisions in them. They are perfectly 
dark and in the day are illuminated with lamps, and 
when full of drunken Turks, Moors, Arabs, Christians 
and now and then a Jew or two . . . each singing or 
rather shouting in different languages, without the least 
connection, the place filled with the smoke of tobacco 
which renders objects nearly impervious to the view, 
some wrangling with the tavern keepers for more 
liquor and refusing to pay for it, . . . it must resemble 
the infernal regions more than any other place in the 
known world. . . . The second and third story of this 
dungeon is surrounded by a small corridor or gallery 
1 Stephens, pp. 71-77 ; Foss, pp. 19, 20, 28-30. 



AMERICAN CAPTIVES IN BARBAKY 21 

from whence are entrances into long, narrow rooms 
where the slaves sleep. They are hung in square 
frames one over another, four tier deep, and they 
repose as well as miserable wretches can he supposed 
to do who are swarming with myriads of vermin of 
all sorts, many nearly naked, and few with anything 
more than an old tattered blanket to cover them with 
in the depth of winter ; for those who have the means 
of subsistence either live in the tavern or little boxes 
called rooms, built of boards, hanging round the 
galleries, for which they pay the Regency from twelve 
to fifty-four masoons per month. . . . The whole 
building is covered with a terrace. ... It woidd be 
a great recreation to the slaves, especially in summer, 
were they permitted to walk or sleep there, but that 
is strictly prohibited." Cathcart kept a tavern for 
several years and was apparently able to lay by a con- 
siderable sum of money. 1 

For slight misdemeanors the punishment was the 
bastinado, which, as Cathcart relates, was inflicted as 
follows : " The culprit is thrown down on his face and 
by a pole six or eight feet long, with two loops of cord 
which are put about his ankles, his legs are held up by 
two men to present the soles of his feet ; his head and 
hands, tied behind, are secured by one of the Guard- 
ians, who sits upon his shoulders, [and] the Guardian 
Bashaw and his Myrmidons are each furnished with 
hoop-poles an inch or more in diameter ; two of them 
commence in very regular time to give him from one 
to five hundred blows, which are generally divided 
between the soles of his feet and the posterior. The 
culprit is then either put in chains, sent to labor, or to 
the hospital to be cured, according to circumstances." 
1 Foss, pp. 31-34; Stephens, p. 249; Cathcart, I, pp. 52-55, 136. 



22 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

For serious transgressions the offender might be be- 
headed, impaled, or burned alive. A slave who mur- 
dered a Mohammedan was cast off the walls of the city 
upon iron hooks fastened into the wall, where he 
might hang suspended for days before he perished. 1 

The Americans were generally well behaved, yet 
were often severely punished for trivial offenses. All 
had their heads close-shaven and were not allowed a 
cap or other covering. When sick the slaves were sent 
to a hospital maintained by Spanish priests, where 
they were well treated, but could be removed at any 
time and sent back to work, which often happened 
before they were in a fit condition. The government 
authorities tolerated the hospital as it cost them 
nothing and saved the lives of many of their slaves. 
The plague raged in 1788, subsided the next year, 
broke out again in 1793, and continued as long as the 
American captives remained in Algiers. In an epi- 
demic of smallpox in 1794 four Americans died. 2 

The captives addressed letters and petitions to the 
President, to Congress, to the ministers of all denom- 
inations, and to Colonel David Humphreys, United 
States minister to Portugal, who in a letter to the 
American people suggested a lottery as the means of 
raising the necessary funds for the ransom of their 
fellow countrymen. Humphreys, having deposited a 
sum of money with the American consul at Alicante 
in December, 1793, arranged to have it distributed to 
the captives through the Swedish consul, Mr. Skjol- 
debrand. The captains received eight dollars each per 
month, the mates six, and the men three dollars and 

i Cathcart, I, p. 70 ; Foss, pp. 23-26. 

2 Foss, pp. 21, 22, 56 ; Stephens, p. 200 ; Carey, p. 44 ; Cathcart, 1, 
pp. 112, 136, 137. 



AMERICAN CAPTIVES IN BARBARY 23 

seventy-five cents. They were also provided with ad- 
ditional clothing-. This was a great Loon to the slaves 
and enabled them to procure extra food and a few 
other small comforts. 1 

The dey at first refused to consider the question 
of peace with the United States, but finally yielded, 
and in July, 1795, the captives were cheered by the 
news that Joseph Donaldson was on his way to Algiers 
for the purpose of negotiating with that potentate. 
Donaldson arrived September 3 ; on the 5th a treaty 
was concluded, and the American flag was given a 
salute of twenty-one guns. The overjoyed slaves now 
looked forward to speedy emancipation. In this, how- 
ever, they were disappointed, for long delay in raising 
the money for their ransom kept them still in cap- 
tivity. They were greatly disheartened, but somewhat 
encouraged in February, 1796, on receiving a sympa- 
thetic letter from Colonel Humphreys, and in March 
Joel Barlow arrived to assist in the negotiations. The 
dey became very impatient at the delay, and made 
dire threats of renewed hostilities and j)iracy. Finally 
Barlow succeeded in procuring the necessary funds 
from a Jew named Bacri, a merchant in Algiers. 2 

Meanwhile the plague had carried off many of the 
Americans, and the numbers were reduced to eighty- 
five. The custom was that for all slaves dying after 
the conclusion of a treaty ransoms were paid just 
the same, and the dey exacted the stipulated amount 
for all the Americans who died after the 5th of 
September, 1795. 3 

At last, on the 13th of July, 1796, the ransomed 

1 Blyth, pp. 09-71 ; Sumner, pp. 78-82; Stephens, p. 260; Foss, 
pp. 54, 55 ; Nav. Chron. pp. 51, 52. 

2 Foss, pp. 52, 53, 5S-65. 3 Stephens, pp. 87, 249. 



24 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

slaves set sail for Leghorn, in the ship Fortune, a 
vessel owned by Bacri. On account of a fresh out- 
break of the plague on board the ship, they put into 
Marseilles, where they were quarantined for eighty 
days. From this point the survivors found their way 
home. 1 

1 Foss, pp. GO, 67. 



CHAPTER III 

FIRST NEGOTIATIONS 

Trouble with Barbary, as a result of the loss of 
British protection, was early foreseen. In the plan 
of a treaty with France which Congress agreed upon 
September 17, 1776, one article provided that the 
king should protect the inhabitants of the United 
States against all attacks on the part of the Barbary 
cruisers. 1 The American commissioners to France 
were unable, however, to get this inserted in the Treaty 
of Amity and Commerce of February 6, 1778, but in 
accordance with Article vin of that treaty the king 
" will employ his good offices and interposition with " 
the Barbary States " for the benefit, conveniency 
and safety of the said United States . . . against all 
violence, insult, attacks, or depredations." 2 

A few months later the commissioners, Benjamin 
Franklin, Arthur Lee, and John Adams, requested the 
king's ffood offices in behalf of certain American ves- 
sels then in Italy and in fear of Barbary pirates. This 
led to a correspondence with the Comte de Vergennes, 
minister of foreign affairs, and M. de Sartine, min- 
ister of marine, as to the best policy to be pursued by 
the United States towards the Barbary powers. The 
result was that by the advice of the ministers the com- 
missioners applied to Congress for authority to treat 
with the Barbary powers and for funds to be expended 

1 Seer. Jour, ii, pp. 10, 28 ; Davis, p. 30. 

2 See Appendix II. 



26 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

in presents. No further steps were taken at that 
time. 1 

The emperor of Morocco showed a friendly dispo- 
sition, and claimed to have been the first sovereign to 
recognize the independence of the United States. He 
opened his ports to American vessels, and expressed a 
wish for a treaty of peace with the new republic. His 
overtures were made through M. Caille, a resident of 
Sallee, who corresponded with Franklin and Jay on 
the subject. In 1783 Franklin received letters from 
M. Crocco, another agent of the emperor, to the same 
effect. 2 The lack of response on the part of Congress 
to these advances may have been in some degree an- 
swerable for the seizure of the brig Betsey in 1784. 

British jealousy of the rising commerce of the 
United States was not unnatural, and was shown in 
the defeat in parliament of a bill introduced by Pitt 
in 1783, which provided for free trade between the 
two countries. Lord Sheffield published a pamphlet 
on American commerce, aimed at this bill, which is 
a strong protectionist argument, as will appear from 
the following : " It is not probable the American States 
will have a very free trade in the Mediterranean ; it 
will not be the interest of any of the great maritime 
powers to protect them there from the Barbary States. 
If they know their interests, they will not encourage 
the Americans to be carriers — that the Barbary States 
are advantageous to the maritime powers is obvious. 
If they were suppressed, the little States of Italy, &c. 
would have much more of the carrying trade. The 

1 Stephens's Facsimile MSS. (London, 1895), xxiii, nos. 1953, 1972, 
1978 ; Dipl. Corr. Rev. i, pp. 431, 453, 462, 465, 484, 491 ; iii, 
p. 92. 

2 Dipl. Corr. Rev. iii, p. 92 ; iv, pp. 135, 176, 179 ; vii, pp. 389- 



FIRST NEGOTIATIONS 27 

French never shewed themselves worse politicians than 
in encouraging the late armed neutrality. . . . The 
armed neutrality would be as hurtful to the great mari- 
time powers as the Barbary States are useful. The 
Americans cannot protect themselves from the latter ; 
they cannot pretend to a navy." 1 

Franklin, while minister to France, received a letter 
from a certain M. Salva dated Algiers, April 1, 1783, 
which related the narrow escape of two American ves- 
sels which had recently sailed from Marseilles, adding : 
" Some secret enemies, whom I know, having given 
information to this Regency of their departure, nine 
armed ships immediately sailed to wait for them at 
Cape Palos. It is to be presumed that the Americans 
had passed the Straits." Franklin wrote to R. R. Liv- 
ingston, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, on the subject, 
July 25, 1783, as follows : " You will see by the en- 
closed copy of a letter I received from Algiers, the 
danger two of our ships escaped last winter. I think 
it not improbable that those rovers may be privately 
encouraged by the English to fall upon us and to pre- 
vent our interfering in the carrying trade ; for I have 
in London heard it is a maxim among the merchants, 
that if there were no Algiers, it loould be worth Eng- 
land's while to build one. I wonder, however, that the 
rest of Europe do not combine to destroy those nests 
and secure commerce from their future piracies." 2 

Concerning the importance of peace with the Barb- 
ary States, John Adams, at that time peace commis- 
sioner in Paris, wrote to the President of Congress 
September 10, 1783 : " There are other Powers with 

1 Commerce of the American States (2d ed. London, 1783), p. 115, 
note. 

2 Dipl. Corr. Rev. iv, pp. 95, 149. 



28 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

whom it is more necessary to have Treaties than it 
ought to be ; I mean Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and 
Tripoli. ... If Congress can find funds to treat with 
the Barbary Powers, the Ministers here are the best 
situated. . . . Ministers here may carry on this nego- 
tiation by letters, or may be empowered to send an 
agent if necessary." 1 Congress accordingly issued a 
joint commission, May 12, 1784, to Adams, Franklin, 
and Jefferson, with David Humphreys, secretary, 
granting them or a majority of them, plenary power 
to negotiate treaties with various powers, including 
Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, and a year later 
authorized them to appoint agents for the purpose. 2 

The first employment of the commissioners appears 
to have been in behalf of the Betsey, captured by 
a cruiser of Morocco, when they addressed a letter, 
March 28, 1785, to Vergennes asking his advice and 
the interposition of the king with Morocco, in accord- 
ance with the treaty of 1778. They were advised to 
request the emperor to refrain from further interfer- 
ence with American commerce until Congress should 
have time to send him a consul. 3 Not long after this 
the Betsey and her crew were released through the 
friendly interposition of Spain. 4 Franklin soon re- 
turned to America, leaving Paris July 12, 1785, 
and was reported to have been captured by Algerine 
pirates on the way. 5 After his departure Adams and 
Jefferson, who was now minister to France, appointed 
Thomas Barclay, consul-general of the United States 

1 Dipl. Corr. Rev. vii, p. 161 ; Davis, p. 31. 

2 Dipl. Corr. U. S. i, p. 501 ; Seer. Jour, iii, p. 536. 

3 Dipl. Corr. U. S. i, pp. 560-573. 

4 Jefferson, i, pp. 385-392. 
Jefferson, i, p. 449. 



FIRST NEGOTIATIONS 29 

at Paris, to negotiate peace with Morocco, and he was 
commissioned October 5, 1785. His mission was 
entirely successful and satisfactory. He arrived in 
Morocco June 19, 178G, and within a month concluded 
a treaty 1 which contained very liberal principles, 
especially as to neutral rights and the exchange of 
prisoners. This treaty required ratification by the new 
emperor in 1795, and there were slight difficulties in 
1802, 1803, and 1804 ; with these exceptions there was 
no further trouble with Morocco. The expense, more- 
over, was small, being less than ten thousand dollars 
in presents at the outset and twenty thousand for the 
ratification in 1795 ; no tribute was paid. 2 Congress 
passed resolutions of thanks to the king of Spain for 
his interposition with Morocco in our behalf, and to 
Barclay for his services in procuring the treaty. 3 

The situation in Algiers was complicated by the 
capture of the Maria and Dauphin, and involved the 
question of ransom of the captives as well as of peace. 
These vessels were taken as a result of a peace con- 
cluded between Algiers and Spain, which allowed the 
Algerines to pass the Straits. July 19, 1785, only a 
few days before the first capture, William Carmichael, 
our charge d'affaires in Spain, wrote to Jefferson : 
" I am alarmed on account of the Algerines. Their 
peace with Spain has opened a large field to their 
piracies." 4 

The man appointed to the difficult task of negotiat- 

1 Appendix II. 

2 Dipl. Corr. U. S. i, pp. C5G, 057, 805, 814; ii, pp. 693, 694 et 
seq. ; St. Pap. x, p. 42 ; Lyman, Diplomacy of U. S. (Boston, 1S2S), ii, 
pp. 345-351. 

3 Seer. Jour, iv, pp. 367, 368. 

4 Dipl. Corr. U. S. i, p. 633. For other letters of Carmichael see 
iii, p. 299 et seq. 



30 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

ing with Algiers was John Lamb, who knew the 
country, having been engaged in the Barbary trade, 
and who had been recommended by Congress. He 
could speak only English, however, and appears not 
to have been well qualified for the work. Adams and 
Jefferson apparently had no great confidence in his 
ability, and sent with him a clerk named Randall, in 
whom they could trust. Lamb arrived in Algiers 
March 25, 1786, and had three interviews with the 
dey, Mohammed, who expressed admiration for Wash- 
ington and a desire for his portrait. His estimate of 
Washington's fellow countrymen in his power seems 
also to have been a high one, for when the question 
of ransom came up he declined to part with them for 
less than six thousand dollars apiece for three captains, 
one of whom had been a passenger on the Dauphin, 
four thousand each for two mates and two passengers, 
and fourteen hundred for each of the fourteen seamen, 
which with eleven per cent, added, according to cus- 
tom, made a total of nearly sixty thousand dollars, or 
an average of about twenty-eight hundred dollars a 
captive, while Lamb had authority to offer only two 
hundred. Under the circumstances, therefore, the 
best of agents must necessarily have failed. Lamb 
retired to Spain to wait for a better opportunity, which 
he thought might occur. He was urged by Adams 
and Jefferson to return to America in order to explain 
the situation to Congress ; but pleading ill health he 
declined to do this, or to report in person to them. 
He then resigned his office. 1 

1 Dipl. Corr. U. S. i, pp. G52, 656, 657, 661, 737, 773, 800, — pages 728 
to 756 relate chiefly to this subject ; see also iii, pp. 22-26 ; Nav. Chron. 
pp. 37, 38, 41 ; Jefferson, i, pp. 438, 569, 581 ; Schuyler, American 
Diplomacy (N. Y. 1001), pp. 205-207. 



FIRST NEGOTIATIONS 31 

It was commonly believed that the European powers 
and their representatives at Algiers were not only- 
indifferent to the success of our negotiations, but that 
most of them actively intrigued against it. Captain 
O'Brien, one of the captives, writing to Carmichael, 
June 24, 1790, says, on the authority of the vekil 
hadji, or secretary of foreign affairs : " That after 
the Americans had freed themselves from the British, 
that the British nation had demanded as a favor of 
this Regency, not to make a peace with the Americans, 
and that some time before the American ambassador 
[Lamb] came, the French [consul?] and Conde 
d'Espilly [Spanish ambassador] tried all their in- 
fluence against the Americans' obtaining a peace." 
The vekil hadji expressed a warm desire for peace 
with the United States, stating that in that event he 
should expect as a present, for his private use, a 
twelve-gun schooner. Lamb found d'Espilly indiffer- 
ent and the French and English consuls polite. D'Es- 
pilly told Carmichael of intrigues on the part of the 
British consuls at Barcelona and Algiers, regarding 
which, in his letter to Jefferson of July 15, 1786, 
relating the circumstances, Carmichael says that it 
" must arise from the court, for their private charac- 
ters are good and they are men of liberal and humane 
principles." 1 

Concerning the attitude of France, Vergennes wrote, 
August 25, 178G, to M. Otto, the French charge 
d'affaires in the United States : " You can assure the 
Congress that the King will seize with eagerness all 
occasions to facilitate their good intelligence with the 
Barbary Powers. This assembly without doubt have 
been informed of the support that his Majesty affords 
1 For. Rel. i, pp. 118 ; Dipl. Corr. U. S. i, pp. 773, 801. 



32 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

to tbe American Commissioners who negotiate at 
Algiers and at Morocco ; the treaty which has been 
recently signed with this last Power, and which will 
probably be published in America, will be the best 
refutation of the suspicions which many public papers 
are willing to inspire against our system of policy." 1 
The friendly disposition of France was indicated a 
year earlier, when a letter from M. Soulanges, dated 
Toulon, July 14, 1785, just before the captures of 
Americans, was addressed to the consular authorities 
in French ports informing them that the Algerines 
were about to cruise against Americans, and saying : 
" I give you immediate advice of this circumstance, 
gentlemen, as well on account of the interest your 
place may have in the cruise of these vessels, as to 
enable you to give notice of it to American cap- 
tains." 2 

Early in 1786 Adams, then minister to England, 
had an interview with Abdurrahman, the Tripolitan 
ambassador in London, which he describes in a letter 
to John Jay, secretary of foreign affairs, dated Feb- 
ruary 17, 1786, in the course of which he says : " It 
is sufficient to say that his Excellency made many 
inquiries concerning America, the climate, soil, heat, 
cold, etc., and observed, 'It is a very great country, 
but Tripoli is at war with it? In return it was asked 
how there could be war between two nations when 
there had been no hostility, injury, insult, or pro- 
vocation on either side. His Excellency replied ' that 
Turkey, Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers and Morocco were the 
sovereigns of the Mediterranean ; and that no nation 

1 Dipl. Corr. U. S. i, p. 242. 

2 Sherburne, Life of John Paul Jones (New York, 1851), pp. 254, 
255, 270, 271. 



FIRST NEGOTIATIONS 33 

could navigate that sea without a treaty of peace with 
them.' " In another letter to Jay, five clays later, after 
discussing the probable cost of buying peace with the 
Barbary States, Adams says : " If it is not done, this 
war will cost us more millions of sterling money in 
a shox-t time, besides the miserable depression of the 
reputation of the United States, the cruel embarrass- 
ment of all our commerce, and the intolerable burthen 
of insurance, added to the cries of our countrymen in 
captivity. ... If a perpetual peace were made with 
these states, the character of the United States would 
instantly rise all over the world. Our commerce, navi- 
gation, and fisheries would extend into the Mediter- 
ranean. . . . The additional profits would richly repay 
the interest, and our credit would be adequate to all 
our wants." *■ 

At Adams's request Jefferson visited London, in 
order that they might confer together on the subject, 
and they had an interview with Abdurrahman. The 
result they reported to Jay, March 28, 1786, which was 
to the effect that, according to the Tripolitan, a perpet- 
ual peace, which would be best, because inviolable 
by future pashas and cheapest in the long run, would 
cost thirty-three thousand guineas, of which three 
thousand would be his own share. A treaty with 
Tunis would cost about the same, and for Algiers and 
Morocco he could not answer, but each of them would 
probably demand about twice that sum. This would 
make a total of about a million dollars, whereas Congress 
had appropriated only eighty thousand. Jay reported to 
Congress on the subject, May 29, 1786, that " it would 
be expedient to leave terms of treaty " to Adams and 

1 Dipl. Corr. U. S. ii, pp. 565-573; Adams, viii, pp. 372, 373. 
379. 



34 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

Jefferson, but they might not be able to borrow money 
in Europe ; therefore it would be better to inform the 
states of the amount needed and " that, until such 
time as they furnish Congress with their respective 
proportions of that sum, the depredations of those 
barbarians will, in all probability, continue and 
increase." 1 

This report illustrates the weakness of Congress 
under the Confederation and the poverty of the gov- 
ernment, which is again emphasized by Jay in a letter 
to Jefferson of December 14, 1786 : " If Congress 
had money to purchase peace of Algiers, or redeem 
the captives there, it certainly would, according to 
their present ideas, be well to lose no time in doing 
both. Neither pains nor expense, if within any toler- 
able limits, should be spared to ransom our fellow 
citizens ; but the truth is, that no money is to be ex- 
pected at present from hence, nor do I think it would 
be risdit to make new loans until we have at least 
some prospect of paying the interest due on former 
ones. J 

About this time there was talk of its being neces- 
sary to send an ambassador to Constantinople to make 
a treaty with the sultan as a preliminary to peace 
with the Barbary States, or at least to facilitate that 
object. Jefferson therefore obtained the opinion of 
Vergennes on the subject, which he communicated to 
Jay May 23, 1786, and which was to the effect that 
a treaty with the porte would be very expensive and 
" would not procure us a peace at Algiers one penny 
the cheaper." 3 

1 Dipl. Corr. U. S., i, pp. 604-608. 

2 Ibid. p. 811. 

3 Jefferson, i, p. 575. 



FIRST NEGOTIATIONS 35 

Adams and Jefferson held radically different views 
as to the attitude that should be assumed toward the 
Barbary States. The former favored a policy of peace 
with the payment of tribute, while Jefferson preferred 
war. Adams wrote to Jay, December 15, 1784 : 
" Some are of opinion that our trade in the Mediter- 
ranean is not worth the expense of the presents we 
must make the piratical states to obtain treaties with 
them. Others think it humiliating to treat with such 
enemies of the human race, and that it would be more 
manly to fight them. The first, I think, have not cal- 
culated the value of our Mediterranean trade. . . . 
The last have more spirit than prudence. As long as 
France, England, Holland, the Emperor, etc., will 
submit to be tributaries to these robbers, and even 
encourage them, to what purpose should we make war 
upon them ? The resolution might be heroic, but would 
not be wise. The contest would be unequal. They can 
injure us very sensibly, but we cannot hurt them in 
the smallest degree. . . . Unless it were possible, 
then, to persuade the great maritime powers of Eu- 
rope to unite in the suppression of these piracies, it 
would be very imprudent for us to entertain any 
thoughts of contending with them, and will only lay 
a foundation, by irritating their passions and increas- 
ing their insolence and their demands, for long and 
severe repentance." * 

Jefferson wrote to John Page, August 20, 1785 : 
" You will probably find the tribute to all these pow- 
ers make such a proportion of the federal taxes as that 
every man will feel them sensibly when he pays those 
taxes. The question is, whether their peace or war will 
be cheapest? But it is a question which should be 

1 Adams, viii, p. 218. 



36 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

addressed to our honor as well as our avarice. Nor does 
it respect us as to these pirates only, but as to the 
nations of Europe. If we wish our commerce to be free 
and uninsulted, we must let these nations see that we 
have an energy which at present they disbelieve. The 
low opinion they entertain of our powers cannot fail 
to involve us soon in a naval war." * 

In the summer of 1786 Adams and Jefferson car- 
ried on an interesting correspondence. Adams wrote 
to Jefferson, July 3, as follows : " I lay down a few 
simple propositions. 1. We may at this time have 
peace with them, in spite of all the intrigues of the 
English or others to prevent it, for a sum of money. 
2. We shall never have peace, though France, Spain, 
England, and Holland should use all their influence 
in our favor, without a sum of money. 3. That neither 
the benevolence of France, or the malevolence of 
England, will be ever able materially to diminish or 
increase the sum. 4. The longer the negotiation is 
delayed, the larger will be the demand. From these 
premises, I conclude it to be wisest for us to negotiate 
and pay the necessary sum without loss of time. . . . 
Give me your opinion of these four propositions. . . 
Perhaps you will say, fight them, though it should 
cost us a great sum to carry on the war. ... If this 
is your sentiment, and you can persuade the southern 
States into it, I dare answer for it that all from Penn- 
sylvania, inclusively northward, would not object. It 
would be a good occasion to begin a navy. . . . The 
policy of Christendom has made cowards of all their 
sailors before the standard of Mahomet. It would be 
heroical and glorious in us to restore courage to ours. 
I doubt not we could accomplish it, if we should set 
1 Jefferson, i, p. 401. 



FIRST NEGOTIATIONS 37 

about it in earnest ; but the difficulty of bringing our 
people to agree upon it, has ever discouraged me." 1 

To this Jefferson replied July 11 : " Our instruc- 
tions . . . having required us to proceed by way of 
negotiation to obtain their peace, it became our duty 
to do this. ... I acknowledge, I very early thought 
it would be best to effect a peace through the medium 
of war. . . . Of the four positions laid down in your 
letter of the 3d instant, I agree to the three first. . . . 
As to the fourth . . . this will depend on the inter- 
mediate captures ; if they are many and rich, the 
price may be raised ; if few and poor, it will be les- 
sened. However, if it is decided that we shall buy 
a peace, I know no reason for delaying the operation, 
. . . but I should prefer the obtaining it by war. 
1. Justice is in favor of this opinion. 2. Honor 
favors it. 3. It will procure us respect in Europe ; 
and respect is a safeguard to interest. 4. It will arm 
the federal head with the safest of all the instruments 
of coercion over its delinquent members. 5. I think 
it least expensive. 6. Equally effectual. I ask a fleet 
of 150 guns. ... So far, I have gone on the supposi- 
tion that the whole weight of this war would rest on 
us. But, 1. Naples will join us. . . . 2. Every prin- 
ciple of reason assures us that Portugal will join us. 
... I suppose then, that a convention might be 
formed between Portugal, Naples, and the United 
States, by which the burthen of the war might be 
quotaed on them, according to their respective wealth ; 
and the term of it should be, when Algiers should 
subscribe to a peace with all three, on equal terms." 2 

In reply to this Adams writes, July 31 : " Your 
favor of the 11th instant I have received. There are 
1 Adams, viii, pp. 406, 740. 2 Jefferson, i, pp. 591-593. 



38 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

great and weighty considerations urged in it in favor 
of arming against the Algerines, and, I confess, if 
our states could he brought to agree in the measure, 
I should be very willing to resolve upon external war 
with vigor, and protect our trade and people. The 
resolution to fight them would raise the spirits and 
courage of our countrymen immediately, and we might 
obtain the glory of finally breaking up these nests of 
banditti. But Congress will never, or at least not for 
years, take any such resolutions, and in the mean time 
our trade and honor suffers beyond calculation. We 
ought not to fight them at all, unless we determine to 
fight them forever. This thought, I fear, is too rugged 
for our people to bear. To fight them at the expense 
of millions, and make peace, after all, by giving more 
money and larger presents than would now procure 
perpetual peace, seems not to be economical. I agree 
in opinion of the wisdom and necessity of a navy for 
other uses, but am apprehensive it will make bad worse 
with the Algerines. I will go all lengths with you in 
promoting a navy, whether to be applied to the Alger- 
ines or not. But I think at the same time we should 
treat. Your letter, however, has made me easier 
upon this point. Nevertheless, to humble the Alger- 
ines, I think you have undercalculated the force neces- 
sary." * 

In his hopes of a perpetual peace Adams's confidence 
in the good faith of the Barbary States was not 
justified by their record in diplomatic history from the 
earliest times, and their subsequent relations with our 

1 Adams, viii, pp. 410, 411. In a footnote the editor, C. F. Adams, 
8ays : " The argument of Mr. Adams is one of expediency, drawn 
solely from the condition of the country at the moment." Subsequently 
Adams was a strong- supporter of the navy, as is well known. 



FIRST NEGOTIATIONS 39 

government showed that their idea of a treaty was 
a compact by which they were to abide just as long as 
it pleased them. This confidence was not shared by 
Jefferson, who in a letter to Monroe, May 10, 1786, 
in speaking of his interview with the Tripolitan 
ambassador, and the proposition to purchase peace of 
all the Barbary States, says : " The continuance of this 
peace will depend on their idea of our power to enforce 
it, and on the life of the particular dey, or other 
head of the government with whom it is contracted. 
Congress will, no doubt, weigh these circumstances 
against the expense and probable success of compel- 
ling a peace by arms." 1 Adams seems to have had the 
better appreciation of what was practicable in view 
of the empty treasury and the weakness of the gov- 
ernment, and Jefferson of what alone would be effect- 
ual in view of the sort of people with whom they had 
to deal. 

Jefferson's plan for using force was by means of 
a perpetual blockade by an international fleet. He 
had obtained the opinion of D'Estaing on the subject, 
who wrote to him May 17, 1786 : " I am convinced 
that, by blocking up Algiers by cross-anchoring and 
with a long tow, that is to say, with several cables 
spliced to each other, and with iron chains, one might, 
if necessary, always remain there, and there is no 
barbarian power, thus confined, which would not soon 
sue for peace. . . . Bombardments are but transi- 
tory. It is, if I may so express myself, like breaking 
glass windows with guineas. None have produced 
the desired effect against the barbarians. Even an 
imperfect blockade, were one to have the patience 
and courage to persist therein, would occasion a per- 
1 Jefferson, i, p. 5G5. 



40 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 



petual evil ; it would be insupportable in the long 
run." 1 

In his autobiography Jefferson says : " I was very 
unwilling that we should acquiesce in the European 
humiliation of paying tribute to those lawless pirates, 
and endeavored to form an association of the powers 
subject to habitual depredations from them. I accord- 
ingly prepared and proposed to their ministers at Paris, 
for consultation with their governments, articles of a. 
special confederation. . . . Portugal, Naples, the Two 
Sicilies, Venice, Malta, Denmark, and Sweden were 
favorably disposed to such an association, . . . and 
nothing was now wanting to bring it into direct and 
formal consideration but the assent of our Government 
and their authority to make a formal proposition. . . . 
But they were in no condition to make any such en- 
gagement. Their recommendatory powers for obtain- 
ing contributions were so openly neglected by the 
several states, that they declined an engagement which 
they were conscious they could not fulfill with punctu- 
ality ; and so it fell through." 2 Jefferson also describes 
his plan in a letter to Monroe, August 11, 1786, and 
goes on to say : " Were the honor and advantage of 
establishing such a confederacy out of the question, 
yet the necessity that the United States should have 
some marine force, and the happiness of this, as the 
ostensible cause of beginning it, would decide on its 
propriety. It will be said there is no money in the 
treasury. There never will be money in the treasury, 
till the confederacy shows its teeth. . . . Every ra- 
tional citizen must wish to see an effective instrument 

1 Dipl. Corr. U. S. i, p. 753 ; St. Pap. x, p. 54. 

2 Jefferson, i, pp. 65, 07, -where the plan is given in detail ; also iii, 
p. 104, and ix, pp. 307,424. 



FIRST NEGOTIATIONS 41 

of coercion, and should fear to see it on any other 
element than the water. A naval foree can never 
endanger our liberties, nor occasion bloodshed ; a land 
force would do both." 1 

Early in 1787 Jefferson had an interview with the 
general of the religious order of Mathurins on the 
subject of the redemption of the American captives. 
He entered into the project with zeal, and proposed to 
employ for the purpose his agents already on the spot. 
The consent of Congress was obtained and negotiations 
with the Mathurins began in September, 1787. It was 
considered necessary to keep the matter a profound 
secret, for if the concern of the United States in the 
transaction should become known, the Algerines would 
not only demand exorbitant ransoms, but future re- 
demptions by the order would be rendered more diffi- 
cult and expensive. " These ideas, suggested to him 
by the danger of raising his market, were approved by 
the minister plenipotentiary [Jefferson] ; because, this 
being the first instance of a redemption by the United 
States, it would form a precedent, because a high 
price given by us might induce these pirates to aban- 
don all other nations in pursuit of Americans ; whereas 
the contrary would take place, could our price of 
redemption be fixed at the lowest point." With the 
same object in view, an assumption of indifference 
and neglect on the part of the government was con- 
sidered expedient and the allowance which had been 
given the captives was withdrawn. As it was not 
thought safe to let them into the secret, they naturally 
complained bitterly of their abandonment. After Jef- 
ferson's departure from Paris in 1789, correspondence 
with the Mathurins was continued by William Short, 
1 Jefferson, i, p. COG. See also Ford's Jefferson, iv, pp. 10, 11, 80. 



42 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

charge d'affaires. Nothing ever came of the plan, 
however, for the dey persisted in demanding excessive 
ransoms ; and finally, after three years or more of vain 
effort and weary delay, the Revolution in France put 
an end to the negotiations by the abolition of the 
Mathurins with other religious orders. 1 

The adoption of the Constitution and the inaugu- 
ration of a stronger government in 1789 gave hope of 
more vigorous measures for the solution of this vexed 
problem, but even then Congress was slow to take 
decisive action. 

1 Dipl. Corr. U. S. ii, pp. 25, 86, 148, 182, 32-1 ; St. Pap. x, pp. 5G-67 ; 
Nav. Chxon. pp. 37— 13. 



CHAPTER IV 

PEACE WITH ALGIERS 

Owing to hopes of success attending the efforts of the 
Mathurins, and the secrecy necessary to be observed, 
it was not until the end of 1790 that the matter was 
made public, nor, in the mean time, were other mea- 
sures taken. On December 28 of that year, Jefferson, 
then secretary of state, made two reports : one to the 
President, on the situation at Algiers, called forth by 
a petition addressed to Congress by the captives ; the 
other to the House of Representatives, on Mediter- 
ranean trade. The first of these was transmitted to 
Congress two days later with a message from Presi- 
dent Washington. 1 

These documents cover the events already related in 
the preceding chapter. In the Mediterranean report 
Jefferson continues to advocate force, and repeats his 
recommendation of cooperation with other powers 
for the blockade of Algiers. This latter proposition, 
apparently, was never seriously considered, and on 
account of the convulsions in Europe, just beginning, 
would probably then have been impracticable. A 
vigorous policy, however, was beginning to win favor. 
On the 6th of January, 1791, the Senate committee 
on Mediterranean trade reported " that the trade of 
the United States to the Mediterranean cannot be 

1 These reports, with accompanying' documents, will he found in 
St. Pap. x, pp. 41, 56, and in For. Rel. i, pp. 100, 104, and the first also 
in Xav. Chron. p. '■'>!. 



44 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

protected but by a naval force ; and that it will be 
proper to resort to the same as soon as the state of the 
public finances will admit." * 

In March, 1791, the emperor of Morocco having 
died, Congress appropriated twenty thousand dollars 
for the purpose of obtaining from the new emperor 
recognition of the treaty made with his father. With 
this object, Thomas Barclay was appointed consul to 
Morocco, but on the way to his post he learned that 
there was a civil war in progi-ess in Morocco, the 
throne being in dispute between several sons of the 
late emperor. He therefore remained in Lisbon, await- 
ing a favorable opportunity. The war, however, proved 
a long one. At this time, all that could be done for 
the captives at Algiers was to renew their allowance, 
which was done through Colonel David Humphreys, 
the United States minister to Portugal. 2 

In Juby, 1791, Jefferson, still in the hope of being 
able to send a naval force against Algiers, wrote to 
Paul Jones, with the approval of the President, sug- 
gesting that he attempt to enlist the cooperation of 
Holland, and intimating that he would be chosen to 
command the American squadron, should one be sent. 
Jones met with little encouragement in Holland, and 
thought that it would be far better for the United 
States to act alone in the matter. He believed that 
Algiers could be brought to terms by a force of two 
frigates and two or three sloops-of-war. He had been 
deeply interested in the fate of the captives from the 
first, and in 1787 had suggested to John Jay that 
a fund be raised for their redemption by deducting 

1 For. Rel. i. p. MiS; Rep. Sen. Com. iv, p. 5. 

- St. Pap. x. pp. 254-260; For. Rel. i, p. 288; Rep. Sen. Com. iv, 
pp. 5, 6 ; NaT. Chron. pp. -14-46. 



PEACE WITH ALGIERS 45 

a shilling per month from seamen's wages throughout 
the country. 1 

February 22, 1792, the Senate favored paying one 
hundred thousand dollars annually for peace with 
Algiers, Tripoli, and Tunis, and forty thousand dollars 
ransom for the captives. May 8, in response to a 
message from the President of the same date, the 
Senate passed resolutions stating its readiness to ratify 
treaties with Algiers providing for peace at a cost of 
forty thousand dollars at the outset and annual tribute 
of twenty-five thousand ; and also for ransom of the 
captives, then thirteen in number, for forty thousand. 
Congress at once appropriated fifty thousand dollars 
for the expenses of the mission, and on June 1 Paul 
Jones was appointed envoy to treat for peace and 
ransom, and also consul at Algiers. Secrecy was 
considered of such importance that Jones's long and 
minute instructions were made out by Jefferson in his 
own handwriting. The following extracts will serve to 
bring out the attitude of the administration towards 
the question : " We have also understood that peace 
might be bought cheaper with naval stores than with 
money, but we will not furnish them with naval stores, 
because we think it is not right to furnish them the 
means which we know they will employ to do wrong 
and because there might be no economy in it as to 
ourselves in the end, as it would increase the expense 
of that coercion which we may in future be obliged to 
practice towards them. ... It has been a fixed prin- 
ciple with Congress to establish the rate of ransom of 
the American captives with the Barbary States at as 
low a point as possible, that it may not be the interest 

1 Buell, Paul Jones (New York, 1900), ii, pp. 285-287; Sherburne's 
Jones, p. 270. 



46 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

of these States to go in quest of our citizens in prefer- 
ence to those of other countries. Had it not been for 
the danger it would have brought on the residue of 
our seamen, by exciting the cupidity of these rovers 
against them, our citizens now in Algiers would have 
been long ago redeemed, without regard to price. The 
mere money for this particular redemption neither has 
been, nor is, an object with anybody here. It is from 
the same regard to the safety of our seamen at large, 
that they have now restrained us from any ransom 
unaccompanied with peace ; this being secured, we 
are led to consent to terms of ransom to which, other- 
wise, our government would never have consented." * 

The papers were intrusted to Thomas Pinckney, 
who was about to set out for Europe as minister to 
Great Britain, and who had authority to turn the busi- 
ness over to Barclay in case anything should prevent 
Jones's serving. On Pinckney's arrival in England 
he heard of Jones's untimely death in Paris on July 

18, 1792. Much time was lost in finding a trust- 
worthy messenger to convey the papers to Barclay 
and in accomplishing the journey for that purpose. 
Finally Barclay received his instructions and had 
made preparations for his mission to Algiers when he 
was suddenly taken sick in Lisbon and died January 

19, 1793. As soon as this became kuown to the 
administration, Humphreys was appointed ; but owing 
to further delays, due chiefly to the difficulty of the 
messenger in getting transportation to Lisbon, it was 
not until September, 1793, that he received his com- 
mission and instructions. He proceeded to Gibraltar, 
and while waiting for a passage to Algiers came the 

1 St Pap. x, pp. 260-268 ; For. Rel. vol. i, pp. 133, 136, 290 ; Rep. 
Sen. Com. viii, p. (i. 



PEACE WITH ALGIERS 47 

news of the truce with Portugal that resulted in the 
numerous captures of 1793. After this the dey posi- 
tively refused to receive our minister. Humphreys, 
foreseeing the danger to American commerce, at once 
dispatched a vessel to the United States to give warn- 
ing to merchants. 1 

It was the opinion of Colonel Humphreys, and of 
Edward Church, United States consul at Lisbon, that 
this truce was made through the influence of the Brit- 
ish consul at Algiers and without the authority of the 
Portuguese government, which, although desirous of 
peace, had intended first, according to the Portuguese 
secretary for foreign affairs, to give " timely notice 
to all their friends, that they might avoid the dangers 
to which they might otherwise be unavoidably exposed. 
. . . But the British Court, zealous overmuch for the 
happiness of the two nations, Portugal and Algiers, 
in order to precipitate this important business, very 
officiously authorized Charles Logie, the British con- 
sul-general and agent at Algiers, not only to treat, but 
to conclude, for and in behalf of this Court, not only 
without authority, but even without consulting it." 
Church says : " The conduct of the British in this 
business leaves no room to doubt or mistake their 
object, which was evidently aimed at us." Humphreys, 
however, was of the opinion that Logie had acted on 
his own responsibility. Pinckney was assured by Lord 
Grenville that England " had not the least intention 
or a thought of injuring us thereby ; that they had 
been applied to by their friend and ally the Court of 
Portugal to procure a peace for them with the Alger- 
ines, and that Mr. Logie had been instructed to use 

1 St. Pap. x, pp. 208-276 ; For. Rel. i, pp. 292-294 ; Nav. Chroa. 
pp. 47, 48. 



48 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

his endeavors to effect this purpose ; that he, finding 
the arrangements for a peace could not immediately 
take place, had concluded the truce ; that in this they 
conceived they had done no more than their friendship 
for a good ally required of them." 1 

Church took measures to warn American shipmas- 
ters in neighboring waters of their danger. He also 
obtained from the Portuguese government convoy for 
several vessels, but this, of course, could only be de- 
pended upon as an occasional arrangement, and, as 
Humphreys wrote to Jefferson, December 25, 1793 : 
" It appears absurd to trust to the fleets of Portugal, 
or any other nation, to protect or convoy our trade. 
If we mean to have a commerce, we must have a naval 
force, to a certain extent, to defend it." Captain 
O'Brien also wrote from Algiers, to the President, 
November 5 and to Humphreys December 6, strongly 
urging force as the only effectual means of securing 
immunity from the pirates. 2 

At last, informed of the added dangers to com- 
merce, the House of Representatives, January 2, 
1794, resolved by a majority of two " that a naval 
force, adequate to the protection of the commerce of 
the United States against the Algerine corsairs, ought 
to be provided." A bill was reported January 20 by 
the Committee of Ways and Means providing for the 
construction of six vessels at a cost of six hundred 
thousand dollars. The opponents argued that the 
finances of the country did not justify the expense, 
and that the public debt must first be discharged ; 

1 St. Pap. x. pp. 278-284, 305; For. Rel. i, pp. 295, 296; Nav. 
Chron. pp. 49, 50 ; Barlow, pp. 120, 121. 

- St. l'aj). x, pp. 284-291; for correspondence relating to the 
captures, see pp. 309-342; For. Rel. i, pp. 414-422; Nav. Ckron. 
pp. 51-53. 



PEACE WITH ALGIERS 49 

that we should follow the example of Europe by buy- 
ing peace, or should hire a European navy to protect 
our trade ; that a navy is a menace to liberty. The 
advocates of a navy predicted an improvement in the 
national finances resulting from the protection to com- 
merce and saving of insurance, and contended that 
the friendship of Algiers could not be relied upon, 
and that to subsidize a European navy was not con- 
sistent with national dignity. Madison opposed the 
bill partly on the ground that a navy would lead to 
international complications, particularly with Eng- 
land, and this opinion was shared by others. The bill 
passed the House by a vote of fifty to thirty-nine. 
Its passage, however, was only made possible by the 
insertion of a provision that in case of peace with 
Algiers all work on the frigates should stop. Having 
passed the Senate, it was approved March 27, 1794. 
The law authorized the President " to provide, by 
purchase or otherwise, equip and employ, four ships 
to carry forty -four guns and two ships to carry thirty- 
six guns each ; or ... in lieu of the six frigates, a 
naval force not exceeding, in the whole, that by this 
act directed, so that no ship thus provided should carry 
less than thirty-two guns ; or he may provide any 
proportion thereof, which in his discretion he may 
think proper." The full complement for each ship 
was prescribed, also the pay and ration. A subsequent 
act appropriated $688,888.82 to defray the expenses 
of the naval armament. 1 

This legislation is of special interest and import- 

1 Nav. Chron. pp. 53-5G ; Benton, Debates of Congress (New York, 
1857), i, pp. 473-4S2. The opposition to the navy was mostly from the 
South ; the representatives from Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and 
Connecticut were unanimously in favor of the hill. 



50 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

ance because it marks the beginning of the present 
navy, the Revolutionary navy having been allowed to 
lapse completely. The work was well begun, and the 
selection of Joshua Humphreys, a shipbuilder of Penn- 
sylvania, to design the ships, was a most fortunate 
one. He was a man of exceptional ability, and his 
views as to the type of ships most suitable at that 
time showed great wisdom. He had previously written 
a letter to Robert Morris, then in the Senate, on the 
subject, in which he proposed to build " such frigates 
as in blowing weather would be an over-match for 
double-decked ships, or in light winds may evade 
coming to action by out-sailing them; " and added : " If 
we build our ships of the same size as the Europeans, 
they having so great a number of them, we shall al- 
ways be behind them. I would build them of a larger 
size than theirs, and take the lead of them, which is 
the only safe method of commencing a navy." In his 
report of December 23, 1794, Humphreys says : " As 
soon as Congress had agreed to build frigates, it was 
contemplated to make them the most powerful, and, 
at the same time, the most useful ships. . . . From 
the construction of those ships, it is expected the 
commanders of them will have it in their power to 
engage, or not, any ship, as they may think proper ; 
and no ship, under sixty-four, now afloat, but what 
must submit to them." The secretary of war, Gen- 
eral Henry Knox, in whose department the work was 
done, the navy department not yet having been 
established, reported December 27, 1794 : " That the 
passing of the said act created an anxious solicitude 
that this second commencement of a navy for the 
United States should be worthy of their national 
character. That the vessels should combine such 



PEACE WITH ALGIERS 51 

qualities of strength, durability, swiftness of sailing, 
and force, as to render them equal, if not superior, to 
any frigate belonging to any of the European Powers." 
This policy of building the best ships of their class was 
thus begun and was followed until the period of the 
Civil War, and has been since, to a great extent. The 
line-of-battle ships, which composed the fighting 
strength of the navies of that day, were slow and 
unwieldy, and a fast frigate could keep out of their 
way. The resources of the United States at that time 
were not equal to the construction of the heavier and 
more expensive ships. 1 

Meanwhile efforts at making peace with Algiers 
were not abandoned. The number of captives had 
now been increased to a hundred and nineteen, and 
their redemption had become correspondingly difficult 
and expensive. The Swedish consul, Matthias Skjolde- 
brand, and his brother were much interested in the 
fate of the Americans. The consul, on account of his 
official position, felt obliged to keep himself in the 
background, but his brother, Pierre E. Skjoldebrand, 
thenceforth took an active part in the negotiations 
between the United States and Algiers. November 
13, 1793, the brothers wrote letters of sympathy and 
advice to Colonel Humphreys. One piece of advice 
was to break relations with a Jew merchant in Algiers, 
named Bassara, who had been employed by the Amer- 
icans as an agent and who was out of favor with the 
dey, and transfer the business to Bacri, another Jew. 
This was done and helped to facilitate matters. But 
the dey was indisposed to peace. He said : " If I were 
to make peace with everybody, what should I do with 
my corsairs? What should I do with my soldiers? 
1 Narr. and Crit. Hist, vii, p. 360 ; Nav. AS. i, pp. G, 8. 



52 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

They would take off ray head for want of other prizes, 
not being able to live upon their miserable allowance." 1 

Humphreys came back to America in 1794, and re- 
turned in April, the next year, to Lisbon with Joseph 
Donaldson, Jr., who had been appointed consul to 
Tunis and Tripoli and was to assist in the negotiations 
with Algiers. For peace and ransom Humphreys had 
been authorized, July 19, 1794, to spend eight hun- 
dred thousand dollars, and was later given minute 
instructions. Humphreys did not go to Algiers, but 
exercised a general supervision of affairs. He went to 
Paris in June, 1795, where he conferred with Monroe, 
the United States minister, received assurances of 
cooperation on the part of the French republic, and 
secured the services of Joel Barlow to assist in the 
negotiations. The dey persistently refused to receive 
any American minister or to treat for peace or ransom, 
but finally relented and Donaldson was sent over. 2 

Cathcart, one of the captives of 1785, was at this time 
secretary to the dey, Hasan Pasha, and appears to 
have had a good deal of influence with him. Accord- 
ing to his own account it was only through his persua- 
sion that the dey consented to receive Donaldson. 
As soon as he yielded, Skjoldebrand chartered a 
llagusan brig which sailed at once for Alicante, where 
Donaldson was waiting, and brought him over. He 
arrived at Algiers September 3, 1795. Cathcart 
gives an interesting account of the negotiations, in 
which he acted as a medium of communication between 
the dey and Donaldson, who had as advisers Skjolde- 
brand, O'Brien, and Bacri. The dey began with an 

1 St. Pap. x, pp. 313-318 ; For. Rel. i, pp. 414, 415. 

2 St. Pap. x, pp. 448, 449 ; For. Rel. i, pp. 528, 529, 553 ; Nav. Chron. 
pp. 62, 63 ; Davis, p. 33. 



PEACE WITH ALGIERS 53 

exorbitant demand and Donaldson with a rather 
modest offer, and both were obstinate. Donaldson was 
with great difficulty persuaded to increase his offer to 
a figure which the dey was finally induced to accept, 
as he said, to spite the English. The treaty was signed 
and the American flag saluted September 5. Then 
followed much discussion as to presents and other 
details, and at last O'Brien sailed September 11 
with the treaty to be delivered to Humphreys, and 
bearing a letter from Skjoldebrand, in which he says : 
" The Jew Bacri . . . has been the person who, in 
concert with Mr. Cathcart, have executed in public 
with the dey, the plans and directions on which Mr. 
Donaldson, in concert with me and Captain O'Brien, 
privately agreed ; and all have had their share of 
merit in removing all the difficulties invented by your 
enemies here, who have used all their endeavors, even 
with lies, to create in the dey an ill disposition towards 
the United States." The French consul was apparently 
one of these unfriendly persons. 1 

Humphreys was informed of the treaty while still in 
France, and did not get back to Lisbon until Novem- 
ber 17, where he found O'Brien with the document 
awaiting him. There was now great delay in procuring 
the funds necessary to carry out the stipulations. 
O'Brien was sent to London in the American brig 
Sophia for the money, and Barlow, who had already 
purchased a number of presents, went to Alicante to 
be ready to cross directly over to Algiers as soon as 
O'Brien returned. But owing to the disturbed condi- 
tion of European politics it was impossible to obtain 
coin in England, and O'Brien was obliged to return 
empty-handed. Both gold and silver could have been 

1 Cathcart, I, ch. x, xi, xii ; For. Rel. i, p. 530. 



54 OUR NAVY AND THi 7 , BARBARY CORSAIRS 

procured in Lisbon a little earlier, but Humphreys 
was then in Paris, and the opportunity was lost. 1 

Meanwhile the dey became very impatient and 
threatened to abandon the treaty and again to send 
out his cruisers against Americans. The captives also, 
who had expected prompt release, were becoming dis- 
heartened. Barlow then waited no longer, but pro- 
ceeded to Algiers, arriving March 5, 1796, with the 
hope of being able to soothe the dey. He, however, 
became more and more angry, and in April gave Bar- 
low and Donaldson eight days' notice to leave Algiers, 
declaring that he would send out his cruisers at the 
end of thirty days, if the money had not then been 
paid. Affairs seemed now to be in a very critical state, 
and the American envoys assumed the responsibility of 
offering the dey the additional present of a thirty-six 
gun frigate as the only chance of saving the treaty. 
This had the desired effect. The dey was mollified 
and granted further time. Donaldson then went to 
Leghorn to endeavor to raise a loan there. Cathcart 
was sent to America with letters from Barlow and the 
dey. At last Barlow succeeded in borrowing from 
Bacri a sum of money sufficient for the ransom. This 
money in reality belonged to the public treasury of 
Algiers ; it had been borrowed by the French consul, 
and deposited with Bacri, and was now taken with the 
knowledge of the dey. The captives were then hastily 
shipped off before the dey should have time to change 
his mind. Barlow says of these unfortunates, in a 
letter to the secretary of state : "Our people have 
conducted themselves in general with a degree of 
patience and decorum which would become a better 
condition than that of slaves." They were taken in the 
1 St. Pap. x. )>|). 440, 4.J9; Pickering, xxxvi, p. 46. 



PEACE WITH ALGIERS 55 

ship Fortune, belonging to Bacri, but under American 
colors, to Marseilles, where they were cared for by 
the United States consul, Stephen Cathalan, Jr. The 
Fortune, still under the American flag, was afterwards 
captured and condemned by the British. Thereupon 
Bacri, holding the flag responsible, demanded forty 
thousand dollars, for which Barlow was forced to give 
bonds. Cathalan sent most of the liberated captives 
home in the Swedish ship Jupiter, which arrived in 
the United States in February, 1797. * 

Humphreys, not wishing to assume the responsibility 
of the frigate to be presented to the dey, sent O'Brien 
to America in the Sophia to refer the matter to the 
government. Upon receiving the report, Timothy 
Pickering, secretary of state, wrote to Humphreys 
June 11, 1796 : " There appears no eligible alternative 
but to confirm the engagement of Messrs. Barlow and 
Donaldson." O'Brien returned to Lisbon in July. In 
the mean time Humphreys had succeeded in negotiating 
bills on London in Lisbon for two hundred and twenty- 
five thousand dollars. This was embarked on the 
Sophia, and O'Brien set sail for Algiers August 4. 
On the way he was captured by a. Tripolitan corsair 
and taken into Tripoli. Another American vessel 
was taken about the same time. The pasha of Tripoli 
was loath to give up such a rich prize, but he dared not 
disregard O'Brien's Algerine passport ; so after hold- 
ing him three weeks, he released him, and the Sophia 
arrived safely at Algiers in October. The treaty stipu- 
lations were now fulfilled, and the dey was so pleased 
that he offered to lend Barlow ninety thousand piastres 

1 St. Pap. x, pp. 450-453 ; For. Rel. i, pp. 553-555 ; Nav. Chron. 
pp.63, 04; Barlow, pp. 117, 120,125,129-136; Cathcart, I, pp. 265- 
207 ; Pickering-, x, pp. 117, 155; xxxvii, pp. 57, 150. 



56 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

(Spanish dollars) for the treaties with Tunis and 
Tripoli. Barlow remained in Algiers during the nego- 
tiation of these treaties, and finally took his departure 
the following summer. 1 

In the mean time the war in Morocco was brought 
to an end in 1795 by the victory of one of the aspir- 
ants to the throne, Muley Soliman, over his brothers. 
James Simpson, United States consul at Gibraltar, 
was at once sent over to obtain from the new em- 
peror recognition of the treaty made with his father. In 
this he was successful, and in December, 1795, the 
President received from the emperor an effusive letter 
to this effect. 2 

The treaty of peace and amity 3 with Algiers, of 
September 5, 1795, which was ratified by the Senate 
March 2, 1796, cost up to January, 1797, nearly a 
million dollars, including 1525,500 for ransom of the 
captives, various presents, and miscellaneous expenses ; 
this was exclusive of the annuity in naval stores, 
valued at something over twenty-one thousand dollars, 
according to the estimate, which afterwards proved to 
be far too low. Naval stores comprised ship-timber, 
spars, cordage, and many other articles for the use of 
ships. Presents were an important feature in dealing 
with these barbarians ; they were called usance, and 
were of three kinds, — a present of twenty thousand 
dollars with each new consul, biennial presents to 
government officers of about seventeen thousand, and 

1 St. Pap. x, p. 450; for details of the financial difficulties which 
hampered and delayed the negotiations, see Report of the Secretary 
of the Treasury, Jan. 4. 17 ( .»7, and accompanying- documents, St. 
Pap. s, pp. 453-463; Barlow, pp. 139-141, 148; Pickering, xxxvi, 
p. 108. 

2 St. Pap. x, pp. 403-408 ; Nav. Chron. p. 58. 
8 Appendix II. 



PEACE WITH ALGIERS 57 

incidental presents, which could not be estimated. 1 
The treaty was not so liberal as that with Morocco 
and was the only one with the Barbary States which 
stipulated the payment of tribute. This tribute, con- 
sisting of naval stores, and the frigate afterwards 
given, furnished the Algerines with means of waging 
war upon us and upon other Christian nations, but 
it was found impracticable to avoid this, and the posi- 
tion taken in the instructions to Paul Jones, already 
quoted, 2 could not be held. 

The page of our history recording these dealings 
with Algiers is not one to take pride in, and it is greatly 
to be regretted that the weight of opinion at that time 
was not in favor of the early and energetic employ- 
ment of force. It is now easy to see how such a course 
would have saved time and money and won respect. 
But to judge the question fairly it is necessary to look 
at it from the point of view of that time. Most of 
those who favored following the precedent of Europe 
by paying tribute to barbarians, and who opposed a 
navy, did what they thought was best for the country, 
and many of them were among the foremost public 
men of the day. 

On the ratification of the treaty, the provision of 
the act of March 27, 1794, that work on the ships 
should cease, took effect. President Washington, 
therefore, in a message to Congress, March 15, 1796, 
called attention to the loss and disadvantage that 
would result from abandoning the work already well 

1 St. Pap. x, ])p. 4.*>3-4C>3 ; Nav. Chron. p. 65 ; Davis, p. 34 ; Rep. 
Sen. Com. viii, p. 7 ; For. Rel. i, pp. ">4'.i, 555 ; iii, p. '.}'■). For details 
of expenses of intercourse with the Barbary powers at a later period, 
see Amer. State Papers, Misc., ii, pp. 20-45. 
2 See above, p. 45. 



58 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

advanced. Two days later a committee of the Senate 
reported that " it will be expedient to authorize the 
President of the United States to cause to be com- 
pleted, with all convenient expedition, two of the said 
frigates of forty-four, and one of thirty-six guns," and 
this recommendation was adopted by an act of Con- 
gress of April 20. 1 These three ships, launched the 
following year, were the United States, Constitution, 
and Constellation. They were the first of a long and 
honorable list containing many famous men-of-war, 
and the two last are still on the Navy Register. 

In his annual message in December, 1796, Wash- 
ington said : " To an active external commerce, the 
protection of a naval force is indispensable. . . . The 
most sincere neutrality is not a sufficient guard against 
the depredations of nations at war. To secure respect 
to a neutral flag requires a naval force, organized and 
ready to vindicate it from insult or aggression. This 
may even prevent the necessity of going to war, by 
discouraging belligerent powers from committing such 
violations of the rights of the neutral party, as may, 
first or last, leave no other option. From the best 
information I have been able to obtain, it would seem 
as if our trade to the Mediterranean, without a pro- 
tecting force, will always be insecure, and our citizens 
exposed to the calamities from which numbers of them 
have but just been relieved. These considerations 
invite the United States to look to the means, and to 
set about the gradual creation of a Navy." 2 

1 Nav. Aff. i, p. 25 ; Nav. Chron. pp. 59-61 ; Rep. Sen. Com. iv, 
p. 6. 

2 Nav. Chron. p. 02. 



CHAPTER V 

PEACE WITH TRIPOLI AND TUNIS 

As before mentioned, Mr. Barlow remained at Algiers 
during negotiations with Tunis and Tripoli. He se- 
cured the services at Tunis of a Frenchman named 
Joseph Famin, who had been recommended to him by 
the French consul. Famin concluded, without expense, 
a truce for six months between the United States and 
Tunis, beginning June 15, 1796. 1 In a letter dated 
September 1, Barlow mentions the capture of two 
American ships by the Tripolitans, one of which turned 
out to be the Sophia with O'Brien and the money for 
the Algerine treaty ; the other ship, he says, was 
broken up and the cargo confiscated. These vessels 
were taken by the Tripolitan corsair Peter Lisle, a 
renegade Scotchman known as Murad Reis. Octo- 
ber 9 Barlow speaks of the capture of a vessel by 
the Tunisians, apparently in violation of the truce. 
October 12 he writes : " Another large ship, richly 
ladened, the Betsy of Boston, Captain Sampson, has 
been taken at Tripoli. The crew are in slavery ; they 
will soon be free." No further details of these captures 
are given. Upon the conclusion of peace with Trij:>oli, 
which soon followed, the Betsy was retained by the 
pasha, but her crew were released. 2 

Taking advantage of the dey's good humor on re- 
ceiving his money, Barlow asked his influence, which 
was supposed to be powerful, in treating with Tunis 

1 St. Pap. x, p. 451 ; For. Rel. i, p. 554. 

2 Barlow, pp. 137-140, 142 ; Stephens, pp. 82-84. 



'60 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

and Tripoli. The dey not only promised this, but 
advanced the necessary funds — fifty thousand piastres 
for Tunis and forty thousand for Tripoli. O'Brien at 
once set sail for those cities with the money, let- 
ters, aud presents. On his arrival at Tunis, the bey, 
Hamuda, demanded three times his original price, 
and this caused delay. 1 With Tripoli things went more 
smoothly. A treaty 2 was concluded without much 
difficulty, November 4, 1796, at a cost of nearly fifty- 
six thousand dollars. After being signed by the pasha, 
Yusuf Karamanli, it was brought by O'Brien to 
Algiers, where it was signed by Barlow and the dey, 
January 3, 1797. It was ratified by the Senate June 
10. The treaty 3 with Tunis was at last concluded 
by Famin in August, 1797, at an estimated expense 
of one hundred and seven thousand dollars. It was 
sent to Colonel Humphreys, who approved it, Novem- 
ber 14, and transmitted it to the State Department. 4 
The expense of these treaties was subsequently much 
increased by yielding, at least partially, to the re- 
peated demands of the Barbary rulers. 

In June, 1797, the dey of Algiers having requested 
that two cruisers should be built and equipped for him 
in the United States, at his expense, President Adams, 
considering the United States " to be under peculiar 
obligations " to the dey, on account of his aid in our 
dealings with Tunis and Tripoli, recommended that 
this request be complied with. " The expense of navi- 
gating them to Algiers may perhaps be compensated 
by the freight of the stores with which they may be 
loaded, on account of our stipulations by treaty with 

1 Barlow, pp. 140-144. 2 Appendix II. 

8 Appendix II. 

4 For. Rel. ii, pp. 18, 123, 125, 126 ; Rep. Sen. Com. viii, pp. 9, 10. 



PEACE WITH TRIPOLI AND TUNIS 61 

the de} r ." * The frigate which had been promised to 
the dey by Barlow as a condition of preserving the 
treaty was built at Portsmouth, N. H., was called the 
Crescent, and is borne on the United States Navy list. 
She sailed for Algiers in January, 1798, loaded with 
naval stores, and taking as passenger Captain Richard 
O'Brien, who had been appointed consul to Algiers 
and consul-general to all the Barbary States. The 
consulship had been offered to Pierre Skjoldebrand, 
but he declined it. 2 

The treaty with Tunis was laid before the Senate 
February 21, 1798, and upon its consideration objec- 
tion was made to three articles. One of these, the 
fourteenth, related to the tariff and provided that Amer- 
ican goods in American vessels should pay three per 
cent, in Tunis, that American goods in foreign vessels 
or foreign goods in American vessels should pay ten 
per cent., while Tunisian goods, under any flag what- 
ever, in United States ports should pay but three per 
cent. It was suspected that Famin had the obnoxious 
clauses of this article inserted for his own commercial 
advantage. Barlow said they were not in the original 
draft of the treaty submitted to him in April, 1797. 
The Senate refused to ratify this article. Of the other 
objectionable articles, the eleventh provided that a 
barrel of gunpowder should be given to Tunis for 
every gun fired in saluting a United States man-of- 
war ; and the twelfth that the bey might impress any 
American merchant vessel into his service, paying such 
freight as he should prescribe. The Senate resolved 

1 President's Message, June 23, 1797, St. Pap. x, p. 464 ; For. Rel. 
ii, p. 65 ; Nav. Chi-on. p. 66. 

2 Cooper, i, p. 31U ; Pickering, vii, pp. 130, 5S0, 664 ; xxxvi, pp. 7, 
124. 



62 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

" that it be recommended to the President of the 
United States, to enter into a friendly negotiation with 
the bey and government of Tunis, on the subject of 
the said [fourteenth] article, so as to accommodate the 
provision thereof to the existing treaties of the United 
States with other nations." l 

William Eaton had been appointed consul to Tunis 
in July 1797, but had not yet been ordered to his 
post. Eaton was an interesting character. He was 
born in Connecticut in 17G4, and at the age of sixteen 
enlisted in the Continental Army. After the war he 
taught school, graduated at Dartmouth College in 
1790, and two years later was appointed a captain in 
the army. December 22, 1798, he embarked on the 
United States brig Sophia, mounting twelve guns, 
commanded by Captain Henry Geddes of the navy, 
accompanied by James L. Cathcart, the former cap- 
tive, now consul to Trijjoli. The Sophia sailed in 
company with the ship Hero, the brig Hassan Bashaw, 
and the schooners Skjoldebrand and Lelah Eisha. 
The Hero was loaded with naval stores for Algiers, in 
payment of stipulations and arrearages. The others 
were armed vessels. The Hassan Bashaw and Skjol- 
debrand were the cruisers built for the dey at his 
expense, on the recommendation of President Adams. 
The Lelah Eisha, and the Hamdullah, a schooner that 
had sailed a year earlier, were to be delivered to the 
dey as a substitute for stipulated naval stores. The 
crews of the vessels to be left at Algiers were to 
return home in the Sophia. 2 The dey at this time was 
Mustapha, Hasan having died in 1798. 

1 Eaton, pp. 55, 50 ; Felton, pp. 185-190. 

2 Eaton, p. 54; Cathcart, II, p. 12 ; Pickering, vii, p. GG4 ; ix, p. 505; 
x, p. 117. 




WILLIAM EATON 



PEACE WITH TRIPOLI AND TUNIS 63 

The Sophia arrived at Algiers February 9, 1799, 
after a passage of thirty-six days from the capes of the 
Delaware, and the other vessels at about the same 
time, except the Hero, which was delayed. Eaton and 
Cathcart at once called on O'Brien. The three consuls 
had been appointed a commission to obtain the neces- 
sary alterations in the treaty with Tunis, and any two 
of them were authorized to act in this capacity. 1 Febru- 
ary 22 they were presented to the dey of Algiers, 
and the interview is thus described by Eaton : " Con- 
suls O'Brien, Cathcart and myself, Captains Geddes, 
Smith, Penrose, Maley, proceeded from the American 
house to the courtyard of the palace, uncovered our 
heads, entered the area of the hall, ascended a winding 
maze of five flights of stairs, to a narrow, dark entry, 
leading to a contracted apartment of about twelve by 
eight feet, the private audience room. Here we took 
off our shoes and, entering the cave (for so it seemed), 
with small apertures of light with iron grates, we were 
shown to a huge, shaggy beast, sitting on his rump, 
upon a low bench, covered with a cushion of embroid- 
ered velvet, with his hind legs gathered up like a tailor 
or a bear. On our approach to him, he reached out 
his fore paw as if to receive something to eat. Our 
guide exclaimed, ' Kiss the Dey's hand ! ' The consul- 
general bowed very elegantly and kissed it ; and we 
followed his example in succession. The animal seemed 
at that moment to be in a harmless mode ; he grinned 
several times, but made very little noise. Having per- 
formed this ceremony, and standing a few moments in 
silent agony, we had leave to take our shoes and other 
property, and leave the den, without any other injury 
than the humility of being obliged, in this involuntary 
1 For their instructions, see For. Rel. ii, p. 281. 



64 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

manner, to violate the second commandment of God 
and offend common decency. Can any man believe 
that this elevated brute has seven kings of Europe, 
two republics, and a continent tributary to him, when 
his whole naval force is not equal to two line-of-battle 
ships ? It is so ! " 1 

The Sophia sailed with Eaton and Cathcart March 2, 
and anchored in the Bay of Tunis on the 12th. Two 
days later the consuls obtained permission to land, 
and proceeded up to the city, where they were wel- 
comed by Famin. Flags were hoisted on the various 
consulates, and the new arrivals were soon occupied 
in receiving visits. The English consul warned them 
against putting any faith in Famin, said the situation 
was a critical one, and advised caution and firmness. 
The bey, he said, "was a man of acute discernment 
and generally of fair dealing, but that he was vain and 
avaricious." 2 

The next clay they were presented to the bey, who 
asked : " ' Is your vessel a vessel of war ? ' ' Yes.' 
' Why was I not duly informed of it, that you might 
have been saluted, as is customary ? ' ' We were un- 
acquainted with the customs.' (True cause, we did not 
choose to demand a salute which would cost the United 
States eight hundred dollars.) . . . ' It is now more 
than a year since I expected the regalia of maritime 
and military stores, stipulated by treaty ; what im- 
pedes the fulfillment of the stipulation ? ' ' The treaty 
was received by our government about eight months 
ago. A malady then raged in our capital, which forced 
not only the citizens, but all the departments of the 

1 Eaton, p. 50. 

- Eaton, pp. 60-62. The events of Eaton's consulate at Tunis are 
covered by Felton, ch. iii-ix. 



PEACE WITH TRIPOLI AND TUNIS 65 

government to fly into the interior villages of the coun- 
try. About the time the plague ceased to rage, and 
permitted the return of the government, the winter 
shut up our harbors with ice. We are also engaged in 
a war with France.' ' : The consuls then explained that 
the treaty had not yet been ratified and that they had 
come instructed to secure certain amendments. The 
bey said: '"You have found no difficulty in fulfill- 
ing your engagements with Algiers and Tripoli ; and 
to the former have very liberally made presents of 
frigates and other armed vessels.' We told him these 
facts had been misrepresented to him. Our govern- 
ment had, indeed, agreed to furnish to the dey of Al- 
giers certain armed vessels for which he was to pay 
cash." They then stated that they had also been in- 
structed to offer him an armed vessel in lieu of naval 
stores on account of the risk of sending the latter, 
they being contraband of war. " Said he : 'I shall 
expect an armed vessel from you gratuitously.' We 
answered him he might not expect anything of the 
kind ; it was utterly impossible. We had business 
enough for our naval force, in defending our commerce 
against the depredations of our common enemy." 1 
Tunis was also at war with France. 

Repeated interviews were held during the next ten 
days, at which the amendments were discussed and 
demands for presents persistently urged. A compro- 
mise was reached on the twelfth article, which was 
so modified that the bey might compel the service of 
an American merchant vessel when needed to carry 
dispatches or goods, paying a suitable freight. The 
consuls tried to limit this service to couriers in case of 
emergency, but were overruled. The eleventh article 
1 Eaton, pp. 62-66. 



6G OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

was made reciprocal, and so practically expunged : 
either nation might demand salutes for its own war 
vessels, which were to be paid for by a barrel of powder 
for each gun fired ; but if not demanded, salutes were 
not to be given. The fourteenth article was finally 
amended so that the commercial intercourse between 
the two countries should be substantially on the footing 
of the nations most favored in the United States. The 
treaty 1 was concluded March 26, 1799, and was rati- 
fied by the Senate January 10, 1800. 2 

Cathcart sailed for Tripoli April 2, 1799, and 
arrived on the 5th. The pasha refused to receive him 
unless he would agree to fulfill a promise said to have 
been made by O'Brien when the treaty was signed, 
which was to give up the brig Sophia to the pasha as 
a present. Cathcart declared that no such promise 
had ever come to the knowledge of his government. 
O'Brien appears to have entered into an engagement 
which he did not report to the state department ; he 
admitted to Captain Geddes having made " a kind of 
a promise by the way of 'greasing the ways.'" Find- 
ing it necessary to discharge this obligation, Cathcart 
offered the brig, to be delivered in nine months, in 
lieu of the stipulated stores which were on the Hero, 
not yet arrived ; it was feared that she had either been 
lost or captured by the French. lie had been author- 
ized to promise a small armed vessel, if it seemed 
indispensable, to preserve peace. Negotiations were 
carried on through the British consul, Bryan Mc- 
Donough, who had a good deal of influence with the 
pasha and was of great assistance. He had formerly 
been very helpful to O'Brien and also to the crew of 

1 Appendix II. 

2 Eaton, pp. Cu-SO ; Rep. Sen. viii, p. 11. 



PEACE WITH TRIPOLI AND TUNIS G7 

the Betsy while in captivity at Tripoli, and had acted 
as charge d'affaires for the United States. Within 
about a week it was finally settled that Cathcart should 
pay as a substitute for the stipulated naval stores ten 
thousand dollars, and eight thousand in lieu of the 
brig, and a consular present valued at four thousand. 
Upon the delivery of the consular present, consisting 
chiefly of jewelry, the flag of the United States was 
given a salute of twenty-one guns, which was returned 
by the Sophia. This settlement was considered a very 
favorable one, and was effected by the distribution of 
fifteen hundred dollars in bribes. The pasha gave 
Cathcart an acknowledgment that he had no further 
claims whatever on the United States. His prize, the 
Betsy, had been converted into a man-of-war mount- 
ing twenty-eight guns, and was the flagship of Murad 
Reis, her captor. The affairs of the United States and 
Tripoli now being adjusted, the Sophia was sent back 
to Tunis, and Cathcart entered upon the duties of his 
office. Tranquillity prevailed, and the first few months 
of his consulate were uneventful. 1 

At Tunis Eaton's situation was similar to Barlow's 
at Algiers three years earlier: waiting month after 
month for the stipulated naval stores, or regalia, as 
they were called, making excuses, sti'iving to keep 
the bey in good humor while firmly resisting his 
claims ; the latter getting more and more impatient, 
threatening to send out his cruisers for Americans, 
and demanding additional presents. He would not 
accept money, — of that he had plenty, — but he must 
have jewels ; and all the other officials of the govern- 
ment must have presents. The sapitapa, or keeper 
of the seals, who was the second minister and closest 
1 Cathcart, II, pp. 2, 3, 7, 8, 18-27, 36, 59, 61. 



68 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

to the bey, was constantly importuning Eaton for 
presents for the bey, requesting for himself a double- 
barreled gun and gold watch-chain. The prime min- 
ister, a very old man, was given some pieces of cloth, 
but was offended at not receiving a more valuable 
present and returned it. " A demand came from the 
Admiral for a gold-headed cane, a gold watch and 
chain, and twelve pieces of cloth : the usance on a 
new consul's being received. Laid on the table. A 
demand came from the Aga of the Goletta for his 
usance on the occasion of the first vessel of war com- 
ing to anchor in the bay. To this I answered that 
I would make him a present of a copy of the treaty. 
. . . The Sapitapa informed me that the Bey had 
rejected the proposal of a small cruiser in lieu of 
the present in jewels. I told him, notwithstanding 
the Bey had refused to listen to a cash proposition, 
I would once more make him a tender, and projDosed 
fifty thousand dollars in full of all demands." This 
also was rejected. To the state department Eaton 
writes, April 3 : "It is hard to negociate where the 
terms are wholly ex parte. The Barbary Courts are 
indulged in the habits of dictating their own terms of 
negociation. ... To the United States they believe 
they can dictate terms. ... It is certain that there is 
no access to the permanent friendship of these states 
without paving the way with gold or cannon-balls ; 
and the proper question is, which method is prefer- 
able. So long as they hold their own terms, no esti- 
mate can be made of the expense of maintaining 
a peace. They are under no restraints of honor nor 
honesty. There is not a scoundrel among them, from 
the prince to the muleteer, who will not bog and steal. 
. . . The United States set out wrongly and have 



PLACE WITH TRIPOLI AND TUNIS 69 

proceeded so. Too many concessions have been made 
to Algiers. There is but one language which can be 
held to these people, and this is terror.'" 1 

Eighty American ships entered the Mediterranean 
in the spring of 1799, and npon this increasing and 
unprotected commerce Tunis and the other Barbary 
powers turned greedy eyes. They were waiting only 
for a pretext ami opportunity to break peace with the 
United States. Therefore Eaton believed that mea- 
sures should be promptly taken to insure the future 
safety of our commerce and the stability of our rela- 
tions with Barbary, and urged that the regalia already 
stipulated should be sent out at once and with a show 
of force ; that a gratuity also should be offered, if 
thought expedient, by way of conciliation, and that 
then terms for the future should be made under our 
guns. In July war seemed imminent, but the bey 
finally consented to wait until January. In October 
Dr. Shaw of the Sophia was sent to England to 
consult with Rufus King, the American minister, as 
to procuring jewels there ; he was then to proceed to 
America and report to the government. This had a 
good effect in convincing the bey that Eaton's inten- 
tions were sincere, and in December he was persuaded 
to grant an extension of time for sixty days in which 
to receive the regalia. 2 

Long before this Eaton had become convinced that 
Famin had all along been intriguing against him. 
He says : " I have uniformly treated this French 
pirate with polite attention, taking care to keep the 
commanding grounds, till I have finally defeated all 
his projects of mischief ; and if nothing interfere with 

1 Eaton, pp. 83-88. 

2 Eaton, pp. 103-107, 117-119; Felton, p. 214. 



70 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

my present arrangements, have now a flattering pro- 
spect of ultimately terminating our affairs with this 
Regency more favorably to the interests of the United 
States and more conformably to the instructions of 
the government. Three things have operated to pro- 
duce this change of projects at court : 1, Dr. Shaw's 
departure to America ; 2, the Bey's persuasion that 
the United States, after obtaining a peace with France, 
will send a fleet into this sea ; 3, the Sapitapa's desire 
to employ American carriers," they being considered 
the safest, as the vessels of other nations were more 
exposed to the belligerent powers. The sapitapa had 
an extensive trade with Spain. Six months later Eaton 
became so exasperated at Famin's intrigues and 
insults that he gave him a public horsewhipping. For 
this he was summoned before the tribunal. The bey 
was angry, and sympathy was with Famin ; but after 
Eaton had thoroughly exposed his iniquity, the court 
was convinced, the bey was completely won over, and 
gave Eaton's hand a " cordial squeeze." 1 

Meanwhile, on March 24, 1800, the Sophia arrived 
with a letter from the President to the bey, assuring 
him that the stipulations would be fulfilled. The bey 
was pleased with the letter, but expressed solicitude 
about the jewels. Eaton replied that they were to 
be procured in England. A number of richly jeweled 
arms were ordered to be made for the bey in London. 
As an evidence of more kindly relations, the sapitapa 
pledged himself that the last clause in the twelfth 
article of the treaty, 2 which, though amended, was 
still objectionable and kept vessels away, should bo 
suspended, except in emergencies, such as had been 
recognized by all other nations as conferring on the bey 
: Eaton, pp. lis, n<), 146-149. 2 Appendix II. 



PEACE WITH TRIPOLI AND TUNIS 71 

the right of exacting service. A circular to this effect 
was at once sent to American consuls in Mediterranean 
ports. At last, on April 12, the Hero arrived with a 
portion of the long expected stores. The danger was 
now averted, and the bey's corsairs, which had been 
waiting for orders to cruise against Americans, were 
turned upon the Danes. Eight Danish vessels were 
captured, and Eaton purchased six of them on credit, 
at the request of their captains, at risk of loss ; and 
after their difficulties had been settled, although he 
had an opportunity to sell the vessels at a large profit, 
he gave them up to their former owners on condition 
of his credit being redeemed. For this he received the 
thanks of the king of Denmark. 1 

Late in November, 1800, the American ship Anna 
Maria arrived with another invoice of naval stores. 
The bey found fault with some of these, and Eaton 
says in his report : " I believe the facts to be, the 
government are dissatisfied that anything has come 
forward. If this opinion require evidence, I consider 
it sufficient to state that the United States are the 
only nation which have, at this moment, a rich, un- 
guarded commerce in the Mediterranean ; and that 
the Barbary Regencies are Pirates." 2 The sapitapa 
demanded the Anna Maria for the service of the gov- 
ernment, but Eaton refused, reminding him of the 
pledge he had previously given. Then the sapitapa 
offered a freight of four thousand dollars for a voyage 
to Marseilles with a cargo of oil, which was accepted, 
as it involved no concession of principle. Later, how- 
ever, he broke his contract and insisted on sending 
the vessel to London. To avoid this and " in order to 

1 Eaton, pp. 130-139, 177-181, 185, 209, 210; Felton, p. 224. 

2 Eaton, pp. 187, 188. 



72 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

get the ship and people out of their hands," Eaton 
became responsible for the cargo, which he purchased 
of the sapitapa at a high price. He then sent the 
ship to Marseilles, where the oil was sold. On account 
of loss due to the vessel's long detention, the owners 
subsequently made a claim for indemnity against the 
United States government. 1 

In the spring of 1801 Eaton had a plan for a com- 
mercial convention between the United States and 
Tunis which should promote the business interests of 
both and thereby make peace more firm and lasting, 
and at the same time more honorable, as he hoped to 
get the treaty still further amended in favor of the 
United States. The bey at fkst seemed favorably dis- 
posed, but suddenly dropped the subject. This was 
due to the action of France, which not only seized and 
disarmed two of his corsairs, but exercised protection 
over all the other powers against which he could cruise. 
He therefore once more began to turn his eyes towards 
America with hostile intent, and projects of peaceful 
trade no longer interested him. 2 The unsatisfactory 
articles of the treaty which kept American commerce 
away from Tunis or were otherwise objectionable 
were finally amended by a convention in 1824. 3 

April 15, 1801, the bey wrote a letter to the Presi- 
dent demanding forty 24-pound battery guns. 4 In 
June a fire in the palace destroyed fifty thousand 
stands of arms, and Eaton was informed that the bey 
had apportioned the loss among his friends, and that 
the quota of the United States was ten thousand 

1 Felton, p. 237 ; Amer. State Papers, Claims, pp. 300, 322, 337-341. 

2 Felton. pp. 245-248. 

8 For. Rel. v, pp. 430-432, 587-689 ; see Appendix II. 
4 Felton, p. 242 ; Nav. Chron. p. 189 ; Claims, p. 300. 



PEACE WITH TRIPOLI AND TUNIS 73 

stands of arms. Eaton positively refused to communi- 
cate this demand to his government, declaring " that 
the treaty stipulations were the conditions of a per- 
petual peace." This firm stand exasperated the bey 
and his minister, who vainly tried to browbeat him. 1 
These repeated and insolent demands were a source 
of constant irritation and he began to long for home. 
He was also annoyed in other ways. He was no 
longer on pleasant terms with O'Brien, who was closely 
associated in business ventures with Bacri, the Jew 
of Algiers, who in turn was believed to be intriguing 
against American interests. 2 

The presence of an American squadron in the 
Mediterranean, on account of trouble with Tripoli, 
seems to have had a wholesome effect on the bey ; 
especially the arrival at Tunis in July, 1801, of Com- 
modore Dale with the frigate President and schooner 
Enterprise, followed by the third installment of naval 
stores in the ship Grand Turk under convoy of the 
frigate Essex. The fourth cargo of stores came De- 
cember 1 in the ship Peace and Plenty, convoyed by 
the frigate George Washington. But in spite of all 
this naval display, the bey had so far regained courage 
in the spring that, immediately after the receipt of 
the long looked for jewels, a part in March, the rest 
in May, 1802, by the frigate Constellation, he made 
requisition for a corvette. In August this had be- 
come a demand for a thirty-six gun frigate. Eaton 
refused to communicate this to his government, and 
the bey wrote personally to the President acknow- 
ledging the receipt of the stores and jewels and de- 
manding the frigate. He proposed to send this letter 
to America in a vessel called the Gloria, which be- 
i Eaton, pp. 204-206. 2 Felton, pp. 238, 239, 243, 244. 



74 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARA CORSAIRS 

longed to Eaton ; but Eaton, rather than have his ship 
so used, sent her to Leghorn and sold her at a loss. 1 

Meanwhile Eaton's situation was complicated by the 
war between the United States and Tripoli, now in 
progress, and the attempts of the bey to give assist- 
ance to the latter. This will be noticed in a later chap- 
ter. It culminated in a quarrel with the bey, who 
ordered Eaton out of the country, and he accordingly 
departed from Tunis March 10, 1803. 2 

1 Eaton, pp. 212, 210, 229-235, 251, 252 ; Felton, p. 255 ; Cathcart, 
II, p. 340 ; St. Pap. iv, p. 3S3 ; v, p. 392 ; x, p. 408 ; Claims, pp. 303, 
300, 331, 332. 

2 Eaton, p. 242. 



CHAPTER VI 

THE VOYAGE OF THE GEORGE WASHINGTON 
TO CONSTANTINOPLE 

William Bainbridge was born in New Jersey in 
1774. He entered the navy as a lieutenant in 1798, 
having- been in the merchant service since the age 
of fifteen. He was made a captain in 1800 and given 
command of the frigate George Washington, of 
twenty-four guns, a vessel which had been purchased 
in 1798, when the navy was greatly expanded on ac- 
count of the difficulties with France then existing. 
The Washington was sent with tribute to Algiers, 
where she arrived in September, 1800, being the first 
United States man-of-war to enter the Mediterranean. 
This was a duty very repugnant to Bainbridge, as it 
must have been to any naval officer appreciating 
keenly the inglorious attitude assumed by his country 
towards barbarians. 1 

At this time the dey of Algiers, Mustapha, had 
incurred the displeasure of the grand seignior by 
making peace with France while Turkey, as the ally 
of England, was at war with Bonaparte in Egypt. 
In order to conciliate the sultan the dey determined 
to send an ambassador with valuable presents to Con- 
stantinople. For this purpose he requested of Consul 
O'Brien the service of the George Washington. The 

1 This chapter is hased chiefly on Bainhridg'e, ch. ii ; see also 
Cooper, i, pp. 377-388 ; Araer. Nav. Off. i, pp. 21-34 ; Nav. Chron. 
pp. 176-179 ; Adventures and Sufferings of Samuel Patterson (Palmer, 
1817), ch. iii. 



76 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

consul replied that the ship's orders would not admit 
of such a long voyage, and urged that Captain Bain- 
bridge could not protect the dey's property against 
his enemies, the Portuguese and Neapolitans, as his 
instructions allowed him to engage French vessels 
only. Bainbridge obtained an audience with the dey, 
and explaining his inability to perform the service, 
he declined the honor, for such it was represented to 
be, as the men-of-war of England, France, and Spain 
had repeatedly undertaken similar missions. The dey 
seemed surprised and displeased at the refusal, but 
acquiesced, saying that he would send an English ship 
of twenty-four guns which the English consul and 
admiral had offered for the purpose. A little later he 
suddenly changed his mind and declined the English 
ship, apparently having determined to force the 
Americans to yield to his demands what they had 
declined to do at his request. They vehemently pro- 
tested against his unwarranted assumption of authority, 
and used every argument their ingenuity could sug- 
gest to escape from their trying position, but in vain. 
The dey was obdurate and had them at a great dis- 
advantage. The George Washington was anchored 
under his batteries, and escape would have been diffi- 
cult and hazardous, if not impossible. Moreover, he 
threatened instant war in case of refusal, and O'Brien 
was convinced that this threat would be made good, 
and that the large, unprotected American commerce 
then in the Mediterranean would be at the mercy of 
the dey's corsairs. 1 

Bainbridge writes of the sitxiation as follows : "The 

Dey of Algiers, soon after my arrival, made a demand 

that the United States ship, George Washington, 

1 St. Pap. iv, pp. 054-358 ; For. Rel. ii, p. 353 ; Cathcart, II, p. 326. 




WILLIAM BAINBRIDGE 



VOYAGE OF THE GEORGE WASHINGTON 77 

should carry an ambassador to Constantinople with 
presents to the amount of five or six hundred thou- 
sand dollars, and upwards of two hundred Turkish 
passengers. Every effort was made by me to evade 
this demand, but it availed nothing. The light in 
which the chief of this regency looks upon the people 
of the United States may be inferred from his style of 
expression. He remarked to me, ' You pay me tribute, 
by which you become my slaves. I have, therefore, 
a right to order you as I may think proper.' The un- 
pleasant situation in which I am placed must convince 
you that I have no alternative left but compliance or 
a renewal of hostilities against our commerce. The 
loss of the frigate and the fear of slavery for myself 
and crew were the least circumstances to be appre- 
hended ; but I knew our valuable commerce in these 
seas would fall a sacrifice to the corsairs of this power, 
as we have no cruisers to protect it. Inclosed is the 
correspondence between Richard O'Brien, Esq., con- 
sul-general, and myself on the subject of the embassy ; 
by which you will see that I had no choice in acting, 
but was governed by the tyrant within whose power 
I had fallen. I hope I may never again be sent to 
Algiers with tribute, unless I am authorized to deliver 
it from the mouth of our cannon. I trust that my 
conduct will be approved of by the President, for, 
with every desire to act right, it has caused me many 
unpleasant moments." * 

Under the circumstances they felt obliged to yield, 
and it must have seemed, at the time at least, the 
best thing to do. The liability to such a predicament 
was simply one of the necessary consequences of the 
wrong policy that had been adopted towards the Barb- 

1 Bainbridge, p. 44. 



78 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

ary States. Eaton, when he heard of it from O'Brien, 
was very indignant, and his comments were harsh and 
perhaps unjust. 1 Bainbridge was a man of great 
spirit and determination, as his career throughout life 
from boyhood amply testifies. Whether, with Eaton 
in place of O'Brien to back him up, he could have 
more successfully resisted the dey's demands, is an 
interesting question. 

Another humiliation was now imposed upon these 
unhappy men. The dey insisted that the George 
Washington should carry the Algerine flag at the main. 
They urged that this would virtually put the ship out 
of commission and she should fly her own colors at the 
main and the Algerine flag at the fore ; but on this 
point also they were obliged to yield. As soon as he 
got to sea, however, Bainbridge gave his own flag the 
precedence. 

According to O'Brien's letter to Eaton, the Wash- 
ington carried on this voyage, besides her own crew of 
one hundred and thirty-one, the ambassador and suite, 
one hundred in number ; also a hundred negro women 
and children, four horses, one hundred and fifty sheep, 
twenty-five horned cattle, four lions, four tigers, four 
antelopes, twelve parrots, and funds and regalia amount- 
ing to nearly a million dollars. 2 O'Brien wrote to 
the secretary of state, October 22 : " As the United 
States ship Washington, Captain Bainbridge, has 
proceeded per force, in fact to save the peace of the 
United States with Algiers, to prevent captivity and 
detention to the ship, officers, and crew, and prevent 
the pretense of a sudden war and pillage and slavery 
to the citizens of the United States, I calculate that if 
said ship goes and comes safe in five months, it will 
1 Eaton, pp. 189, 190, 221. 2 Ibid. p. 189. 



VOYAGE OF THE GEORGE WASHINGTON 79 

cost the United States forty thousand dollars. This, 
in comparison to what our losses might be if war, left 
me no time to hesitate in the choice of the evils and 
difficulties which presented fully in view ; in survey- 
ing both sides of the coast and how we should stand 
on both tacks, I found there was no alternative but to 
proceed." 1 This was surely a practical business view 
of the situation. O'Brien's point of view may, not un- 
naturally, have been influenced by a lively recollection 
of ten years of slavery. 2 

The George Washington set sail October 19, 1800, 
and during the passage of three weeks there was much 
discomfort from overcrowding. The religious observ- 
ances of so large a number of Mohammedans consider- 
ably hindered the working of the ship. At their 
prayers, which were performed five times a day, it was 
necessary to face towards Mecca ; and wdienever the 
ship tacked they were obliged to change direction 
accordingly, so that one of their number was stationed 
at the compass to insure correctness of position. These 
ceremonies afforded much amusement to the ship's 
crew. 

The ship approached the Dardanelles with a fair 
wind. At a point where the strait is about a thousand 
yards in width are two castles, nearly opposite each 
other, which command the channel. Here ships were 
obliged to show their passports before proceeding to 
Constantinople. The batteries were composed of heavy 
guns, which, however, were stationary, and could not 
be trained on a vessel that had passed them. Bain- 
bridge had no passport and feared a long detention be- 

1 St. Pap. iv. p. 358 ; For. Rel. ii, p. 354 

- The course pursued l>y Bainbridge and O'Brien is discussed in 
Cooper, i, pp. 380-383. 



80 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

fore obtaining permission to proceed, if indeed it were 
granted at all. He therefore determined to attempt 
the passage by stratagem. As he approached the 
castles he began to take in sail and make preparations 
to anchor, at the same time firing a salute, which was 
promptly returned by the batteries on both sides of 
the strait. Taking advantage of the great quantity 
of smoke produced, the captain rapidly made all sail, 
bore off, and was soon out of range. He arrived at 
Constantinople November 9, and anchored in the outer 
harbor. 

He was soon visited by an officer, who inquired 
under what flag the ship sailed, and having been told, 
went ashore to report. He soon returned, saying 
that the government had never heard of such a 
nation as the United States and wished a more explicit 
reply. Bainbridge explained that he came from the 
New World discovered by Columbus, and this was 
accepted as satisfactory. The officer returned again in 
a few hours, bringing with him a lamb and a bunch of 
flowers, tokens of peace and welcome. The sultan was 
friendly and had the ship brought into the inner har- 
bor. As she passed the palace, she fired a salute of 
twenty-one guns. The sultan noticed the stars on the 
American flag, and from the fact that his own flag also 
bore one of the heavenly bodies, he inferred a simi- 
larity in the laws, religion, and customs of the two 
countries. 

About a week after his arrival, Bainbridge was 
visited by the dragoman of the reis effendi or grand 
vizier, next in rank to the sultan, who stated that 
his master was offended by the neglect with which 
he had been treated, and that he ordered Captain 
Bainbridge to report to him the next morning at ten 



VOYAGE OF THE GEORGE WASHINGTON 81 

o'clock. This the captain declined to do, not recog- 
nizing the authority over him of the reis effendi. 
Thinking it best, however, to get advice on the sub- 
ject, he applied to Lord Elgin, the British ambassador, 
who informed him that it was merely an attempt to 
extort money, and he kindly sent a message to the 
reis effendi which prevented further annoyance. 

A few days later, the capudan-pasha, or admiral, 
arrived from Egypt with fifteen ships of the line, and 
several frigates ; and as they sailed in, the George 
Washington saluted the capudan-pasha. Just then 
the flagship was struck by a squall and was with 
difficulty saved from going ashore ; so the salute was 
not returned. The next day Mr. Zacbe, secretary to 
the capudan-pasha, came aboard and apologized for 
the omission, and the salute was later returned. Zacbe, 
who spoke English fluently, had known Franklin in 
Paris, and was well acquainted with American his- 
tory. He showed Bainbridge great attention, and they 
became firm friends. The capudan-pasha, who was 
the brother-in-law and intimate of the sultan, also 
treated Bainbridge with great kindness and consider- 
ation, and invited him to his palace. He also visited 
the George Washington several times, and was much 
pleased with her fine appearance and the discipline of 
the crew. 

At one of their interviews the capudan-pasha ex- 
pressed his surprise that the Washington had passed 
through the Dardanelles without being stopped, re- 
marking that she was the first foreign armed vessel 
that had ever reached Constantinople without a pass- 
port from the grand seignior obtained at the castle, 
if not previously. He did not liold Bainbridge respon- 
sible for this, supposing him to have been ignorant of 



82 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

this necessary formality. The governor of the castle, 
however, had been sentenced to death for his negli- 
gence. Bainbridge hastened to explain the manner of 
his passage, declared the innocence of the governor, 
and begged that he might be pardoned, and that he 
himself should be held responsible. The capudan- 
pasha accepted the explanation and pardoned the 
governor, while his friendship for Bainbridge was 
only strengthened by the captain's straightforward 
avowal. 

Bainbridge also conversed with the capudan-pasha 
on the subject of a treaty between the United States 
and Turkey, and made the following report to the 
secretary of the navy : " On the 23d of December, 
1800, I was requested by the Capudan-pasha to wait 
upon him at his palace. I was received in a very 
friendly manner, and had some conversation respecting 
the formation of a treaty with the Ottoman Porte ; 
and he expressed a very great desire that a minister 
should be sent from the United States to effect it. 
I informed him that there was one already named, 
who at present was in Lisbon, and probably would bo 
here in six months. He said he would write to the 
ambassador, which letter would be a protection for 
him while in the Turkish empire, and gave me liberty 
to recommend any merchant vessel to his protection 
which might wish to come here previously to the 
arrival of the ambassador. I thanked him in the name 
of the United States for the protection he had been 
pleased to give the frigate under my command and for 
his friendly attentions to myself and officers. I con- 
ceive it to be a very fortunate moment to negotiate 
an advantageous treaty with this government." * 
1 Bainbridge, p. 52. 



VOYAGE OF THE GEORGE WASHINGTON 83 

While at Constantinople Bainbridge also made the 
acquaintance of Edward D. Clarke, the noted English 
traveler, who has left the following account of the 
visit of the George Washington: " On the arrival of 
an American frigate; for the first time at Constantinople 
considerable sensation was excited, not only among 
the Turks, but also throughout the whole diplomatic 
corps stationed at Pera. The ship, commanded by 
Captain Bainbridge, came from Algiers with a letter 
from the Dey to the Sultan and Capudan-Pasha. . . . 
The order of the ship and the healthy state of the 
crew became topics of general conversation in Pera ; 
and the different ministers strove who should first 
receive him in their palaces. We accompanied him 
in his long-boat to the Black Sea, as he was desirous 
of hoisting there for the first time the American flag ; 
and upon his return were amused by a very singular 
entertainment at his table during dinner. Upon the 
four corners were so many decanters containing fresh 
water from the four quarters of the globe. The natives 
of Europe, Asia, Africa, and America sat down to- 
gether at the same table, were regaled with flesh, 
fruits, bread, and other viands, while of every article 
a sample from each quarter of the globe was presented 
at the same time. The means of accomplishing this 
was easily explained by his having touched at Algiers, 
in his passage from America, and being at anchor so 
near the shores both of Europe and Asia." 1 The very 
favorable impression which Bainbridge made on both 
Turks and Europeans at Constantinople was due to 
his personal qualities, and was of advantage to him 
and to his country. > 

The reception of the Algerine ambassador was far 

1 Clarke's Travels, iii, pp. 77-79. 



84 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

from friendly. The cley's peace with France and hos- 
tility towards nations at peace with the porte had 
given great offense to the grand seignior, who sent a 
message back to the dey demanding that he declare 
war against France and send him a million piastres 
within sixty days. The ambassador, who remained at 
Constantinople with the presents, 1 was anxious that 
the Washington should return as soon as possible with 
this message to Algiers, and Captain Bainbridge 
therefore made preparations to sail. The capudan- 
pasha gave him a firman which insured him respect 
and protection in all Turkish ports. He also ordered 
that the frigate should be saluted on passing the for- 
tress of Tapana, which was an honor accorded only 
to the capudan-pasha himself and had never before 
been given a foreign vessel. 

The George Washington sailed December 30. As 
she passed through the Dardanelles, salutes were 
exchanged with the castle, and the pardoned governor 
invited Bainbridge to his house, expressing the deep- 
est gratitude to him for having saved his life. The 
ship arrived off Algiers January 21, 1801, and an- 
chored out of range of the batteries. The dey suggested 
that she should come in closer for the convenience of 
the officers, but the object of his solicitude was soon 
disclosed when he requested Bainbridge, through the 
consul, to return to Constantinople with his messenger. 
This the captain promptly declined, declaring that he 
would run the risk of war rather than again submit 
to the humiliation. Indeed, he had written to the 
secretary of the navy to this effect, while at Con- 
stantinople. O'Brien in his report of the Washington's 
return, to the secretary of state, January 27, in 
1 St. Pap. iv, p. 361. 



VOYAGE OF THE GEORGE WASHINGTON 85 

speaking of the sultan's demands and the losses of 
the dey and his probable measures to reimburse him- 
self, says : " I hope we shall not be the victims ; we 
are nearly two and a half years in arrear ; no funds ; 
we have a valuable unguarded commerce in these seas ; 
we are threatened by all Barbary ; therefore we should 
act with energy, make good our stipulations and an- 
nuities, have consular friends (not to be depending on 
mercenary Jews), and show force in these seas." 1 

Before leaving Algiers in October, Bainbridge had 
borrowed some old cannon for ballast, to replace the 
stores he had brought from America, and he now 
wished to return these. He requested Consul O'Brien 
to send him ballast in lighters, that he might make 
the exchange. But the dey would not allow the consul 
.to do this, and at the same time threatened instant 
war if the cannon were not returned. Bainbridge 
refused to run his ship into the mole unless the dey 
pledged himself that nothing further should be said 
about returning to Constantinople. To this the dey 
finally agreed, and the ship was brought in. 

Bainbridge now had an audience with the dey, who 
was in a bad humor and soon flew into a violent rage. 
With his guard of janizaries ready to obey any com- 
mand of the irresponsible despot on the instant, it 
seemed a perilous moment for the captain, and might 
have proved so, had he not suddenly thought of the 
capudan-pasha's firman. This he at once drew from 
his pocket, and the effect was magical. The ferocious 
pirate was transformed into a cringing supplicant, 
anxious to serve the man whom a moment before he 
had seemed ready to destroy. 

The next day war was declared against France, the 
1 St. Pap. iv, pp. 301, 362 ; For. Rel. ii, p. 354. 



86 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

French consul's flag-staff was cut down, and four hun- 
dred Venetians, Maltese, and Sicilians, who had been 
captured under British passports, were liberated. The 
exasperated dey, determined to wreak vengeance on 
some one, ordered all the French in Algiers, fifty-six 
in number, men, women, and children, including the 
consul, to be put in irons and held for ransom at a 
thousand dollars each. Bainbridge resolved to use his 
influence, now much increased by reason of the capu- 
dan-pasha's firman, in behalf of the unhappy French, 
and with O'Brien had an interview with the dey. They 
begged him to revise his verdict, and after much per- 
suasion were so far successful as to obtain for them 
forty-eight hours within which to leave the country. 

The French were filled with gratitude, but knew 
not how they were to escape, as there was no available 
vessel in port. As the only hope the consul begged 
Bainbridge to take them on the George Washington, 
to which he willingly acceded, although it was not 
yet known that peace had been restored between the 
United States and France. The ship was hastily 
prepared for the voyage, the old cannon were put 
ashore, other ballast taken in, the French embarked, 
and the ship got under way with scarcely an hour to 
spare. The French were landed at Alicante, whence 
they found their own way home. For this service 
Bainbridge received the thanks of Bonaparte. 

Pie then sailed for home, and on his arrival reported 
in person to President Jefferson. His conduct was 
approved, and he was commended for the " judicious 
and skillful manner in which he had discharged his 
duties while under the pressure of such embarrassing 
circumstances." In the reduction of the navy which 
soon followed, in obedience to the act of March 3, 



VOYAGE OF THE GEORGE WASHINGTON 87 

1801, and as a result of peace with France, when the 
number of captains was reduced to nine, Bainbridge 
was retained, although he had been twenty-seventh on 
the list. 

The secretary of state, James Madison, in a letter 
to O'Brien dated May 20, 1801, instructs him to 
discourage as far as possible the use of American 
vessels as carriers for the Algerines, citing the case of 
the Fortune x as an instance of the disadvantage and 
loss likely to result from the practice ; although in 
that case the flag only, and not the ship, was Ameri- 
can. The sentiment of the administration respecting 
the impressment of the George Washington by the dey 
of Algiers is shown in the following extract from the 
same communication : " One subject of equal import- 
ance and delicacy still remains. The sending to 
Constantinople the national ship of war, the George 
Washington, by force, under the Algerine flag and 
for such a purpose, has deeply affected the sensibility, 
not only of the President, but of the people of the 
United States. Whatever temporary effects it may 
have had favorable to our interests, the indignity is 
of so serious a nature, that it is not impossible that it 
may be deemed necessary, on a fit occasion, to revive 
the subject. Viewing it in this light, the President 
wishes that nothing may be said or done by you, that 
may unnecessarily preclude the competent authority 
from animadverting on that transaction in any way 
that a vindication of the national honor may be 
thought to prescribe." 2 

1 See above, p. 55. 2 St. Pap. iv, p. 33G ; For. Rel. ii, p. 348. 



CHAPTER VII 

WAR WITH TRIPOLI 

In 1762 AH Karamanli became pasha of Tripoli. He 
had three sons, Hasan, Hamet, and Yusuf, who were 
inspired by mutual hostility and jealousy most bitter. 
Hamet was weak and vacillating and more despised 
than feared. Yusuf, the youngest, was determined to 
succeed his father, and in 1790, being then twenty 
years old, he murdered his brother Hasan. In 1796, 
on the death of his father, he got control of the army 
and had himself proclaimed pasha. Hamet happened 
to be away at the time, and a year later took refuge 
in Tunis, under the protection of the bey. 1 His wife 
and children remained in Tripoli, held as hostages by 
Yusuf. 

One of Yusuf's first acts was the conclusion of the 
treaty with the United States. This was procured at 
far less expenditure, to the United States, of time, 
trouble, and money, than the treaties with Algiers and 
Tunis. The pasha seems soon to have come to appre- 
ciate this fact and to realize that he had not made as 
good a bargain as his fellow pirates. Accordingly, 
after a few months of apparent contentment following 
the settlement with Consul Cathcart in the spring of 
1799, 2 he became dissatisfied, and not less so as he 
viewed the growing and unprotected American com- 
merce in the Mediterranean. Under the circumstances 
the temptation to break the peace was doubtless strong 
1 Greenhow, pp. 11, 12. 2 See above, p. 67. 



WAR WITH TRIPOLI 89 

to a barbarian who held the doctrine that treaties were 
to be observed only so long as convenience dictated. 
In this idea he was encouraged by his minister of 
marine and naval officers, especially by Murad Reis, 
the renegade Peter Lisle, who apparently had a partic- 
ular aversion for Americans. The prime minister, 
Mohammed Dghies, alone advised against war. 1 

In August, 1799, difficulties arose between the pasha 
and Cathcart, first about passports and later about 
certain goods which the pasha purchased of the con- 
sul and never paid for. The next year began the in- 
evitable demands. In April Cathcart was requested 
" to acquaint the President of the United States that 
he [the pasha] is exceedingly pleased with his proffers 
of friendship ; . . . that had his protestations been 
accompanied with a frigate or brig-of-war, such as we 
had given the Algerines, he would be still more in- 
clined to believe them genuine." Cathcart called at- 
tention to the fact that in addition to the original sum 
of forty thousand dollars paid for the treaty more than 
that amount had subsequently been given in presents 
not stipulated ; whereas, according to the tenth article 
of the treaty, 2 no further payment or tribute was ever 
to be expected. But the pasha was discontented. He 
had made better terms with European nations, and 
moreover complained that Algiers and Tunis were 
treated by the United States more liberally than Tri- 
poli. He therefore wrote a personal letter to Presi- 
dent Adams, dated May 25, 1800, in which he ac- 
knowledges the friendly sentiments of the President, 
communicated to him by Cathcart, and concludes : 
" But, our sincere friend, we could wish that these 
your expressions were followed by deeds, and not by 
1 Greenhow, p. 13. - Appendix II. 



90 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

empty words. You will therefore endeavor to satisfy 
us by a good manner of proceeding. We on our part 
will correspond with you, with equal friendship, as 
well in words as deeds. But if only flattering words 
are meant without performance, evei*y one will act as 
he finds convenient. We beg a speedy answer without 
neglect of time, as a delay on your part cannot but be 
prejudicial to your interests." In September the brig 
Catharine of New York, Captain Carpenter, was 
brought in by one of the pasha's cruisers, and although 
the act was disavowed, she was detained a month, 
plundered of many valuable articles, and subjected to 
other annoyances. October 29, 1800, Cathcart issued 
a formal protest enumerating and complaining of the 
pasha's aggressions and referring the dispute to the 
dey of Algiers, in accordance with the twelfth article 
of the treaty. 1 

In November, 1800, and January, 1801, Cathcart 
sent out circular letters to American consuls in Medi- 
terranean ports giving warning of probable trouble 
in the spring. In February the pasha repudiated the 
treaty, and demanded, as an alternative to war, a new 
treaty, without reference to Algiers, for which was to 
be paid two hundred and fifty thousand dollars and 
an annual tribute of twenty thousand. He had re- 
cently concluded a treaty with Sweden on these terms. 
It was the policy of the Barbary States always to be 
at war with some one, so as to give employment to the 
corsairs ; as soon as peace was made with one nation 
it was necessary to pick a quarrel with another. The 
pasha expressed his willingness, for a consideration of 
a hundred thousand dollars, to allow the United States 

1 St. Pap. iv, pp. 342-354, 360, 304-374; For. Rel. ii, pp. 350-352, 
354-357. 



WAR WITH TRIPOLI 91 

eighteen months within which to accept his terms. 
He finally reduced this last proposition to twenty 
thousand dollars and certain presents, which Cathcart 
agreed to in a letter dated February 19. The pasha 
then changed his mind and made further demands. 
The next day Cathcart wrote a letter to O'Brien and 
Eaton detailing all these circumstances, and sent out 
another circular warning American merchantmen of 
the danger. He also wrote a long letter to the secre- 
tary of state giving a full history of the transaction. 
Eaton considered the situation at Tripoli so critical as 
to justify him in chartering a Ragusan brig in April 
to convey the intelligence to the United States with 
the least possible delay. 1 

May 10, 1801, the pasha declared war against the 
United States, cut down the American flag-staff on 
the 14th, and Cathcart left Tripoli for Leghorn on the 
24th, leaving the interests of the United States in 
the care of Nicholas Nissen, the Danish consul. On 
his way to Leghorn Cathcart was held up and plun- 
dered by a Tunisian corsair, for which Eaton demanded 
satisfaction of the bey of Tunis, and it was promised. 
The pasha of Tripoli sent out his corsairs at once in 
search of American prizes, but apparently without 
success, 2 as the timely warning which had been sent 
out had put the merchantmen on their guard. The 
two largest Tripolitan cruisers, under the command of 
Murad Reis, a ship of twenty-six guns and two hun- 
dred and sixty men, called the Meshuda, and a brig of 

1 Cathcart, II, pp. 197, 228, 264, 266, 274, 279 ; Eaton, pp. 191-204 ; 
Felton, p. 24 i . 

2 According to Greenliow (p. 13) and Blyth (p. 88), the Tripolitans 
took five prizes, but it seems doubtful, as there is no official mention 
of it, and the captives are not accounted for. 



92 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

sixteen guns and one hundred and sixty men, pro- 
ceeded to Gibraltar with the intention of cruising in 
the Atlantic. 1 

Meanwhile the administration, in anticipation of 
trouble, had determined to send a squadron of obser- 
vation to the Mediterranean. Accordingly, four ves- 
sels, under the command of Commodore Richard Dale, 
set sail from Hampton Roads about June 1, 1801. 
Dale was a Virginian and in his forty-fifth year at this 
time. He was Paul Jones's first lieutenant in the 
famous fight between the Bon Homme Richard and 
the Serapis in 1779, and was one of the six captains 
appointed in 1794 at the establishment of the new 
navy. His instructions 2 from the secretary of the 
navy were dated May 20, 1801. He was directed to 
proceed first to Gibraltar, which, with the governor's 
permission, he was to make his base of supplies. He 
was then to appear off Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli 
delivering letters from the state department to the 
consuls. If he found affairs in a tranquil condition he 
was to cruise in the Mediterranean not later than De- 
cember, and then return to the United States. " But 
should you find on your arrival at Gibraltar, that all 
the Barbary powers have declared war against the 
United States, you will then distribute your force in 
such a manner, as your judgment shall direct, so as 
best to protect our commerce and chastise their inso- 
lence — by sinking, burning, or destroying their ships 
and vessels wherever you shall find them. . . . Should 

1 St. Pap. iv, pp. 3G2, 383 ; Felton, p. 253 ; Cathcart, II, pp. 317, 
321-326. 

- These instructions were written by General Samuel Smith, acting- 
secretary during the interim between the resignation of Benjamin 
Stoddert and the appointment of Rohert Smith, brother of Samuel. 




} : I < II \RI> DALE 



WAR WITH TRIPOLI 93 

Algiers alone have declared war against the United 
States, you will cruise off that port so as effectually 
to prevent anything from going in or coming out, and 
you will sink, burn, or otherwise destroy their ships 
and vessels wherever you find them. Should the Bey 
[pasha] of Tripoli have declared war (as he has 
threatened) against the United States, you will then 
proceed direct to that port, where you will lay your 
ship in such a position as effectually to prevent any of 
their vessels from going in or out. ... If Tunis alone, 
or in concert with Tripoli, should have declared war 
against the United States, you will chastise them in 
like manner. . . . Any prisoners you may take, you 
will treat with humanity and attention, and land them 
on any part of the Barbary shore most convenient to 
you. . . . But you will be careful to select from them 
such Christians as may be on board, whom you will 
treat kindly and land, when convenient, on some Chris- 
tian shore. Should you have occasion, you may accept 
their services." 1 

Besides instructions to the consuls the commodore 
bore a letter from President Jefferson to the pasha of 
Tripoli. A circular from the state department was 
also sent to the United States ministers in England, 
Spain, Portugal, and Holland, and another to the con- 
suls at Mediterranean ports, explaining the objects of 
the expedition. Lastly, Dale was given the form of a 
letter to be written by him to the dey of Algiers and 
the bey of Tunis declaring the object of his presence 
in the Mediterranean to be the protection of American 
commerce against the threatened attacks of Tripoli 

1 St. Pap. iv, pp. 379-382 ; For. Rel. ii, p. 359. For the operations of 
Dale's squadron, see Nav. Chron. pp. 190-198; Cooper, i, ch. xviii ; 
Bainbridge, ch. iii ; Decatur, ch. iii ; Porter, ch. iv. 



94 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

and expressing the friendly disposition of the United 
States towards themselves. Dale also had thirty 
thousand dollars which the administration hoped to 
induce the dey to accept as a commutation for one 
annuity of naval stores. 1 

Jefferson, in a letter to W. C. Nicholas, dated 
June 11, 1801, mentions the expedition, and in speak- 
ing of the policy of subsidizing the Barbary States 
says he is " convinced it is money thrown away and 
that there is no end to the demand of these powers, 
nor any security in their promises. The real alterna- 
tive before us is whether to abandon the Mediter- 
ranean or to keep up a cruise in it, perhaps in rotation 
with other powers, who would join us as soon as there 
is peace " 2 in Europe. 

Dale's squadron consisted of the frigates President, 
44 guns, 3 flagship, Captain James Barron, Philadel- 
phia, 36, Captain Samuel Barron, and Essex, 32, 
Captain William Bainbridge, and the schooner Enter- 
prise, 12, Lieutenant Andrew Sterrett. Bainbridge 
had returned home in the George Washington just in 
time to take the Essex back to the Mediterranean ; 
his first lieutenant was Stephen Decatur, afterwards 
famous. David Porter, who was also to win a name 
for himself, was first lieutenant of the Enterprise. 
The commodore arrived at Gibraltar July 1. Here 
he found the two Tripolitan corsairs and by forestall- 
ing their passage into the Atlantic doubtless pre- 
vented severe losses to American commerce. Murad 
lieis declared there was no war, but Dale gathered 

1 St. Pap. iv, pp. 334-342 ; For. Rel. ii, pp. 347-349. 

- Ford's Jefferson, viii, p. G2. 

8 The rates of all vessels are taken from Emmons, and occasionally 
differ slightly from the figures of Cooper. The number of guns 
actually carried was nearly always in excess of the rate. 



WAR WITH TRIPOLI 95 

enough information elsewhere to convince him of the 
contrary. He therefore directed the Philadelphia to 
cruise in the Straits and watch the Tripolitans. The 
Essex was ordered first to convoy the ship Grand Turk 
to Tunis ; thence she was sent to Marseilles, Barce- 
lona, and Alicante to collect American merchantmen 
in those ports and give them convoy through the 
Straits. The commodore cruised along the Barbary 
coast with the President and Enterprise, first putting 
into Algiers, where his appearance, according to Con- 
sul O'Brien, had a much better effect than a cargo of 
stores would have had. The ships arrived at Tunis 
July 17, the Essex coming in the next day, and 
here also they made a favorable impression. 1 On the 
24th they appeared off Tripoli. The pasha was a 
good deal disturbed and anxious to treat for peace. 
He communicated with the commodore through Nis- 
sen, the Danish consul. Dale remained off Tripoli 
eighteen days, and during this time nothing of import- 
ance occurred. He then cruised westward a short dis- 
tance and thence to Malta for water, where he arrived 
August 16. 2 

Meanwhile the Enterprise on August 1, while 
running for Malta, fell in with a Tripolitau polacca 
of fourteen guns and eighty men. As the Enterprise 
carried twelve guns and ninety-four men, the vessels 
were about evenly matched. They at once engaged at 
close range and fought for three hours. By his 
superior skill in manoeuvring, Sterrett was able to 
avoid the enemy's attempts to board, and by choosing 
his position, to rake him repeatedly. Twice the Tri- 
politan struck his colors, and when he thought he had 

1 See above, p. 7M. 

2 St. Pap. iv, pp. 383, 384 ; For. Rel. ii, p. 360. 



96 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

his adversary at a disadvantage, reopened his fire, 
hoisting his flag again. The third time, there being 
no longer hope of making up for his poor seamanship 
and gunnery by treachery or stratagem, he threw 
his flag into the sea, and by supplicating gestures 
begged for quarter. Porter was then sent aboard the 
corsair to take possession. All her guns and small 
arms, with everything else of value, were thrown 
overboard, and she was sent back to Tripoli an empty 
hulk. Sterrett's report to Commodore Dale, dated at 
sea August 6, 1801, is as follows : " I have the honor 
to inform you, that on the 1st August I fell in with 
a Tripoli tan ship of war, called the Tripoli, mounting 
fourteen guns, commanded by Keis Mahomet Sous. 
An action immediately commenced within pistol-shot, 
which continued three hours, incessant firing. She 
then struck her colors. The carnage on board was 
dreadful, she having twenty men killed and thirty 
wounded ; among the latter was the captain and first 
lieutenant. Her mizzen-mast went over the side. 
Agreeable to your orders, I dismantled her of every- 
thing but an old sail and spar. With heartfelt plea- 
sure I add, that the officers and men throughout the 
vessel behaved in the most spirited and determined 
manner, obeying every command with promptitude 
and alertness. We had not a man wounded, and sus- 
tained no material damage in our hull or rigging." 
Sterrett received the thanks of Congress and a sword, 
and his officers and men a month's extra pay. The 
Tripoli crept slowly home, and on her arrival the 
pasha was filled with rage and chagrin. The unfortu- 
nate Mahomet Sous was mounted on a jackass, paraded 
through the streets, and bastinadoed. The effect of 
this severity was that men were greatly discouraged 



WAR WITH TRIPOLI 97 

from serving in the corsairs then fitting out. For 
some time after this, very few Tripolitan cruisers ven- 
tured from port. 1 

Dale's orders did not allow him to take prizes, al- 
though he was directed by the secretary of the navy 
to " sink, burn, or otherwise destroy." The reason 
for this will appear from the following extract from 
the President's Message of December 8, 1801, in 
which, after relating the capture of the Tripoli, he 
says : "Unauthorized by the Constitution, without the 
sanction of Congress, to go beyond the line of defense, 
the vessel being disabled from committing further 
hostilities, was liberated with its crew. The legisla- 
ture will doubtless consider whether, by authorizing 
measures of offense also, they will place our force on 
an equal footing with that of its adversaries." Jeffer- 
son's strict construction of the Constitution probably 
carried him too far ; for while the Constitution vests 
in Congress alone the right to declare war, it seems 
reasonable to suppose that, when attacked, the Execu- 
tive, without appeal to Congress, at least when not 
in session, may exercise all the rights and powers of 
belligerents. However, a few months later, February 
6, 1802, Congress passed "an act for the protection 
of the commerce and seamen of the United States 
against the Tripolitan cruisers," giving the President 
full discretion in the employment of the navy and also 
authorizing him to commission privateers. 2 

Commodore Dale left Malta August 21, and on 
the 30th overhauled a Greek ship with forty-one Tri- 
politan passengers, including an officer and twenty 
soldiers. He took them on board the President, and 

1 St. Pap. iv, p. 3S5 ; Nat. InteU. Nov. 18, 1801. 

2 St. Pap. iv, p. 327 ; Nav. Ckron. pp. 198, 199 ; Cooper, i, p. 414. 



98 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

appearing before Tripoli opened a correspondence 
with the pasha, through Mr. Nissen, on the subject 
of the exchange of prisoners. The pasha expressed 
small concern for his subjects in Dale's power, but 
finally agreed to give three Americans for all the sol- 
diers. This was in case he should capture any Ameri- 
cans, which fortunately he had not yet been able to 
do. He now wished to make a truce, but Dale de- 
clined to talk on this subject. He landed the Tripoli- 
tans and sailed for Gibraltar September 3. On his 
arrival he learned from Consul Gavino that Murad 
Reis had sent most of his men in boats to Tetuan, 
whence they were to journey to Tripoli overland. 
Leaving the two vessels in charge of the captain of 
the brig and twenty men, Murad had taken passage 
himself in an English ship bound to Malta ; from 
there he passed over to Tripoli. The moral effect of 
Sterrett's victory probably had much to do with this 
abandonment of their ships by the Tripolitans. Of 
the men who had been landed, two hundred and fifty 
found their way to Algiers, where the dey requested 
passports for them to Tripoli. This request was de- 
clined by Consul O'Brien. Tripoli was suffering 
severely from the blockade and food was scarce. The 
pasha was very desirous of the release of his ships at 
Gibraltar and their employment as carriers of grain. 
Both he and the bey of Tunis objected strenuously to 
the blockade as an innovation in warfare, and they 
appealed to the dey to support them in opposition to 
a system so inimical to the interests of all Barbary. 
If it had been possible to maintain a close blockade, 
it is probable that the pasha might have been brought 
to terms within a reasonable time. 1 

1 St. Pap. iv, pp. 3S5-387, 455. 



WAR WITH TRIPOLI 99 

In the mean time the Essex had been cruising along 
the north shore in obedience to orders. At Barcelona 
her fine appearance attracted attention, and so excited 
the envy of certain Spanish naval officers that they 
behaved in an insulting manner to Bainbridge and 
his officers, and Decatur nearly became involved in 
a duel. The Essex collected a large fleet of American 
merchantmen, which she escorted through the Straits, 
and then, after cruising eastward along the Barbary 
coast, again visited the European ports and assembled 
another convoy. The Philadelphia, 1 after the deser- 
tion of the Tripolitan vessels, also cruised along the 
Barbary coast and blockaded Tripoli for a short time 
in September. 

October 22, the President being off Gibraltar, one 
of her boats upset in the bay and two officers and 
eight men were lost. 2 During her cruising from port 
to port in the Mediterranean, the flagship had a nar- 
row escape, about the first of December, while leaving 
the harbor of Mahon on the island of Minorca. The 
pilot misjudged the depth of water and the ship struck 
a rock while running six knots, rolled heavily, and 
slid off. The commodore took command, worked the 
ship through the narrow channel, and ran for Tou- 
lon. Although it blew a gale four or five days, she 
arrived safely December 6. She was there hove out, 
and it was found that her stem and keel were seri- 
ously injured, and but for the peculiar and skillful 
manner in which her planks had been fastened, she 
must certainly have been lost. Her return home was 
thereby delayed. 3 

1 Eaton, p. 220. 

2 Dale to Sec. of Navy (Oct. 26, 1801), Nat. [ntell. Jan. 29, 1802. 
8 Cooper, i. p. 117; Nat. [ntell. March 22, 1802. 



LofC 



100 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

The frigate Boston, 28, Captain Daniel McNeill, 
was sent to France in October, 1801, with the United 
States minister, Robert R. Livingston, and after per- 
forming that duty her orders were to join the Mediter- 
ranean squadron. She arrived at Gibraltar December 
22, and sailed the next day in search of the commo- 
dore, but apparently did not find him ; and it has been 
thought that McNeill purposely avoided him and the 
other Americans, wishing to act independently. Hos- 
tilities had been renewed between Sweden and Tripoli, 
and a Swedish squadron arrived at Gibraltar about 
this time, under orders to cooperate with Commodore 
Dale. 1 In October Dale sent the Enterprise home, 
remaining himself in the Mediterranean until March, 
when he sailed for America in the President, arriving 
at Norfolk April 14, 1802. Meanwhile he had directed 
the Essex to blockade the two Tripolitan cruisers at 
Gibraltar, and the Philadelphia had gone into winter 
quarters at Syracuse, under orders to show herself 
occasionally off Tunis and Tripoli. 2 

During the blockade of Tripoli Consul Eaton at 
Tunis took an active interest in the course of events. 
He kept in communication with Commodore Dale, 
published a circular declaring Tripoli to be in a state 
of blockade, and refused passports to Tunisian ves- 
sels bound for Tripoli. He wrote to Samuel Lyman, 
member of Congress, October 12, 1801 : " To avoid 
the expense of prolonging the war, Tripoli should 
be bombarded. This is a very practicable measure. 
Commodore Dale thinks that four frigates and three 
bomb-ketches are an ample force to do it effectually. 

1 St. Pap. x, pp. 467, 468 ; Cooper, i, p. 424 ; Amer. Nav. Off. 
i, p. 82; ii, p. 117. 

2 St. Pap. iv, p. .386 ; Morris, pp. 22, 25. 



WAR WITH TRIPOLI 101 

He also supposes a descent on the coast at the same 
time would have good effect. I am of the same opinion, 
and am so confident of its practicability, that I will 
volunteer in the enterprise, in any character consistent 
with my former military rank and my present station, 
with two thousand active light troops." 1 

This proposal of a land attack was associated with 
the project, first suggested by Cathcart, of espousing 
the cause of the rightful pasha of Tripoli, Hamet 
Karamanli, now an exile in Tunis. It was believed 
that the Tripolitans were disheartened by their re- 
verses and the hardships of the blockade, and would 
welcome their lawful ruler if backed by sufficient force 
to assure success. Eaton conferred with Hamet, who 
entered williugly into the scheme, but his weak, irreso- 
lute character made him difficult to manage. The bey 
of Tunis, it was believed, would also give his approval. 
Eaton's first letter on the subject to the secretary of 
state is dated September 5, 1801. In December, being 
in poor health, Eaton took advantage of the opportu- 
nity for a sea voyage offered by the passage of the 
George Washington to Leghorn. The Washington, 
under the command of Lieutenant John Shaw, had 
again brought tribute to Algiers soon after her return 
to the United States with Bainbridge, and then had 
convoyed the ship Peace and Plenty to Tunis, with 
naval stores for the bey. After that she remained 
several months in the Mediterranean, giving convoy 
when needed. Eaton spent the winter in Italy, leav- 
ing his affairs at Tunis in the hands of Dr. William 
Turner of the navy, at this time surgeon of the frigate 
Philadelphia. At Naples he had interviews with the 
prime minister of Sicily and the king of Sardinia, and 
1 Felton, pp. 255-258 ; Cathcart, II, pp. 327-332, 341. 



102 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

obtained from the latter permission for United States 
vessels to procure stores in his ports. At Leghorn, late 
in February, 1802, he learned that Hamet had received 
overtures from Yusuf, the reigning pasha, who, in 
order to defeat the scheme for his own expulsion, 
offered his brother the province of Derne. At the 
same time the bey of Tunis withdrew his protection 
from the exile. Eaton believed that the pasha's plan 
was to get Hamet within his grasp, which would 
quickly crush him. He at once returned to Tunis in a 
vessel of fourteen guns called the Gloria, which he had 
purchased. She was commanded by Captain Joseph 
Bounds and manned chiefly by Americans. She ar- 
rived at Tunis March 12. Eaton found Hamet about 
to embark for Derne, and succeeded in persuading 
him to abandon this plan. He then insisted on going 
to Malta, although Eaton wished him to go to Leg- 
horn, where he would be under the eye of Cathcart. 
It was finally arranged that the exiled pasha should 
go to Malta and there await the arrival of the squadron, 
which he was to accompany to Tripoli, when it was 
hoped that the people would revolt and deliver the 
city into his hands ; he accordingly sailed on a Russian 
ship bound for Malta. Meanwhile the Gloria was 
sent in quest of the Boston, which was blockading 
Tripoli at that time. Captain McNeill was found and 
informed of the situation, and he was prepared to 
arrest Hamet in case he should change his mind and 
attempt to pass over to Derne. Hamet, however, pro- 
ceeded directly to Malta, where he arrived April 11. 
Eaton was assisted in his plans by the sapitapa, whose 
interest in the case was enlisted by a promise of ten 
thousand dollars in the event of success. The Gloria 
was taken temporarily into the service and placed at 



WAR WITH TRIPOLI 103 

Eaton's disposal, and he sent her to Gibraltar with 
dispatches. 1 

About this time the bey of Tunis was interested in 
an attempt to bring - about peace between the United 
States and Tripoli, and on May 24, 1802, Eaton had 
an interview with his prime minister, who proposed 
peace through the mediation and under the guar- 
antee of the bey. The minister observed that the 
pasha of Tripoli must have a present, and that it must 
surely be the interest of the United States to obtain 
peace for the security of their commerce and to save 
the expense of armaments. Eaton replied that the 
United States would always prefer peace to war, but 
the peace must be honorable ; that the subject of a 
present to the pasha would not be considered ; that 
American commerce in the Mediterranean was never 
safer than at that time ; and that it was no more 
expensive to manoeuvre a squadron in that sea than 
elsewhere, it being necessary always to keep a number 
of vessels in commission for the training of officers 
and men. The subject was therefore dropped. The 
pasha was also then endeavoring to bring about peace 
with the United States through the mediation of 
Algiers. 2 

According to a report made by Eaton to the secre- 
tary of state, June 8, 1802, the blockade of Tripoli 
during the previous winter and spring was very lax. 
lie says that since October the Philadelphia had 
appeared but once before Tripoli, and then for six 
hours only, although she was under orders to make 

1 St. Pap. iv, p. 459; v. pp. 394-400; For. Rel. ii, pp. 699, 700; 
Claims, pp. 301-304, 330; Cathcart, II, pp. 349-353; Eaton, pp. ^*, 
212-214, 225-227 ; Felton, pp. 258-262 ; Amer. Nav. Off. i, p. 139. 

2 Eaton, pp. 216-219 ; St. Pap. iv, pp. 456, 457, 460. 



104 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

occasional excursions from her station at Syracuse 
along the Barbary coast ; and that the Boston was the 
only vessel that had done any blockade duty during 
that time. Captain Barron of the Philadelphia in his 
report says that he " was unable to look into Tripoli, 
or approach the coast, as the northerly winds are very 
common and excessively heavy." Eaton's plans for 
reinstating Hamet as pasha of Tripoli met with little 
encouragement from naval officers, and he complained 
that they " have undergone very severe criticism by 
Captains S. Barron and Bainbridge ; and by them 
reprobated in a style of most illiberal censure, and 
under their influence rejected by Captain Murray," 
who had recently arrived on the station in the Con- 
stellation. Eaton had a sharp tongue and little tact, 
and seems to have been unable to establish pleasant 
relations with these officers. He believed Bainbridge 
to have been offended at his outspoken animadversions 
on the George Washington's Constantinople mission 
and to have prejudiced the others against him. 1 
1 Eaton, pp. 220-222 ; Morris, p. G4. 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE SECOND YEAR OF THE WAR 

In 1802 it was determined to prosecute the war against 
Tripoli with more vigor, and free scope was given the 
President hy the act of February 6. As the terms 
of enlistment of Commodore Dale's men had nearly 
expired, it became necessary to send out a new squad- 
ron to relieve the vessels still remaining in the Medi- 
terranean. After this, men were enlisted for two years 
instead of one. The command of the squadron was 
offered to Commodore Thomas Truxtun, who had won 
renown with the frigate Constellation in the war 
with France. On account of the scarcity of captains 
no officer of this grade was appointed to command 
the flagship, which Truxtun considered a descent in 
rank for him and therefore declined. 1 His action was 
interpreted by the navy department as a resignation 
from the service, and the navy thus lost one of its most 
valuable officers. The command was then given to 
Captain Richard V. Morris, who hoisted his pennant 
on the frigate Chesapeake, 36. The vessels of the 
squadron, being in various stages of preparation, sailed 
successively, as they became ready for sea. The En- 
terprise, which had just arrived home, was soon ready, 
and returned to the Mediterranean February 17, still 
under the command of Lieutenant Sterrctt, followed 
by the Constellation, 36, Captain Alexander Murray, 
with Charles Stewart as first lieutenant, on March 14. 
1 Nat. Intell. June 16, 18, 20, 23, 1800. 



106 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

The Chesapeake, flagship, with Lieutenant Isaac Chaun- 
cey as acting captain, sailed April 27 ; the Adams, 28, 
Captain Hugh G. Campbell, with Isaac Hull as first 
lieutenant, June 10 ; the New York, 36, Captain James 
Barron, with Stephen Decatur as first lieutenant, Sep- 
tember 1 ; and the John Adams, 28, Captain John 
Eodgers, September 19. On board the Adams was 
Midshipman Oliver H. Perry, the future hero of Lake 
Erie. Great things were expected of this squadron, 
and it was thought that the pasha would soon sue for 
peace on any terms. 1 

Before he sailed Commodore Morris received orders 
dated February 18, March 20, April 1 and 13. 2 The 
first was his special commission, signed by the Presi- 
dent and issued in accordance with the act of Feb- 
ruary 6, by which he was " authorized and directed to 
subdue, seize, and make prize of all " Tripolitan ves- 
sels and goods, " and to bring or send the same into 
port, to be proceeded against and distributed accord- 
ing to law." The other orders were signed by the 
secretary of the navy, Robert Smith, and conveyed 
specific instructions, at the same time allowing him 
ample discretion. He was to respect the rights of 
neutral nations, send his prizes to the United States 
when practicable, with all necessary papers, and to 
effect an exchange of prisoners if possible. He was to 
use his " best exertions to keep the enemy's vessels in 
port, to blockade the places out of which they issue, 
and prevent as far as possible their coming out or 
going in," and to aid and relieve American vessels and 
give them convoy when consistent with his naval oper- 

1 This chapter is hased chiefly on Morris ; see also Cooper, i, ch. 
xix. and Nav. Chron. pp. 199-203. 

2 Morris, pp. 14-23. 



THE SECOND YEAR OF THE WAR 107 

ations, and for these purposes was to distribute his 
force to the best advantage, in his judgment. He was 
to confer with Commodore Dale, who was supposed to 
be still on the station, and was authorized to detain 
one of the vessels ordered to return, until the Adams 
should arrive. Funds were deposited in London sub- 
ject to his draft, and a supply ship was to be sent 
after him consigned to Consul Gavino at Gibraltar. 
He was authorized to purchase gunboats for the 
protection of American commerce in the Straits of 
Gibraltar; and in. case of a considerable amount of 
sickness, he was instructed to establish a hospital at 
some healthy port. 

Shortly before Morris sailed, word came from Com- 
modore Dale of threatening trouble with Morocco, 
and Dale himself soon arrived at Norfolk with later 
information which he believed would modify Morris's 
orders. The secretary of the navy, however, would 
allow him to wait no longer, but on April 17 ordered 
him to proceed immediately, stating that he would 
receive further instructions by the Adams, which 
would be the next vessel to sail. Morris was detained 
at Hampton Roads by contrary winds until April 27, 
and the instructions which he received by the Adams, 
three months later, were dated April 20. 

In the mean time the Enterprise was the first of the 
new squadron to arrive on the station, and she soon 
sailed for the coast of Tripoli. There were still re- 
maining in the Mediterranean from the previous year 
the Philadelphia, which had spent most of the winter 
at Malta, the Essex, the Boston, and the George 
Washington. The Philadelphia and the Washington 
soon returned to the United States. On the 5th of 
May, off Tripoli, the Enterprise overhauled a Tuni- 



108 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

sian xebec. After she had been boarded and exam- 
ined, certain articles of small value were found to be 
missing. This was reported by her crew to the bey, 
who in a rage sent for Consul Eaton, and accused 
Lieutenant Sterrett of piracy. Shortly afterwards 
the Enterprise came into Tunis. It was an unpleasant 
affair, and the honor of the service was at stake. 
However, after diligent investigation, Eaton and the 
officers of the schooner were able to trace the theft to 
a private marine and two sailors, and to convince the 
bey that their shipmates, both officers and men, were 
innocent of any wrong-doing. The culprits were sent 
aboard the Boston for trial. 1 

The Constellation arrived at Gibraltar about May 1, 
and either there or at Algiers received a number of 
jeweled muskets and pistols which had been brought 
from London by an English frigate. They were a 
portion of the presents procured for the bey, and 
were turned over to Eaton at Tunis, May 28. 2 Cap- 
tain Murray, having sent the Enterprise to Gibraltar 
with a convoy, proceeded in the Constellation off 
Tripoli, where he found the Boston and four Swedish 
frigates blockading the port. A short time before this 
the Boston had an engagement with three Tripolitan 
gunboats, one of which was sunk, while the others took 
refuse under the batteries. June 26 the Boston sailed 
for Malta to procure provisions and was to return at 
once, but did not. The eccentric Captain McNeill 
seems to have cruised elsewhere for several weeks, 
touched at Gibraltar in September, where he fell in 
with the Adams and took aboard her invalids, and 
then sailed for home, arriving at Boston in Octo- 

1 Felton, p. 265 ; Blyth, p. 97 ; Nat. Intell. Sept. 22, 1802. 

2 St. Pap. x, p. 46S ; Eaton, p. 219 ; Nat. Intell. Sept. 22, 1802. 



THE SECOND YEAR OF THE WAR 109 

ber. While in the Mediterranean he reported to 
neither Dale nor Morris. The Swedish vessels also 
went off for provisions in July, leaving the Constella- 
tion alone. 1 

One day, as she was lying about ten miles off the 
port, several Tripolitan gunboats were seen stealing 
along the shore from the westward. They had left 
Tripoli in the night to bring in an American prize 
which was expected from Tunis, but did not appear. 
In his report to the secretary of the navy, dated 
July 30, 1802, 2 Murray says: "On the 22nd in- 
stant we discovered their whole fleet of gunboats 
about three miles to leeward of the town, consisting 
of eight sail, with the Admiral's Galley, mounting 
long 24 and 18 pr. brass guns, full of men. We 
crowded all the sail we could to cut them off from the 
forts, and had nearly succeeded, but they plyed their 
oars and sails with such energy that by the time we 
got within gunshot of them we were within reach of 
the shot from their batteries, which began to fire upon 
us. However, we resolved to attack them, and stood 
on till we were within a mile and a half of the beach. 
Most of the boats had by this time got nearly on shore. 
The Admiral then began to fire upon us, as did the 
other galleys, when we rounded too in 12 fathoms of 
water (our pilot being much alarmed in standing in 
so near the land) and gave them a very severe fire 
for about half an hour, which must have done them 
considerable damage. At the same time they had an 
army of at least 6000 men drawn up along the beach 
to protect them, which our shot put to the route. As 

1 Nat. Intell. Oct. 20, 1802 ; Misc. Letters, iii, nos. 30, 42, Murray 
and Campbell to Secretary of Navy (July 30, Sept. 7, 1802). 

2 Misc. Letters, iii, uo. 36. 



110 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

the wind was in such a direction that we could not lay 
longer in our wanted position, we were obliged to 
haul off, when they got up under the walls of the 
town." 

In the same letter Murray, in speaking of the diffi- 
culties of blockading Tripoli, says : " We cannot keep 
those small galleys in port, and they being in every 
respect so like all the small craft that navigate these 
seas and lurk so near the land, that the best security 
for our commerce will be to offer convoy from port to 
port to such vessels as wish to avail of our protection, 
and if we are still to carry on this kind of warfare, be 
assured, Sir, that it will be necessary to increase our 
force with brigs or schooners which will be fully ade- 
quate to any force they can have to encounter with 
belonging to Tripoli, and they can pursue their small 
craft in any direction where frigates cannot venture, 
provided they have sweeps to row after them, for few 
of their Galleys carry more than 8 guns and 40 men. 
In the Winter season they seldom venture out, nor will 
it be safe for us to be on this station in that season." 
August 14 he wrote : " I have turned off a number of 
merchant vessels since I have been on the station, but 
the little craft from Tunis will now and then get in, 
in defiance of me, by rowing close under the land, 
and furnish them with many supplies, and I am not 
satisfied in my mind that this blockade can answer 
any good purpose." Captain Murray was inclined to 
favor the policy of buying peace with the Barbary 
powers. July 31 three Danish frigates appeared and 
remained off the town twelve days ; Murray was un- 
able to ascertain what their business was. Shortly 
after their departure the Constellation was obliged to 
repair to Malta for a temporary supply of water and 



THE SECOND YEAR OF THE WAR 111 

provisions. She had been blockading Tripoli as closely 
as possible for over two months, but as the Swedes 
had not yet returned, the town was now left entirely 
unguarded. Later it was necessary to proceed to 
Leghorn for further supplies. The Swedes soon made 
peace, and Tripoli was unmolested for the rest of the 
year. 1 

Both Eaton and Cathcart complained to the secre- 
tary of state of the reckless manner in which unarmed 
merchantmen navigated the Mediterranean at risk 
of capture. Eaton writes February 3, 1802 : " The 
Mediterranean is covered with this kind of adventurers. 
If individuals will neither have regard to their own 
safety nor the general interests of the United States, 
should not the government interdict this loose manner 
of hazarding both by legal prohibitions to commerce 
here without convoy ? One single merchantman's 
crew chained at Tripoli, would be of incalculable pre- 
judice to the affairs of the United States in that 
regency." Cathcart says, July 2, 1802, " that positive 
instructions ought to be given to all consuls in the 
Mediterranean, in order that they may know whether 
they have power to retain the vessels of their nation 
in port, as the consuls of other nations have." Their 
apprehensions were justified June 17 by the capture 
of the brig Franklin of Philadelphia, Captain Andrew 
Morris, off Cape Palos, by one of two Tripolitan 
corsairs which had put into Algiers for supplies 
a week before, having recently, with three others, 
slipped out of Tripoli ; another American escaped. 
These corsairs were described by Consul O'Brien as 
" row galleys, with three lateen sails, each having 

1 Misc. Letters, iii, nos. 36, 38, 48, Murray to Secretary of Navy 
(July 30, Aug. 14, Nov. 7, 1802). 



112 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

four guns ; one a crew of forty men, the other of 
thirty-five." On the 26th the captor returned to Al- 
giers with the prize and with her crew of nine in 
chains. O'Brien demanded the release of vessel and 
crew on the ground that Algiers had guaranteed the 
treaty between the United States and Tripoli, but did 
not succeed in bringing the dey to his view of the 
matter ; still the dey finally ordered the corsair and 
her prize away from Algiers. They then proceeded 
to Biserta, near Tunis. Eaton exerted himself zeal- 
ously for the relief of the captives, but was not even 
allowed to see them. The bey, however, would not 
permit them to be transported by land through his 
dominions. The Franklin was left at Tunis and after- 
wards sold to the commercial agent of the bey. Pre- 
sumably she was the American prize which the gun- 
boats chased by the Constellation were expecting. 
The corsair returned to Tripoli with the captives, 
arriving July 19, apparently unobserved by the Con- 
stellation ; but Captain Murray was promptly in- 
formed of the affair by Consul Nissen. Five of the 
prisoners were liberated, being foreign subjects. The 
captain and three seamen were held. Their release 
was claimed under the agreement in regard to ex- 
change of prisoners between Commodore Dale and 
the pasha, when the Tripolitan soldiers were given 
up the year before ; but this was not allowed. They 
were finally liberated in October, 1802, through the 
influence of Algiers, at an expense of sixty-five hun- 
dred dollars. 1 

Some merchantmen, however, were able to take 

1 St. Pap. iv, pp. 454-465 ; For. Rel. ii, pp. 461-463 ; Felton, p. 273 ; 
Morris, pp. 59-61 ; Nat. Intell. Feb. 18, 1803 ; Misc. Letters, iii, no. 
35, Nissen to Eaton (July 27, 1802). 



THE SECOND YEAR OF THE WAR 113 

care of themselves. A few months after the capture 
of the Franklin, the ship Jason of Boston, Captain 
William G. Weld, was attacked by pirates off Tunis. 
She not only beat them off, but recaptured two Ameri- 
can vessels that had previously been taken by them. 1 

Commodore Morris arrived at Gibraltar May 25, 
1802. Having sprung his mainmast on the voyage, 
he was kindly allowed by the British admiral to refit 
at the navy-yard. He found the Essex blockading the 
Meshuda, the larger of the two Tripolitan cruisers at 
Gibraltar ; what had become of the other does not ap- 
pear. The Essex was detained until the repairs on the 
Chesapeake were completed, and sailed for the United 
States June 17. The trouble with Morocco was begin- 
ning to look serious. The emperor wished to send 
wheat to Tripoli, and for that purpose requested pass- 
ports of James Simpson, the United States consul at 
Tangier, and also demanded the release of the Meshuda. 
He had been urging these measures for several months, 
and was now beginning to threaten. His naval force 
was insignificant, but he was fitting out a few new 
vessels on which he placed great hopes. Simpson had 
resisted the demands, but was now inclined to yield, 
and appealed to Morris, who refused to give his con- 
sent, pointing out the absurdity of blockading Tripoli 
and then giving passports to ships carrying wheat to 
that port. Thereupon the emperor declared war, and 
Simpson withdrew to Gibraltar June 25. 2 

The Chesapeake was now alone at Gibraltar, and 
nothing had been heard from Murray, McNeill, or 
Sterrett. Under the circumstances the necessity of 

1 MS. Record of Weld family. 

- St. Pap. iv, pp. 465-471 ; For. Rel. ii, pp. 464-466; Morris, pp. 
26-: J ,2. 



114 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

remaining on the spot, watching the movements of 
Morocco, blockading the Tripolitan cruiser, and look- 
ing out for the safety of Americans entering the Medi- 
terranean, seemed apparent to the commodore. He 
suggested to the United States ministers at London, 
Paris, and Madrid that American merchantmen should 
rendezvous at Cadiz, whence he might give them con- 
vey from time to time through the Straits. The Enter- 
prise arrived from the eastward about the middle of 
July, and was employed in convoying merchantmen. 
The Adams, which had been long expected, arrived at 
last, July 22, with orders for Morris, dated April 20, 1 
to lay the whole squadron before Tripoli, accompanied 
by Consul Cathcart, who was authorized to treat for 
peace with the pasha. It was thought that the naval 
display would make a decided impression and aid in 
procuring favorable terms. The secretary, however, 
adds : " Although I have directed you to lay your 
whole force before Tripoli, you will yet consider your- 
self authorized, should you deem it necessary, to leave 
one vessel to watch the motions of the Emperor of 
Morocco, and to prevent the escape of the Tripolitan 
vessel at Gibraltar." The emperor had already as- 
sumed a less hostile attitude, evidently impressed by 
the proximity of the Chesapeake, which had visited 
Tangier, and he had invited Simpson to return. The 
consul thereupon returned to his post at Tangier on 
the Enterprise, as soon as the Adams arrived. The 
emperor now demanded annual presents, under the 
pretense that they had been stipulated, which Simp- 
son proved to be untrue. It was clear that the hostil- 
ity of Morocco would break forth again as soon as the 
Straits were left unprotected. August 17, leaving the 
1 Morris, p. 33. 



THE SE< '>.::> VJ.'.Ji 01 THE WAR 115 

Adams, Captain Campbell, at Gibraltar, Morris sailed 
for Leghorn with the Chesapeake and Enterprise and 
v bound to intermediate ports. Orders 
were left with Consul Gavino for the Boston, which 
had been reported to be at Malta in Jul 
directly to America. Just after the commodore's de- 
parture the emperor of Mo imed the Me 
as bis property and demanded that she be rel< 
and given passports by Simpson and other consuls at 
Tangier. l\><; consuls refused. The emperor sent 
thirty Moors from Tetuan to take possession of the 
ship. Captain Campbell wrote to Simpson : " With 

set to the Emperor's pretensions to the Tripolean 
ship, I have only to observe that unless they are 
accompanied with vouchers sufficient to prove her his 
property, I am determined to prevent her leaving this 
place, nor can anything less than your passport alter 
my determination ; " and ho urged "the aecessity of 
coming to a better understanding with the Emperor 

cting the ship." ] 
Morris, having cruised along the north shore of the 
Mediterranean, visiting several ports, arrived at Leg- 
horn October 12, and there found the Constellation. 
He received a letter from Cathcart, who was opposed 
to any payment whatever for a peace with Tripoli. 
1 he Constellation was ordered to Toulon for needed 
repair-,, thence, to Gibraltar to procure supplies for 

squadron. Captain Murray was authorized to 
instruct Simpson "to grant passports to vessels hound 
to Tripoli laden with wheat." This retreat of the com- 
modore from his former position in regard to passport-, 

1 St. Pap. iv. pp. 471-480; For. Rel. ii. pp. 166 169; Morris, pp. 
•'!">-•%; Misc. Letters, iii. no. 12, Campbell to Sec. of Navy (Sept. T 
1802). 



116 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

was due to his fear of war with Morocco and to Mur- 
ray's statement that provisions in Tripoli were plenty 
and cheap, which made the entrance of wheat into 
that port of less importance. Nissen had reported 
that the grain crop of Tripoli was unusually abundant 
that year. 1 Murray was instructed to proceed from 
Gibraltar to Malta with the Constellation and any 
other American vessels he might meet, except the 
Adams, which was to remain in the Straits. In a letter 
to the secretary of the navy, dated October 15, 2 Morris 
called attention to the necessity of a formidable force 
in the Mediterranean, and also of small vessels like 
the Enterprise, which could operate in shoal water 
and along shore. He doubted if gunboats could be 
purchased on account of the unwillingness of nations 
at peace with the Barbary powers to give offense by 
selling vessels to be used against them. 

The Enterprise was directed to convoy merchant- 
men to Gibraltar, and the Chesapeake proceeded to 
Malta, arriving there November 20. She was again 
in need of repairs, it being found that her bowsprit 
"was decayed more than five inches in, and the rot 
extended thirty -five feet." The commodore was al- 
lowed to refit from the British stores at Malta. He 
here had an interview with an emissary of Hamet 
Karamanli, but was not favorably disposed toward the 
scheme for restoring the ex-pasha. Hamet had gone 
to Derne in August. In December the Enterprise 
arrived with dispatches, dated August 28, 3 which had 
come by the John Adams, and which gave Morris full 
powers to act with Cathcart, or independently in 
making peace with Tripoli and negotiating with any 
other Barbary power, if necessary. The sum of twenty 

1 Misc. Letters, iii, no. 35. 2 Morris, p. 40. 8 Ibid. p. 45. 



THE SECOND YEAR OF THE WAR 117 

thousand dollars was to be sent him to facilitate these 
measures, but was to be used only if clearly indispens- 
able. Eaton was not to be considered an authorized 
agent of the government in affairs relating to Tripoli, 
and whatever engagements he may have made with 
Ilamet were not to stand in the way of peace nego- 
tiations with his brother. Morris was " instructed to 
protect our commerce by all the means in your power 
against the armed vessels of any Barbary State that 
may either declare or wage war against us," and was 
given discretion in the distribution of his force. One 
hundred gun-carriages, which the emperor of Morocco 
had ordered and was to pay for, and which the Presi- 
dent had decided to send to him as a present, were 
to be withheld for a time, on account of his having 
declared war. 1 

The New York, on arriving in the Mediterranean, 
proceeded first to Algiers, where she delivered to 
Consul O'Brien thirty thousand dollars, which it was 
hoped the dey would take in payment of his annual 
dues instead of naval stores. Being badly in need of 
repairs, the frigate then put into Port Mahon to refit. 
She finally arrived at Malta late in December, short 
of provisions. The John Adams, on her arrival, was 
detained at Malaga by Captain Murray, sent her dis- 
patche's to the commodore by the Enterprise, and at 
last proceeded herself, arriving at Malta January 5, 
1803. She brought a letter from the secretary of the 
navy, dated October 23, 2 directing the Chesapeake 
and Constellation to return to the United States at 
once. The commodore was to transfer his fla<r to the 
New York or John Adams. Captain Murray, who 

1 St. Pap. iv, p. 465. 

2 Morris, p. 57. 



118 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

read this letter at Malaga, soon sailed for home, in 
obedience to the order. The Chesapeake, however, 
was not in a fit condition for an Atlantic voyage in 
winter, and was detained. She had been to Syracuse 
for provisions, but without success, and returned to 
Malta the day the order arrived. 

Commodore Morris now had with him at Malta his 
flagship the Chesapeake, Lieutenant Chauncey, the 
New York, Captain James Barron, the John Adams, 
Captain Rodgers, and the Enterprise, Lieutenant Ster- 
rett. The Adams, Captain Campbell, was at Gibraltar. 
The court summoned a year later to inquire into 
Morris's conduct found no fault with his proceedings 
up to this time, and their first charge relates to his 
remaining at Malta from January 5 to 30, instead 
of blockading Tripoli. Morris says : " The John 
Adams, which had brought provisions from Gibraltar, 
wanted caulking, aud it was necessary to distribute 
the provisions she brought. These things were not 
completed till the 25th. The persons employed to 
gain intelligence from Tripoli gave notice that their 
cruisers were returned to port and that they were 
about to haul up their gunboats. It was therefore use- 
less to make the parade of blockading -partially by 
three frigates a port which was blockaded effectually 
by the elements." 1 At this time disquieting news 
came from Algiers and Morocco, the former in a 
letter from O'Brien which stated that the dey was 
unwilling to take cash in place of naval stores, and 
refused to receive Cathcart as consul, O'Brien having 
resigned. Eaton also urgently desired the commodore's 
presence at Tunis. Morris's new responsibilities as 
negotiator with the various Barbary powers seem to 

1 Morris, p. 59. 



THE SECOND YEAR OF THE WAR 119 

have weighed heavily upon him, and these letters 
caused him uneasiness. 

Having learned that a polacca called the Paulina, 
under the Imperial flag, had left Malta bound to 
Tripoli, the commodore sent out the Enterprise to 
cruise for her, and she was brought in January 17. 
The prize carried some Tunisian property in her 
cargo, which made trouble later, and the Imperial 
consul also took an active interest in the affair. Morris 
wished to have the prize tried at once, but as there 
was no admiralty court at Malta, it was necessary to 
wait for an opportunity to take the case to Gibraltar 
or to the United States. The question subsequently 
arose whether the owner of the alleged Tripolitan 
portion of the cargo, a Jew named Valenzin, was 
really a subject of Tripoli. His property having been 
sold, he went to America to urge his claim against 
the government. The Committee on Claims of the 
House of Representatives gave hearings, but before 
the matter was settled Valenzin became discouraged 
and committed suicide. 1 

January 30 the commodore sent the Enterprise 
to Tunis with a letter to Eaton, and sailed himself 
with the three frigates, intending to display the squad- 
ron before Tripoli ; and then, if Cathcart's overtures 
of peace were unsuccessful, his plan was to send in 
the ships' boats and attempt to burn the shipping in 
the harbor. From the time he left port heavy gales 
from the northwest and southwest rendered approach 
to either Tripoli or Tunis impossible. On the 9th of 
February the ships were reduced to reefed foresails and 
storm staysails, and Morris feared that the Chesapeake 

1 Morris, pp. 62, 09 ; Claims, pp. 2SS, 292-29G ; Nat. Intell. Jan. 1, 
1S0G. 



120 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

would lose her masts. On the 10th, there being no 
moderation of the weather, he returned to Malta. It 
continued to blow heavily until the 19th. 

During this stay at Malta a duel was fought be- 
tween Midshipman Joseph Bainbridge of the New 
York, a brother of Captain Bainbridge, and the secre- 
tary of Sir Alexander Ball, governor of Malta. The 
Englishman had gone out of his way to insult Bain- 
bridge, who knocked him down, and the next day 
received a challenge. Decatur heard of the affair, 
and, knowing that the Englishman was an experienced 
duelist, offered to act as second to Bainbridge, who 
was wholly ignorant of such matters. Decatur chose 
pistols and prescribed the distance of four yards, 
feeling sure that if they fought at the usual distance 
of ten paces, Bainbridge would be killed. The Eng- 
lishman's second objected to this, whereupon Decatur 
offered to take Bainbridge's place and fight at ten 
paces, but declared that he would not allow his prin- 
cipal, an inexperienced boy, to be put at such a dis- 
advantage. This offer was declined, and the duel took 
place on Decatur's terms. After the order " Aim," 
they fired together at the word " Fire," and neither 
was hurt. The Englishman was not satisfied, so they 
fired again, and he was killed. The governor demanded 
that Decatur and Bainbridge should be surrendered to 
the authorities for trial in the civil courts, but the 
squadron soon sailed and the matter was dropped. 1 
A few months before this, Captain McKnight of the 
marines, of the Constellation, a brother-in-law of Deca- 
tur, was killed in a duel by one of the lieutenants of 
that ship. 2 

By this time, February 19, the squadron was getting 
1 Decatur, pp. 55-59. 2 Misc. Letters, iii, no. 48. 



THE SECOND YEAR OF THE WAR 121 

short of provisions, none could be procured at Malta 
or Syracuse, and the store-ships from the United States 
refused to bring supplies farther than Gibraltar. It 
would also be necessary soon to send the Chesapeake 
home, according to orders. The commodore therefore 
felt obliged to give up his projected designs against 
Tripoli, and decided to return to Gibraltar by way of 
Tunis and Algiers. He believed that if he had had 
provisions he could have remained longer, and in the 
spring could have destroyed most, if not all, of the 
cruisers of Tripoli. He was much disappointed when 
the Constellation's orders compelled her to return to 
America, instead of bringing him provisions, as he had 
expected. 

The squadron sailed from Malta February 19, and 
arrived in Tunis Bay on the 22d. Eaton came aboard 
and reported that affairs were in a critical state. The 
bey was making trouble about the Paulina, captured 
by the Enterprise in January. He insisted on the 
immediate restitution of the Tunisian property carried 
in her, and would not await the result of admiralty 
proceedings. On the 28th the commodore, with Cap- 
tain Rodgers, Cathcart, who had accompanied the 
squadron, and Eaton, had an audience with the bey, 
and finally agreed to give up any property which the 
papers of the prize showed to belong to Tunis. The 
bey's commercial agent examined the papers, and an 
agreement was reached, but a few days later the agent 
made fresh demands. The commodore yielded, and 
then, to prevent further imposition, he proceeded to 
embark without paying a farewell visit to the bey. 
Thereupon the commercial agent detained him and 
demanded the payment of a loan which had been ad- 
vanced to Eaton. This sum, amounting to twenty-two 



122 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

thousand dollars, had been used by Eaton in further- 
ing his plans with regard to Hamet Karamanli, and 
he had reported it to the state department four 
months before, hoping to have the expenditure allowed 
by the government. He had told the commercial 
agent that he had hopes of a remittance by the first 
United States vessel that appeared, and the agent 
now told Morris that Eaton had promised that he 
(Morris) would pay the loan. This Eaton emphatic- 
ally denied. The commodore was very angry at his 
detention, for which he blamed Eaton, and in his re- 
port of March 30, 1803, to the secretary of the navy, 
accused him of duplicity, with evident injustice. He 
paid the money, and for his security Eaton made an 
assignment to the government of the United States 
of his whole property. The next day they all had 
another audience with the bey, at which various affairs 
were warmly discussed, and which ended in Eaton's 
being ordered by the bey to leave his dominions. The 
commodore returned to his ship and sent ashore the 
twenty-two thousand dollars in charge of Dr. George 
Davis of the navy, who was to represent the United 
States at Tunis until a new consul should be appointed. 
March 10 the squadron sailed with Eaton and Cath- 
cart as passengers. 1 

The squadron arrived off Algiers March 19. The 
Enterprise ran in and brought off Consul O'Brien, 
who reported the condition of affairs and returned on 
shore with a letter from the commodore to the dey. 
The dey still refused to receive thirty thousand dollars 
in lieu of naval stores, although it was represented to 
him that there might be long delay in procuring the 

1 Morris, pp. 70-80 ; Eaton, pp. 235, 238-242 ; Claims, pp. 303, 304, 
331. 



THE SECOND YEAR OF THE WAIL 123 

latter. At the same time he would not allow the money 
to be returned to the commodore. He also refused to 
receive Cathcart as consul. The squadron then sailed 
for Gibraltar, and arrived March 23. All the vessels 
took in supplies, and a new crew was recruited for 
the Enterprise, Lieutenant Hull taking command of 
her. The claim of the emperor of Morocco to the 
Meshuda, the Tripolitan vessel at Gibraltar, as his 
property, was now allowed, and she was furnished with 
consular passports and permitted to depart. April 6 
the commodore shifted his pennant to the New York, 
taking with him Captain Chauncey ; David Porter 
was first lieutenant of the ship. Captain Barron of 
the New York took command of the Chesapeake, 
and the next day sailed for the United States with 
Sterrett, Decatur, and Bainbridge as passengers. It 
was considered inadvisable for the two latter to re- 
main longer in the Mediterranean at that time on 
account of the duel at Malta. On the 8th the Adams 
sailed with a convoy of merchantmen, under orders 
to proceed to Malta by way of Leghorn. On the 11th 
the New York, John Adams, and Enterprise set sail, 
bound for Malta. 

Eaton sailed for the United States March 30 in 
the ship Perseverance, and arrived in Boston May 5. 
The affairs of the exiled pasha, Hamet, had not made 
much progress up to this time. His presence at Malta 
had caused a good deal of uneasiness in Tripoli, but 
he finally decided to accept his brother's offer of the 
government of Derne, although Eaton continued to 
oppose it. Captain Murray became more favorably 
disposed towards Hamet, and in August, 1802, offered 
to take him across to Derne, but he preferred going 
in an English vessel that he had chartered, and did 



124 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

so. Commodore Morris had interviews with Hamet's 
agents at Malta and at Tunis. He declined to ad- 
vance money, but offered to furnish twenty barrels of 
powder. He was informed that Harnet could raise 
thirty thousand men. The secretary of state, James 
Madison, had written to both Eaton and Cathcart on 
the subject in the summer of 1802, expressing the 
opinion of the administration that advantage might 
be taken of Hamet's claim to create a diversion in 
Tripoli and so force the pasha's abdication ; or if an 
opportunity offered to make an advantageous peace 
with Yusuf, then Hamet must be treated with kind- 
ness and consideration, and if possible favorable terms 
in his interest must be extorted from his brother. 
Further than this the administration was not willing 
to involve itself in Hamet's affairs. 1 

i St. Pap. v, pp. 162, 397-401; Eaton, pp. 222, 223, 242; Morris, 
pp. 43, 47, 51, 69, 80, 31. 



CHAPTER IX 

OPERATIONS BEFORE TRIPOLI IN THE SUMMER 
OF 1803 

On the passage from Gibraltar to Malta an accident 
happened on hoard the New York which nearly ended 
in disaster. Through the carelessness of the gunner 
a quantity of powder was exploded near the magazine. 
Nineteen officers and men were injured, of whom four- 
teen died, including the gunner. Bulkheads were blown 
down and the ship was on fire and full of smoke below. 
The captain ordered the drummer to beat the crew to 
quarters, the men went quietly to their stations, and 
perfect discipline prevailed ; but they were then thrown 
into confusion by an order of the commodore to hoist 
out the boats. It was a critical moment, and no one 
knew how soon the flames would reach the magazine. 
Captain Chauncey then bravely led the way below, and, 
assisted by Lieutenant Porter and other volunteers, 
succeeded in putting out the fire with wet blankets and 
buckets of water. 1 

The squadron arrived at Malta May 1, 1803, and 
the New York was there detained, repairing the dam- 
age done by the explosion and taking in fresh stores. 
The Enterprise also was hove out and newly coppered. 
These matters consumed nearly three weeks. The John 
Adams, however, was ready for service, and on the 3d 
was sent to cruise off Tripoli. Soon after reaching her 

1 For the events of this chapter, see Nav. Chron. pp. 203-212; 
Morris, pp. 92-98; Cooper, i, ch. xix ; Porter, ch. iv. 



126 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

station she captured the Tripolitan ship Meshutla, 
flying the colors of Morocco. This vessel, as soon as 
released from her long blockade at Gibraltar, had gone 
to Tunis, taken on military and naval stores, and was 
attempting to run into Tripoli when intercepted by 
the John Adams. Captain llodgers returned to Malta 
with his prize on the 18th. Meanwhile the commodore 
had received a letter from Dr. Davis, charge d'affaires 
at Tunis, dated March 24, stating that there was " a 
strong armament fitting out at Tunis, and that a junc- 
tion was intended between the fleet of that power and 
the Algerines," 1 apparently with the purpose of preying 
upon American commerce as soon as some pretext 
could be found for declaring war. This information 
caused him a good deal of anxiety, but Tripoli de- 
manded his first attention, and on May 20 the New 
York, John Adams, and Enterprise sailed for their 
station off that port. 

On approaching the town eleven small lateen-rigged 
coasting vessels, convoyed by several gunboats, were 
seen close in shore, making for the port. The New 
York immediately gave chase, and succeeded in cutting 
off the coasters, which put into the port of Old Tripoli, 
a short distance from the main town. The gunboats, 
by using their sweeps, escaped into the harbor and 
under the batteries of Tripoli. Preparations were at 
once made for the defense of the coasting vessels. A 
large stone building close to the shore was occupied 
by soldiers, and as soon as darkness came on the car- 
goes of the vessels, composed of sacks of wheat, were 
used in the construction of breastworks on each side 
of the building. They were manned by heavy rein- 
forcements from the town, and at high tide the vessels 

1 N;iv. Chron. p. 204. 



IN THE SUMMER OF 1803 127 

were hauled up on the beach, close under these de- 
fenses. 

Lieutenant Porter volunteered to take in a boat 
party that night, and attempt the destruction of the 
enemy's vessels, but the commodore was unwilling to 
risk what might be a serious loss of life, preferring an 
attack by day, when the ships' batteries could cooper- 
ate, lie, however, permitted a reconnaissance, which 
Porter did in a single boat with muffled oars. He 
gained little information and did not discover the 
defensive operations of the enemy. He was seen and 
fired upon, but came off without injury. The next 
day an attack was made by the boats of the squadron 
under Porter's command. The enemy had a large force, 
including cavalry, and poured in a hot fire upon the 
boats as they approached, and being concealed behind 
the defenses, suffered little on their part. Boats in 
those days were not provided with howitzers, which 
would doubtless have been very effective against the 
improvised breastworks. The Americans landed on the 
beach so close to these works that they were pelted 
with stones by the Tripolitans, but they nevertheless 
set fire to all the coasting vessels. They then reem- 
barked and withdrew in two divisions, to the right and 
left, so as to give the ships an opportunity to open 
fire. A heavy fire was thereupon thrown in, but the 
Tripolitans, with reckless courage, rushed out from 
behind their defenses, put out the fire, and saved their 
shipping. The Americans lost ;i dozen or fifteen in 
killed and wounded. Porter was shot through the left 
thigh and slightly wounded in the right. The conduct 
of officers and men was highly praiseworthy, Lieuten- 
ant James Lawrence and Midshipman John Downes 
being especially commended. The loss of the enemy 



128 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

was unknown, but was thought to be severe. Porter, 
although wounded, proposed another attack with the 
boats, but the commodore would not consent. It was 
believed that had the night attack been allowed and a 
force landed before the breastworks were built and the 
vessels hauled up, they could have been destroyed. 

The Adams joined the squadron May 26. On the 
28th an attack was made on the gunboats off Tripoli. 
These boats were lateen rigged. Some of the larger 
ones carried in the bow a brass gun eleven and a half 
feet long, throwing a twenty-nine pound shot, and two 
howitzers aft. They were moored behind the rocks at 
the entrance to the harbor and outside the mole. The 
John Adams was sent in first and opened fire. The 
New York and Adams were unable, on account of the 
lightness of the wind, to place themselves so as to fire 
without endangering the John Adams, and the gun- 
boats withdrew with little injury. Commodore Morris 
was charged with mismanagement in the disposition 
of his force, and says in his justification : " It was my 
wish and intention to destroy the enemy and their 
boats, and if the disposition of the ships was not at 
one time exactly as I could have wished it to have 
been, still I cannot impute it to myself as an offense, 
but to causes that I could not control. The same 
might, and no doubt has happened to abler and better 
seamen than myself ; the escape of the enemy, under 
their batteries, was entirely owing to the calmness of 
the weather and the fast approach of night." 1 

The next day Commodore Morris opened negotia- 
tions through Mr. Nissen, the Danish consul. A few 
days later, on receiving assurances of his safety, he 
landed and had one or two interviews with the pasha's 
1 Nav. Chron. p. 211. 



IN THE SUMMER OF 1803 129 

minister, Mohammed Dgliies. Morris offered five 
thousand dollars as a consular present and an addi- 
tional sum of ten thousand at the end of five years. 
The pasha demanded two hundred thousand dollars 
and the expenses of the war. Negotiations were there- 
upon broken off, and the commodore returned to his 
ship June 8. On the 10th he sailed for Malta with 
the New York and Enterprise, leaving the John 
Adams and Adams to blockade Tripoli. The Enter- 
prise soon returned and joined the blockaders. 

On the evening of June 21 some commotion was 
noticed in the harbor which seemed to indicate that 
preparations were being made to send off a cruiser or 
to assist in running a vessel in. Accordingly Captain 
Rodgers, the senior officer present, in order more effect- 
ually to control the approaches to the port, sent the 
Adams to the westward and the Enterprise to 
the eastward, while he himself in the John Adams 
lay directly off the town. At six o'clock in the 
morning Lieutenant Hull of the Enterprise discov- 
ered a large vessel running for Tripoli. The Enter- 
prise at once ran in and intercepted the enemy, and, 
although less than half her size, drove her into a small 
bay for shelter. At half-past seven Captain Rodgers 
saw the Enterprise flying a signal which he could 
not distinguish, and making sail ran down to her, 
when Hull communicated the state of affairs. The 
two vessels then stood in close. In his report to the 
secretary of the navy * Rodgers says : " At half- 
past 8 A. M. shortened sail and prepared to anchor 
with springs on our cables, discovering that the enemy 
was anchored with springs on his cables in a deep, 
narrow bay about five or six leagues to the eastward 

1 Nav. Chron. p. 208. 



130 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

of the town and in a situation very advantageous to 
the defense of their ship. At the same time observed 
nine gunboats, close in with the shore, coming to her 
assistance, and a vast number of cavalry and armed 
men on the beach. At seven minutes before 9 A. M., 
being in seven fathoms water and supposing we were 
within point-blank shot, commenced firing, which the 
enemy returned and a constant fire was maintained 
on both sides for forty-five minutes, when the enemy's 
fire was silenced ; at which instant the crew aban- 
doned the ship in the most confused and precipitate 
manner, such as her boats could not carry leaping 
overboard. At this moment, being in a quarter less 
than five fathoms water and the rocks appearing 
under our bottom and in every direction around us, 
I thought it would be prudent to wear and lay the 
ship's head off shore, and in the mean time ordered 
Lieutenant Hull to stand as close in as consisted with 
safety and amuse the enemy on the beach until our 
boats could be hoisted out to take possession. At a 
quarter before 10 A. M., discovering one of the enemy's 
boats returning to the ship whilst in the act of hoist- 
ing out ours, tacked and renewed our fire, and in a 
few minutes after had the satisfaction to see the 
enemy's colors hauled down, at the same time firing 
both their broadsides, which was accompanied by the 
ship's blowing up with a tremendous explosion which 
burst the hull to pieces and forced the main and mizen 
masts one hundred and fifty or one hundred and sixty 
feet perpendicularly into the air, with all the yards, 
shrouds, stays, &c. belonging to them. This ship was 
polacre rigged, mounting 22 guns, and the largest 
cruiser belonging to Tripoli, to appearance a very 
fine vessel ; and from the number of persons we saw 



IN THE SUMMER OF 1803 131 

abandon her, her crew must have consisted of upwards 
of two hundred men. All the men who returned to 
the ship were blown up in her, and I have reason to 
believe her captain was among the number, as well as 
many lives lost before they abandoned her, as we saw 
several shot-holes through her. Immediately after the 
ship blew up I ordered the signal made to chase the 
gunboats, but was not able to approach them within 
gun-shot, owing to the water being very shoal a great 
distance seaward of them." 

With the Meshuda and the cruiser just destroyed 
out of the way, Morris believed that Tripoli was no 
longer to be feared on the sea, and that the blockade 
was now unnecessary. Moreover, the squadron had 
no efficient means of attacking the enemy's gunboats, 
which, on their part, might be very dangerous to the 
frigates in case of these vessels becoming becalmed. 
On the other hand, in view of the activity of Algiers 
and Tunis, he considered the presence of the squadron 
in the western Mediterranean to be important. He 
feared also that the emperor of Morocco, out of re- 
sentment at the capture of the Meshuda, might declare 
war again, in the absence of any naval force in his 
vicinity. The term of enlistment of the Adams's crew 
had expired, which made it necessary, in his opinion, 
to send that ship home at once, and his fear of the 
united fleets of Algiers and Tunis was such that he 
dared not trust her to make the voyage alone. In 
view of all these considerations he raised the blockade 
of Tripoli June 26, and collected his whole force at 
Malta. 

The squadron, with the Meshuda, left Malta July 
11, proceeding to Messina and Naples. Here the 
commodore conferred with Sir John Acton, chief 



132 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

minister of the king of the Two Sicilies, and obtained 
certain concessions to American commerce, and per- 
mission to refit United States ships in some port of 
the kingdom, in case Malta should prove unsuitable 
for that purpose. He also made arrangements for the 
reception and maintenance of such prisoners as the 
Americans might capture. A request for the loan of 
ten gunboats and two bomb-ketches, to be used in 
attacking Tripoli, was declined on account of the 
uncertain relations of Sicily towards England and 
France, but it was promised that they should be loaned 
the next year if the king's neutrality could be pre- 
served. 1 

Leaving Naples August 3, the squadron arrived at 
Leghorn on the 13th. Here the commodore learned 
that the corsairs of Algiers and Tunis were in port, 
and so no longer to be feared. The Enterprise was 
sent to Malta for dispatches said to have been for- 
warded there ; the John Adams was sent with convoy 
to Gibraltar, and the Adams to Tunis with Consul 
Cathcart, and thence to Gibraltar. Cathcart had in- 
structions from the secretary of state, dated April 9, 
1803, to offer the bey of Tunis, but only if it seemed 
necessary for the preservation of peace, tribute not 
exceeding ten thousand dollars a year, to be paid 
biennially in cash and not in naval stores. The bey's 
demand for a frigate was to be refused. The sum of 
twenty thousand dollars was allowed for a peace with 
Tripoli, to be followed by the same periodical pay- 
ments as in the case of Tunis. This was to be a pri- 
vate arrangement and not incorporated in the treaty. 
The secretary of state believed that tribute would be 
necessary to secure peace with the pasha of Tripoli, 

1 Morris, p. 96. 



IN THE SUMMER OF 1803 133 

because " all the other nations at war with him have 
yielded to the customary terms of peace," and for the 
United States to hold out alone would entail " a very 
great expense." It was foreseen that such an arrange- 
ment with Tripoli would lead to demands from Tunis, 
and it was therefore thought that it might be best to 
make the offer first to Tunis, and that this would 
facilitate negotiations with Tripoli. This yielding of 
prineiple instead of sending increased armaments was 
only laying the foundation for future trouble ; but 
fortunately it came to nothing, for the bey of Tunis 
rejected the terms. He also refused to receive Cath- 
cart as consul. He continued his demand for the 
frigate, which called forth from the President, Janu- 
ary 27, 1804, a letter whieh, although still resisting 
this demand, is expressed in language too deferential, 
and in which Cathcart's behavior, complained of by 
the bey, is disclaimed in an apologetic way. 1 

Commodore Morris left Leghorn in the New York, 
August 31, 1803, and reached Malaga September 9. 
On the 12th he received by the Nautilus a letter 
from the secretary of the navy, dated June 21, which 
announced his suspension and ordered him to return 
at once to the United States in the Adams, leaving 
the other vessels under the command of Captain 
Rodgers. The message was short and curt. Morris 
says : " The style of this letter and the manner in 
which it was transmitted are calculated to wound, as 
much as the occasion would permit, the officer to 
whom it is addi^essed." 2 The John Adams and the 
Adams arrived in the Straits soon after this. Rodders 

1 St. Pap. v. ,.. 132 ; For. Kel. ii, p. 701 ; Eaton, pp. 25G-2G0 ; Cath- 
cart, I, pp. 287 293. 

2 Morris, p. 98. 



134 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

hoisted his pennant on the New York, Campbell took 
the John Adams, and Morris sailed home in the 
Adams September 25, arriving November 21, 1803. 
Commodore Rodgers's command was of short dura- 
tion. The squadron of Commodore Preble was already 
arriving, and Rodgers's orders were to return to the 
United States as soon as he was relieved. 

After his return Morris was called to account for 
his proceedings in the Mediterranean, and his explana- 
tions not being satisfactory, a court of inquiry was 
called by an order of the secretary of the navy, dated 
March 10, 1804. The warrant set forth that " a close 
and vigorous blockade of the port of Tripoli hath 
not been made, and all practicable means have not 
been used to annoy the enemy, concerning the cause 
of which disobedience and neglect we think it neces- 
sary that inquiry should be made." The court was 
composed of Captain Samuel Barron, president, Cap- 
tain Hugh G. Campbell, and Lieutenant John Cassin, 
members, all of whom were the juniors in rank of 
Commodore Morris. Walter Jones, Jr., Esq., was 
judge-advocate. The court reported April 13, 1804, 
" That the said Captain Morris did not conduct him- 
self in his command of the Mediterranean squadron 
with the diligence or activity necessary to execute 
the important duties of his station ; but that he is 
censurable for his inactive and dilatory conduct of the 
squadron under his command." 1 President Jefferson, 
having received this report, wrote to Secretary Smith, 
April 27 : "I now return you the sentence of the 
court of inquiry in Morris's case. What is the next 
step? I am not military jurist enough to say. But 
if it be a court-martial to try and pass the proper 
1 Morris, pp. 9-13 J Nav. Chron. pp. 205-207. 



IN THE SUMMER OF 1803 135 

sentence on him, pray let it be done without delay, 
while our captains are here. This opportunity of 
having a court should not be lost." 1 The opportunity 
was lost, however, for what reason it is now difficult 
to say. May 16 the secretary of the navy wrote to 
Morris as follows : " With my letter to you of the 
2nd instant I transmitted to you a copy of the opinion 
of the Court of Inquiry appointed to enquire into your 
conduct as commanding officer of the late squadron of 
armed vessels of the United States in the Mediter- 
ranean. This opinion having satisfied the President 
that it is not the public interest that you should be 
longer continued in command in the navy of the 
United States, I have it in charge from him to inform 
you that he has revoked your commission." 2 This 
abrupt dismissal from the service was arbitrary and 
out of proportion to his offense, which at the worst was 
inefficiency ; and moreover he was fairly entitled to 
a court-martial. 

Morris had a good reputation as an officer, and 
appears to have conscientiously performed his duty to 
the best of his ability, but he was not equal to the 
responsibility of flag rank. Doubtless he would have 
made a creditable record as captain of a frigate under 
Truxtun, if that officer had not declined the command 
of the squadron. It was unfortunate that he did de- 
cline, for the history of the squadron might have been 
a different one and the war have been brought earlier 
to an end with Truxtun at the head. Morris was not 
wholly to blame for the meagreness of the results. He 
had many difficulties to contend with. Most of his 
vessels were sent out in a state of imperfect prepara- 

1 Ford's Jefferson, viii. p. 301. 

2 Officers of Ships of War, vi, p. 432. 



136 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

tion, and much time was wasted in repairs that should 
have been made and carefully supervised by responsi- 
ble officers in the home navy-yards. He says in regard 
to the Chesapeake's mainmast : " It certainly was a 
shameful neglect in the carpenter employed at Norfolk 
not to have discovered the defect in that mast. There 
are also a number of smaller spars defective." 1 The 
arrangements for supplying the squadron also, making 
it necessary to return from Malta to Gibraltar for 
provisions, wasted much time ; the captains of the 
store-ships refused to go beyond Gibraltar, because 
their contracts did not oblige them to. Furthermore, 
the squadron was seriously weakened by the recall of 
the Constellation and Chesapeake. After making due 
allowance, however, the fact remains that very little 
was accomplished. A commander of first-rate ability 
rises above difficulties and overcomes them. 

Heretofore the Americans had been at a disadvan- 
tage for lack of small vessels, which were necessary to 
make the blockade more effective and to pursue and 
engage in shallow waters the gunboats of the enemy, 
which were very efficient vessels of their class. The 
Enterprise was the only vessel in the navy at that 
time below the frigate class. This want was appre- 
ciated by Captain Murray and by Commodore Morris 
also, but he does not seem to have made any effort to 
procure gunboats until after the blockade of Tripoli 
had been raised, when he made application to the king 
of the Two Sicilies. With the purpose of supplying 
the lack of light cruisers, Congress, on February 28, 
1803, appropriated ninety-six thousand dollars for the 
construction of four vessels of this description. They 
were the brigs Siren and Argus, each carrying sixteen 

1 Morris, p. 26. 



IN THE SUMMER OF 1803 137 

twenty-four pound carronades and two long twelve- 
pounders, and the schooners Nautilus and Vixen, with 
twelve eighteen-pound carronades and two long guns. 1 
Carronades were short, light guns, able to bear only 
a small charge of powder. 

A further defect of the frigates was that they were 
not equipped for bombarding the works of the enemy, 
as only the forty-fours carried long guns heavier than 
eighteen-pounders, and their carronades, though of 
large calibre, were entirely unfitted for assaulting forti- 
fications. 

1 Cooper, ii, pp. 1, 2. 



CHAPTER X 
THE LOSS OF THE PHILADELPHIA 

Edward Preble was born in Falmouth, now Port- 
land, Maine, in 1761. When about sixteen he ran 
away to sea on a privateer. In 1779 his father, Gen- 
eral Jedediah Preble, got him an appointment as 
midshipman in the Massachusetts State Marine. He 
saw a good deal of active service in the Revolution in 
Massachusetts cruisers, and was captured and confined 
for a time in the prison-ship Jersey. After the war 
he spent fifteen years in the merchant service. In 
1798 he was appointed a lieutenant in the navy, and 
a year later was made a captain and served in the 
naval war with France. When it was decided, in the 
spring of 1803, to recall Morris, a new squadron was 
fitted out, the command of which was given to Preble. 
May 14 he was ordered to Boston to refit the frigate 
Constitution, which was to be his flagship. She re- 
quired recoppering and other extensive repairs which 
consumed much time, and she was not ready for sea 
until August. Tobias Lear, who had been President 
Washington's private secretary and later his military 
secretary with the rank of colonel, had recently been 
appointed consul-general to the Barbary States, and 
took passage for Algiers in the Constitution, accom- 
panied by his wife. 1 

Commodore Preble's instructions from the secretary 
of the navy, Robert Smith, are dated July 13, 1803, 

1 Preble, pp. 37-41. 




KDWAKIi PREBLE 



THE LOSS OF THE PHILADELPHIA 139 

and differ in no essential particular from those of 
Commodore Morris, except that he was to establish 
a depot of stores at Malta or some other point near 
Tripoli, to avoid the delay and inconvenience of re- 
turning to Gibraltar for provisions. He received other 
letters from the secretary of later date authorizing 
him to hire one or more small vessels to be used 
against Tripoli and also to transfer to his squadron 
certain midshipmen from the vessels ordered home. 1 
The vessels of the squadron sailed as they became 
ready for sea in the following order : Nautilus, 12, 
Lieutenant Richard Somers, June 30 ; Philadelphia, 
30, Captain William Bainbridge, July 18 ; Vixen, 
12, Lieutenant John Smith, August 3 ; Constitution, 
44, flagship, Lieutenant Thomas Robinson, Jr., acting 
captain, August 14 ; Siren, 1G, Lieutenant Charles 
Stewart, August 27 ; Argus, 16, Lieutenant Stephen 
Decatur, September 8. The Enterprise, 12, Lieu- 
tenant Isaac Hull, already in the Mediterranean, was 
to remain there as one of the new squadron, but on the 
arrival of the Argus, which was a larger vessel than 
the Enterprise, Hull, being senior in rank to Decatur, 
was to exchange commands with him. 2 

Preble "at this time was personally known to very 
few of the officers ordered to serve under him. He 
had not happened to be thrown with them in the 
French war, had made a long voyage in 1800 to the 
East Indies in the Essex, and since then had been out 
of active service on account of sickness contracted on 
this voyage, from which he never fully recovered. His 
severe discipline and hot temper, not softened by ill 

1 Letter P.ook (1709 to 1807), p. 72 ; Preble Papers : Sec. of Navy to 
Preble (July 28 and Aug. 2, 1S03). 
- NaT. Chron. p. 213. 



140 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

health, made him at first unpopular among his subor- 
dinates. Local prejudice, too, may have contributed 
somewhat to the feeling against Preble. Of his council 
of officers, the commanders of his vessels, Hull, from 
Connecticut, was the only New Englander besides 
himself ; all the others, together with a majority of 
the junior officers, came from the Middle or Southern 
States. It was only after his great qualities were recog- 
nized that they learned to respect and admire him. 
They discovered under his rough exterior true kind- 
ness of heart and exact justice. He likewise did not 
appreciate his officers. Most of them were very young, 
even those in command all being under thirty, and he 
spoke complainingly of them as boys ; but a year later 
he had acquired a real affection for them. This squad- 
ron was their training school for the struggle with the 
British navy a few years later ; Preble was a great 
teacher, and they were worthy pupils. Hull, Bainbridge, 
and Stewart successively commanded the Constitution 
in her victories in the War of 1812, and Decatur also 
captured an English frigate. Chauncey was in chief 
command on the lakes, and among the officers of lower 
rank, Porter, Jones, Lawrence, Burrows, Warrington, 
Charles Morris, Macdonough, and Biddle all became 
famous in the war with England. 

The Philadelphia arrived at Gibraltar August 24, 
just four weeks after the Nautilus, which was the first 
vessel out. Captain Bainbridge being informed that 
there were two Tripolitan cruisers off Cape de Gat, at 
once proceeded in search of them, and on the night of 
the 26th, when near the cape, fell in with a ship and 
a brig under foresails only. Bainbridge hailed the 
ship, and learning that she was a war vessel from Barb- 
ary, he ordered the commander to send his papers 



THE LOSS OF THE PHILADELPHIA 141 

aboard the Philadelphia. In his report 1 to the secre- 
tary of the navy he says : " I now discovered that she 
was a cruiser belonging to the Emperor of Morocco 
and called the Mirboka, commanded by Ibrahim Lu- 
barez, mounting twenty-two guns and carrying one 
hundred and twenty men." In another letter he makes 
the number ninety-eight. The brig turned out to be 
the Celia of Boston, which had been captured by the 
corsair August 17. The commander of the Mirboka 
at first attempted to conceal this fact, and would not 
allow his vessel to be searched ; but upon an armed 
boat being sent he yielded, and the boarding officer 
found confined below Captain Bowen of the Celia, with 
seven of his crew. "After making this discovery I 
instantly ordered all the Moorish officers and crew on 
board the Philadelphia, for I had no hesitation in cap- 
turing the ship, after such proceedings on their part 
in violation of the faith of a passport which had been 
obtained from the United States consul at Tangier." 
While this was being done the Celia was lost sight 
of, and was not recovered until the following night. 
Bainbridsre believed that Lubarez had acted under 
orders in capturing the Celia, but this he denied, declar- 
ing that he had taken the brig because, when he left 
port, war seemed inevitable. Bainbridge then observed 
that as he had made the capture while cruising with an 
American passport, he should be treated as a pirate, 
and hanged at the yardarm. This threat had the de- 
sired effect, and Lubarez promptly produced an order 
from the governor of Tangier to capture Americans. 
The Moorish prisoners were treated with kindness, and 
it made a marked impression upon them when the 
ship's corporal of the Philadelphia was punished in 

1 Bainbridge, p. 73. 



142 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

their presence for having struck one of them, although 
under great provocation. Bainbridge took the Mirboka 
to Gibraltar, there to await the arrival of Commodore 
Preble. The Celia was restored to her captain and 
crew, who thereupon resumed their interrupted voyage. 
Captain Bainbridge afterwards received the thanks 
of the President and secretary of the navy for the 
capture of the Mirboka. The Philadelphia next went 
in search of another cruiser of Morocco reported to 
be near Cape St. Vincent, but did not find her, and 
returned September 11 to Gibraltar. 1 

On the 7th of September, some distance off Cadiz, 
Commodore Preble in the Constitution fell in with 
a vessel, undoubtedly the one of which Bainbridge was 
in search. He cleared ship for action and then spoke 
the vessel and boarded her ; Consul Lear was with the 
boarding party. She proved to be the Moorish frigate 
Maimona of thirty guns and one hundred and fifty 
men ; she had passports signed by Consul Simpson 
at Tangier. As Lear reported her papers to be all 
right, and as the commodore had no reason to suspect 
the hostile intentions of Morocco, he let her go. On 
entering the Straits at night the Constitution suddenly 
found herself close by a British frigate. Preble showed 
great spirit in the parley that took place with the 
Englishman, who at first refused to answer his hail. 
This incident caused a change in the feeling towards 
Preble among his officers and marked the beginning 
of his popularity. 2 

1 For this exploit of the Philadelphia and for the loss of the ship 
and captivity of her crew, see St. Pap. v, p. 5 ; For. Rel. ii, p. 591 ; 
Nav. Chron. pp. 214-217, 250-256 ; Bainbridge, ch. iii, iv, v ; Porter, 
ch. v; Cowdery ; Ray, ch. vii-xi; Cooper, ii, ch. i, ii ; Amer. Nav. 
Off. i. pp. 88-51. 

- Preble, p. 42 ; C. Morris, p. 21 ; Amer. Hist. Rec. i, p. 54 ; Preble 
Papers : Lear to Preble (Sept. 7, 1803), MS. Journal (Sept. 7, 1803). 



THE LOSS OF THE PHILADELPHIA 143 

The flagship arrived at Gibraltar September 12, 
and Lieutenant John II. Dent joined, becoming acting 
captain in place of Lieutenant Robinson, who was 
junior to Dent. The Vixen arrived on the 14th, and 
the New York and John Adams from Malaga the same 
day. Lieutenant Porter was transferred from the New 
York to the Philadelphia as first lieutenant, taking 
the place of Lieutenant John Cox, who wished to 
return home. Midshipman Macdonough of the Phila- 
delphia had been left with the Mirboka as prize-master. 
All these vessels, with the Enterprise and Nautilus, 
were in the Straits about this time. The Adams came 
in from Tunis September 22, and sailed for the United 
States with Commodore Morris on the 25th. 1 

Upon his arrival at Gibraltar Commodore Preble 
at once perceived that affairs must be settled with 
Morocco before proceeding further. It was desirable 
to make as imposing a naval display as possible before 
the Moors ; and Commodore Rodgers, although senior 
in rank to Preble, and feeling hurt at his junior's 
pennant flying in his presence, unselfishly agreed 
to postpone his departure for the United States and 
accompany him to Tangier with the New York and 
John Adams. In order that Tripoli should not be 
neglected the Philadelphia and Vixen were sent at once 
to establish the blockade of that port. The Nautilus 
and Enterprise were employed in convoying American 
merchantmen and in watching the Moors all along the 
coast, as far as Mogadore, with orders to capture their 
cruisers wherever found. The Siren and Argus had 
not yet arrived from the United States. 

Preble set out in the Constitution for Tangier Sep- 

1 Amer. Hist. Rec. i, p. 54; Nav. lust, v, p. 50; Anier. Nav. Off. 
i,p. 40; Cathcart, I, pp. 294, 295. 



144 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

tember 20, having on board his ship the Moorish 
officers of the Meshuda and Mirboka ; but owing to 
contrary winds he was several days in getting there. 
Meanwhile, on the 22d, he fell in with the Adams, 
just from Tunis. He was at Gibraltar again Octo- 
ber 1, and the Siren arrived that day from America. 
Preble returned to Tangier on the 4th, where Rodgers 
with the New York and John Adams joined him on 
the 6th ; the Nautilus was also in company. Consul 
Simpson came aboard the Constitution and consulted 
with the commodore. On the same day the emperor 
of Morocco, Muley Soliman, arrived at Tangier at the 
head of his army. The ships were cleared for action, 
and the emperor, impressed by the show of force, de- 
clared the most friendly sentiments. He was thereupon 
saluted with twenty-one guns. On the 8th the emperor 
paraded his army on the beach and was given another 
salute which was returned. During the following week 
negotiations progressed smoothly with the assistance 
of Commodore Rodgers, Colonel Lear, and Consul 
Simpson. 

The emperor had chosen an inopportune moment for 
his naval demonstration, little expecting the simul- 
taneous arrival in the Straits of two American squad- 
rons. He was undoubtedly directly responsible for 
all the trouble, which resulted from his exasperation 
at the captui*e of the Meshuda. But he now disavowed 
the act of the governor of Tangier in sending out 
cruisers and removed him from office. As a token of 
good will he sent off to the squadron a present of bull- 
ocks, sheep, and fowls, and promised to give up the 
brig Hannah of Salem, which with her crew had been 
seized at'Mogadore. October 10 Commodore Preble 
and Consul Simpson had an audience with the emperor, 



THE LOSS OF THE PHILADELPHIA 145 

and on the 12th the treaty of 1786 was ratified and 
confirmed. This was accomplished without expense or 
presents at the time or engagements for the future. 
The Nautilus was sent the next day to Mogadore to 
release the Hannah and recall the Enterprise. Preble 
on his part released the Mirboka ; and the Meshuda, 
with the consent of Commodore Rodgers, was also given 
up. These vessels were appraised and Congress after- 
wards granted prize-money to the captors. The Mai- 
mona had gone to Lisbon, where she remained until the 
trouble had blown over. The Siren was sent to Gibraltar 
with dispatches for the government and letters to differ- 
ent consuls announcing peace with Morocco. The John 
Adams returned to Gibraltar October 13, the New York 
the next day, and the Constitution on the 15th. On the 
19th Commodore Rodgers, with the New York and 
John Adams, set sail for the United States. 1 

Meanwhile, on the 19th of September, the Philadel- 
phia and Vixen had sailed from Gibraltar with orders, 
dated three days earlier, to go first to Malaga, holding 
up and sending in any vessels of Morocco that might be 
met on the way, and then to give convoy up the Medi- 
terranean to any merchantmen bound east. Having 
touched at Malta, they were to sail at once for the 
coast of Tripoli and blockade that place. They left 
Malta October 5 and appeared before Tripoli on the 
7th. About two weeks later Bainbridge was informed 
by the captain of an Imperial brig, coming out of 
Tripoli, that two Tripolitan vessels of war were out 
upon a cruise. Thereupon, thinking they were prob- 

1 For Preble's negotiations with Morocco, see St. Pap. v, p. 8 ; ^or. 
Rel. ii, p. .".92; Nav. Aff. i, pp. 115-117 ; Nav. Chron. p. 215; Nav. 
Inst, v, pp. 55-62 ; Preble, pp. 41-40; Preble Papers : Preble to Simp- 
son (Sept. 13, 1S03), Simpson to Preble (Sept. 14, 1S03), Emperor 
to Simpson (Sept. 11, 1803). 



146 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

ably to the westward, he sent the Vixen to cruise off 
Cape Bon, " as the most likely place of falling in with 
them should they be returning from that quarter, and 
at the same time a safer situation for the schooner 
than off Tripoli," 1 as the season for heavy storms 
was approaching. The Philadelphia thenceforth main- 
tained the blockade alone. For several days nothing 
of importance occurred. 2 

Towards the end of October the frigate was driven 
some distance to the eastward by a heavy blow from 
the west ; but the wind having shifted to the east, she 
was running back before it to her station on the last 
day of the month, when the events occurred which are 
narrated by Captain Bainbridge in his report to the 
secretary of the navy, dated November 1, 1803, as 
follows : " Misfortune necessitates me to make a com- 
munication the most distressing of my life ; and it is 
with deep regret that I inform you of the loss of the 
United States frigate Philadelphia, under my com- 
mand, by being wrecked on rocks between four and 
five miles to the eastward of the town of Tripoli. The 
circumstances relating to this unfortunate event are : 
At 9 A. M., being about five leagues to the east- 
ward of Tripoli, saw a ship inshore of us standing 
before the wind to the westward. We immediately 
gave chase ; she hoisted Tripolitan colors and con- 
tinued her course very near the shore. About 11 
o'clock had approached the shore to seven fathoms 
water, commenced firing at her, which we continued 
by running before the wind until half-past 11, being 

1 Bainbridge's testimony before Court of Inquiry, Nat. Intell. Sept. 
25, 1805. 

2 Preble Papers : Preble to Bainbridge (Sept. 16, 1803) ; Bainbridge 
to Preble (Oct. 22, and Nov. 1, ISOo). 



THE LOSS OF THE PHILADELPHIA 147 

then in seven fathoms water ; and finding our fire 
ineffectual to prevent her getting - into Tripoli, gave 
up the pursuit and was bearing off the land when we 
ran on the rocks in twelve feet water forward and 
seventeen feet abaft. Immediately lowered down a 
boat from the stern, sounded and found the greatest 
depth of water astern. Laid all sails aback, loosed 
topgallant sails and set a heavy press of sail canvas on 
the ship, blowing fresh, to back her off. Cast three 
anchors away from the bows, started the water in the 
hold, hove overboard the guns excepting some abaft 
to defend the ship against the gunboats which were 
then firing on us ; found all this ineffectual. Then 
made the last resort of lightening her forward by cut- 
ting away the foremast, which carried the main-top- 
gallant mast with it. But labor and enterprise were 
in vain, for our fate was direfully fixed. . . . Striking 
on the rocks was an accident not possible for me to 
guard against by any intimation of charts, as no such 
shoals were laid down in any on board, and every 
careful precaution, by three leads kept heaving, was 
made use of on approaching the shore to effect the 
capture of a Tripolitan cruiser. And after the ship 
struck the rocks all possible measures were taken to 
get her off and the firm determination made not to give 
her up as long as a possible hope remained, although 
annoyed by gunboats which took their position in such 
a manner that we coidd not bring our guns to bear 
on them, not even after cutting away part of the 
stern to effect it. When my officers and self had not 
a hope left of its being possible to get her off the 
rocks and having withstood the fire of the gunboats 
for four hours, and a reinforcement coming out from 
Tripoli, without the smallest chance of injuring them 



148 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

by resistance, to save the lives of brave men left no 
alternative but the distressing one of hauling- our colors 
clown and submitting to the enemy whom chance had 
befriended. In such a dilemma the flag of the United 
States was struck. . . . The gunboats in attacking 
fired principally at our masts ; had they directed their 
shot at the hull, no doubt but they would have killed 
many. The ship was taken possession of a little after 
simset and in the course of the evening myself and all 
the officers, with part of the crew, were brought on 
shore." * 

To Preble Bainbridge wrote : " Had we been able 
in our situation to have injured our enemy in the least, 
never would I have surrendered, while such means 
were in my power." 2 Before striking his flag Captain 
Bainbridge destroyed his signal books, and gave orders 
to throw overboard all the small arms and everything 
else of value. The gunner and carpenter were sent 
below to flood the magazine and scuttle the ship. As 
it afterwards turned out, the latter operation was im- 
perfectly done. According to William Ray, a marine 
on the Philadelphia, several of the crew begged the 
captain not to surrender the ship, believing that she 
could be got off the reef. 

Before the court of inquiry 3 into the loss of the 
Philadelphia, composed of Captains James Barron, 
Hugh G. Campbell, and Stephen Decatur, with Wil- 
liam Eaton as judge-advocate, and held on board the 
Constitution at Syracuse June 29, 1805, Lieutenant 
Porter testified : " The ship had about eight knots 

1 Nav. Chron. p. 250 ; Nav. Aff. i. p. 123. 

2 Preble Papers (Nov. 25, 1803). 

. Chron. pp. 254-250. There is a full report in Nat. Intell. 
Sept. 25, 1805. 



THE LOSS OF THE PHILADELPHIA 149 

way upon her. This witness was ordered into the 
mizen top to look into the harbor of Tripoli and ob- 
serve if any cruisers were in port. At this instant the 
water shoaled and the helm was put down. He had 
got about halfway up the mizen rigging when he felt 
the ship strike. He immediately returned on deck. 
. . . The ship lifted at times abaft and the helm was 
then clear. The enemy's gunboats were already seen 
coming out of port, nine in number, as nearly as the 
witness recollects." Porter speaks of the various 
expedients tried on the recommendation of a council 
of officers and mentioned by the captain in his report. 
" In the mean time the enemy passed under the fire 
of the frigate's stern guns and took a position on the 
starboard and weather quarter, where no guns could 
be brought to bear on them by reason of their advan- 
tageous position and the deep heel to port and fixed 
position of the ship. ... It had now already been 
determined that the flag must be struck, as no hopes 
remained of saving the ship and no possible means of 
defending her." Porter estimated the position of the 
wreck at three and a half miles from the town and a 
mile and a half north of the nearest point of land. Xo 
attempt had been made to carry out one of the ship's 
anchors for the purpose of warping her off the reef. In 
regard to this Porter stated that in his opinion the ship 
had no boat able to bear an anchor, and Lieutenant 
Hunt testified " that in the river Delaware he made an 
experiment in carrying out an anchor in the Philadel- 
phia's launch, when she was obliged to be buoyed by 
casks." All the other witnesses supported the testi- 
mony of Lieutenant Porter. The verdict of the court 
was : " The Court having deliberated on the evidence 
deduced from the testimony of the witnesses heard in 



150 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

this case, are decidedly of opinion that Captain Wil- 
liam Bainbridge acted with fortitude and conduct, in 
the loss of his ship the United States frigate Philadel- 
phia, on the 31st October, 1803 ; and that no degree 
of censure should attach itself to him from that event." 
In this opinion the government and the people con- 
curred. 

The Philadelphia had struck and run up on a shelv- 
ing rock forming part of an extensive reef called 
Kaliusa, not shown on the ship's charts. The reef 
was divided into two parts with deep water between 
them, and the ship was wrecked on the eastern reef. 
If she had continued a short distance farther before 
bearing off she would have run clear, between the two 
reefs, and if she had followed the chase up to the 
mouth of the harbor, she would have cleared the 
western reef. The absence of the Vixen at this time 
was particularly unfortunate. If she had been on 
hand the Philadelphia would not have run so close in 
shore. Or if she had appeared after the wreck she 
could have defended the frigate, prevented her sur- 
render, and saved her, or could have destroyed her to 
prevent her capture, after taking off the crew. 

After the surrender the Tripolitans swarmed over 
the ship, plundering everything they could lay their 
hands on, stripping officers and men, and leaving 
most of them nearly naked. They were then tumbled 
into boats and taken ashore, the Philadelphia's men 
manning the oars. They were landed about ten o'clock 
in the evening ; the officers were landed, while the 
men were thrown out of the boats when within a few 
rods of the shore, as the surf made it difficult to beach 
the boats. They were conducted between rows of 
armed men to the castle gate, through which they 



THE LOSS OF THE PHILADELPHIA 151 

passed into a narrow passage leading by many turns 
to a great hall paved with marble and sumptuously 
furnished. Here they were received by the pasha, 
surrounded by his ministers and guards, richly dressed. 
He was in ;i gracious mood and asked many questions 
in regard to the capture. The officers were then led 
to another apartment where supper was served for 
them, and about midnight were conducted by the 
pasha's prime minister, Sidi Mohammed Dghies, 
through the town to the late American consul's house, 
which for the present was to be their abode. Dghies 
treated the officers with consideration and kindness, 
and was always friendly in his feeling towards Ameri- 
cans, lie introduced Captain Bainbridge to the Dan- 
ish consul, Nicholas C. Nissen, who exerted himself 
in every way for their relief. The men were led from 
the audience hall to another room in the castle, where 
they were given dry rags in exchange for their wet 
clothes, which were not returned to them. They were 
then taken to an open balcony, where they spent the 
night supperless, and suffered severely from the cold. 
The next day they were set to work cleaning out an 
old warehouse. This was to serve as their prison and 
was too small to afford them all room to lie down ; 
several months later they were transferred to a larger 
and cleaner prison. Towards evening of the day after 
the capture they were given their first food, a small 
loaf of bread to each man. 

Captain Bainbridge was greatly depressed in spirits 
over the calamity which the fortune of war had brought 
upon himself and his officers and men, as well as upon 
his country, and for which he felt responsible. His 
officers sympathized deeply with him, and in a letter, 
signed by all of them, November 1, 1803, expressed 



152 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

their feelings in the following words : " We, late 
officers of the United States frigate Philadelphia, 
under your command, wishing to express our full 
approbation of your conduct concerning the unfor- 
tunate event of yesterday, do conceive that the charts 
and soundings justified as near an approach to the 
shore as we made, and that after the ship struck, 
every exertion was made and every expedient tried to 
get her off and to defend her, which either courage 
or abilities could have dictated." 2 In view of the fact 
that these officers were necessarily to be summoned as 
witnesses in the official inquiry always held in such 
cases, the propriety of their thus formally committing 
themselves might be questioned ; but under the cir- 
cumstances they could hardly be criticised for a spon- 
taneous act of kindness, and no one could grudge the 
captain the comfort he derived from this letter, which 
was very great. 

November 2 a heavy blow from the northwest piled 
the water up on the shore so that the stern of the 
Philadelphia floated. The Tripolitans with boats, 
anchors, and cables, and an army of men at work, suc- 
ceeded in pulling her off the reef the next day. The 
anchors, guns, and other articles that had been thrown 
overboard, being in shallow water, were easily recov- 
ered. The scuttling of the ship had been so hastily 
and imperfectly done that the Tripolitans were able 
to pump her out and make her tight. She was then 
brought into the harbor, amid the rejoicings of the 
people and to the great mortification of the Americans. 
In his letter of November 25 to Preble, Bainbridge 
says : " The gale of wind which came on about forty 
hours after we surrendered to the rocks, raised the 

1 Nav. Chron. p. 252 ; Nav. Aff. i, p. 123 ; Bainbridge, p. 82. 



THE LOSS OF THE PHILADELPHIA 153 

waters ou this coast so as to get the ship off, much 
damaged, her keel, etc. broke ; this added to our dis- 
tress, but feel conscious that it was morally impossible 
for us to have effected it." 

These unfortunate captives, three hundred and seven 
in number, had a long bondage before them. The 
officers were well treated at first, and were allowed to 
take the air on the roof of the house, but this privilege 
was denied them after three or four days. A week 
later, a report having come to the pasha of the ill 
treatment of the Tripolitan prisoners on the Meshuda, 
Captain Bainbridge and his officers were removed to 
the prison of the men and kept there a day without 
food. Bainbridge insisted that the report must be 
false. Through the influence of the minister, Dghies, 
the officers were sent back to their quarters in the 
evening. 1 After the destruction of the Philadelphia 
in February they were removed to the pasha's castle, 
where they remained during the rest of their stay in 
Tripoli, closely confined most of the time, though 
occasionally allowed some liberty. Dr. Jonathan 
Cowdery, one of the surgeon's mates, attracted the 
attention of the pasha, who employed him as his 
physician, and he was allowed more freedom than any 
other officer. He kept a journal during his captivity, 
which gives much information about the condition of 
the prisoners. 2 Part of the time he was permitted to 
care for the men when sick, but was often denied this 
privilege. Dr. Cowdery lived to be many years the 
senior surgeon of the navy. 

Very soon Consul Nissen, finding that the officers 
missed occupation, sent them a large number of books, 

1 Preble Papers : Bainbridge to Preble (Nov. 15, 1803). 

2 See also letter of Cowdery in Nat. Intel!. Aug. 5, 1805. 



154 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

and then purchased for them their own books that 
were offered for sale at a moderate price, which was 
promptly and cheerfully refunded. After this, time 
not only passed more quickly, but was greatly im- 
proved. The captain and Lieutenant Porter organized 
a school of instruction for the younger officers, which 
kept them busy during the rest of their stay ; and they 
learned much that they never otherwise would have 
been able to, in the press of professional duties. The 
captain was allowed a room by himself, and spent 
much time alone. Pie was permitted to write to Com- 
modore Preble when in need of money or supplies, 
which were sent when opportunity offered. Besides 
this he kept up a secret correspondence with Preble 
through Nissen and the Danish consul at Malta, writ- 
ing these letters in cipher or with lime juice, which 
made an invisible mark that became legible on heat- 
ing. Several projects for escape were discussed b} r the 
officers, and one or two plans were partially carried 
out, but in each case insurmountable difficulties were 
met with. 

The men fared much worse than the officers. The 
different classes of mechanics were put to work at their 
various trades, and the others employed in all sorts of 
hard labor, chiefly on the fortifications. They were 
beaten and maltreated by many of their taskmasters 
and keepers, and sometimes bastinadoed. At night 
they were locked up in their dismal prison. When- 
ever anything happened to exasperate or enrage the 
Tripolitans, they took their revenge on the unhappy 
captives, who were subjected to insult and hard usage 
greatly exceeding their usual allowance. This was 
especially the case just after the destruction of the 
Philadelphia and during the attacks on the town by 



THE LOSS OF THE PHILADELPHIA 155 

Commodore Preble's squadron in 1804. They occa- 
sionally complained to the pasha, and he forbade their 
being beaten, but apparently with little effect. Their 
diet was scanty and poor, consisting chiefly of coarse 
black bread and olive oil. When the blockade was 
closest, food was necessarily scarce, not only with them 
but with the whole population. A few escaped their 
sufferings by death, and a few by adopting the Mo- 
hammedan faith. Most of these renegades, especially 
a Swede named Wilson, and some of the others, were 
bad characters. There w r ere many Englishmen among 
the crew, and the captain wished that Admiral Nelson 
might claim them and so liberate them. 1 The men 
as well as the officers meditated escape, and formed 
a plan to surprise the castle when the gates were opened 
in the morning, liberate their officers, seize the pasha 
with his family and guards, and put the castle in 
a state of defense. The plan was never attempted, and 
in the absence of the squadron must necessarily have 
failed. 

At the request of Captain Baiubridge and with the 
help of Consul Nissen, extra food was provided for the 
sick, and later provisions and clothing for the crew 
were sent by the commodore. By this means the men 
had occasional supplies of good food. Now and then, 
on holidays, recreation was allowed and their dreary 
lives brightened. In celebration of Christmas, 1804, 
they feasted on fresh beef and vegetables and wine 
provided by order of the captain through Nissen, who 
was untiring in his attention to the men no less than 
to the officers. On New Year's Day the same enter- 
tainment was provided, and William Ray, who kept a 
journal, says : " I was told to take eight men, go to the 

1 Preble Papers : Bainbridge to Preble (Nov. 25, and Dec. 5, 1803). 



156 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

Danish consul's, and get the wine. Our men were 
the tapsters and the consul requested rue to keep an 
account of the measure. The good-natured, benevolent 
man told us to drink as much as we wanted. . . . The 
tapsters accepted of his liberal invitation with such 
unreserved cordiality that . . . they were not able to 
carry the cask to the prison. Another set of bearers 
was collected and the consul made them drink, until 
they were nearly as much intoxicated as the first ; and 
when we were departing, he distributed a handful of 
money amongst the whole. Our tars pronounced him 
the best fellow they had ever met with, and swore he 
must have been a sailor." * 

After his return to America, at the request of the 
secretary of the navy, Captain Bainbridge wrote a 
letter setting forth the services of Mr. Nissen at Tri- 
poli, for the information of Congress ; and that body 
passed a resolution, approved April 10, 1806, ex- 
pressing " the high sense entertained by Congress of 
his disinterested and benevolent attentions, manifested 
to Captain Bainbridge, his officers and crew, during 
the time of their captivity in Tripoli." 2 The officers 
of the Philadelphia presented Nissen with a silver urn. 3 

In spite of poor food and hard usage there were but 
six deaths out of the whole number of three hundred 
and seven in nineteen months. When the captives 
were finally liberated, the pasha called together the 
renegades among the crew, five in number, " and told 
them that peace was now concluded, the Americans 
were about to leave Tripoli, and if they or either of 
them chose to go, it was left at their option. Unaware 
of the artifice, all except Wilson expressed their wish 

1 Ray, p. 151. 2 Nav. Chron. p. 260. 

3 Nat. Intell. Oct. 9, 1805, June 3, 1807. 



THE LOSS OF THE PHILADELPHIA 157 

and anxiety to relinquish the turban and accompany 
us to America. Wilson, jealous of the Pasha's sincer- 
ity and perhaps afraid of the threatened halter, 
thanked his majesty for this generous offer, but told 
him that he preferred Tripoli to America and Ma- 
hometanism to Christianity, and that he chose to re- 
main and would ever continue firmly attached to his 
service. Wilson was honored and caressed by the 
Pasha and his Divan for his singular fidelity, while 
the other four were sent into the country with a for- 
midable guard. We had a glance at them as they 
passed our prison and could see horror and despair 
depicted in their countenances." 1 

The loss of the Philadelphia was a severe blow to 
the American cause. The squadron, with two frigates 
only, was already too small for the work in hand, and 
it had now lost a very large proportion of its strength. 
On the other hand, the enemy gained a better vessel 
than they had ever owned before, though fortunately 
for a short time only. Moreover, the large number of 
captives in the power of the pasha greatly complicated 
matters, and of course gave him an immense advan- 
tage in treating for peace. Preble, when he heard the 
news, wrote to the secretary of the navy that " it dis- 
tresses me beyond description." It may be said with 
some confidence that if Bainbridge with his ship and 
men had been with his chief the following summer, 
the commodore's vigorous campaign would probably 
have been decisive, and peace, uncomplicated with the 
question of ransom, would have come earlier. 

1 Kay, p. 158. 



CHAPTER XI 

THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PHILADELPHIA 

Commodore Preble sailed from Gibraltar for Cadiz 
October 23, 1803, with the Constitution and Enter- 
prise, 1 in order to obtain water and other supplies 
which could not be got at Gibraltar just at that time, 
as the British fleet required everything then on hand. 
He had lost an anchor and cable at Tangier which he 
wished to replace, if possible. He returned in about 
two weeks, stopping at Tangier on the way, to show 
himself once more to the Moors. The Argus arrived 
from America November 1, and Lieutenant Hull took 
command of her, turning the Enterprise over to De- 
catur. November 12 the commodore issued a circular 
proclaiming the blockade of Tripoli, which he sent to 
the United States ministers at London, Paris, and 
Madrid, and to a number of American consuls. He 
afterwards received instructions from the secretary of 
the navy, dated February 4, 1804, not to seize neutral 
vessels attempting to enter Tripoli without knowledge 
of the blockade, but to turn them back. Such, how- 
ever, as had been warned, and those having knowledge 
of the blockade were to be sent into port for adjudi- 
cation. The blockade must, moreover, be an actual 
one. 2 November 13 the commodore sailed up the 

1 For the operations of Preble's squadron up to July, 1804, see 
Preble, ch. iii, iv ; Cooper, ii, cb. ii, iii ; Nav. Cbron. pp. 218-220 ; 
Amer. Hist. liec. i, pp. 55, 5(i ; Preble Papers. 

2 Nav. Cbron. p. 213 ; St. Pap. v, p. 397. 



THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PHILADELPHIA 159 

Mediterranean with the Constitution and Nautilus. 
The Argus, after a cruise to the eastward, remained at 
Gibraltar to watch Morocco and look after American 
interests in the Straits. 1 The Siren, with ex-Consul 
Cathcart on board, had already been sent, October 24, 
with a convoy to Leghorn, where Cathcart was to turn 
over to Stewart certain public property to be delivered 
to Consul Lear at Algiers. The Enterprise was sent to 
Syracuse with the supply ship Traveler, after which 
she was to join the Philadelphia and Vixen off Tri- 
poli. On the 19th the Constitution arrived at Algiers 
and landed Colonel Lear, proceeding on her way the 
next day. On the 24th, off the coast of Sardinia, " at 
9 a. M. spoke His B. M. ship Amazon on a cruise, the 
captain of which gave me the melancholy and distress- 
ing intelligence of the loss of the U. S. ship Philadel- 
phia." 2 Putting into Malta three days later, Preble 
found a letter from Bainbridge giving details of the 
disaster. He sailed at once for Syracuse, where he 
arrived the next day. 

Syracuse was made the base of supplies for the 
squadron. It had certain advantages over Malta, 
among which was the smaller number of desertions. 
One of Preble's difficulties had been that of enlisting 
crews for the squadron, by reason of the small pay in 
the navy as compared with the merchant service. 3 
The crews were therefore made up largely of foreign- 
ers, principally English ; Preble states, however, that 
to the best of his knowledge and belief they were nat- 
uralized Americans and not British subjects. When 
they deserted they sought the protection of the British 

1 Preble Papers : Preble to Hull (Nov. 7). 

2 Preble Papers, Journal. 

3 Preble Papers : Sec. of Navy to Preble (June 25, 1803). 



160 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

flag, and the English commanders would not give them 
up. There had been trouble on this account at Gib- 
raltar, where three deserters took refuge on an Eng- 
lish frigate, the captain of which refused to surrender 
them to Lieutenant Stewart, then the senior American 
officer at Gibraltar. Preble feared the same difficulty 
at Malta. This state of things was subsequently 
remedied by order of Admiral Nelson. It was also 
often impossible, on account of the existing war be- 
tween England and France, to procure supplies, par- 
ticularly in the ports most frequented by the British 
and French fleets. The supplies sent out from home 
were apt to be irregular and delayed in their arrival, 
and the provisions were sometimes spoiled. 1 

The Vixen had first heard of the loss of the Phil- 
adelphia at Malta November 19, in a letter 2 from 
Captain Bainbridge dated the first of that month. 
Lieutenant Smith at once set sail for Gibraltar, in 
obedience to this letter, to notify the commodore ; but 
meeting with bad weather and contrary winds and be- 
ing short of provisions, he was forced to turn back, and 
reached Syracuse December 12. On the 16th Preble 
sent the Nautilus to Gibraltar with dispatches to be 
forwarded to the navy department. The Vixen was 
employed on convoy duty. The next day the commo- 
dore sailed on a cruise in his flagship, with the Enter- 
prise in company, to reconnoitre off Tripoli. On the 
23d the Enterprise captured the ketch Mastico, under 
Turkish colors and without passports, bound from 
Tripoli to Constantinople. " She is armed with two 
cannon and some muskets, pistols &c, has on board 

1 Preble, p. 137 ; C. Morris, pp. 22-24 ; Port Folio, Dec. 1810; 
Preble Papers : Corres. between Stewart, Preble, and Gore (Oct. 1803). 

2 Preble Papers. 



THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PHILADELPHIA 1G1 

a Turkish master, seven Greeks and four Turks, sailors, 
a Turkish officer, two Tripoline officers, ten Tripoline 
soldiers as passengers and forty-two negro men, women 
and children," l who with other presents, were to be 
given to the capudan-pasha. " She had on board also 
two cannon in the hold." She had formerly been 
a French gunboat. " An Italian doctor who came on 
board [the Constitution] at Malta and who was in 
Tripoly when the Philadelphia was captured," told 
Preble that the Tripolitan officers were of high rank 
and that the soldiers had served in the gunboats which 
attacked the wrecked frigate, as did also the Turkish 
captain of the Mastico, who " was among the first that 
boarded her and was extremely active in taking 
the officers out and carrying them to the Bashaw of 
Tripoly, as well as plundering them of their cloathing. 
Conceiving it improper to let her pass under all these 
circumstances with officers, soldiers, guns and other 
property all belonging to the Bashaw of Tripoly and 
bound from one of his ports, I ordered all the crew 
and passengers on board " the flagship, except the 
slaves and a few others, and " sent off the Prize under 
convoy of the Enterprise " to Syracuse. Preble after- 
wards learned that the Mastico had taken part in the 
attack on the Philadelphia, under Tripolitan colors. 
The Constitution reconnoitred Tripoli until the 26th, 
when a heavy northeast gale threatened to drive her 
ashore, but she succeeded in getting back to Syracuse 
on the 30th. The Mastico was renamed the Intrepid, 
and was taken into the United States service. 

The Constitution remained at Syracuse until March, 
but the smaller vessels, except the Enterprise, which 

1 Preble Papers : Journal (Dec. 24, 1803) ; see also Preble to Sec. of 
Navy (Feb. 3, 1804). 



162 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

was undergoing repairs, were actively cruising all 
winter. The Siren, in obedience to orders, had landed 
Cathcart at Leghorn November 12, was detained until 
the 26th, received the public property which was 
delivered to Lear at Algiers December 21, and after 
a very stormy passage arrived at Syracuse on the 28th. 
She was then found in need of repairs, and her main- 
mast was shifted farther aft to improve her sailing. 1 
Preble went to Malta in the Vixen January 12, 1804, 
to arrange for sending letters and supplies to Bain- 
bridge. He was shown attention by the English army 
and navy officers, and formed a pleasant acquaintance 
with Sir Alexander Ball, the governor. He returned 
to Syracuse on the 24th, and on the 27th the Nautilus 
arrived from Gibraltar, leaving the Argus still in the 
Straits. 

In the mean time the commodore had been carrying 
on a correspondence with Captain Bainbridge. His 
earlier letters were delayed in delivery through the 
neo'lio'ence of the American consul at Malta. In a 
long, sympathetic letter dated off Malta, December 
19, 1803, Preble says : "Your zeal for your country 
has occasioned the loss of a frigate and, for a time, of 
a valuable commander, officers and crew. I have not 
the smallest doubt, but that you all have done every- 
thing which you conceived could be done to get the 
ship off and extricate yourself from the unhappy 
situation in which you were placed. . . . You may 
rest assured that in me you have a friend whose exer- 
tions shall never be wanting in endeavors to relieve 
you ; and in the mean time you may command such 
supplies of money for the comfort of yourself, officers 
and crew as you may require. I have only to request 
1 Preble Papers : Stewart to Preble (Jan. 1, 1804). 



THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PHILADELPHIA 1G3 

your requisition for such supplies. ... I have been 
furnished by the governor of Syracuse with every con- 
venient accommodation for the deposit of provisions 
and stores, masts, spars, boats, etc. I have formed an 
establishment at that place and made it the general 
rendezvous of the squadron, although in the winter 
I shall keep a vessel at Malta for information and 
occasionally visit it myself. I am now on my way for 
a cruise off Tripoli. The weather has been extremely 
stormy since our arrival at Syracuse ; for many days 
it blew a gale and prevented us from putting to sea. 
... I shall lodge funds for you at Malta and will 
make such arrangements that you can receive a regu- 
lar supply from thence, until I can make a better 
arrangement at Tunis. God bless and preserve you. 
May you have health and live to enjoy the smiles of 
the fickle goddess. . . . The first consul of France, 
the much celebrated Bonaparte, has interested himself 
deeply in your situation." l 

From Syracuse, January 4, 1804, Preble wrote in 
regard to sending money and supplies for the captives, 
mentioned the capture of the Mastico, and added : " A 
gale of wind drove me from off Tripoly or I should 
have sent a Boat on Shore. I shall soon be off there 
again." a During his stay at Malta Preble wrote again, 
January 23: "You will receive a present supply 
of money from here through the British consul, B. 
McDonough, Esq., forwarded by Mr. Higgins. Any 
letters you will direct to the care of William Higgins, 
Esq., whom I have appointed Agent at this port for 
the squadron of the United States in these seas, and 
I am confident that he will pay you every attention. 
The clothing and other stores, which ought to have 
1 Bainbridge, p. 93. 2 Preble Papers. 



164 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

been with you six weeks since, were detained by Mr. 
Pulis [United States consul at Malta, who turned out 
to be an unworthy representative] ; and for what 
reason I know not. Your drafts on Mr. Higgins will 
be duly honored. Keep up your spirits and despair 
not ; recollect there 's a sweet little cherub that sits 
up aloft." l 

In January Preble began negotiations for peace 
with Tripoli through the agent of the pasha at Malta, 
who was ready to agree that no money should be 
demanded for peace or tribute, but merely a small 
consular present with the first consul, that the Phil- 
adelphia should be exchanged for a schooner, that the 
Tripolitan prisoners in Preble's hands, sixty in num- 
ber, should be exchanged for as many Americans, and 
that the remaining Americans, two hundred and forty 
in number, should be ransomed at five hundred dol- 
lars each, or one hundred and twenty thousand in all. 
The agent later expressed the opinion that the pasha 
would reduce the ransom to one hundred thousand 
dollars, the other terms being the same. The com- 
modore wrote to Consul Lear for his advice on the 
subject. Before hearing from him, however, an event 
happened which changed the aspect of affairs. 2 

The destruction of the Philadelphia was suggested 
by Bainbridge in a letter to Preble dated December 
5, 1803. He says : " By chartering a merchant vessel 
and sending her into the harbor with men secreted, 
and steering directly on board the frigate, it might be 
effected without any or a trifling loss. It would not 
be possible to carry the frigate out, owing to the diffi- 
culty of the channel." On the strength of this letter 

1 Nav. Inst, v, p. 65. 

2 Preble Papers : Preble to Sec. of Navy (Feb. 3, 1804). 



THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PHILADELPHIA 165 

it was claimed that the idea of burning the frigate 
originated with Bainbridge ; the plan is again urged 
in his letters of January 18 and February 15, 1804. 1 
But long before he received the letter, Preble an- 
nounced to the secretary of the navy, December 10, 
his intention of doing this very thing, and he subse- 
quently wrote to others that he had formed this inten- 
tion as soon as he had heard of the frigate's capture. 
Years afterwards several naval officers ascribed the 
credit to Decatur. No doubt the idea of attempting 
to save or destroy the Philadelphia occurred inde- 
pendently to many of the officers of the squadron, and 
men too, as would be only natural ; and as Bainbridge 
knew of the ship's being in the hands of the enemy 
three weeks before Preble did, he probably had the 
plan well matured in his mind correspondingly early. 
His suggestion bears a striking resemblance to the 
plan finally carried out. As the Constitution and 
Enterprise were cruising together about this time, 
Preble discussed the matter freely with Decatur, who 
offered to attempt cutting out the Philadelphia with 
the Enterprise. Soon after this, Stewart, returning 
from a cruise, requested to be allowed to do the same 
thing with the Siren. The commodore, however, had 
given his promise to Decatur, but rejecting the attempt 
at cutting out, believing it impossible to save her, 
proposed to destroy the frigate, and to utilize for the 
purpose the recently captured ketch Intrepid. The 
letters of Bainbridge were of great assistance, giving 
information of the exact situation of the Philadelphia 
and of the strength and disposition of the Tripolitan 
batteries and gunboats. During the month of January 
the plan was fully matured. The Intrepid, whose 
1 Preble Papers. 



THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PHILADELPHIA 1G7 

Everything being ready and the weather favorable, 
on February 3 Decatur mustered the crew of the 
Enterprise, explained the object of the expedition, and 
called for volunteers. Every officer, man, and boy 
immediately stepped forward. Five officers, Lieuten- 
ants James Lawrence, Joseph Bainbridge, and Jona- 
than Thorn, Surgeon Lewis Heermann and Midship- 
man Thomas Macdonough, and sixty4wo men, were 
selected. These were joined by Midshipmen Ralph 
Izard, John Rowe, Charles Morris, Alexander Laws, 
and John Davis from the Constitution ; and Salvadore 
Catalano, a Sicilian pilot familiar with the harbor of 
Tripoli, was also taken. Catalano was afterwards for 
many years a sailing-master in the navy. 

The Siren and Intrepid sailed in the evening of 
February 3, and were off Tripoli on the 7th. To avoid 
suspicion, the Intrepid drew ahead and anchored after 
dark about a mile to the westward of the town. Bad 
weather was just setting in, and although Decatur was 
extremely anxious to go in that night, he took the 
precaution to send in a boat with the pilot and Mid- 
shipman Morris to reconnoitre. They found the sea 
breaking across the western entrance, and advised 
against going in. The vessels therefore stood off 
shore, and were driven far to the eastward by a violent 
gale which lasted several days. The situation of the 
Intrepid's crew was most uncomfortable. Morris says : 
" The commander, three lieutenants, and the surgeon 
occupied the very small cabin. Six midshipmen and 
the pilot had a platform laid on the water casks, 
whose surface they covered when they lay down for 

31 ; Xav. Chron. pp. 256-260 ; Nav. Aff. i, p. 128 ; iii, pp. 180-188 (con- 
taining Preble's orders to Stewart and Decatur, and official reports of 
Preble, Stewart, and Decatur). 



168 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

sleep, and at so small a distance below the deck that 
their heads would reach it when seated on the plat- 
form. The marines had corresponding accommoda- 
tions on the opposite side, and the sailors had only 
the surface of the casks in the hold. To these incon- 
veniences were added the want of any room on the 
deck for exercise and the attacks of innumerable 
vermin which our predecessors the slaves had left 
behind them. The provisions proved to be decayed 
and offensive." 1 

On the 16th they again approached Tripoli. The 
weather was fine, with a light wind. The Intrepid 
stood slowly in towards the town, using drags to pre- 
vent her too early arrival. The Siren, disguised as a 
merchantman, held back to give the appearance of not 
being associated with her consort. Both vessels were 
seen from Tripoli. Dr. Cowdery believed them to be 
English merchantmen, and William Ray thought they 
were Americans coming to treat for peace. At dark 
Decatur was two miles from the eastern entrance. The 
sea was still breaking in the western entrance, and the 
Intrepid entered the harbor by the eastern or main 
channel. The plan had been for the Siren's boats to 
join the Intrepid at ten o'clock ; but as the wind was 
very light, Decatur feared that he might not be able 
to reach the frigate, and decided not to wait for the 
boats, and the drags were taken in. Stewart had, the 
day before, sent him one boat under Midshipman 
Thomas O. Anderson with nine men. This would 
seem to make the total number on board the Intrepid 
eighty-four. 2 

1 C. Morris, p. 27. 

2 A list is given in Nav. Aff. ii, p. 776, and iii, p. 126, of those on 
board the Intrepid February 16, 1804, which contains 70 names, 



THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PHILADELPHIA 169 

As the ketch crept towards the harbor final arrange- 
ments were made and officers and men again instructed 
in the duties that had been already assigned and 
explained to them. Firearms were to be used only in 
case of urgent necessity. The boarders were to carry 
first the spar deck, next the gun deck, and then divide 
into parties with combustibles for the rest of the work 
in hand. The commander, with Midshipmen Kowe and 
Izard and fifteen men, was to hold the spar deck ; 
Lieutenant Lawrence, with Midshipmen Laws and 
Macdonough and ten men, was to take the berth deck 
and forward storerooms ; Lieutenant Bainbridge, with 
Midshipman Davis and ten men, the wardroom and 
steerage ; Midshipman Morris, with eight men, the 
cock-pit and after storerooms. Lieutenant Thorn, with 
Dr. Heermann and fourteen men, was to remain on the 
ketch. Midshipman Anderson in the Siren's boat was 
to secure the Philadelphia's boats and prevent, if 
possible, the enemy's escape by means of them or by 
swimming. The watchword was " Philadelphia." 

The Intrepid drifted slowly into the harbor by the 
faint light of a young moon, and by half-past nine was 
within two hundred yards of the Philadelphia. The 
frigate had her topmasts housed ; she was stripped of 
her sails, and her lower yards were on the gunwales. 
The foremast, which had been cut away at the time of 
the wreck, had not been replaced. She had forty guns, 
all loaded and double-shotted, and appears to have 
been well manned. The little ketch of sixty tons and 
four small guns was face to face with this force and 
also within easy range of the pasha's castle and several 

besides the pilot, including 14 commissioned and warrant officers, 
12 petty officers, 28 able seamen, 8 ordinary seamen, and 8 marines. 
See Appendix V. 



170 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

other batteries, mounting in all one hundred and fifteen 
heavy guns. The floating defenses, anchored close by, 
consisted of two or three cruisers and a few galleys, all 
fully manned. The gunboats were hauled up on shore 
for the winter. If the slightest suspicion of the Intre- 
pid's character had been aroused, she would have been 
blown out of the water and not a man could have 
escaped. 

As she approached, the crew were kept concealed, 
except six or eight men in Maltese dress. The pilot, 
Catalano, had the helm, and Decatur stood beside him. 
At a distance of about a hundred yards the Intrepid 
was hailed and ordered to keep off. The pilot replied 
that she had lost her anchors in the recent gale, and 
requested permission to make fast to the frigate for 
the night. This was granted, and the Tripolitan asked 
what the brig outside was. Catalano replied that it 
was the Transfer, a vessel recently purchased at Malta 
by the Tripolitans, and which the pilot knew was 
expected about that time. He then kept up a conver- 
sation at the dictation of Decatur, in order to distract, 
as much as possible, the attention of the Tripolitans. 
The Intrepid was now close under the port bow of the 
Philadelphia ; " but just as the ketch was about coining 
in contact with the frigate the wind shifted, blowing 
lightly directly from the frigate, and it left us at rest 
abeam and about twenty yards from her. This was a 
moment of great anxiety. We were directly under her 
guns, motionless and powerless, except by exertions 
which might betray our character. The Siren's boat 
was, however, in tow, and was leisurely manned, and 
took a rope to make fast to the ship. She was met by 
a boat [from the Philadelphia] with another rope, when 
both were united, and each boat returned to its vessel. 



THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PHILADELPHIA 171 

This rope was passed along the deck and hauled upon 
by the crew as they lay stretched upon it, and the 
vessels gradually brought nearer each other. When 
nearly in contact the suspicions of the enemy appeared 
to be aroused, and the cry of ' Americanos ! ' resounded 
through the ship. In a moment we were near enough, 
and the order ' Board ! ' was given : and with this cry 
our men were soon on the decks of the frigate."' ! 
Morris was the first to reach the deck, followed in an 
instant by Decatur. Most of the Tripolitans were 
huddled together in confusion on the forecastle. The 
Americans were quickly formed and charged forward, 
with their commander in the lead. The enemy made 
little resistance and no firearms were used. The lower 
decks were also soon cleared. Decatur says in his 
report : " I can form no judgment as to the number of 
men on board; but there were twenty killed. A large 
boat full got off and many leaped into the sea. "We 
have made one prisoner." The combustibles were then 
passed up from the ketch and distributed, and the men 
scattered to the various parts of the ship that had been 
assigned to them. The commodore's orders were posi- 
tive not to attempt to save the Philadelphia. There 
was, then, no alternative to the painful necessity of 
destroying her. The thing was done quickly and 
exactly according to arrangement. Morris was a trifle 
late in receiving his combustibles, but he remained at 
his post until he had a fire well started, and then had 
some difficulty in reaching the deck, on account of fire 
and smoke above him. In a few minutes the ship was 
in flames, and the men had barely time to regain the 
Intrepid, cut the fasts, shove off, and save her from the 
fire. The ketch still had on deck a large quantity of 
1 C. Morris, p. 2S. 



172 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

combustibles in barrels, covered on f y by a tarpaulin, 
ready for use in case she should )>e converted into 
a fire-ship for the destruction of the enemy's shipping. 
The danger of her taking fire, therefore, was very 
great. Decatur was the last to leave the frigate, and 
leaped into the rigging of the ketch just as she swung 
off. The whole affair had taken less than twenty min- 
utes. No one was killed and only one slightly wounded. 
The sweeps were manned, and the Intrepid began 
her retreat from the harbor, favored by a light breeze 
off shore. Her situation was still a perilous one. The 
town had by this time become thoroughly aroused. 
Morris says : " Up to this time the ships and batteries 
of the enemy had remained silent, but they were 
now prepared to act ; and when the crew of the ketch 
gave three cheers in exultation of their success, they 
received the return of a general discharge from the 
enemy. The confusion of the moment probably pre- 
vented much care in their direction and, though under 
the fire of nearly a hundred pieces for half an hour, the 
only shot which struck the ketch was one through 
the top-gallant sail. We were in greater danger from 
the ship, whose broadside commanded the passage by 
which we were retreating and whose guns were loaded 
and were discharged as they became heated. We 
escaped these also, and while urging the ketch on- 
wards with sweeps, the crew were commenting upon 
the beauty of the spray thrown up by the shot be- 
tween us and the brilliant light of the ship, rather 
than calculating any danger that might be appre- 
hended from the contact. The appearance of the ship 
was indeed magnificent. The flames in the interior 
illuminated her ports and, ascending her rigging and 
masts, formed columns of fire, which, meeting the tops, 



THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PHILADELPHIA 173 

were reflected into beautiful capitals ; whilst the occa- 
sional discharge of her guns gave an idea of some 
directing spirit within her. The walls of the city and 
its batteries and the masts and rigging of cruisers at 
anchor, brilliantly illuminated and animated by the 
discharge of artillery, formed worthy adjuncts and an 
appropriate background to the picture." 1 The star- 
board battery of the Philadelphia was discharged 
towards the town and into the shipping of the enemy, 
and was supposed to have done some damage. After 
a while the frigate's cables burned off, and she drifted 
ashore and soon blew up. At the entrance to the 
harbor the Intrepid was met by the Siren's boats. 
The brig herself was found outside, and Decatur went 
aboard and reported his success to Stewart. The wind 
was still light, but it soon began to blow and rapidly 
increased to a gale. It was favorable for their course, 
however, and they were soon running for Syracuse. 

"The success of this enterprise," says Morris, 
" added much to the reputation of the Navy, both at 
home and abroad. Great credit was given and was 
justly due to Commodore Preble, who directed and 
first designed it, and to Lieutenant Decatur, who vol- 
unteered to execute it and to whose coolness, self- 
possession, resources and intrepidity its success was 
in an eminent degree due." When Admiral Nelson, 
who was at that time blockading Toulon, heard of 
it, he called it " the most bold and daring act of the 
age." 

As to whether the Philadelphia could have been 
saved and brought away in triumph, opinions differ. 
The belief of Bainbridge, already quoted, was that it 
was impossible, and Preble, in his official report of 

1 C. Morris, p. 29. 



174 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

February 19, 1804, says : " I was well informed that 
her situation was such as to render it impossible to 
bring her out ; and her destruction being absolutely 
necessary to favor my intended operations against this 
city, I determined the attempt should be made." 
More than twenty years later Jacob Jones, one of the 
Philadelphia's captive officers in Tripoli, wrote to 
Mrs. Decatur : " I know of nothing which could have 
rendered it impracticable to the captors to have taken 
the Philadelphia out of the harbor of Tripoli." At 
the same time the pilot Catalano certified : " That he 
is and always was of opinion, that in the state of the 
wind at the time and his knowledge of the current and 
the soundings of the harbor, that the ship might have 
been brought out with safety had not orders been per- 
emptorily given to destroy her. That he gave this 
opinion to Commodore Decatur on board the Phil- 
adelphia at the moment of her capture, who was only 
prevented by his orders from making the attempt." 
Mrs. Decatur said : " It was, moreover, the opinion of 
my husband that he could have towed the ship out, 
the distance being only two miles, if the wind had 
been adverse ; that her guns, which were all loaded, 
would have protected the ketch while engaged in that 
operation ; that it being dark, they had nothing to 
apprehend from the batteries ; and that it was the 
flames of the frigate that exposed them to the view of 
the enemy and greatly increased the peril of the 
enterprise." 1 Mackenzie and Cooper believed it to 
have been impracticable on the ground that the ship's 
own motive power was lacking and that Decatur bad 
not men enough to afford the attempt to tow her out 
the probability of success. The removal of the frigate 
1 Mrs. Decatur, pp. 10, 12, 30. 



THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PHILADELPHIA 175 

from the hands of the enemy was of supreme import- 
ance, and Commodore Preble doubtless felt that he 
would not be justified in increasing the risk of failure 
or in leaving the question to be decided at a critical 
moment. 

The Siren and Intrepid reached Syracuse on the 
morning of February 19, to the great relief and joy 
of the commodore and of every other officer and man 
in the squadron, the vessels then in port being the 
Constitution, Vixen, and Enterprise. The log of the 
flagship records that " at 10 appeared in the offing 
the United States Brig Siren and the Intrepid. . . . 
The wind being light we sent boats out to assist in 
towing them in. . . . At y? past 10 they passed 
through our squadron in triumph, receiving three 
cheers from each as they passed." 1 

In a letter 2 of the same date to the secretary of 
the navy, Preble earnestly recommended Decatur's 
promotion. This was promptly accomplished and the 
secretary wrote a letter dated May 22, 1804, addressed 
to Stephen Decatur, Esq., Captain in the Navy of the 
United States, in which he says : " The achievement 
of this brilliant enterprise reflects the highest honor 
on all the officers and men concerned. You have 
acquitted yourself in a manner which justifies the 
high confidence we have reposed in your valor and 
your skill. The President has desired me to convey to 
you his thanks for your gallant conduct on this occa- 
sion, and he likewise requests that you will in his 
name thank each individual of your gallant band for 
their honorable and valorous support, rendered the 

1 Preble Papers ; Ilollis, The Frigate Constitution (Boston, 1900), 
p. 98. 

- Mrs. Decatur, p. 33. 



17G OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

more honorable from its having been volunteered. As 
a testimonial of the President's high opinion of your 
gallant conduct in this instance, he sends you the 
enclosed commission." 1 Decatur was the youngest 
captain ever appointed in the United States navy, 
being a little over twenty-five years of age. He was 
promoted over the heads of seven other officers, which 
caused some dissatisfaction, as is always the case under 
such circumstances. This was foreseen by Charles 
W. Goldsborough, chief clerk of the navy depart- 
ment, who wrote a confidential letter to Preble on the 
subject. After expressing great admiration for Deca- 
tur he says : " Suppose Capt. Decatur was to decline 
accepting the promotion given him, upon the principle 
of regard for the feelings of those who were appointed 
Lieutenants before him. Such a measure would im- 
mortalize him. The deed would justly bear the charac- 
ter of sublimity — rare instance of the most noble 
disinterestedness. ... It would be the means of 
avoiding those bickerings & heart-burnings which his 
promotion will create among those who were his senior 
Lt. officers, & of fixing him with their cordial consent 
in the commission. If he were to act his part, they 
would feel the same noble sentiment & make to the 
government a declaration of their wishes that he might 
be placed over their heads." 2 

At nearly the same time the grade of master com- 
mandant, now known as commander, which had been 
abolished by the naval reduction act of 1801, was 
revived, and Lieutenants Charles Stewart, Isaac Hull, 
Andrew Sterrett, John Shaw, Isaac Chauncey, John 
Smith, Richard Somers, and George Cox were pro- 

1 Nav. Chron. p. 259. 

2 Preble Papers (June 6, 1804). 



THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PHILADELPHIA 177 

moted to the new rank. Several midshipmen were 
appointed acting lieutenants by Commodore Preble. 

In November, 1804, Congress resolved : " That the 
President of the United States be requested to present 
in the name of Congress to Captain Stephen Decatur 
a sword, and to each of the officers and crew of the 
United States ketch Intrepid, two months' pay." 1 
The officers would not accept this extra pay, but, with 
reason, felt that they were entitled to prize-money. 
The matter was brought up several years later, and 
Congress, with great injustice, declined or neglected 
to grant prize-money to the officers and men of the 
Intrepid, although it was recommended by committees 
both of the Senate and the House, and a bill provid- 
ing for it passed the Senate. 2 

Meanwhile the squadron had not been idle. Early 
in February the Vixen and Nautilus were sent to 
Tunis to communicate with Dr. Davis, the American 
charge d'affaires, and the former was to proceed to 
Algiers with dispatches for Consul Lear. She was 
next to search for Tripolitan cruisers, if any were 
reported to be to the westward, then stop again at 
Algiers, take on board Lear or O'Brien or both of 
them, and return to Syracuse. O'Brien had remained 
in Algiers after his resignation. The Vixen performed 
this duty, and returned with O'Brien early in April. 
The Nautilus proceeded from Tunis to the coast of 
Tripoli, and on February 16, the same day the Phil- 
adelphia was burned, she captured the brig Fortunata 
Barbara, under English colors, trying to run into 

1 \av. Chron. p. 259. 

2 Decatur, app. iii ; Mrs. Decatur, pp. 35-45 ; Nav. Aff. ii, pp. 483- 
486, 776-779 ; iii. pp. 25-35, 122-127, 178-189, 459-461 ; iv,pp.84, 209, 
301,398, 816. 



178 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

Tripoli. The Nautilus returned to Malta with the 
prize, which was afterwards ordered to the United 
States for adjudication, but not being seaworthy put 
back to Malta, and was finally given up to her former 
owners for a small sum, to avoid litigation. 1 

Lieutenant Dent was sent in the Enterprise to 
Messina to see what arrangements could be made for 
the purchase or charter of gunboats and mortar-vessels. 
Decatur, after his return, was sent to Messina to 
superintend necessary repairs to the Enterprise. The 
Constitution sailed March 2 for Malta, and returned 
to Syracuse on the 17th. March 9 the Siren and 
Nautilus sailed for the coast of Tripoli, and soon after 
their arrival the Siren captured a polacca called the 
Madona Catapoliana, under the Russian flag, from 
Tripoli bound to Malta. Lieutenant Stewart sent her 
to that place as a prize. She was of little value, and 
later was given up, in view of the friendly interest of 
the czar in American affairs at Tripoli. March 20 the 
Siren ran foul of the Nautilus, and the latter went 
back to Syracuse for repairs, but soon returned to the 
blockade. Some days later she encountered a severe 
gale, was obliged to throw overboard four guns, and 
received such severe damage as to compel her to go to 
Messina for a thorough overhauling. 2 

One morning towards the end of March, an armed 
brig was discovered lying to off Tripoli. She had just 
left that port bound for Malta, and attempted to get 
back into the harbor ; but the Siren succeeded in cutting 
her off and she at once surrendered. She proved to 

1 Preble Papers: Preble to Sec. of Navy (Feb. 3, April 19, and 
July 5, 1804) ; to Smith and to Somers (Feb. 3) ; certificate (Apr. 23). 

2 Preble Papers : Preble to Sec. of Navy (April 10 and July 5, 
1804) ; Reed to Somers (March 20) ; Somers to Preble (April 16). 



THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PHILADELPHIA 179 

be the Transfer, before mentioned as having been 
expected at Tripoli, 1 and had been carrying on a con- 
traband trade between Malta and Tripoli for some 
time. She had been a British privateer and had been 
purchased at Malta by the Tripolitan consul. She was 
undoubtedly the property of the pasha. The prize had 
a crew of eighty men. Lieutenant Stewart sent her to 
Syracuse, and the commodore took her into the service 
April 17. He says in his journal: "I have named 
her the Scourge. She mounts sixteen six-pounders 
and is a good cruiser." Pie gave the command of her 
to Lieutenant Dent, at that time acting captain of the 
Constitution. 2 

The commodore sailed from Syracuse March 21, 
and arrived off Tripoli on the 26th. He had letters 
for the French consul, M. Beaussier, which Mr. Liv- 
ingston, the United States minister to France, had 
received from Talleyrand by order of Bonaparte. He 
delivered them the next day through Midshipman 
Izard, who went ashore with a flag. Izard was allowed 
to see Captain Bainbridge, to whom Preble obtained 
permission to send supplies by neutral vessels, but not 
in boats of the squadron. Bainbridge advised Preble 
to be on the lookout for Tripolitan vessels which might 
attempt to enter Syracuse harbor in disguise. He 
suggested that the commodore should endeavor to 
exchange all his Tripolitan prisoners for one or two of 
the Philadelphia's officers, whose knowledge of Tripoli 
would be very useful to him. For offensive measures 
he advised an attack on the Tripolitan gunboats by 
eighteen or twenty of the ships' boats ; also a land 

1 See above, p. 170. 

2 Preble Papers : Preble to Sec. of Navy (April 19, 1804) ; Journal 
(April 17). 



180 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

attack by three or four thousand men. On the 28th 
Preble had a conference with the French consul on 
board the flagship, but nothing was accomplished. 
The pasha, exasperated at the loss of the Philadelphia, 
now demanded, according to the consul, two hundred 
and fifty thousand dollars for peace and ransom, and 
would not consider an exchange of prisoners ; this 
demand was soon raised to half a million. Preble was 
convinced that the French consul was acting in the 
interest of the pasha, and that all the other consuls, 
except Nissen, were intriguing against peace with the 
United States, in the belief that in such event the 
pasha would go to war with some of their own gov- 
ernments. March 30 a northeast gale set in, and the 
Constitution and Siren ran over to Tunis and from 
there to Malta, where they arrived April 12. The 
next day the Vixen arrived from Algiers with O'Brien, 
who soon sailed for Tunis in the Enterprise with 
dispatches for Davis from the secretary of state. 1 

During the whole spring the commodore was con- 
stantly cruising about from port to port, arranging 
for the needs of the squadron, the relief of the captives 
in Tripoli, and for the summer campaign. His activity 
and energy were untiring. Incidentally he found it 
necessary to keep his eye on the bey of Tunis, who 
was getting restless and still demanding a frigate. 
O'Brien and Davis had a conference with the sapitapa 
on the subject and made a report. 2 

In the mean time the Argus had searched in vain 
for a Tripolitan cruiser reported to be in the western 

1 Preble Papers : Preble to Sec. of Navy (April 19, 1804) ; Bain- 
bridge to Preble (Marcb 20) ; Journal (Marcb 28) ; Preble to Liv- 
ingston (June 29). 

- Preble Papers : O'Brien and Davis (April 29, 1804). 



THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PHILADELPHIA 181 

Mediterranean. In March she was ordered to leave 
her station in the Straits of Gibraltar, and join the 
squadron. She convoyed a store-ship to Syracuse, 
and arrived off Tripoli in April. On the 30th she 
captured a small sloop. 1 The blockading force now 
consisted of the Siren, Argus, Vixen, and Enterprise, 
with Stewart as senior officer present in command. 
They were later joined by the Scourge. During May 
and June they had several unimportant encounters 
with the batteries and gunboats of Tripoli. 2 

In the course of his cruising in the Constitution 
Preble arrived at Naples May 9. Here he obtained 
from the king of the Two Sicilies, who was also at 
war with Tripoli, an order for six gunboats and two 
bomb -vessels, with their equipment, " under the title 
of a friendly loan." The gunboats were twenty-five 
ton, flat-bottomed vessels, difficult to handle under 
sail or oar, and unseaworthy, being intended only for 
harbor defense ; each carried a long twenty -four 
pounder in the bow. The bomb-vessels were thirty- 
ton boats, similar in construction to the gunboats, and 
each carried a thirteen-inch brass mortar. The com- 
modore also borrowed six long twenty-six pounders, 
which he mounted on the upper deck of the Constitu- 
tion, in the waist. As the squadron was short-handed, 
the king also allowed ninety-six Neapolitan bombar- 
diers, gunners, and sailors to enter the United States 
service ; they helped to man the gunboats and bomb- 
vessels, being equally distributed among these craft. 
Preble then proceeded to Messina, where the boats 

1 Officers' Letters, i, no. 32 : Hull to Sec. of Navy (March 3, 1804) ; 
Preble Papers : Log of ArgUS (April IJO). 

2 Preble Papers : Decatur to Preble (May 2G) ; Stewart to Preble 
(June 13). 



182 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

were, and thence conveyed the gunboats to Syracuse, 
arriving May 31 ; the mortar-boats were not ready. 1 

The commodore left Syracuse June 4, stopped over 
three days at Malta, and appeared before Tripoli on 
the 13th. He had with him on the flagship ex-Consul 
O'Brien, who had returned from Tunis, and whom he 
now sent ashore to treat for ransom and exchange of 
prisoners, but he was unable to make satisfactory 
terms. Preble offered to pay two hundred dollars for 
each prisoner, but "not a cent for tribute or peace." 
He had been advised by Lear to offer six hundred, 
but this he would not do. The pasha would not abate 
his previous demands. 2 

At this time the bey of Tunis was making threats 
on account of one of his vessels being detained by the 
blockaders off Tripoli, although she had been subse- 
quently released. A Spanish vessel also, from Tunis 
bound to Tripoli, with material for Spanish carpenters 
who were building gunboats for the pasha, had been 
stopped and sent back to Tunis. The bey had sent 
several cruisers to sea and was fitting out others. 
But on the appearance of the Constitution, Argus, 
and Enterprise in Tunis Bay, June 19, he became 
quiet* and professed friendship. The commodore then 
sailed for Syracuse, arriving on the 25th. 3 

June 28 Preble sent two thousand dollars and pro- 
visions and clothing to Captain Bainbridge in a neutral 
vessel convoyed by the Argus. In his letters of July 
7 and 8, Bainbridge again suggested sending a land 
force against Tripoli, and believed that in attacking 

1 Preble Papers : Acton to Preble (May 13, 1804). 

2 Preble Papers: Preble to See. of Navy (June 14) ; to Catbcart 
(July 5) ; Journal (June 1.3 and 14). 

3 Nav. Cliron. p. 219 ; Nav. Inst, v, p. 09, note ; Preble Papers : 
Preble to Sec. of Navy (June 14). 



THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PHILADELPHIA 183 

the enemy's gunboats, the ships' boats would prove 
more efficient than the borrowed gunboats. He ad- 
vised bombarding Tripoli at night, and said that in 
his opinion throwing shells into the town occasionally 
would drive all the inhabitants into the country, and 
that if it were kept up a month or two the distress of 
the people would incline the pasha to more moderate 
terms. 1 

July 7 the Siren, Argus, Vixen, and Scourge were 
on the blockade. " At daybreak a large Galliot was 
discovered standing for Tripoly," from the westward. 
The squadron immediately gave chase with a good 
breeze. The enemy made for the shore and reached 
a point about nine luiles west of the town. " At 6 the 
wind left us, then about gun-shot from the chase, 
which we observed them hauling on shore. Several 
shots were fired, but without producing any effect, and 
they continued unloading her. I then made the signal 
for armed boats and immediately dispatched the Syren's 
launch with a 12 lb. Carronade and barge with 
a heavy swivel under the command of Lt. Caldwell 
& Mr. Dorsey, Midshipman, who advanced with the 
greatest expedition & spirit to the reef, where they 
both grounded and were momentarily exposed to a 
severe fire from the Enemy (who were posted in great 
numbers behind the rocks and ridges of Sand hills) ; 
however, they soon extricated themselves & took a 
position from whence they kept up a brisk fire with 
the carronade & swivel untill the schooner [Vixen] 
by the assistance of some boats towing & her sweeps 
gained a position to cover them. The rocks formed 
too strong a breastwork to admit of the Enemy's being 

1 Bainbridge, p. 80 ; Preble Papers. For correspondence between 
Preble and Bainbridge, see also Sabine's Preble, eh. viii. 



184 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

dislodged, but from the fire of the Vixen & boats 
the vessel was cut to pieces. Seeing nothing farther 
could be effected I made the signal of recall that the 
boats might return to tow off the respective ships." 
In this attack one man was killed and three wounded, 
one of them mortally. All of them were marines. 
Lieutenant Stewart believed that the enemy suffered 
severely. 1 

Commodore Preble sailed from Syracuse for Mes- 
sina June 29, and arrived July 1. On the 8th he 
sent the Nautilus, whose repairs were just completed, 
to Syracuse with the two mortar-boats, which were 
now ready. The commodore followed in his flagship 
the next day. On the 14th everything was ready, 
and he left Syracuse with the Constitution, Nautilus, 
and Enterprise, the six gunboats and two mortar-boats. 
After being detained five days at Malta by bad 
weather they sailed for Tripoli, and joined the block- 
ading force July 25. The squadron was accompanied 
by a store-ship. 

1 Preble Papers : Stewart to Preble (July 8, 1804). 



CHAPTER XII 

COMMODORE PREBLE BEFORE TRIPOLI 

COMMODORE PREBLE now had his squadron assembled 
before Tripoli, prepared to do all that could be done 
with the means at his disposal. Besides his two 
thirteen-inch mortars he had forty-two heavy guns : 
thirty long twenty-four pounders on the gun deck of 
the Constitution and one on each of the six gunboats, 
and the six borrowed twenty-six pounders on the spar 
deck of his ship. The remaining force comprised the 
brigs Siren, Argus, and Scourge, and the schooners 
Vixen, Nautilus, and Enterprise, commanded respect- 
ively by Lieutenants Charles Stewart, Isaac Hull, 
John H. Dent, John Smith, Richard Somers, and 
Stephen Decatur. All these officers, except Dent, had 
been promoted, but the fact was unknown in the 
squadron at this time. The first two brigs carried 
sixteen twenty-four pound carronades, the first two 
schooners twelve eighteen-pound carronades, while the 
Scourge had sixteen and the Enterprise twelve six- 
pouuders. On the Constitution's quarter-deck and 
forecastle were mounted a number of long twelve- 
pounders ; and each of the two heavier brigs had two 
of the same. To make up the total strength of the 
squadron, a few other lighter pieces must be added. 
Of all these guns the only ones fit for assaulting the 
enemy's batteries were the twenty-four and twenty-six 
pound long guns. The squadron was manned by one 
thousand and sixty officers and men. 1 

1 This chapter is hased on Preble's Report of Sept. 18, 1S04, to the 



186 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

Tripoli was a walled city protected by forts and 
batteries mounting one hundred and fifteen guns, most 
of them heavy. One of the batteries had been built 
by the crew of the Philadelphia and was called Fort 
America ; another was known as Vixen Battery, from 
having first fired on that vessel. The enemy's force 
for the defense of the city and fortifications was 
estimated at twenty-five thousand Arabs and Turks. 
Their floating defenses comprised a ten-gun brig, two 
eight-gun schooners, two large galleys, and nineteen 
gunboats, each carrying an eighteen or twenty-six 
pounder, some a twenty-nine pounder, in the bow, and 
two howitzers aft. The brig, schooners, and galleys 
were manned by about oue hundred men each, while 
the gunboats carried from thirty-six to fifty men each, 
making a considerably larger number of men afloat 
than Preble had under bis command. These vessels 
were disposed behind the long line of reefs extending 
two miles from the northeast corner of the town, and 
forming the northern side of the harbor, through the 
numerous openings in which their light craft could 
sally forth for attack and quickly retire under their 
batteries when pursued. On account of the shoal 
water and reefs the Constitution could not get near 
enough to destroy them. 

The day before arriving off Tripoli the first matter 
attended to was filling the water casks of the gun- 
boats, and as soon as the squadron was assembled 
arrangements were made for towing these small ves- 

Sec. of the Navy, Nav. Aff. i, p. 133 ; Nav. Chron. p. 220. It is a long 
document in the form of a journal. All quotations, not otherwise 
specified, are from this report. See also Preble, ch. v ; Decatur, ch. 
v, vi ; Cooper, ii, ch. iii, iv, v ; Amer. Nav. Off. i, pp. 89-122, 208- 
232 ; Nav. Inst, v, p. 83 ; Mag. Amer. Hist. iii. p. 182 ; Preble 
Papers. 



COMMODORE PREBLE BEFORE TRIPOLI 187 

sels to sea in case of northerly gales. To the Consti- 
tution were assigned the two mortar-boats, to the 
Argus two of the gunboats, and to the Siren, Vixen, 
Nautilus, and Enterprise one each. The commodore 
also gave orders for anchoring before Tripoli in two 
columns, parallel with the shore. July 28 the weather 
for the first time appeared favorable for beginning 
operations, and at 3 P. M. Preble anchored his squad- 
ron two miles and a half north of the town. No sooner 
was this done, however, than the wind, which had been 
east-southeast, shifted to north-northwest and then to 
north-northeast, and soon began to blow hard, making 
it necessary at six o'clock to weigh anchor and stand off 
shore. The wind increased and blew a gale until the 
31st. Fortunately it continued to haul to the east- 
ward, so that the sea did not rise in proportion to 
the wind, otherwise the difficulty of clawing off a lee 
shore with the gunboats in tow might have been more 
than the squadron was equal to. As it was, it split 
the reefed foresail and close-reefed main topsail of the 
Constitution. August 1 the wind subsided, and the 
squadron stood in again towards Tripoli. Notwith- 
standing all the bad weather, opportunities had been 
found to discharge from the store-ship and distribute 
to the squadron water, provisions, and the naval and 
military stores necessary for the active service ahead. 
The store-ship was then sent to Malta under convoy 
of the Scourge, with Lieutenant Izard in charge. 

August 3 was a fine day with an easterly breeze. 
Several of the enemy's gunboats were seen outside 
the harbor, and the commodore determined to make 
an attack. Signaling his commanders at 12.30 p. m. 
to come within hail, he issued his orders. The two 
mortar-boats were assigned to Lieutenants John H. 



188 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

Dent and Thomas Robinson. The gunboats were 
marshaled in two divisions of three boats each, under 
the command of Lieutenants Richard Somers and 
Stephen Decatur in No. 1 and No. 4 respectively. In 
the first division with Somers were Lieutenants James 
Decatur of the Nautilus and Joshua Blake of the 
Argus in No. 2 and No. 3 ; while No. 5 and No. 6 in 
the second division were in charge of Lieutenants 
Joseph Bainbridge of the Enterprise and John Trippe 
of the Vixen. Each gunboat had a crew of about 
thirty. 

The squadron stood in until two o'clock, when the 
gunboats and bombs were cast off and ordered to 
advance under cover of the larger vessels. All then 
approached to within point-blank range of the batteries. 
At quarter before three the mortars began the battle 
by throwing shells into the town. The enemy imme- 
diately opened a hot fire from all their guns, ashore 
and afloat. The Tripolitan flotilla consisted of their 
nineteen gunboats and two galleys, and was arrayed 
in three divisions : an easterly division of nine boats 
outside the rocks, a reserve division of seven boats, 
including the galleys, in the centre behind the rocks, 
and a westerly division of five boats outside and close 
under the western batteries. 

The American gunboats were ordered to attack the 
easterly division of the enemy ; but Somers, being the 
senior officer, had the right of the line, which was to 
leeward, and he was unable to bring his division into 
action with Decatur's. His own boat in particular, 
being a dull sailer, could not be brought up, even 
with the aid of sweeps. James Decatur, however, was 
able to get up to windward and to join his brother's 
division. Blake, owing to a misunderstanding about 



COMMODORE PREBLE BEFORE TRIPOLI 189 

signals, did not close with the enemy, but maintained 
his fire from a distance, accomplishing- little. Of his 
own movements Somers says : " I found it impossible 
to join the division to windward, which had commenced 
firing on the weather line of the enemy, who lay close 
under the rocks. By this time there was five of the 
enemy's gunboats of the lee line under way, advanc- 
ing and firing. When within point-blank shot I com- 
menced firing on the enemy with round and grape. 
They still advanced until within pistol-shot when they 
wore round and stood in for the batteries. I pursued 
them until within musket-shot of the batteries, which 
kept up a continual fire of round and grape. Three 
of their boats had got in behind the rocks. I then 
wore and stood off. The boat has received no damage, 
and but two of the men slightly wounded." 1 It was 
thought that if Blake had supported Somers they 
could have captured some of the enemy's gunboats. 

Meanwhile Decatur's division, reinforced by his 
brother's boat, attacked the eastern division with spirit. 
Bainbridge had his lateen yard shot away at the out- 
set and was unable to close, but getting as near as he 
could, kept up a heavy fire ; at one time he grounded 
for a moment under the batteries. The other three 
boats, No. 4, No. 6, and No. 2, reserved their fire until 
close upon the enemy, when they poured in a heavy 
discharge of grape and canister. They were now 
closely engaged with three times their number of Tri- 
politan gunboats, which were larger and better boats 
than their own and most of them more heavily armed 
and manned. Moreover, they were too near the enemy 
to receive longer the support of the squadron's fire. 
The elder Decatur, having delivered his fire, ran along- 
1 Preble Papers : Somers to Preble (Aug. 4, 1804). 



190 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

side the nearest gunboat and boarded her, followed by 
Lieutenant Thorn, Midshipman Macdonough, and the 
Americans of his crew, leaving the Neapolitans in the 
boat. They at once engaged in a desperate hand-to- 
hand encounter on the deck of the Tripolitan gunboat 
with pistols, cutlasses, pikes, and axes. In the centre 
of the boat was a large hatchway, to the further side 
of which the enemy retreated, followed by the Ameri- 
cans around both ends. The fight was soon ended by 
the surrender of the Tripolitans. Of their crew of 
thirty-six they had lost sixteen killed and fifteen 
wounded, the other five being made prisoners. The 
prize was then taken in tow. 

James Decatur also had singled out an enemy and, 
after pouring in his fire, had run alongside to board, 
when the Tripolitan at once surrendered ; but as De- 
catur was about to step aboard to take possession, the 
captain drew a pistol and shot him through the head. 
Midshipman Brown, next in command, thereupon drew 
oif, and running under the stern of No. 4 informed 
Stephen Decatur of what had happened. According 
to Preble, Somers, and Morris, the gunboat engaged 
by James Decatur escaped after killing him ; but Mac- 
kenzie, apparently on the authority of Stephen Decatur 
himself, states that upon learning of his brother's 
murder he left his prize in charge of Thorn, with 
a large part of his crew, and immediately pursued and 
overtook the assassin. Stewart also, in a letter written 
at the time, says that Decatur took the boat first 
attacked by his brother. 1 

1 Nav. Chron. p. 223 ; Preble Papers : Somers to Preble (Aug. 4, 
1804) ; C. Morris, p. 32 ; Decatur, p. 93, note ; Nat. Intell. Dec. 5, 1S04 ; 
see also statement of Stewart quoted in Cbautauquan, July, 1898, 
p. 414. 



COMMODORE PREBLE BEFORE TRIPOLI 191 

At all events, after the capture of his first prize, 
Decatur engaged a second gunboat, armed with a long 
eighteen-pounder and two howitzers and manned by 
a crew of twenty-four. He ran alongside, and at once 
boarded with Macdonough and the remnant of his 
crew. Decatur singled out the captain, a man of great 
size and strength, and attacked him furiously. The 
Tripolitan made a thrust with his boarding pike and, 
in attempting to parry the blow, Decatur's cutlass was 
broken off at the hilt, leaving him for the moment 
unarmed. Another thrust of the pike wounded him in 
the arm. Decatur seized the weapon, wrenched it 
away, and grappled with his antagonist. After a short 
struggle they fell to the deck with Decatur on top. 
Meanwhile the two crews were fighting fiercely about 
their leaders, and a Tripolitan aimed a blow at 
Decatur's head with his scimitar ; when a seaman 
named Daniel Frazier, having both arms disabled by 
wounds, interposed his head and received the blow, 
which laid open his scalp. The Tripolitan captain, being 
much more powerful than Decatur, soon turned him 
underneath and holding him down with his left hand, 
drew a knife and was about to plunge it into his breast. 
Decatur seized the uplifted arm with his left hand 
while he managed to get his right into his pocket, 
where he had a pistol. Giving it the proper direction, 
he fired through the pocket ; the giant relaxed his 
hold and fell dead. Having lost seventeen killed, 
including their leader, the seven surviving Tripolitans, 
four of whom were wounded, soon gave up the fight. 
In his official report of August 3, 1804, Decatur gives 
a very brief account of his day's fighting. He speaks 
of bearing down on the enemy's gunboats and only 
adds : " I boarded and carried two of them and was 



192 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

successful in bringing them off." Accompanying this 
is Surgeon Heermann's report for the day, which gives 
four wounded on board gunboat No. 4, including 
" Capt. Decatur, wounded slightly in the arm," and 
" Dnl. Frashier, two incised wounds on the head, 
one of them severe ; one bad wound across the wrist 
and seven slightly about his hands." 1 Of James 
Decatur's crew two were wounded. 

In the mean time Lieutenant Trippe had been well 
occupied. Running alongside a heavy gunboat with 
a crew of thirty-six, he boarded her, followed by Mid- 
shipman Henley and nine men. The boats then drifted 
apart, and no others could get aboard the enemy. In 
this case, also, there was a hand-to-hand contest be- 
tween the commanders, the Tripolitan being much the 
more powerful. Trippe received eleven sabre wounds, 
but finally succeeded in thrusting his boarding pike 
through the Tripolitan's body and brought him down. 
With the loss of their leader the enemy surrendered, 
having had fourteen killed and seven wounded ; the 
remaining fifteen were made prisoners. Trippe had 
three wounded besides himself. 

For centuries the Barbary pirates had inspired ter- 
ror by their fierce attacks and their mode of boarding 
and sweeping the decks of an enemy. It was supposed 
that the only hope for an adversary lay in keeping 
them at a distance by superior seamanship and gun- 
nery ; in hand-to-hand fighting they were believed to 
be invincible. But they had now met their peers and 
had been overcome by numbers far smaller than their 

1 Preble Papers. According to most accounts Reuben James was 
the seaman who risked bis life for Decatur (see Decatur, app. ii), but 
the surgeon's report would seem to settle it. Reuben James does not 
appear in the list of wounded ; a Thomas James received a " superficial 
puncture in the face." 



COMMODORE PREBLE BEFORE TRIPOLI 193 

own. In future actions they did not allow the Ameri- 
cans to get within boarding distance, and no more 
prizes were taken from the Tripolitan gunboat flotilla. 

" Five of the enemy's gunboats and two galleys, 
composing the centre division and stationed within the 
rocks as a reserve, joined by the boats that had been 
driven in and supplied by fresh men from the shore to 
replace those they had lost, twice attempted to row out 
to endeavor to surround our gunboats and their prizes. 
I as often made the signal to cover them, which was 
promptly attended to by the brigs and schooners, all 
of which were gallantly conducted and annoyed the 
enemy exceedingly ; but the fire from this ship kept 
their flotilla completely in check. Our grape-shot 
made great havoc among their men, not only on board 
their shipping, but on shore. We were several times 
within two cables' length of the rocks and within three 
of their batteries, every one of which in succession 
were silenced so long as we could bring our broadside 
to bear upon them. But the moment we passed a bat- 
tery it was reanimated, and a constant heavy fire kept 
up from all that we could not point our guns at. We 
suffered most when wearing and tacking ; it was then 
I most sensibly felt the want of another frigate." 

The mortar-boats were actively engaged during 
the whole time, throwing shells into the town, and 
although so near the batteries that the men were wet 
through with the spray caused by the enemy's pro- 
jectiles falling in the sea near them, the crews came 
off uninjured. Most of the shells appear not to have 
exploded. They had been obtained at Messina and 
were of poor quality. The house of Nissen, the Danish 
consul, was struck several times. He was the only 
consul that remained in town during the bombardment, 



194 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

all the others, with many of the inhabitants, having 
fled into the country. The Philadelphia's officers 
were able to see, from the window of their prison, the 
attack of Decatur's division on the Tripolitan gun- 
boats. The Philadelphia's men were employed in 
carrying ammunition to the Tripolitan batteries and 
were severely beaten and maltreated. 

" At half-past four, the wind inclining to the north- 
ward, I made the signal for the bombs and gunboats 
to retire from action, and immediately after, the 
iignal to tow off the gunboats and prizes, which was 
handsomely executed by the brigs, schooners, and 
boats of the squadron, covered by a heavy fire from 
the Constitution." The fire of the flagship just at this 
time is described more in detail in Preble's journal : 
*' Tacked ship and fired two broadsides in stays, which 
drove the Tripolines out of the castle and brought 
down the steeple of a mosque." As soon as the gun- 
boats had been towed to a safe distance, the Con- 
stitution took the bomb-vessels in tow. This was at 
a quarter before five, and the action had lasted two 
hours. 

The vessels of the squadron had their sails and rig- 
ging a good deal cut by shot, and a twenty-four pound 
ball passed nearly through the Constitution's main- 
mast. The only man wounded, not in the gunboats, 
was a marine on the flagship ; the marines worked the 
twenty-six pounders on the spar deck. " We must im- 
pute our getting off so well to our keeping so near that 
they overshot us, and to the annoyance our grape-shot 
gave them ; they are, however, but wretched gunners. 
. . . The enemy must have suffered very much in 
killed and wounded, both among their shipping and 
on shore. Three of their gunboats were sunk in the 








A 



COMMODORE PREBLE BEFORE TRIPOLI 195 

harbor, several of them had their decks nearly cleared 
of men by our shot, and a number of shells burst in 
the town and batteries." 

In his official report and in general orders, 1 pub- 
lished the next day, the commodore praises the con- 
duct of the officers and men of his flagship, of the 
smaller vessels, and of the flotilla, including the 
Neapolitan gunners and bombardiers. It has some- 
times been said that Preble was dissatisfied with the 
result of the day's work and thought that more prizes 
should have been taken, but there is not the slightest 
hint of such a feeling on his part in his report or in 
his private journal, where it might be expected if any- 
where. There is only praise, except the mildest sort 
of reprehension of Lieutenant Blake. 2 

Lieutenant James Decatur was taken aboard the 
Constitution as soon as the action was over and died 
almost immediately. He was buried at sea the next 
day. He was the only American killed, and thirteen 
were wounded. The wounded Tripolitans were also 
brought aboard the flagship and cared for by the med- 
ical officers of the squadron. 

August 5 a French privateer, which had been in 
Tripoli some days, came out, and Preble induced her 
captain to return to the port with letters to the prime 
minister and the French consul, and with fourteen 
badly wounded prisoners, who were thus restored to 
their friends. It was thought that this act of humanity 
might produce a pleasant impression upon the pasha 
and perhaps affect favorably the welfare of the Amer- 
ican prisoners in his power, but apparently no such 
result was brought about. When the privateer returned 
she brought a letter from the French consul intimat- 

1 Preble Papers. 2 Nav. Inst, v, p. 71, note. 



196 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

ing that the pasha was more disposed to peace upon 
reasonable terms ; but as no definite proposition was 
made, Preble paid no attention to it. Meanwhile all 
hands were occupied in repairing damages and in fit- 
ting out the prize gunboats, which were altered from 
lateen-rigged boats to sloops. They were called No. 7, 
No. 8, and No. 9. Each carried a heavy brass or 
copper gun in the bow and two brass howitzers aft. 
Two of these bow guns, according to Preble's official 
report, weighed sixty-six hundred pounds each, were 
eleven and a half feet long, and threw a twenty-nine 
pound shot. The other, mounted on No. 9, was an 
eighteen-pounder. 

On the 7th everything was ready for another attack. 
Gunboat No. 2 was commanded by Lieutenant Charles 
Gordon of the Constitution, No. 3 by Sailing-Master 
Samuel B. Brooks of the Argus, No. 6, No. 7, No. 8, 
and No. 9 by Lieutenants Henry Wadsworth of the 
Constitution, William M. Crane of the Vixen, Jona- 
than Thorn of the Enterprise, and James R. Caldwell 
of the Siren ; the others had the same commanders 
as on the 3d. The two bomb-vessels, under Dent and 
Robinson, took a position in a small bay to the west- 
ward of Tripoli, where they were not much exposed to 
the enemy's fire, and bombarded the town. The gun- 
boats advanced in two divisions, under Somers and 
Decatur, and opened fire on one of the western bat- 
teries mounting seven heavy guns, and also on the 
town. They received a hot fire in return. The action 
began at half -past two in the afternoon. The wind was 
north-northeast, and being on shore, the commodore did 
not venture very close with the Constitution, fearing 
that if the ship were disabled she might be lost. She 
remained to windward with the Enterpriseand Nautilus, 



COMMODORE PREBLE BEFORE TRIPOLI 197 

which were commanded by Lieutenants James Law- 
rence and George W. Reed, in the absence of their 
captains. They stood ready to cut off the enemy's gun- 
boats and galleys, fifteen in number, should they come 
out to attack the American gunboats, which they 
seemed to be threatening to do. " The seven-gun 
battery in less than two hours was silenced, except one 
gun. I presume the others were dismounted by our 
shot, as the walls were almost totally destroyed. At 
a quarter past three P. M. a ship hove in sight to the 
northward, standing for the town ; made the Argus 
signal to chase." The Siren and Vixen remained near 
the gunboats to cover them in case of need. At half- 
past three gunboat No. 9, in Decatur's division, re- 
ceived a hot shot in her magazine and blew up. Out 
of her complement of twenty-eight, Lieutenant Cald- 
well, Midshipman Dorsey, and eight men were killed, 
and six men wounded, two of them mortally. At 
the time of the accident Midshipman Spence was 
superintending the loading of the gun. This was 
finished, the gun was fired, and the men gave three 
cheers as the boat sank under them. Spence, who could 
not swim, and the other eleven men who were unhurt, 
together with the wounded, were picked up by the 
Siren's boats or the nearest gunboats. Those who were 
able immediately went to work with the crews of the 
other boats. Spence's father was purser of the Phil- 
adelphia and a prisoner in Tripoli at this time. 1 

At half-past five, as the wind began to freshen, the 
commodore signaled to the gunboats and bombs to 
retire, and they were taken in tow by the other ves- 
sels. " In this day's action No. 4 had a twenty-four 

1 Nav. Chron. p. 228, note ; Nat. Intell. Dec. 5, 1804 (Stewart's 

letter). 



198 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

pound shot through her hull ; No. 6, her lateen 
yard shot away ; No. 8, a twenty-four shot through 
her hull, which killed two men. Some of the other 
boats had their rigging and sails considerably cut. 
We threw forty-eight shells and about five hundred 
twenty-four pound shot into the town and batteries. 
All the officers and men engaged in the action behaved 
with the utmost intrepidity. At half-past six all the 
boats were in tow and the squadron standing to the 
aorthwest." 

The strange sail turned out to be the frigate John 
Adams, Captain Isaac Chauncey, from the United 
States, who brought out the new commissions for 
Captain Decatur and the other officers who had been 
promoted. To Commodore Preble he brought a letter 
from the secretary of the navy, dated May 22, 1804, 
less pleasing in its import, announcing as it did the 
coming of Commodore Samuel Barron with four frig- 
ates to supersede him in command. This act of the 
administration, however unfortunate, would appear 
from the secretary's letter to have been unavoidable. 
When the news of the loss of the Philadelphia reached 
Washington, it was decided to push the war with 
increased vigor. The secretary writes : " The Presi- 
dent immediately determined to put in commission 
and to send to the Mediterranean a force which would 
be able, beyond the possibility of a doubt, to coerce 
the enemy to a peace on terms compatible with our 
honor and our interest. A due regard to our situation 
with Tripoli, and precautionary considerations in re- 
lation to the other Barbary powers, demanded that 
our forces in that quarter should be so far augmented 
as to leave no doubt of our compelling the existing 
enemy to submit to our own terms, and of effectually 



COMMODORE PREBLE BEFORE TRIPOLI 199 

checking any hostile dispositions that might be enter- 
tained towards ns by any of the other Barbary powers. 
. . . Your good sense will perceive that we have thus 
been unavoidably constrained to supersede you in a 
command in which you have acquitted yourself in 
a manner honorable to yourself, useful to your coun- 
try, and in all respects perfectly satisfactory to us. 
The only captains in the country, junior to yourself, 
are Captains James Barron and H. G. Campbell ; 
and as the frigates cannot be commanded but by cap- 
tains, agreeably to law, we of necessity have been 
obliged to send out two gentlemen senior to yourself 
in commission. Be assured, sir, that no want of con- 
fidence in you has been mingled with the considera- 
tions which have imposed upon us the necessity of 
this measure. You have fulfilled our highest expecta- 
tions ; and the President has given it, in an especial 
charge to me, to declare to you that he has the high- 
est confidence in your activity, judgment, and valor. 
Through me he desires to convey to you his thanks 
for the very important services which you have ren- 
dered to your country ; and I beg you to be assured, 
sir, that it affords me great personal satisfaction to be 
the medium of conveying to you his sentiments in 
relation to your conduct." * The force expected con- 
sisted of the frigates President, 44, Captain George 
Cox, flagship of Commodore Samuel Barron; Con- 
gress, 36, Captain John Rodgers ; Essex, 32, Captain 
James Barron ; and Constellation, 3G, Captain H. G. 
Campbell. 

As Chauncey expected the new squadron to arrive 
very soon, Preble was greatly disappointed at the 
prospect of not being able to carry out to the end 
1 Nav. Chron. p. 245. 



200 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

the campaign he had planned, as well as chagrined at 
his displacement from the command. In his private 
journal he wrote, under the date of August 8 : " How 
much my feelings are lacerated by this supersedure 
at the moment of victory cannot be described and 
can be felt only by an officer placed in my mortify- 
ing situation." In his official report he acknowledges 
the secretary's letters " approbating my conduct and 
conveying to me the thanks of the President for my 
services. I beg you, sir, to accept my warmest 
thanks for the very obliging language in which you 
have made these communications, and to assure the 
President that to merit the applause of my country 
is my only aim, and to receive it the highest grati- 
fication it can bestow. ... I cannot but regret that 
our naval establishment is so limited as to deprive 
me of the means and glory of completely subduing 
the haughty tyrant of Tripoli, while in the chief com- 
mand. It will, however, afford me satisfaction to give 
my successor all the assistance in my power." How- 
ever, owing to delay in the arrival of the new squad- 
ron, Preble was not called upon immediately to sur- 
render his command. 

After the news of Preble's assaults on Tripoli in 
August had reached home, the administration could 
better appreciate his true worth, and the secretary of 
the navy wrote to him : " This information furnishes 
additional testimony of your energy and judgment. 
We sensibly feel the value of your services and take 
pleasure in acknowledging them. Be assured that your 
Country will never prove ungrateful. I most ardently 
hope that you will have accomplished the reduction 
of Tripoli before the arrival of Commodore Barron's 
squadron, so that the whole gloiy of its reduction may 



COMMODORE PREBLE BEFORE TRIPOLI 201 

be attributed to you. Nothing, however, can deprive 
you of the reputation wliich you have justly acquired 
by the preparatory arrangements made by you for this 
object and by your conduct in carrying those arrange- 
ments into effect, and although your successor may 
give the final blow to the enemy, the credit will, I 
trust, justly attach to you." * 

The John Adams was loaded with stores for the 
squadron, and, to make room, most of her gun-car- 
riages had been put aboard the other vessels, to be 
brought out later. She was therefore of little use to 
Preble in attacking Tripoli ; but her men and boats 
made a welcome addition to the resources of the squad- 
ron, which was short-handed and taxed to its utmost 
to man the flotilla. Preble waited several days for 
Barron, believing that one vigorous assault by the 
united squadrons would end the war. On the 9th he 
reconnoitred the harbor in the Argus. The brig had 
a narrow escape, being struck under the water-line by 
a large shot which cut half through her planking. The 
Scourge returned from Malta the same clay. 

The next day, in answer to a signal from the French 
consul, a boat with Mr. O'Brien was sent in, under 
a flag of truce, with letters and an offer to pay eighty 
thousand dollars for ransom and ten thousand for 
a consular present. 2 The boat returned with informa- 
tion that the pasha would accept five hundred dollars 
ransom for each prisoner, amounting to about one 
hundred and fifty thousand dollars, waiving all claim 
to payment for peace and tribute. These were substan- 
tially the same terms proposed by the pasha six months 
before and less by three hundred and fifty thousand 

1 Preble Papers (Nov. 28, 1804). 

2 Preble Papers : Preble to Beaussier (Aug. 9, 1804). 



202 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

dollars than his later demands. They were rejected. 
Preble states in his journal that the next day he au- 
thorized "the French consul to offer the pasha one 
hundred thousand dollars for ransom of the prisoners, 
ten thousand as a consular present, nothing for peace, 
and no tribute. These terms were rejected." 

As Barron's squadron did not appear, Preble made 
preparations for a night attack on Tripoli ; but there 
was a heavy sea, and he considered it inadvisable to 
make the attempt while it continued. On the 16th 
the Enterprise, Lieutenant Lawrence, was sent to 
Malta " with orders to the agent there to hire trans- 
ports and send off immediately a supply of fresh water, 
provision, and other stores." Fresh vegetables were 
especially needed, as scurvy had made its appearance 
in the squadron. Some of the vessels had been five 
months on the coast without visiting port. On the 
evening of the 18th, Decatur and Chauncey were sent 
in to reconnoitre in small boats. They found the 
Tripolitan gunboats " anchored in a line abreast from 
the Mole to the Pasha's castle, with their heads to the 
eastward." The next morning it blew a gale from 
the north-northwest and the squadron was obliged to 
weigh anchor and get an offing. During the next few 
days, while it was still blowing hard, the Intrepid and 
another vessel from Malta with water and provisions 
joined the squadron. On the 22d the Enterprise also 
returned, bringing no news of Barron's squadron. On 
the 24th the conditions were favorable for a night 
attack. At midnight the bombs and gunboats were 
towed in by the boats of the squadron. From two to 
six o'clock they bombarded the town and were then 
towed out. They received no fire in return. Appar- 
ently little damage was clone by the bombardment. 



COMMODORE PREBLE BEFORE TRIPOLI 203 

After another delay on account of bad weather, the 
next attack was made on the night of August 28. 
The evening was spent in preparation. The bomb- 
vessels were disabled and could not take part; one 
leaked, and in the other the mortar-bed had given way. 
The John Adams, Scourge, transports, and bombs were 
anchored seven miles out. Captain Chauncey, with 
several of his officers and seventy of the crew of the 
John Adams, and Lieutenants Dent and Izard of the 
Scourge, joined the Constitution. The gunboats were 
in two divisions as before, under Decatur and Somers. 
Lawrence relieved Bainbridge in No. 5 ; the others 
were commanded as on the 7th. At half-past one in 
the morning they went in, accompanied by the Siren, 
Argus, Vixen, Nautilus, and Enterprise, and the boats 
of the squadron, and at three anchored close to the 
rocks. The brigs and schooners kept under way just out- 
side, ready to support the gunboats ; their guns were too 
light to make any impression on the batteries. The 
ships' boats remained with the gunboats, to give assist- 
ance if needed. The gunboats kept up a heavy fire 
for two hours and a half, throwing four hundred round 
shot, besides grape and canister. At daylight, from 
her position two miles off Fort English, the Con- 
stitution stood in towards the harbor, receiving a 
heavy fire from the fort, the castle, and the bat- 
teries. When within two cables' length of the rocks, 
she opened a hot fire with round and grape-shot on 
the thirteen Tripolitan gunboats and galleys engaged 
with the American flotilla. One boat was sunk, two 
driven ashore disabled, and the others retreated. The 
frigate advanced to within musket-shot of the mole 
battery, and was there brought to, and holding this 
position for three quarters of an hour, fired over three 



204 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

hundred round shot, besides grape and canister, into 
the batteries, the castle, and the town ; she fired nine 
broadsides. One twenty-four pound shot entered the 
room occupied by the Philadelphia's officers and fell 
close to Captain Bainbridge's head. He was nearly 
buried in a mass of stone and mortar, and his ankle 
was injured. By quarter-past six the gunboats had 
withdrawn and were in tow, and the Constitution 
hauled off. The commodore believed that he had 
inflicted severe damage on the enemy by this attack. 
One of the John Adams's boats, in company with the 
gunboats, was sunk by a shot which killed three men 
and wounded one. These were the only casualties on 
the American side. All the vessels and gunboats were 
cut up more or less in their sails and rigging, but 
otherwise suffered little injury. 

The next few days were spent in preparing for an- 
other attack. On the 31st another supply ship arrived 
from Malta, but brought no news of Commodore Bar- 
ron. September 2 a Spanish vessel coming out of 
Tripoli reported that great damage had been done 
in the city and harbor by the last bombardment and 
that many people had been killed, also that three of 
the gunboats that had been sunk had been raised and 
refitted. 

On the 3d the squadron was ready for the fifth 
attack, which proved to be the last. The bombs were 
in commission again under their former commanders, 
Lieutenants Dent and Robinson. The two divisions 
of gunboats were, as usual, commanded by Captains 
Decatur and Somers. No. 3 was put in charge of 
Lieutenant Morris, while Lieutenant Trippe, having 
recovered from his wounds, returned to No. 6. Cap- 
tain Chauncey and a number of his officers and men 



COMMODORE PREBLE BEFORE TRIPOLI 205 

again volunteered for duty on the flagship. " At two 
P. M. Tripoli bore south-southwest two and a half 
miles distant, wind east by north. At half-past two 
the signals were made for the gunboats to cast off, 
advance and attack the enemy's galleys and gunboats, 
which were all under way in the eastern part of the 
harbor, whither they had for some time been working 
up against the wind. This was certainly a judicious 
movement of theirs, as it precluded the possibility of 
our boats going down to attack the town without 
leaving the enemy's flotilla in their rear and directly 
to windward. I accordingly ordered the bomb-vessels 
to run down within proper distance of the town 
and bombard it, while our gunboats were to engage 
the enemy's galleys and boats to windward. At half- 
past three, our bombs having gained the station to 
which they were directed, anchored and commenced 
throwing shells into the city. At the same time our 
gunboats opened a brisk fire on the galleys, and within 
point-blank shot, which was warmly returned by them 
and Fort English and by a new battery a little to the 
westward ; but as soon as our boats arrived within 
good musket-shot of their galleys and boats, they gave 
way and retreated to the shore within the rocks, and 
under cover of musketry from Fort English. They 
were followed by our boats and by the Siren, Argus, 
Vixen, Nautilus, and Enterprise as far as the reefs 
would permit them to go with prudence. The action 
was then divided. One division of our boats, with the 
brigs and schooners, attacked Fort English, whilst 
the other was engaged with the enemy's galleys and 
boats. The Pasha's castle, the mole, crown and several 
other batteries kept up a constant fire on our bomb- 
vessels, which were well conducted and threw shells 



206 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

briskly into the town, but from their situation they 
were very much exposed and in great danger of being 
sunk. I accordingly ran within them with the Consti- 
tution, to draw off the enemy's attention and amuse 
them whilst the bombardment was kept up. We 
brought to within reach of grape and fired eleven 
broadsides into the Pasha's castle, town and batteries, 
in a situation where more than seventy guns could 
bear upon us. One of their batteries was silenced. 
The town, castle and other batteries considerably 
damaged. By this time it was half-past four o'clock. 
The wind was increasing and inclining rapidly to the 
northward. I made the signal for the boats to retire 
from action, and for the brigs and schooners to take 
them in tow, and soon after hauled off with the Con- 
stitution to repair damages." 

The mortars threw fifty shells. The gunboats were 
an hour and a quarter in action, and fired four hun- 
dred round shot, besides grape and canister. The brigs 
and schooners were able to get near enough to Fort 
English to make their carronades effective. The fort 
was considerably damaged, and several of the Tripoli- 
tan irunboats were disabled. All the vessels of the 
squadron and the gunboats were a good deal cut up in 
their sails and rigging, but suffered no serious injury. 
Lieutenant liobinson's mortar-boat was disabled, and 
came near sinking, but was finally towed off. There 
were no casualties on the American side. The commo- 
dore commended the services of Captain Chauncey on 
the Constitution during the last two actions. 

For several days Commodore Preble had been 
maturing a plan to send into the harbor a fire-ship, 
or floating mine, to be exploded in the midst of the 
enemy's shipping, in the hope that many of their gun- 



COMMODORE PREBLE BEFORE TRIPOLI 207 

boats might be destroyed and that possibly injury 
might be done to the castle and town, if the fire-ship 
could be brought near enough. The ketch Intrepid 
was chosen for the purpose. A compartment was built 
in the hold just forward of the mainmast, in which 
were placed one hundred barrels, or about fifteen 
thousand pounds, of powder in bulk. From this led 
a tube in which a train was laid connected with a fuse 
calculated to burn fifteen minutes. This communi- 
cated with another room aft, which was filled with 
splinters and other combustibles. When the vessel 
had been brought into position, this was to be ignited, 
and it was thought that the fire produced would keep 
off boarders and that the crew would have time to 
escape while the fuse was burning. On the deck just 
over the powder were placed one hundred thirteen- 
inch and fifty nine-inch shells, with a large quantity 
of solid shot and kentledge. Captain Somers volun- 
teered to take in the Intrepid and Lieutenant Wads- 
worth to accompany him. As usual there was no lack 
of volunteers for this service, although the desperate 
nature of the expedition was pointed out to them. Six 
men were selected from the crew of the Constitution 
and four from the Nautilus. Two of the fastest rowing 
boats in the squadron were taken, — a six-oared boat 
from the Constitution, and one of four oars from the 
Siren, — in which the crew were to make their escape. 
On the evening of September 4 there was a light 
breeze from the east, and it was decided to go in. 
Everything seemed favorable for the enterprise except 
that three Tripolitan gunboats were seen near the 
western entrance, by which they were to go in. The 
ketch was convoyed as far as the rocks near the 
entrance by the Argus, Vixen, and Nautilus, and these 



208 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

vessels remained in the vicinity, so as to pick up the 
boats when they came out. It was between nine and 
ten o'clock when they parted company. Just before 
going in Lieutenant Joseph Israel of the Constitution 
went aboard the Intrepid, it is said to deliver a mes- 
sage from the commodore, and as he begged earnestly 
to be allowed to join the expedition, Somers consented. 

It was a dark night and the Intrepid was soon lost 
to view, but Lieutenant Ridgely 1 of the Nautilus 
believed that he saw her with a night-glass up to the 
last moment, and that she was still advancing. As she 
entered the harbor she was seen by the Tripolitans and 
the batteries at once opened on her. Suddenly, at 9.47 
p. M., 2 there was a blinding flash and a terrific explo- 
sion. The vessels outside plainly felt the concussion. 
The masts rose high in the air with sails and rigging 
on fire, with fragments of wreckage and many shells, 
some of which exjiloded. Cries of terror and drums 
beating to arms were heard in the town for a few 
minutes. The batteries ceased their fire. Then fol- 
lowed profound silence and darkness. The vessels 
hovered about the entrance until sunrise, keeping 
a sharp lookout for the boats, which never appeared. 

It is certain that the explosion was premature, be- 
cause there was no preceding blaze of the combus- 
tibles ; and it was also evident that the ketch had not 
had time to reach her destination. The exact manner 
of the explosion has always been a mystery. It may 
have been caused by one of the enemy's shot passing 
through the magazine, as was the case with gunboat 
No. 9 on August 7. Or it may have been an acci- 

1 See article by Ridgely, A Naval Reminiscence, in Naval Maga- 
zine, i, p. 172, March 1836. 

2 Preble Papers : Log of Constitution. 



COMMODORE PREBLE BEFORE TRIPOLI 201) 

dent ; some of the watchers said they saw a light pass 
rapidly across the deck of the ketch just before the 
catastrophe, and thought that possibly it was being 
carried to ignite the combustibles and that a spark 
found its way into the powder. Preble believed that 
the Tripolitans attempted to board the Intrepid from 
their gunboats, and that the magazine was fired by 
Somers rather than surrender to the enemy and allow 
them to get possession of the powder, of which they 
were in great need. In support of this theory Preble 
states that one of the largest Tripolitan gunboats was 
missing the next day, and that three others were seen 
to be shattered and drawn up on the beach. But this 
fact has been doubted, and an error in observation, at 
a little distance, would have been possible. Another 
theory was that so many of the crew were killed or 
disabled by the enemy's fire that escape became im- 
possible and that the magazine was therefore inten- 
tionally exploded, rather than allow the vessel to be 
captured. It has always been believed that Somers 
and his companions were capable of this act of self- 
devotion, and it is known that they had expressed the 
determination not to allow the capture of themselves 
or the ketch. 1 

All of the thirteen bodies were recovered, two days 
later, by the Tripolitans. Two were found in the bot- 
tom of the ketch, which grounded on the rocks at the 
north side of the western entrance, one was in the six- 
oared boat, which drifted ashore to the westward, four 
were floating in the harbor, and six were picked up 
on the beach southeast of the town. All were so man- 
gled as to make identification impossible. Captain 
Bainbridgc saw six of the bodies. He believed that 

1 See statement of Stewart iu Chautauquan, July, 1898, p. 414. 



210 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

no damage whatever was done to the enemy by the 
explosion and no Tripolitan was injured. This view 
has become the most generally accepted one, and, if 
true, Preble must have been mistaken in supposing 
that any gunboats had been sunk or injured. On the 
other hand, Eaton, a few months later, met a Turk in 
Egypt who had been in Tripoli at the time of the 
explosion, and who affirmed that the Intrepid blew up 
" after having been boarded by two row galleys." 1 
If the Intrepid had been boarded, many Tripoli tans 
would have been blown up. If their bodies had been 
found and could have been distinguished from Ameri- 
cans, the fact might have been concealed by their 
countrymen, but the case is perhaps hardly suppos- 
able. However, Dr. Cowdery distinctly states in his 
journal that he saw fourteen bodies and heard of six 
others. He was able, as he thought, to pick out three 
of them as officers, although of course it was not 
known in Tripoli how many officers there were in the 
party, or how many in all. His opinion was based on 
the softness of their hands and a few fragments of 
clothing. There was a rumor that several showed 
wounds of grape-shot, but this is mentioned by neither 
Bainbridge nor Cowdery. The bodies were buried 
south of the town, the three supposed officers by them- 
selves. 2 

This event and the mystery surrounding it cast 
a gloom over the squadron. Decatur in particular, 
having so recently lost his brother, was deeply affected. 
Somers had been his dearest friend from boyhood ; 
they had been schoolmates in Philadelphia and entered 
the navy together in 1798. A monument to the mem- 
ory of Somers, Caldwell, James Decatur, Wadsworth, 

1 Eaton, p. 287. 2 See Heston's Absegami, pp. 21.°.-217. 



COMMODORE PREBLE BEFORE TRIPOLI 211 

Israel, and Dorsey, erected by their fellow officers 
of the squadron, stands in the grounds of the Naval 
Academy at Annapolis. The total number of casual- 
ties in Preble's squadron, during its operations before 
Tripoli, was thirty killed and twenty-four wounded, 
of whom two died of their wounds. 

September 5, preparations were made for another 
attack, but the weather became threatening ; and as it 
was getting to be too late in the season for the safety 
of the gunboats and bomb-vessels, the commodore 
decided to dismantle them. Their guns, mortars, and 
ammunition were accordingly taken on board the Con- 
stitution and John Adams, and on the 7th the boats 
were sent to Syracuse, towed by the John Adams, 
Siren, Nautilus, Enterprise, and Scourge. The Con- 
stitution, Argus, and Vixen remained before Tripoli, 
blockading the port. The ammunition of the squadron 
had been so far expended that there was no more than 
enough for these three vessels. 

At last, September 10, the frigates President, Com- 
modore Barron, and Constellation, Captain Campbell, 
appeared, and Commodore Preble turned over the 
command of the squadron to his successor, with the 
customary ceremonies. On the 12th the President 
and Constitution captured two Greek ships, loaded 
with wheat, bound for Tripoli. The Constellation and 
Argus chased a third, which was also taken. 1 The first 
two of these prizes were sent to Malta under convoy 
of the Constitution, arriving September 17, after a 
stormy passage. Here Preble learned that the gun- 
boats and bombs had arrived safely at Syracuse two 
da} r s before. Those that had been borrowed were re- 
turned to the Neapolitan government. 
1 St. Pap. v, P . 164. 



212 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

In his report to the secretary of the navy, after 
calling special attention to Decatur's high qualities, 
Preble says : " The other commanders merit the 
highest commendations for their prompt obedience 
to orders on all occasions and for the zeal, spirit, and 
judgment which they displayed in the several attacks 
on the enemy's shipping and batteries, as well as 
for the general good order and discipline, at all times 
observed on board their respective vessels. The officers 
of the squadron have conducted themselves in the most 
gallant and handsome manner ; and the conduct of 
the different ships' companies has merited my warmest 
approbation, since I have had the honor to command 
them. It affords me much satisfaction to observe that 
we have neither had a duel nor a court-martial in the 
squadron since we left the United States. I most sin- 
cerely regret the loss of our gallant countrymen who 
have sacrificed their lives to the honor of the service, 
and that it has not been in my power, consistent with 
the interest and expectation of our country, to liberate 
Captain Bainbridge and the unfortunate officers and 
crew of the Philadelphia." 



CHAPTER XIII 

THE WINTER OF 1804-1805 

From Malta Commodore Preble proceeded to Syra- 
cuse, September 22, in the Argus. The Constitution 
was undergoing repairs, and with the consent of Com- 
modore Barron, Captain Decatur was now ordered to 
take command of her. Preble was for some time occu- 
pied in settling his accounts at Malta, Syracuse, Mes- 
sina, and Palermo. October 29 he joined the John 
Adams, and proceeded to Naples early in December. 
He there tried to arrange for the loan or hire of 
another flotilla of mortar-vessels and gunboats for the 
next year's operations, but was unsuccessful. Decem- 
ber 23 he sailed for home in the John Adams, Captain 
Chauncey, with James Lawrence as first lieutenant 
and ex-Consul O'Brien as passenger. They touched 
at Gibraltar and Tangier, and arrived at New York 
February 26, 1805. 1 

When Preble first received notice of his recall, in 
August, he feared that the cause of it might be mis- 
understood, and therefore sent copies of the secretary's 
letter of May 22 to his many friends in the Mediter- 
ranean. In reply he received many sympathetic letters 
from American consuls and others, regretting his de- 
parture and congratulating him upon his achievements 
in the war. Among the acquaintances he had made 
were several English officers, who had shown him 
great attention, and had done him many favors ; es- 
1 Nav. Chron. p. 244 ; Amer. Hist. Rec. i, p. 57. 



214 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

pecially Captain Schomberg of the British navy, and 
Sir Alexander Ball, governor of Malta, who was also 
a naval man, having formerly been one of Nelson's 
captains. The governor wrote two or three very 
friendly letters. The war had excited the interest of 
the pope also, who declared that " the American com- 
mander, with a small force and in a short space of 
time, has done more for the cause of Christianity than 
the most powerful nations of Christendom have done 
for ages." * 

Preble received a letter of regret November 4, signed 
by fifty-three of his officers, which was very gratifying 
to him. This letter and his reply show the warm feel- 
ino- between the commodore and his subordinates. 2 
His official report was sent to Congress February 20, 
1805, with a message from the President, in which he 
says : " The energy and judgment displayed by this 
excellent officer, through the whole course of the serv- 
ice lately confided to him, and the zeal and bravery 
of his officers and men in the several enterprises exe- 
cuted by them, cannot fail to give high satisfaction 
to Congress and their country, of whom they have 
deserved well." 3 March 3, Congress voted the com- 
modore a gold medal, swords to the officers who had 
distinguished themselves, and a month's extra pay to 
all petty officers, seamen, and marines. The medal was 
presented to Preble in May, 1806, and the men re- 
ceived their extra pay ; but the President, embarrassed 
at being called upon to decide as to which officers 
had distinguished themselves, deferred action on the 
matter of swords. In 1812 the subject was brought 
up in Congress by Josiah Quincy. He was made 

1 Preble, ch. is ; Nav. Chron. pp. 246, 247. 
N.iv. Chron. p. 2 12 3 Ibid. p. 220. 



THE WINTER OE 1804-1805 215 

chairman of the committee to which it was referred, 
and had some correspondence with the secretary of 
the navy. The committee reported in favor of giving 
swords to all the officers. Being in the midst of war 
with England, however, more important business pre- 
vented further consideration. 1 

When he first arrived in the Mediterranean in 1803, 
Preble feared that his force was inadequate, and before 
the loss of the Philadelphia he wrote to the secretary 
of the navy urging that two or three additional vessels 
be sent out, and he repeated this recommendation at 
every opportunity. 2 It might have been better if the 
administration had not been so forcibly impressed with 
the idea that large reinforcements were necessary. At 
least, if two frigates, under the junior captains, had 
been sent promptly, so as to reach Tripoli in the spring 
of 1804, it would have been far better than the arrival 
of four at the end of the season. With the help of 
two additional frigates the operations before Tripoli 
in the summer of 1804 would very likely have resulted 
in bringing the pasha to terms, and in the release of 
the prisoners without ransom. If Preble's great 
efficiency had been fully appreciated at home, the 
importance of retaining him in the chief command 
would have been recognized as paramount, and would 
probably have suggested some way of reinforcing with- 
out superseding him. 

The difficulties with which Preble was forced to 
contend would have overcome most men. Naval ad- 
ministration in the United States was still in its 

1 Xav. Chron. p. 248; Nav. Aff. i. pp. 281, 2S2, 291-293; Amer. 
Hi3t. Rec. i. pp. 58-60; Palmer, Hist. Register of U. S. (Phil. 
1814), i. p. 88 ; Preble Papers : Preble to Sec. of Navy (June 17, 1800). 

2 Preble, ch. vii. 



216 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

infancy, and the needs of the navy were little under- 
stood and excited little interest in Congress or among 
the people. There was still, moreover, a widespread 
prejudice against the service, especially in the domi- 
nant political party. The difficulty of inducing Con- 
gress to make appropriations for the navy was such 
that in order to carry on the Tripolitan war addi- 
tional duties were laid on imports, and the money thus 
raised was known as the Mediterranean Fund. 1 Rob- 
ert Smith, the secretary, was a man of ability, energy, 
and zeal, but the department was not thoroughly or- 
ganized and could not be while it received such grudg- 
ing support from Congress. There was great delay in 
fitting out ships, the work was imperfectly done, and 
they were sent to sea without a proper supply of 
naval stores. The scarcity of all commodities in the 
Mediterranean ports, due to the war between England 
and France, made it necessary to send out from the 
United States most of the supplies and provisions. 
Those sent were of poor quality, and large quantities 
of beef and pork were spoiled and had to be thrown 
overboard. An insufficient amount of clothing was 
sent, and there was much suffering from cold. An in- 
stance of the difficulty in providing stores is furnished 
by the case of the ship Huntress, which occurred, 
however, at a later date. The Huntress sailed for the 
Mediterranean in May, 1805, with naval stores for 
the squadron. She was provided with certificates from 
the President and the British and French ministers, 
but had none from the Spanish minister. June 1 she 
was seized by a Spanish cruiser and a few days later 
was recaptured by a British cruiser, and sent to Liver- 

1 Rep. Sen. Com. iv, p. 6. 



THE WINTER OF 1804-1805 217 

pool. 1 The squadron was very far from being fully 
manned, and the crews contained much poor material, 
largely made up of foreigners, owing to the fact that 
the government would not pay as high wages as mer- 
chantmen received ; desertions were therefore com- 
mon. There were other instances of faulty adminis- 
tration, which would not have occurred in a well- 
organized department. The weather of 1804 was more 
than usually severe and boisterous, adding greatly to 
the difficulty of naval operations. All these things 
increased to a large degree Preble's cares and per- 
plexities, and his ability to rise above them distin- 
guished him from commanders of ordinary capacity. 2 

In his negotiations with Tripoli, Preble was willing 
to pay a fair price for the release of the unfortunate 
captives, but absolutely refused to consider any pay- 
ment for peace or tribute. He also refused to give an 
amount for ransom which " would stimulate the avarice 
of the other Barbary powers," and set a standard 
likely to embarrass the United States and other 
nations under similar circumstances in the future. 
Colonel Lear authorized the offer of a much larger 
sum, and the French consul, through whom negotia- 
tions were conducted, strongly urged it, but the com- 
modore was firm in his determination not to yield. 3 
It would be a satisfaction to be able to record that 
he refused to pay any ransom whatever. 

Upon his arrival in the United States, Preble at 
once set out for Washington. He reached the capital 
March 4, 1805, the day of Jefferson's second inaugu- 
ration, and was received by the President with great 
distinction. He urged upon the government the need 

1 Claims, pp. 363, 304 ; Nat. Intell. Dec. 13, 1805, April 7, 1806. 

2 Preble, ch. vii. 3 Ibid. ch. vi ; see above, pp. 164, ISO, 182, 201. 



218 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARA CORSAIRS 

of bomb-vessels and gunboats for use against Tripoli, 
of a larger and better class than could be obtained in 
the Mediterranean. Accordingly the equipment of 
nine gunboats was at once begun ; these were seventy- 
one feet long, sloop-rigged, and carried two long thirty- 
two pounders, one at each end. Two bomb-vessels 
also were built, but as it became apparent that they 
could not be finished in time for the summer cam- 
paign, Preble was directed to procure two other ves- 
sels suitable for conversion into bombs. Thereupon 
he purchased in Boston two vessels of about one hun- 
dred tons each ; they were fitted for the purpose, 
armed with a thirteen-inch mortar and two long nine- 
pounders each, and named Spitfire and Vengeance. 1 

Preble was received with enthusiasm wherever he 
went, and was honored during the remainder of his 
life ; but this was for a brief period only. His health, 
which had long been declining, broke down completely, 
and he died August 25, 1807, at the age of forty-six. 

Commodore Barron's squadron was organized in the 
spring of 1804. The John Adams, Captain Chauncey, 
sailed from Hampton Roads June 26, and after stop- 
ping at Gibraltar, Algiers, and Malta, arrived off 
Tripoli August 7, during the second assault on the 
town. The commodore's flagship, President, Captain 
Cox, and the Congress, Essex, and Constellation, 
Captains Rodgers, James Barron, and Campbell, sailed 
from the same port July 4 and arrived at Gibraltar 
August 12. 2 On board the flagship was William 

1 Nav. Chron. p. 244 ; Preble to Sec. of Navy : Preble Papers (April 
9, June 24) ; Captains' Letters, i, no. 40, iii, no. 4 (April 25, Sept. 8). 

2 For the movements of Barron's squadron, see Nav. Chron. pp. 
262 268; ( Ooper, ii, eh. vi ; Eaton, pp. 268-274; Navy DeptMSS.; 
Preble Papers ; National Intelligencer. 



THE WINTER OF 1804-1805 219 

Eaton, late consul at Tunis, who had been appointed 
navy agent for the Barbary States. Among the offi- 
cers of the Constellation was Oliver PI. Perry. 

At Gibraltar Barron found letters from James 
Simpson, United States consul at Tangier, which 
intimated that the emperor of Morocco, not having 
seen an American man-of-war for several months, was 
beginning to regain his courage. He had asked for 
a passport for a ship with provisions for Tripoli, 
and was fitting out his cruisers. Barron wrote to 
Simpson that the blockade of Tripoli would not be 
raised for the emperor's vessel, and August 15 sent 
the Congress and Essex to Tangier. Their appear- 
ance doubtless had a salutary effect, and in two 
weeks, having examined the coast as far as Sallee, 
they returned to Gibraltar. 1 Captain Rodgers of the 
Congress, the senior officer, believing that the emperor 
would not go to extremities, proceeded up the Medi- 
terranean, leaving Captain James Barron in the Essex 
at Gibraltar, with instructions to keep a watch on 
Morocco. The demonstrations of the emperor were 
probably made with the design of delaying American 
war vessels on their way to Tripoli, or of drawing 
others away from Tripoli. 

Meanwhile Commodore Barron sailed from Gibral- 
tar with the President and the Constellation August 
16, arrived at Malta September 5, and off Tripoli 
on the 10th, where he found the Constitution, Argus, 
and Vixen, as already related. Three vessels were 
soon taken 2 for violation of the blockade, two of 
which were sent to Malta with the Constitution on the 
14th, and the third with the Argus the next day. A 

1 Rodgers to Sec. <>i Navy; Nat. Intell. Oct. 29, 1804. 

2 See above, p. 211. 



220 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

few days later the Congress arrived off Tripoli from 
Gibraltar by way of Algiers, where Consul Lear had 
joined her. On the 23d the President, with Lear on 
board, sailed for Syracuse, where she arrived four 
days later. The Vixen also left the blockade about 
this time, and soon afterwards her rig was altered 
from schooner to brig ; Captain Smith had previously 
obtained Commodore Preble's permission to make this 
change. 

There were now on blockade the Congress and 
Constellation, with Captain Rodgers the senior officer 
present. A small xebec was captured and held for 
examination. Four small coasting vessels laden with 
wheat were discovered one day creeping along shore 
from the westward. Two of them were driven ashore, 
and Captain Rodgers sent in boats after them, but 
they were supported by troops on the beach and es- 
caped. Rodgers made a night reconnoissance in a boat 
along shore close to the batteries, took soundings and 
went inside the rocks, where he found the enemy's 
gunboats hauled up. October 25, the Nautilus having 
arrived, Rodgers sailed for Malta in the Congress, 
which needed repairs. A little later the Argus joined 
the blockaders, but soon returned to Syracuse on 
account of smallpox on board. 

The Essex arrived at Malta from Gibraltar October 
29, and her place in the Straits was taken by the 
Siren. Early in November most of the vessels not 
on blockade duty were at Syracuse, where Commodore 
Barron was sick on shore. On the 6th Rodgers took 
command of the Constitution and Decatur of the 
Congress. About the middle of November the Presi- 
dent, Captain Cox, joined the blockade, and the Argus 
sailed for Egypt with Eaton. On the 30th the Scourge, 



THE WINTER OF 1804-1805 221 

Lieutenant Izard, sailed for the United States with 
dispatches. 

November 27 the Constitution, Captain Rodgers, 
sailed for Lisbon in order to recruit her crew, as it 
was believed that seamen could be procured there ; 
she was also in need of new sails and other supplies. 
She arrived December 28, having touched at Gib- 
raltar and Tangier, and remained until February 5, 
1805. Having nearly rilled her complement, she re- 
turned to Tangier, and there found the Siren. Leav- 
ing instructions with Captain Stewart to keep a watch 
on Morocco, Captain Rodgers returned to Malta 
February 25. He next proceeded off Tripoli, where 
he found the Constellation and Vixen. The blockade 
had been kept up by different vessels all winter and 
was continued during the spring. liodgers soon re- 
turned to Malta. Commodore Barron was now there, 
and his condition was becoming serious. March 1 
Captain Rodgers submitted to him a suggestion 
a blockading force of two or three vessels shoul be 
constantly kept before Tripoli, others being held in 
readiness to relieve them at any time. L i way all 
the vessels would be ready for service .on as con- 

ditions favored an attack on the to'- ie also recom- 

mended that other ports, such a us, Bengazi, and 

Derne, should be closely wal , in order to inter- 

cept the enemy's cruisers a pting to enter them. 

During the winter o iy spring, the squadron 

was reinforced by the purchase of two small vessels. 
One of these was bought at Malta, converted into a 
sloop, armed with ten guns, and named Hornet. The 
other was a brig mounting eight guns called the 
Franklin ; and from the fact that she had once been 
owned by the bey of Tunis, she was undoubtedly the 



222 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

same brig Franklin of Philadelphia which had been 
captured by the Tripolitans in 1802 and subsequently 
sold to the commercial agent of the bey. 1 

The views of President Jefferson on Barbary affairs 
at this time are expressed in a letter to Judge Tyler, 
dated March 29, 1805, in which he says : " The war 
with Tripoli stands on two grounds of fact. 1st. It 
is made known to us by our agents with the three 
other Barbary States, that they only wait to see the 
event of this, to shape their conduct accordingly. If 
the war is ended by additional tribute, they mean to 
offer us the same alternative. 2nd. If peace was made, 
we should still, and shall ever, be obliged to keep 
a frigate in the Mediterranean to overawe rupture, or 
we must abandon that market. ... If in the course of 
the summer they cannot produce peace, we shall recall 
our force, except one frigate and two small vessels, 
Mch will keep up a perpetual blockade. Such a 
ade will cost us no more than a state of peace, 
and ill save us from increased tributes and the dis- 
grace attached to them. There is reason to believe 
the exam j [e we have set begins already to work on 
the dispositio e the powers of Europe to emancipate 
themselves fro. hat degrading yoke. Should we 
produce such a re\ I L ion there, we shall be amply 
rewarded for what wc i ve done." 2 

The Constitution saileu "in for Tripoli early in 
April, and was joined by the i ' lent. The Constella- 
tion and Vixen were then sent back fc< Malta for sup- 
plies. April 24, Rodgers captured a Tuni in xebec 
of eight guns, bound into Tripoli with two Neapolitan 

1 Letter Book (1799-1807), p. 177 : Sec. of Navy to Campbell 
(Sept. 4, 180G) ; Eaton, p. 392 ; see above, p. 112. 

2 Jefferson, iv, p. 574. 



THE WINTER OF 1804-1805 223 

ships she had taken. All three vessels were sent to 
Malta under convoy of the President, which then 
returned and rejoined the Constitution off Tripoli. 

Commodore Barron's health at last became so far 
impaired as to make it impossible for him longer to 
manage the affairs of the squadron. Accordingly, on 
May 22, he turned the command over to Captain 
Rodgers. His letter conveying this intelligence he 
sent to Rodgers by the Essex. This ship sailed for 
Tripoli at once, having on board Colonel Lear, who had 
spent the winter with Commodore Barron at Malta, so 
as to be on hand when the time should come for peace 
negotiations. The Essex arrived off Tripoli May 26, 
and delivered Commodore Barron's letter on board 
the Constitution. Captain Rodgers at once assumed 
command of the squadron. On the 29th, by his order, 
Captain James Barron of the Essex and Captain 
George Cox of the President exchanged ships, Barron's 
rank entitling him to the larger of the two frigates. 

Commodore Rodgers's squadron was much the largest 
and most powerful that had ever been organized under 
the American flag, although it was never assembled 
at any one place and the new mortar-vessels and gun- 
boats had not yet arrived from the United States 
The force at this time in the Mediterranean consist 
of the frigates Constitution, 44, flagship of Comm< 
Rodgers, of which Lieutenant David Porter 
acting captain very soon afterwards, Presi 44, 

Captain James Barron, Constellation, ' ptain 

Campbell, Congress, 36, Captain Decatur, and Essex, 
32, Captain Cox ; the brigs Siren, 16, ( ; Stewart, 

Argus, 16, Captain Hull, Vixen, 12, Captain Smith, 
and Franklin, 8 ; the schooners Nautilus 12, Captain 
Dent, and Enterprise, 12, Captain R< Vinson, and the 



224 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

sloop Hornet, 10, Lieutenant Samuel Evans. Dent 
and Robinson had been promoted to the grade of mas- 
ter commandant in September, 1804. There were also 
the two gunboats captured at Tripoli, August 3, 1804. 
The frigate John Adams, 28, which had taken Com- 
modore Preble home, was now on her way back to the 
Mediterranean, under the command of Captain John 
Shaw. 1 The bomb-vessels Vengeance and Spitfire, 
under Lieutenants William Lewis and Daniel McNeill, 
Jr., sailed from Boston June 19 and 23. 2 The nine 
gunboats which had been equipped especially for this 
service by the advice of Commodore Preble, sailed 
from different ports about the middle of May ; three 
of them sailed from New York in company with the 
John Adams. No. 2 carried one thirty-two pounder, 
No. 3, two twenty -four pounders, and all the others two 
thirty -two pounders each ; these were all long guns 
and were stowed below during the passage across 
the Atlantic. 3 Eight of them had reached Gibraltar 
safely by the middle of June and arrived at Syracuse 
early in July, within forty-eight hours of each other. 

Gunboat No. 7, Lieutenant Peter S. Ogilvie, sailed 
from New York May 14. Six days out she sprung her 
i A ast, returned to port, sailed again, and was never 
J" , "d of afterwards. 4 No. 8 had a stormy passage, 
^r commander, Lieutenant Nathaniel Harraden, 
rep' ■■ '■■ 3 to Commodore Preble that she behaved well 
and . considered, her "perfectly safe to cross the 
Atlanta No. 3, Lieutenant Joseph Maxwell, was 

1 Amer. Na " i, p. 141 ; Nat. Intell. Aug. 28, 1805. 

2 Preble Pap< ^ble to Sec. of Navy (June 24, 1805). 

3 Emmons, p. 22 ; t . Pap. v, p. 435. 

4 Officers' Letters 1 26 : Ogilvie to Sec. of Navy (May 30, 
1805) ; also Nat. Intell. 7, 1805. 

5 Nat. Intell. July 26, . 




JOHN RODGERS 



THE WINTER OF 1804-1805 225 

seized by Spanish gunboats off Gibraltar and detained 
for a short time. 1 No. 6 was held up off Cadiz by a 
British squadron, and three of her crew were impressed, 
against the protest of her commander, Lieutenant 
James Lawrence. 2 July 12, Commodore Rodgers 
published a general order setting forth this insult 
to the American flag and directing his commanding 
officers, under similar circumstances in the future, 
after having resisted to the utmost of their power, 
to strike the flag, go aboard the enemy's vessel, deliver 
their swords, and insist upon remaining as prisoners 
of war, unless put back on their own vessels by actual 
force. 3 The remaining gunboats from the United 
States, No. 2, No. 4, No. 5, No. 9, and No. 10, were 
commanded by Lieutenants Ralph Izard, John Hen- 
ley, Alexander Harrison, Samuel Elbert, and Seth 
Cartee ; their voyage across the ocean was unevent- 
ful. 

The Enterprise spent several months in the Adri- 
atic, where Captain Robinson purchased four gunboats 
and two trabaccoloes, or small coasting vessels, which 
assisted in towing the gunboats, and were apparently 
to be themselves converted into gunboats, or possibly 
into mortar-boats. The Enterprise sailed from Ancona 
on the 24th of June with these six small vessels in 
company, and after a stormy passage of over two 
weeks arrived at Syracuse. Oue of the gunboats was 
lost on the way, and was still missing July 12, when 

1 Captains' Letters, ii : Rodgers to See. of Navy (Aug. 21, 1805) ; 
Nat. Intell. Dec. 13, 1805. 

2 Officers' Letters, i, nos. 156, 157 : Lawrence to Rodgers (July 11, 
1805), to Sec. of Navy (Aug. 30, 1805) ; Captains' Letters, ii: Rodgers 
to Sec. of Navy (Aug. 21, 1S05) ; Gleaves, Life of Lawrence (New 
York, 1904), p. 59. 

3 Nav. Chron. p. 271. 



226 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

Robinson made his report, but appears to have turned 
up later. 1 

It is thus evident that Commodore Rodgers might 
have brought against Tripoli by the end of July, 
1805, if peace had not been concluded before that 
time, a force consisting of six frigates, four brigs, two 
schooners, one sloop, two bomb-vessels, and sixteen 
gunboats. 

1 Commanders' Letters, i, no. 28 : Robinson to Rodgers ; Eaton, 
p. 392. 



CHAPTER XIV 

THE CAPTURE OF DERNE 

Since his return home in the spring of 1803, ex- 
Consul Eaton had spent much time in Washington, 
and had succeeded in exciting a moderate amount of 
interest in his project to cooperate with Hamet Kara- 
manli, the exiled pasha of Tripoli. He had been 
appointed navy agent May 26, 1804, and placed under 
the orders of Commodore Barron. To the latter the 
secretary of the navy wrote, June 6, 1804 : " With 
respect to the ex-pasha of Tripoli, we have no objec- 
tion to your availing yourself of his cooperation with 
you against Tripoli, if you shall, upon a full view of 
the subject, after your arrival upon the station, con- 
sider his cooperation expedient. The subject is com- 
mitted entirely to your discretion. In such an event 
you will, it is believed, find Mr. Eaton extremely 
useful to you." 2 

It has been mentioned 2 that Hamet made his resi- 
dence at Derne in the fall of 1802. About a year 
later, placing himself at the head of an army of Arabs, 
he took up arms against his brother, the pasha of 
Tripoli, whose forces he met in the field. He gained 
some advantages ; but later, either on account of re- 
verses or for lack of supplies, he was obliged to fall 
back, and early in 1804 withdrew to Egypt, leaving 
Derne in the hands of his enemies. Information of 

1 St. Pap. v, pp. If.:;, 164 j Eaton, p. 368. 

2 See above, p. 123. 



228 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

this had reached Washington some time before the 
fourth squadron sailed, and it was decided to with- 
hold, at least temporarily, certain military supplies and 
money that it had been intended to send out to him. 1 
But Commodore Barron was given the discretion 
indicated in the instructions quoted above. 

September 15, 1804, having given Captain Hull of 
the Argus orders for a cruise, the commodore gave 
him also the following verbal orders in the presence 
of Eaton, and attested by Hull and Eaton : " The 
written orders I here hand you, to proceed to the port 
of Alexandria or Smyrna for convoying to Malta any 
vessels you may find there, are intended to disguise 
the real object of your expedition, which is to proceed 
with Mr. Eaton to Alexandria in search of Hamet 
Pasha, the rival brother and legitimate sovereign of 
the reigning Pasha of Tripoli ; and to convey him and 
his suite to Derne or such other place on the coast as 
may be determined the most proper for cooperating 
with the naval force under my command, against the 
common enemy ; or, if more agreeable to him, to bring 
him to me before Tripoli. Should Hamet Pasha not 
be found at Alexandria, you have the discretion to 
proceed to any other place for him, where the safety 
of your ship can be, in your opinion, relied upon. The 
Pasha may be assured of the support of my squadron 
at Bengazi or Derne, where you are at liberty to put 
in, if required, and if it can be done without too 
great risk. And you may assure him also, that I will 
take the most effectual measures, with the forces under 
my command, for cooperating with him against the 
usurper, his brother, and for reestablishing him in the 
regency of Tripoli. Arrangements to this effect are 
1 Eaton, p. 265. 



THE CAPTURE OF DERNE 229 

confided to the discretion with which Mr. Eaton is 
vested by the Government." 1 

The Argus sailed from Malta November 17, and 
arrived at Alexandria on the 27th. 2 From this point 
Eaton proceeded to Rosetta, at the mouth of the 
Nile. Letters from Sir Alexander Ball procured him 
a cordial reception and great assistance from English 
officials in Egypt, especially Major Misset, the British 
minister in Cairo, who was then at Rosetta. Decem- 
ber 4, Eaton began the ascent of the Nile with a party 
including Lieutenant Presley N. O'Bannon of the 
marine corps, Midshipmen George Mann and Eli 
E. Danielson, the latter Eaton's stepson, Captain 
Vincent, secretary to Major Misset, Dr. Francisco 
Mendrici, whom Eaton met at Rosetta and had pre- 
viously known in Tunis, and others, besides servants ; 
eighteen in all. They embarked in two armed boats 
and arrived at Cairo on the 8th. A war was then in 
progress between the Mamelukes and the Ottoman 
government, and traveling was somewhat dangerous 
on account of bands of wild Arabs, who terrorized 
the country. The Americans represented themselves 
as officers traveling on leave of absence from the 
squadron during the winter's suspension of operations. 

At Cairo Eaton found the secretary of state and 
two ex-governors of Hamet Pasha, " destitute of every- 
thing but resentment, for even hope had abandoned 
them." From them he learned that Hamet with a few 
Tripolitans and Arabs, after many vicissitudes, had 

1 St. Pap. v, p. 1(35 ; For. Rel. ii, p. 703 ; Eaton, p. 3G7. 

2 For the expedition to Derne, see Eaton, pp. 270-393, 422-424; 
Felton, ch. x, xi ; St. Pap. v, pp. 10:1-17.") ; For. Pel. ii, pp. 702-706; 
Nav. Chron. pp. 272-278 ; also Comdrs.' Letters, i, no. 26, Hull 
to Barron (Dec. 1804) ; letter of Mid. Peck in Nat. Intell. Oct. 9, 
1805, 



230 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

joined the rebellious Mamelukes, who at that time 
were besieged at Miuieh, one hundred and fifty miles 
or more up the Nile from Cairo. The prospect of get- 
ting into communication with him seemed doubtful. 

Eaton obtained an audience with the viceroy and 
frankly explained the object of his visit. With the 
aid of Dr. Mendrici, who had influence at court, he 
succeeded in inducing the viceroy to grant a letter of 
amnesty for Hamet and a passport through the Turk- 
ish lines. The chief difficulty then seemed to be to 
get him away from the Mamelukes, who, it was feared, 
would not allow him to leave them. Couriers were sent 
by the viceroy in search of the exiled pasha, with 
copies of these letters. Eaton sent on the same errand 
a Tyrolese colonel of engineers named Johann Leitens- 
dorfer, whom he met at Cairo, and other messengers 
as well. Hamet was requested to come to Rosetta, and 
Eaton himself proceeded to that place to meet him, 
but after waiting a few days, went to Alexandria, 
where he found a letter from Hamet appointing a 
rendezvous on the edge of the desert a hundred and 
ninety miles inland. Although it was believed that 
the journey would be full of danger, on account of 
the disturbed condition of the country, Eaton deter- 
mined to make the attempt. He left Alexandria Jan- 
uary 22, 1805, with Lieutenant Blake and Midship- 
man Mann of the Argus and an escort of twenty-three 
men. On the evening of the next day, having traveled 
seventy miles or more, they were arrested at Daman- 
hur by a body of Turkish troops. The commander of 
this post Eaton succeeded in conciliating by tact and 
flattery, with the aid of a gratuity, and he was pre- 
vailed upon to send in search of Hamet an Arab chief, 
who engaged to produce him within ten days. This 



THE CAPTURE OF DERNE 231 

was done. Hamet finally appeared, and the party 
returned to the coast. 

Eaton's plan had been to embark with Hamet on 
the Argus and proceed to a point near Derne where 
they would meet his troops. But new difficulties now 
arose through the intrigues of the French consul at 
Alexandria, who represented the American officers to 
be British spies, and persuaded the Turkish admiral 
and the governor of Alexandria not to permit the 
party to embark. It was therefore decided to march 
to Derne overland. Although the viceroy s&it orders 
to the governor to allow the embarkation, it was still 
thought best to go by land, chiefly because it was 
feared that Hamet's army would evaporate in his 
absence. He therefore formed his camp some distance 
to the west of Alexandria. Arrangements were made 
with Captain Hull to meet the expedition at the Bay 
of Bomba with supplies and reinforcements. The 
Argus then sailed for Malta with Hamet's secretary 
as passenger bearing a letter to the commodore, and 
likewise with a letter from Eaton, dated February 14, 
requesting two additional small vessels and a bomb- 
ketch, two brass field-pieces, one hundred stands of 
arms, one hundred marines, and ten thousand dollars. 1 

Februaiy 23, Eaton entered into a convention with 
Hamet in which it was provided that " the government 
of the United States shall use their utmost exertions 
so far as comports with their own honor and interest, 
their subsisting treaties and the acknowledged law of 
nations, to reestablish the said Hamet Pasha in the 
possession of his sovereignty of Tripoli." The expense 
incurred by the United States was to be repaid by 
Hamet out of the tribute derived from certain other 
1 St. Pap. v, pp. 1G9, 407. 



232 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

nations. It was also provided that Eaton " shall be 
recognized as general and commander-in-chief of the 
land forces " operating against the usurping pasha. 1 
Eaton undoubtedly exceeded his authority in commit- 
ting his government to this compact. 

March 2 the provisions of the party were seized and 
a guard sent to arrest Hamet, who was with difficulty 
restrained from fleeing to the desert. The trouble 
was found to be due to " the influence of the super- 
visor of the revenue, who had not yet been bought," 
and was soon arranged by the British consul. A few 
days later they marched to the Arab's Tower, forty 
miles west of Alexandria. Here the international army 
was assembled and organized with General William 
Eaton, commander-in-chief, Colonel Leitensdorfer, 
adjutant, an English volunteer named Farquhar, and 
a medical officer, possibly Mendrici, but this is not 
clearly stated in Eaton's journal ; nine Americans, 
including Lieutenant O'Bannon, Midshipman Pascal 
P. Peck, and a non-commissioned officer and six 
private marines; twenty -five cannoniers of various 
nationalities, with three officers ; thirty-eight Greeks, 
with two officers ; Hamet and his suite of ninety men ; 
a party of Arabian cavalry under Sheik el Tahib and 
another chief ; a number of footmen and camel-drivers ; 
altogether about four hundred men, and a caravan 
of one hundred and seven camels and a few asses. 
Eaton believed that he could easily have raised an 
army of twenty or thirty thousand Arabs and Moors, if 
he had had the means of arming and subsisting them. 

On March 8 the march was begun across the Lybian 
Desert to Derne, a distance of between five and six 
hundred miles. For the greater part of the way the 

1 Appendix II. 



THE CAPTURE OF DERNE 233 

route lay within sight of the sea. Water was generally 
obtained from natural basins worn in the rocks by 
the streams during the wet season, and filled with 
rain-water ; but there was often great scarcity of 
water and suffering for want of it. An advance of 
fifteen miles was made the first day, and then on the 
following morning the owners and drivers of the 
camels became mutinous and demanded advance pay. 
In this they were encouraged by Sheik el Tahib, one 
of the Arab chiefs, who made trouble during the 
whole march. This difficulty caused a delay of a day 
and a half. Hamet was irresolute and seemed to have 
no influence with the Arabs. At last Eaton, finding 
argument fruitless, assembled the Christians " and 
feinted a countermarch, threatening to abandon the ex- 
pedition." This had the effect of checking the mutiny 
and the march was resumed. On the 13th a courier 
from Derne appeared and announced to Hamet that 
the province was preparing to support him. This 
news caused rejoicing and a dischai-ge of firearms, 
which alarmed the Arabs in the rear, who thought 
an attack was being made. They thereupon attempted 
to disarm and massacre the Christians escorting the 
caravan, but were restrained by one of their more 
prudent chiefs. 

March 16 and 17, there was a cold rain-storm, and 
the Arabs again became mutinous. On the 18th, hav- 
ing advanced about one hundred and fifty miles, 
Eaton learned that the caravan had been freighted by 
Hamet for this distance only. The owners finally pro- 
mised to proceed two days farther, upon being paid. 
This took nearly all the money Eaton had, and when 
they had received it, all deserted, part the first night 
and part the second, setting out on their return to 



234 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

Egypt. Sheik el Tahib and other chiefs now refused 
to proceed until news should be brought from Bomba 
that the United States vessels were there, and proposed 
to send a runner to ascertain the fact. Eaton ordered 
their rations stopped. These complications consumed 
three days. The Arabs finally yielded, about half the 
caravan was induced to return, and the march was 
resumed. 

March 22, they arrived at a great plain, bordering 
upon the sea, inhabited by thousands of wild Arabs 
who had never before seen Christians or tasted bread. 
They had vast herds of camels, horses, and cattle, and 
countless sheep and goats. Hamet was here reinforced 
by eighty mounted warriors, and a caravan of ninety 
camels was freighted ; and later another force of 
Arabs, including one hundred and fifty warriors, with 
their families, joined the expedition. On the 2Gth 
a courier announced that a large force, sent by Yusuf 
Pasha, was marching from Tripoli to Derne. This 
caused another panic, Hamet hesitated and wavered, 
the camel-drivers fled with the caravan, and Sheik 
el Tahib deserted with part of his tribe and a large 
number of other Arabs. Hamet begged Eaton to offer 
inducements for the sheik to return. This Eaton re- 
fused to do and was glad to be rid of him, but he soon 
came back of his own accord. On the 28th Hamet's 
slender stock of resolution seemed to have oozed away 
completely, and he decided to abandon the enterprise 
and return to Egypt. Eaton kept on with the baggage, 
and in two hours Hamet followed him. That even- 
ing all the Arabs that had joined a few days before 
deserted, having been discouraged by Sheik el Tahib. 
An officer was sent back after them and returned with 
them the following: afternoon. 



THE CAPTURE OF DERNE 235 

The next complication was a quarrel between Sheik 
el Tahib and another sheik, which ended in the latter' s 
deserting - with many others whom it was important to 
retain on account of their influence with Arabs near 
Derue. Hamet went back to induce them, if possible, 
to return. " From Alexandria to this place we have 
experienced continual altercations, contentions and 
delays among - the Arabs. They have no sense of 
patriotism, truth nor honor ; and no attachment where 
they have no prospect of gain, except to their religion, 
to which they are enthusiasts. Poverty makes them 
thieves and practice renders them adroit in stealing. 
The instant the eye of vigilance is turned from an 
object on which they have fixed a desire, it is no more 
to be found. Arms, ammunition and provisions most 
engage their furtive speculations, but sundry of our 
people have been robbed of their clothes and other 
articles. With all their depravity of morals they 
possess a savage independence of soul, an incorrigible 
obstinacy to discipline, a sacred adherence to the laws 
of hospitality and a scrupulous pertinacity to their 
religious faith and ceremonies." * After an absence of 
four days, Hamet returned with the sheiks who had 
deserted. Meanwhile there had been more trouble with 
Sheik el Tahib, who demanded an increased ration, 
lie became insolent, and Eaton threatened him with 
death if he attempted to incite a mutiny. He rode off 
with two other chiefs, but a few hours later returned 
very penitent and took an oath to remain faithful 
thereafter. 

On the evening of April 2, Eaton held a meeting of 
Hamet and all the sheiks in his tent, and endeavored 
to impress upon them the importance of union and 
1 Eaton, p. 312. 



236 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

perseverance, and they all " gave pledges of faith and 
honor." The force now consisted of between six and 
seven hundred fighting men, who with camel-drivers 
and camp-followers, including women and children, 
made a total of about twelve hundred. The next morn- 
ing the march was resumed, but after advancing only- 
ten miles the Arabs positively refused to go farther 
until a caravan had been sent to an oasis five days' 
journey inland for a supply of dates. Eaton finally 
agreed to this on condition that they should proceed 
the next day, being met at Bomba by the detachment 
sent after the dates. During the few days following 
there was much suffering for lack of water, but a good 
supply was found on the 8th. 

On this day, also, occurred the most serious commo- 
tion yet experienced. Although there was only a six 
days' supply of rice and no other food, Hamet insisted 
upon encamping and sending a courier to Bomba to 
look for the American ships. Eaton stopped the Arabs' 
rations. They prevailed upon Hamet to return to Egypt 
and made a move to seize provisions. Eaton assembled 
the Christians and formed a line to resist this at- 
tempt. After facing each other for an hour the Arabs 
dispersed. " Supposing the tumult tranquilized, I or- 
dered the troops to pass the manual exercise, according 
to our daily practice. In an instant the Arabs took an 
alarm, remounted and exclaimed : ' The Christians are 
preparing to fire on us.' The Pasha mounted and put 
himself at their head, apparently impressed with the 
same apprehension. A body of about two hundred ad- 
vanced in full charge upon our people, who stood their 
ground motionless. The enemy withdrew at a small 
distance, singled out the officers and with deliberate 
aim cried * fire ! ' Some of the Pasha's officers ex- 



THE CAPTURE OF DERNE 237 

claimed 'for God's sake do not fire. The Christians 
are our friends.' ... I advanced towards the Pasha 
and cautioned him against giving- countenance to a 
desperate act. At once a column of muskets were 
aimed at my breast. The Pasha was distracted. A uni- 
versal clamor drowned my voice. I waved my hand as 
a signal for attention. At this critical moment some 
of the Pasha's officers and sundry Aral) chiefs rode 
between us with drawn sabres and repelled the muti- 
neers." 1 Hamet repented of his rashness, ordered the 
Arabs to disperse, called Eaton his friend and pro- 
tector, and promised to take up the march if rations 
were issued. This was done, and the next morning 
they moved forward. 

By April 10 there was " nothing but rice and water 
for subsistence and that at half rations " for three 
days. No news from Bomba. Hamet was beginning 
to entertain the idea that he was being used by the 
Americans merely " for the purpose of obtaining a 
peace with his brother, " a suspicion that proved to 
be not wholly unreasonable. A mutiny was organized 
among the cannoniers, of which Eaton was secretly 
informed ; they were to insist on a full ration. The 
situation seemed critical, and Eaton took O'Bannon 
into his confidence. Eai'ly in the evening, however, 
before any outbreak took place, a courier arrived from 
Bomba with news that the ships had been sighted. 
Confidence was now restored, and nothing more was 
heard of the mutiny. The last of the rice was issued 
on the 12th. The next day Hamet had one of his 
camels killed, and exchanged another for sheep with 
the Arabs ; this gave the troops one full ration. For 
the next two days they subsisted on roots and herbs. 
1 Eaton, pp. 323, 324. 



238 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

On the afternoon of the 15th they reached Bomba, 
but found there no trace of a human being and not 
a drop of water ; moreover, not a vessel was in sight. 
The Arabs now became mutinous and abusive. Eaton 
took the Christians upon a mountain, where they built 
fires and kept them burning all night. 

The next morning at eight o'clock, just as the 
Arabs were preparing to leave in disgust, a sail was 
sighted, which proved to be the Argus ; she had seen 
the smoke of the fires. Eaton went aboard at noon. 
He found a letter from the commodore dated March 
22, 1805, 1 informing him that stores and provisions 
were sent and seven thousand dollars in specie, but 
that no marines could be spared. Captain Hull also 
brought the commodore's reply to Hamet's letter. 2 
The camp was moved around the bay to a cistern of 
water, and in the afternoon provisions were sent 
ashore. Either here or later, at Derne, Midshipman 
Mann came ashore and rejoined Eaton. April 17, the 
Hornet arrived with abundance of provisions. They 
remained in camp recuperating until the 23d, when 
they resumed the march with a sufficient supply of 
provisions to carry them to Derne, a distance of about 
sixty miles. The next day another courier arrived, 
with the news that an army from Tripoli was rapidly 
approaching Derne and would probably reach the place 
first. The Arabs were again seized with alarm and 
became mutinous. Sheik el Tahib, at the head of the 
cavalry, began a retreat. Hamet, as usual, was irreso- 
lute and despondent. After much persuasion and a 
promise of money, the sheiks were induced to advance, 
and on the afternoon of the 25th they encamped on 
a height overlooking Derne. 

1 St. Pap. v, p. 175 ; Eaton, p. 308. 2 St. Pap. v, p. 408. 



THE CAPTURE OF DERNE 239 

The town was reconnoitred, and information was 
also obtained from a number of sheiks who came out 
in the evening to meet Ilamet and assured him that 
two of the three departments into which the city 
was divided were loyal to him. The third department, 
situated along the water front and containing a third 
of the inhabitants, was devoted to the interest of his 
brother Yusuf. This department was, however, the 
strongest in position and in its defenses, which con- 
sisted of a water battery of eight nine-pounders on 
the northeast, breastworks, and walls of old houses 
on the southeast, and a ten-inch howitzer on the terrace 
of the bey's palace ; the walls of the houses were also 
pierced with loopholes for musketry. It was likewise 
learned that the bey had eight hundred fighting men, 
and that the Tripolitan army was near at hand. On 
the 26th Eaton sent in a flag of truce with a letter to 
the bey offering terms. His reply was : " My head or 
yours." Smoke signals were made, and in the after- 
noon the Nautilus appeared. The next morning the 
Argus and Hornet hove in sight. The Nautilus and 
Hornet came close in, and sent a boat ashore with two 
field-pieces. One of these was landed, but owing to 
the great difficulty and delay of hauling it up the 
steep and rocky precipice that bordered the bay, the 
other was left behind, as Eaton was very anxious to 
attack without any loss of time. 

Eaton at once set about making his dispositions, 
and the attack was made that day, April 27, 1805. 
The enemy began by firing on the ships. The Hornet, 
Lieutenant Evans, anchored within a hundred yards 
of the water battery and opened fire. The Argus, 
Captain Hull, and Nautilus, Captain Dent, anchored 
about half a mile from shore, to the eastward of the 



240 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

Hornet, and opened on the town and battery. The 
breastworks and a ravine at the southeast part of the 
town were held by a considerable force of the enemy, 
and opposite this point, on an elevation, were posted 
the squad of marines, twenty -four cannoniers with the 
field-piece, and thirty-six Greeks, all under the imme- 
diate command of Lieutenant O'Bannon ; also a few 
Arabs on foot. Hamet occupied an old castle south- 
southwest of the town, with the Arabian cavalry 
drawn up in his rear. By two o'clock the action had 
become general, and forty-five minutes later the bat- 
tery was silenced by the fire from the ships, and most 
of the enemy in that quarter being driven out rein- 
forced the party opposed to the Christian land forces. 
At this point the enemy's musketry fire was very hot. 
In the excitement the rammer of the field-piece was 
shot away and its fire in consequence slackened. 
Eaton saw that his little force of undisciplined troops 
was falling into confusion, and as the only hope of 
restoring confidence, he ordered a charge. The enemy 
fled from their defenses, firing from behind trees and 
houses as they retreated. At this moment Eaton was 
shot through the left wrist by a musket ball. O'Ban- 
non and Mann, with the marines, Greeks, and as many 
of the cannoniers as could be spared from the field- 
piece, pushed on towards the battery under a heavy 
fire from the houses. The way was cleared for them 
along the beach by the ships' guns. The battery was 
soon captured and the American flag was planted 
upon its walls. The guns, which were found ready 
loaded and primed, were turned on the town, and with 
the help of the ships' fire the enemy were soon dis- 
lodged from their houses. The bey fled from his 
palace and sought refuge in a mosque, and Hamet took 



THE CAPTURE OF DERNE 241 

possession of the deserted residence. The Arabian 
cavalry flanked the flying enemy, and a little after 
four o'clock the whole town was in the hands of the 
assailants. The ships' boats were sent ashore with 
ammunition for the battery, and took off the wounded. 
One marine was killed and two wounded, one of them 
mortally ; eleven others were wounded, including 
Eaton and several Greeks. Practically all the fighting 
on this occasion was done by the Christians under 
Eaton's command, assisted by the ships' batteries. 1 

May 1, the Hornet sailed with dispatches for Com- 
modore Barron. The bey of Derne left the mosque 
where he had taken refuge and sought asylum in the 
harem of an aged sheik, who, although a partisan 
of Hamet, could not be induced to break the laws of 
hospitality by giving him up. The town was now for- 
tified against the Tripolitan army, which was approach- 
ing. The enemy advanced slowly, and on the 8th 
occupied the ground held by Eaton's forces before the 
capture. They spent several days in attempts to cor- 
rupt the inhabitants of the town, who were vacillating 
between the two parties, fearing that if they adhered 
to Hamet they would be slaughtered in case of his 
defeat. The late bey intrigued actively from his sanc- 
tuary, attempting to incite a counter-revolution in the 
town. At the head of fifty Christians Eaton proposed 
to enter the house of the old sheik and seize the bey. 
This course, however, was offensive to the Arabs, and 
Hamet begged that action be deferred until the next 
day. That night, May 12, the bey escaped to the Tri- 
politan camp. 

Eaton believed that the enemy before Derne would 

1 For Eaton's report of the capture of Demo, see Eaton, p. 336 ; 
for Hull's report, Nav. Chron. p. 275. 



242 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

disperse, but they displayed more resolution than he 
gave them credit for. On the 13th, apparently encour- 
aged by the bey's tales of disaffection towards Hamet, 
they made an attack on the town which fell only a 
little short of being successful. In the morning they 
appeared on the heights back of the town to the num- 
ber of about twelve hundred, including Tripolitans, 
Arabs, and fugitives from Derne. After reconnoi- 
tring, they attacked an outpost about a mile from the 
town, consisting of one hundred of Hamet's cavalry, 
who held their ground firmly until overcome by num- 
bers, when they were forced to give way. They re- 
treated into the town, followed by the Tripolitans, who 
pursued as far as the bey's palace, now occupied by 
Hamet. Although exposed to the fire of the Argus and 
Nautilus, as well as of the battery and small arms 
from the houses, they made a vigorous attack on the 
palace, determined, if possible, to seize the person of 
the pasha. Their success seemed imminent, and Eaton 
began to fear that the day was lost. His little force 
of Christians was too weak for a sortie from the bat- 
tery, and he turned the guns upon the town. A fortu- 
nate shot from a nine-pounder killed two of the enemy's 
mounted men. Immediately the undisciplined rabble 
beat a disorderly retreat, pursued by Hamet's cavalry 
and harassed by the fire from the ships. On this day 
Hamet's people surprised Eaton by an exhibition of 
courage and firmness of which their previous behavior 
had given him no reason to believe them capable. 
From deserters it was learned that the enemy had lost 
twenty-eight killed and fifty wounded, eleven of them 
mortally. Hamet lost twelve or fourteen killed and 
wounded. 

The Tripolitans fortified their camp, about three 



TIIK CAPTURE OF DERNE 243 

miles distant, and made preparations for another at- 
tack, but their leaders could not induce the Arabs to 
join in it. Eaton had the same difficulty. He wished 
to attack the enemy's camp, but Ilamet and his people 
could not be prevailed upon to make the attempt. 
Eaton was beginning to fear a dearth of provisions, as 
the enemy cut off all supplies from the country. The 
Nautilus sailed May 18 with dispatches, leaving the 
Argus alone before Derne. Several times the enemy 
seemed about to attack, but they could never persuade 
the Arabs to expose themselves again to the fire of 
the Christians ; artillery they could not face. Eaton 
believed that if he had had money he could have 
bought a wholesale defection of these allies of the 
Tripolitans. " We want nothing but cash to break 
up our enemy's camp without firing another shot." On 
the 28th the enemy sent a detachment of fifty or 
sixty, supported by cavalry, on a foraging expedition ; 
they descended a ravine and attacked a party of 
Arabs, but were driven back. June 1, the Hornet 
returned with dispatches from the commodore, dated 
May 19, 1 announcing that peace negotiations were 
about to be entered upon, and that Derne must prob- 
ably soon be evacuated. June 10, the enemy, who 
had been largely reinforced by Arabs, made another 
attack and were firmly resisted by Hamet's cavalry. 
The engagement which ensued lasted four hours. The 
Argus was occasionally able to use her long twelve- 
pounders when the enemy in their movements emerged 
from the hills and ridges, and one of Eaton's field- 
pieces also gave some assistance. The Tripolitans 
were finally repulsed with a loss, according to desert- 
ers, of forty or fifty killed, and seventy wounded. 

1 St. Pap. v. p. 101 ; Eaton, p. .371. 



244 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

Harriet lost between fifty and sixty killed and wounded. 
O'Bannon wished to lead out the Christians and take 
an active part in the fight, but Eaton was unwilling 
to leave the defenses unmanned, and, moreover, 
doubted if offensive operations would be justifiable 
in view of the peace negotiations supposed to be in 
progress. 

June 11, the Constellation, Captain Campbell, ar- 
rived with orders from Commodore Rodgers, dated 
June 5, 1 to evacuate Derne immediately, and an- 
nouncing that peace had been concluded. It now be- 
came necessary to embark on the Constellation all the 
Christians, together with Hamet and his suite. This 
must be done secretly, moreover, as it was feared that 
the populace and the Arabs, enraged at being deserted, 
would attempt to revenge themselves by a massacre 
of those about to depart. Eaton was filled with dis- 
appointment and mortification at this ignominious 
ending of the expedition which he had hoped would 
result in the capture of Tripoli. But he had now no 
choice but to yield to necessity. To divert the atten- 
tion of the people, preparations for an attack on the 
enemy were made June 12. In the evening patrols 
of marines were placed as usual to prevent communi- 
cation between the town and the battery. The Con- 
stellation's boats came ashore and first took off the 
cannoniers and Greeks, with the field-pieces and the ten- 
inch howitzer captured April 27. Then Hamet and his 
suite were embarked, and next the American officers 
and marines. Lastly Eaton himself put off in a small 
boat, and had barely got clear " when the shore, our 
cani]) and the battery were crowded with the dis- 
tracted soldiery and populace, some calling on the 
1 Eaton, p. 375. 



THE CAPTURE OF DERNE 245 

Pasha, some on mo, some uttering shrieks, some exe- 
crations. Finding we were out of reach, they fell upon 
our tents and horses, which were left standing - , carried 
them off and prepared themselves for flight." 1 

The next morning the Arabs and many of the in- 
habitants of Derne fled to the mountains. The enemy 
had already retired, under the impression that the 
Constellation had brought reinforcements to Eaton. A 
Tripolitan officer, a messenger from Yusuf Pasha, who 
had come from Tripoli in the Constellation, went on 
shore under a flag of truce, bearing letters of amnesty 
from the pasha " to the people of Derne on condition 
of their returning to allegiance ; " but the people re- 
maining in the town had no faith in Yusuf 's promises, 
and in despair prepared to defend themselves to the 
last. This abandonment of Hamet's followers to the 
tender mercies of his brother was the most painful 
part of this whole transaction, but it is believed that 
no harm came to them and that Yusuf's promises in 
their case were fulfilled. 

The Constellation sailed directly for Syracuse. 
Prom this point Eaton sailed for the United States in 
the brig Franklin August 6, and arrived at Hamp- 
ton Roads November 10, 1805. 2 

1 Eaton, p. 3G2. 2 Nat. Iutell. Nov. 20, 1805. 



CHAPTER XV 



PEACE WITH TRIPOLI 



Before Commodore Barron sailed for the Mediter- 
ranean lie received instructions from the secretary of 
the navy, dated June 6, 1804, from which the follow- 
ing is an extract : " Colonel Tobias Lear, our consul- 
general at Algiers, is invested by the President with 
full power and authority to negotiate a treaty of peace 
with the Pasha of Tripoli, and also to adjust such 
terms of conciliation as may be found necessary with 
any of the other Barbary powers. He is, therefore, to 
be conveyed by you to any of these regencies, as he 
may request of you, and you will cordially cooperate 
with him in all such measures as may be deemed the 
best calculated to effectuate a termination of the war 
with Tripoli, and to ensure a continuance of the friend- 
ship and respect of the other Barbary powers." 1 He 
also conveyed to Colonel Lear instructions from the 
secretary of state, of the same date, containing the 
following : " Commodore Barron has orders to provide, 
at a suitable time, for your joining him, in order to 
the negotiating a peace with Tripoli. . . . The power 
of negotiation is confided to you in the first instance, 
but in case of accident it is to devolve on the acting 
commodore of the squadron." 2 From this it would 
appear that Lear was expected to take a more active 

1 St. Pap. v, p. 164. 

2 Ibid. pp. 433, 434. 



PEACE WITH TRIPOLI 217 

part in the negotiations than he had during Preble's 
command. 1 

In December, Colonel Lear, who was at Malta, 
received a letter from the Spanish consul at Tripoli 
advising him to come to that place under a flag of 
truce, as the pasha seemed to be ready to negotiate. 2 
Believing that he could make better terms on the 
approach of the season for active operations, Lear 
took no notice of this letter until the end of March, 
when he acknowledged it, but declined to make any 
proposal. In April, the pasha proposed, through the 
Spanish consul, " that the United States should pay 
him two hundred thousand dollars for peace and ran- 
som, and deliver up to him gratis all his subjects in 
their power and make full restitution of the property 
taken from them." Lear in his report says : " These 
propositions were so completely inadmissible that after 
communicating them to Commodore Barron, I thought 
no more of them, fully expecting further advances." 
During the next few weeks " there were intimations 
made in various ways of the disposition of the Pasha 
to treat ; but none in a direct or official manner." 

In the mean time Captain Bainbridge and Mr. 
Nissen, the Danish consul at Tripoli, had written 
letters 8 to Commodore Barron, in March, stating that 
peace could probably be bought for one hundred and 
twenty thousand dollars ; that the Tripolitan minister 
of foreign affairs, Sidi Mohammed Dghies, who had 
opposed the war in the first place, had always been 

1 This chapter is based chiefly on St. Pap. v, pp. 159-203, 392- 
450 ; For. Rel. ii, pp. 095-725 ; iii, pp. 20-2'.*. There is a condensed 
account of the negotiations in Nav. Chron. pp. 268-271. 

2 See Lear's report of July 5, 1^05, to Sec. of State, St. Pap. v, pp. 
441-450; For. Rel. ii. p. 7 Hi. 

8 St. Pap. v, pp. 410-415. 



248 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

friendly to American interests, and had treated the 
captives with kindness, was strongly in favor of peace, 
partly because his private interests suffered by the 
war ; that Dgliies expected to go into the country soon, 
on account of his health ; and as his influence with the 
pasha would be very valuable, it would be advisable 
to send some one empowered to treat as soon as pos- 
sible. Bainbridge also expressed the opinion that it 
would be impossible to effect the release of the cap- 
tives without paying a ransom, unless with the help of 
land forces. 

May 18, Commodore Barron wrote to Colonel Lear 
and received a reply the next day. As they were 
both in Malta at this time, and had been for many 
months, they had doubtless discussed the question of 
peace many times, and these letters served to record 
their opinions, in which they agreed, that the time for 
entering upon negotiations had arrived, and plans 
were made accordingly. The subsequent events are 
described by Lear in his report to the secretary of 
state as follows : " On the 24th I embarked on board the 
United States frigate Essex, Captain James Barron, 
to proceed to Tripoli. On the 26th in the morning we 
saw the town of Tripoli . . . and the United States 
frigates Constitution and President. At ten o'clock, 
A. M., Captain Barron and myself went on board the 
former, when Captain Rodgers received the letter of 
Commodore Barron relinquishing to him the command 
of the squadron. He returned with us to the Essex, 
when we stood in for the town, and . . . hoisted the 
white flag, which was immediately answered by the 
same from the Pasha's castle. In half an hour a boat 
came off with the Spanish consul," whom " I informed 
. . . that the propositions which had been made 



PEACE WITH TRIPOLI 249 

through him were totally out of the question and must 
be relinquished before I would consent to move one 
step in the business." The Spanish consul went ashore, 
and on account of bad weather was not able to come 
aboard again until the 29th. " We now removed from 
the Essex to the Constitution. The Pasha relinquished 
all pretensions to a payment for peace or any future 
demand of any nature whatever, but demanded the 
sum of one hundred and thirty thousand dollars for 
the ransom of our countrymen, and the delivery of 
his subjects gratis. To this I objected as strongly as 
to the first proposition ; and after some time spent in 
discussing the subject, I told the Spanish consul that 
to prevent unnecessary delay and altercation, I would 
give him in writing my ultimatum, which must be at 
once decided upon, viz : That there should be an 
exchange of prisoners, man for man, so far as they 
would go ; that the Pasha should send all the Ameri- 
cans in his power on board the squadron now off 
Tripoli ; that his subjects should be brought over 
from Syracuse and delivered to him with all conven- 
ient speed, and as he had three hundred Americans, 
more or less, and we one hundred Tripolitans, more 
or less, I would engage to give him for the balance in 
his favor sixty thousand dollars ; that a treaty of 
peace should be made upon honorable and mutually 
beneficial terms." 

This ultimatum having been reported to the pasha, 
he replied on the 31st that he " had at length agreed 
to the sum of sixty thousand dollars for the balance of 
the prisoners, but that he could not think of deliver- 
ing up the Americans until his subjects were ready to 
be delivered to him." Lear insisted, saying that he 
" would allow the Pasha twenty-four hours from this 



250 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

time to agree to my propositions in toto, or reject 
them." The next day, June 1, Captain Bainbridge 
came aboard the Constitution, his parole having been 
guaranteed by Nissen and Dghies. " He assured me 
that the Americans would not be delivered up until 
a treaty of peace should be made with the Pasha, as 
peace was more his object than the sum he might get 
for the captives." Lear agreed to negotiate the peace 
first " with any proper character," but " would have 
nothing more to do with the Spanish consul ; " and 
" the Americans should be sent aboard without waiting 
the arrival of the Tripolines from Syracuse." Bain- 
bridge then went on shore, and the next morning, 
June 2, Nissen came aboard with a commission to 
negotiate. 

The treaty was then drawn up, and according to Nis- 
sen it contained " some articles more favorable to us 
than were to be found in any treaty which the Pasha had 
with any other nation." The pasha accepted the treaty 
on condition that the Americans should withdraw their 
forces from Derne, and should endeavor to persuade 
his brother Hamet also to withdraw, agreeing on 
his part, in the latter case, to restore to his brother 
his wife and children, if time were allowed him to do 
this. These details having been arranged, the prelim- 
inary articles were signed on board the Constitution 
June 3. " We went on board the Vixen to stand in 
near the harbor. When we were close to the town we 
fired a gun and hauled down the white flag. A salute 
of twenty-one guns was fired from the batteries and an- 
swered by the Constitution. I went into the harbor in 
the Constitution's barge, with the flag of the United 
States displayed, and was received at the landing place 
by the American officers, who had been in captivity, 



PEACE WITH TRIPOLI 251 

with a sensibility more easily to be conceived than de- 
scribed. An immense concourse of people crowded the 
shore and filled the streets, ;ill signifying their plea- 
sure on the conclusion of the peace. . . . On the 4th 
of June, at eleven a. m., the flag-staff was raised on 
the American house and the flag of the United States 
displayed, which was immediately saluted with twenty- 
one guns from the castle and forts and was returned 
by the Constitution." The American prisoners, after 
a captivity of over nineteen months, were then released 
and sent aboard the ships. Lear had an audience with 
the pasha, and says that " his court was much more 
superb than that of Algiers." On the 10th, Lear sent 
the pasha two copies of the treaty to be signed, and 
was invited to attend the divan. The treaty was there 
read, article by article, discussed, and finally signed 
and sealed. A week later the Constitution, which had 
gone to Syracuse, returned with the money and eighty- 
nine Tripolitan prisoners. Dr. John Ridgely, one of 
the late captives and formerly surgeon of the Phil- 
adelphia, was left at Tripoli as charge d'affaires. June 
21, the American vessels then at Tripoli sailed for 
Malta and Syracuse. 

The treaty was liberal and enlightened, providing 
for the exchange of prisoners in case of future war 
and for their surrender, without ransom, at the con- 
clusion of peace, and containing other articles advan- 
tageous to both parties. It involved no payment for 
peace, nor tribute, although it was tacitly understood, 
in accordance with ancient custom in Barbary, that 
when a consul was appointed, a present not exceeding 
six thousand dollars should be sent with him. It was 
ratified by the Senate April 12, 180G. 1 

1 See Appendix II. 



252 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

It is apparent from the published letters of Consul- 
General Lear, Commodores Barron and Rodgers, and 
Captain Bainbridge that they were all in favor of 
concluding peace at this time, even though it involved 
the payment of ransom. The long, tedious, and dis- 
tressing captivity of the officers and crew of the Phil- 
adelphia appealed to the sympathies of all, and stimu- 
lated efforts to procure their early release. Colonel 
Lear, in spite of his military title, was a man of peace, 
and was very desirous of ending the war at the first 
opportunity. Success in diplomacy was doubtless his 
ambition. Yet he was firm in standing by his ultima- 
tum, yielding only in allowing delay in the restoration 
of Hamet's family. Barron was suffering from physical 
disability, and at the time was mentally disqualified 
for the exercise of sound judgment on any question. 
Even Rodgers, contrary to what might have been 
expected, was not only acquiescent in a matter in 
which his authority was subordinate to that of Lear, 
but his letters 2 to Barron and to the secretary of the 
navy offer no suggestion of a final appeal to arms 
with the view of reducing the pasha's demands. There 
is no expression of protest or regret, but rather of 
approval. He says the pasha " acceded to peace on 
terms which left us no interest in a refusal of his 
wishes." The only hint we have of a warlike senti- 
ment on his part is found in the following extract 
from Lear's report to the secretary of state : "I must 
here pay a tribute of justice to Commodore Rodgers, 
whose conduct during the negotiation on board was 
mixed with that manly firmness and evident wish to 
continue the war, if it could be done with propriety, 
while he displayed the magnanimity of an American 
1 St. Pap. v, pp. 429-432, 436. 



PEACE WITH TRIPOLI 253 

in declaring that we fought not for conquest, but to 
maintain our just rights and national dignity, as fully 
convinced the negotiators that we did not ask, but 
grant peace. . . . Commodore Rodgers observed that 
if the Pasha would consent to deliver up our country- 
men without making peace, he would engage to give 
him two hundred thousand dollars, instead of sixty 
thousand, and raise the difference between the two 
sums from the officers of the navy, who, he was per- 
fectly assured, would contribute to it with the highest 
satisfaction." Bainbridge may not unnaturally have 
been somewhat biased in his view of the case by his 
painful situation as a captive. Preble also, when news 
of the peace reached him, appears to have approved of 
the terms, for not long after, September 29, 1805, he 
wrote to the secretary of the navy that Eaton's " ex- 
traordinary movements and the great increase of our 
naval forces undoubtedly occasioned the Pasha to sue 
for peace, and it is a pleasing circumstance and must 
be gratifying to every American that it has been estab- 
lished on more honorable terms than any other nation 
has ever been able to command." 1 

The preponderance of opinion, however, both con- 
temporary and later, has been that the conclusion of 
peace at this time was hasty and ill judged ; that the 
payment of ransom was unjustifiable in view of the 
force then in the Mediterranean ; that this force 
should have been used in an attack on Tripoli ; that 
Eaton, having captured Derne, should have been rein- 
forced and supported in his design to attack Tripoli 
by land ; and that the cause of Ilamet Karamanli 
should have been upheld. 

1 Preble Papers. The treaty is defended in Nat. Intell. Oct. 0, 25, 
Nov. C, 



'J5I OUR NAVY ,\Nl> THE BARBARA CORSAIRS 

The secretary <>r state, Madison, in Ins instructions 
to Colonol Lour oi June C, L804, oxpressos the hope 
that, in viow of tho strong force about to bo sen! out, 
poaeo may be effected "without any price or pecu- 
niary compensation whatever." lie authorizes tho 
purchase of peaoe and tho payment of ransom only in 
oase of adverse events, accident to the squadron, or 
hostilities on the part of other Barbary powers. In his 
letter of April 20, L805, he states his opinion that 
"the possibility of any considerable sacrifices being 
necessary should be considered as diminished by the 

spirited attack made on the enemy by ( 'ominodoro 

Preble." ] 

It may reasonably he believed that, it' Preble had 
been in command, he would have made a vigorous 

attach on Tripoli with the tine squadron, which, a little 

later, could have been brought before the place, a 

squadron so much more powerful than t hat wit h which 

he had done such <^ood work the year before. lei it 
must be remembered that Preble offered a still larger 
sum for ransom, even after he had heard that Barron's 
squadron was on the way." Preble's favorable opinion 

of the peace, quoted above, underwent a radical change 

within a few months, for he wrote to Eaton February 

8, L806, that he was sure "the Senate feel that just 
sense of indignation which they Ought at the sacrifice 
oi national honor which has heen made hy an igno- 
minious negotiation." 8 When writing this, however, 
he evidently had in mind the treatment of Elamet, the 

exiled pasha, rather than the matter o\' ransom. 

It is to be regretted that the negotiations were nol 
deferred a few weeks, until the arrival of the bomb- 

1 St. l';i|>. \, pp. I 33 135. '•' See above, p. 201. 

l 'i oble Papers. 



PEACE WITH TRIPOLI '255 

vessels and gunboats from America, when the entire 
squadron might have been made ready for united ac- 
tion against the enemy. The mere assembling of such 
a formidable force before Tripoli might have fright- 
ened the pasha into yielding any terms demanded, 
especially if Eaton's movement on land had been re- 
inforced and pushed. As it was, after Preble with- 
drew his force, there never appeared before Tripoli, 
at any one time, more than a few blockading vessels, 
and the real strength of the squadron was never 
demonstrated to the pasha. The national honor was 
vastly more important than hastening the release of 
the captives in Tripoli, and the nation, having out- 
grown the weakness and poverty of the earlier years, 
should have been above haggling with a pirate. 

Eaton's expedition, as a factor in the campaign 
against Tripoli, particularly with regard to its effect 
in disposing the pasha to peace, has been variously 
estimated. When the plan was first proposed, it ex- 
cited little interest among naval officers, who appar- 
ently were skeptical as to its practicability. Indeed, 
with a leader of less than Eaton's indomitable energy 
and perseverance, the enterprise must have proven a 
failure. That Commodore Barron, when he first took 
command, warmly approved of the project is shown by 
his verbal orders of September 15, 1804, to Captain 
Hull, 1 but later his attitude seems to have been modi- 
fied by ill health and other influences, and he began 
to express caution and a fear of having exceeded his 
instructions. Lear was outspoken in his opposition to 
tic scheme, and doubtless had great influence with the 
commodore. The following winter Captain Dent of 
the Nautilus stated to a committee of the Senate: 

1 See above, p. '2'_'S. 



256 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

" That I consider Commodore Barron's health, during 
the last winter and spring and until after the negotia- 
tion, such as to disqualify him from transacting any- 
business, his mind being so much impaired as scarcely 
to recollect anything that transpired from one day to 
another. ... It was generally believed by the officers 
in the Mediterranean that Mr. Lear had a great ascend- 
ency over the commodore in all his measures relative 
to the squadron, and from frequent observations of 
Mr. Lear's intimacy with the commodore, during his 
debilitated state, I am of the same opinion." 1 
" Preble wrote to Eaton, October 28, 1805: "The 
arduous and dangerous services you have performed 
have justly immortalized your name and astonished 
not only your country, but the world. If pecuniary 
resources and naval strength had been at your com- 
mand, what would you not have done ! . . . I have 
often regretted that you did not leave the United 
States with me. An earlier acquaintance might have 
given greater reputation to our arms, while I was on 
the station, but could not have increased your glory 
beyond its present zenith, for you have acquired im- 
mortal honor and established the fame of your coun- 
try in the East." 2 

There was an idea that Eaton's expedition, if so far 
successful as to threaten the overthrow of the Tripoli- 
tan government and the restoration of Hamet, might 
have serious results for the American captives. The 
pasha informed Dr. Cowdery 3 that, if driven to ex- 
tremity, he would put the prisoners to death, and 
Nissen expressed his belief that such would be their 
fate. 4 The secretary of the navy wrote to Preble, 

1 St. Pap. v, p. 406. 2 Preble Papers. 

;1 Cowdery, pp. 26, 27. ' St. Pap. \, p. 107. 



PEACE WITH TRIPOLI 257 

September 18, 1805 : " I have seen many of the 
officers that were prisoners. All say positively that if 
Lear had persisted in refusing paying a ransom for 
them, peace would not have been made and they would 
all have been certainly massacred." 1 There seems, 
however, to have been no apprehension in the squad- 
ron that this threat would be executed. Rodgers wrote 
to the secretary of the navy, June 8, 1805 : " I never 
thought myself that the lives of the American prison- 
ers were in any clanger ; " 2 although in the same 
letter he speaks of this danger as a possibility. To the 
Senate committee just mentioned, Lieutenant Wallace 
Wormeley, who hud been a midshipman on the Phil- 
adelphia and a captive in Tripoli, said : "I do not 
believe that there was any danger to be apprehended 
for our lives." 3 There was also an idea that, if hard 
pressed, the pasha might have fled into the interior, 
taking the captives with him. There can be little 
doubt that the capture of Derne and the defeat of the 
Tripolitan army before that place had a disquieting 
effect on the pasha, and must in a great degree have 
stimulated his desire for an early peace. 

The government has been accused of breach of 
faith with Hamet in abandoning his cause when there 
was a prospect of success. The degree of responsi- 
bility of the administration may be learned from the 
official utterances of its members. August 22, 1802, 
the secretary of state wrote letters to Consuls Eaton 
and Cathcart containing the earliest expression of the 
administration's views. Both letters refer to this 
matter in nearly the same words, and the following 
is an extract from the former : " Although it does not 

1 Preble Papers. 2 St. Pap. v, p. 437. 

;3 Ibid. p. 405. 



258 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

accord with the general sentiments or views of the 
United States to intermeddle in the domestic contests 
of other countries, it cannot be unfair, in the prose- 
cution of a just war or the accomplishment of a rea- 
sonable peace, to turn to their advantage the enmity 
and pretensions of others against a common foe. How 
far success in the plan ought to be relied on, cannot 
be decided at this distance and with so imperfect 
a knowledge of many circumstances. The event, it is 
hoped, will correspond with your zeal and with your 
calculations. Should the rival brother be disappointed 
in his object, it will be due to the honor of the United 
States to treat his misfortune with the utmost tender- 
ness, and to restore him as nearly as may* be to the 
situation from which he was drawn, unless some other 
proper arrangement should be more acceptable to him. 
This wish of the President will be conveyed to Com- 
modore Morris and Mr. Cathcart with a suggestion 
that, in the event of peace with the ruling Pasha, 
an attempt should be made to insert some provision 
favorable to his brother." Six days later the secretary 
of the navy wrote to Commodore Morris : " In adjust- 
ing the tejmis of peace with the Dey [pasha] of Tripoli, 
whatever regard may be had to the situation of his 
brother, it is not to be considered by you of sufficient 
magnitude to prevent or even to retard a final settle- 
ment with the Dey. Mr. Eaton in this affair cannot 
be considered an authorized agent of the government." 
The secretary of the navy in his instructions to Com- 
modore Barron, June 6, 1804, already quoted, 1 says : 
" With respect to the ex-pasha of Tripoli, we have 
no objection to your availing yourself of his coopera- 
tion. . . . The subject is committed entirely to your 

1 See above, p. 227, also pp. 117, 124. 



PEACE WITH TRIPOLI 259 

discretion." In his instructions to Consul-General 
Lear, of the same date, the secretary of state says : 
" Of the cooperation of the elder brother of the pasha 
of Tripoli wo are still willing to avail ourselves, if the 
commodore should judge that it may he useful, and to 
engage which, as well as to render it more effectual, 
he has discretionary authority to grant him pecuniary 
or other subsidies not exceeding twenty thousand 
dollars ; but the less reliance is placed upon his aid, 
as the force under the oi'ders of the commodore is 
deemed sufficient for any exercise of coercion which the 
obstinacy of the pasha may demand." 1 The above 
expressions could hardly be construed as a promise 
to restore Hamet to the throne of his ancestors, but 
explicit orders might have been given that he should 
be fully enlightened as to the exact position of the 
administration in regard to his affairs. 

It is to be considered next whether Barron and 
Eaton exceeded their instructions and led Hamet to 
expect more than was authorized by the administra- 
tion. Eaton wrote to the secretary of the navy, De- 
cember 5, 1805 : " Commodore Barron's instructions 
to Captain Hull of September 15th, 1804, and my 
convention with Hamet Pasha of February 23rd, 1805, 
comprise all the obligations entered into with Hamet." 2 
These two documents have already been quoted ; 3 in 
the first Barron says : " The Pasha may be assured 
of the support of my squadron at Bengazi or Derne. 
. . . And you may assure him also that I will take 
the most effectual measures, with the forces under 
my command, for cooperating with him against the 

1 For the letters referred to in this paragraph, see Morris, pp. 45- 
51; St. Pap. v. pp. 162, 164,434. 

2 St. Pap. v. p. 199. 8 See above, pp. 228, 231. 



260 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

usurper, his brother, and for reestablishing him in 
the regency of Tripoli." Eaton, in the second article 
of his convention, commits the United States to " use 
their utmost exertions " under certain conditions " to 
reestablish the said Hamet Pasha." It is not improb- 
able also that, on various occasions during their long 
march through the desert, Eaton may have revived 
the drooping spirits of the exile by confident assur- 
ances of support on the part of the United States. 
In his letter of March 22, 1805, to Eaton, Barron, 
apparently fearful of having gone too far in his in- 
structions to Hull, says: "You must be sensible that 
in giving their sanction to a cooperation with the 
exiled pasha, Government did not contemplate the 
measure as leading, necessarily and absolutely, to a 
reinstatement of that prince in his rights on the regency 
of Tripoli. They appear to have viewed the coopera- 
tion in question as a means which, if there existed 
energy and enterprise in the exile and attachment to 
his person on the part of his former subjects, might 
be employed to the common furtherance and advan- 
tage of his claims and our cause, but without mean- 
ing to fetter themselves by any specific and definite 
attainment as an end, which the tenor of my instruc- 
tions and the limited sum appropriated for that special 
purpose clearly demonstrate. . . . Under my present 
impressions I feel it my duty to state explicitly that 
I must withhold my sanction to any convention or 
agreement committing the United States, or tending 
to impress upon Hamet Pasha a conviction that we 
have bound ourselves to place him upon the throne. 
... I wish you to understand that no guaranty or 
engagement to the exiled prince, whose cause, I must 
repeat, we are only favoring as an instrument to our 



PEACE WITH TRIPOLI 261 

advantage and not as an end in itself, must be held to 
stand in the way of our acquiescence to any honor- 
able and advantageous terms of accommodation which 
the reigning pasha may be induced to propose ; such 
terms being once offered, and accepted by the repre- 
sentative of Government appointed to treat of peace, 
our support to the ex-pasha must necessarily cease." 1 
This letter reached Eaton April 16, too late to relieve 
Barron of the responsibility assumed in his order of 
September 15. 

A summary of the case from the point of view of 
the administration is given by the President in his 
message to Congress of January 13, 1806 : " We 
considered that concerted operations by those who have 
a common enemy were entirely justifiable and might 
produce effects favorable to both, without binding 
either to guarantee the objects of the other. . . . Our 
expectation was that an intercourse should be kept up 
between the ex-pasha and the commodore ; that while 
the former moved on by land, our squadron should 
proceed with equal pace, so as to arrive at their desti- 
nation together and to attack the common enemy by 
land and sea at the same time. The instructions of June 
6th to Commodore Barron show that a cooperation 
only was intended and by no means an union of our 
object with the fortune of the ex-pasha ; and the 
commodore's letters . . . prove that he had the most 
correct idea of our intentions. His verbal instruc- 
tions, indeed, to Mr. Eaton and Captain Hull, if the 
expressions arc accurately committed to writing by 
those gentlemen, do not limit the extent of his co- 
operation as rigorously as he probably intended. . . . 
If Mr. Eaton's subsequent convention should appear 
1 St. Pap. v, p. 176 ; Eaton, p. 368- 



262 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

to bring forward other objects, . . . the second arti- 
cle, as he expressly states," guards " it against any- 
ill effect. ... In the event it was found that, after 
placing the ex-pasha in possession of Derne, one of 
the most important cities and provinces of the country, 
where he had resided himself as governor, he was 
totally unable to command any resources or to bear 
any part in cooperation with us. This hope was then 
at an end, and we certainly had never contemplated 
nor were we prepared to land an army of our own, or 
to raise, pay or subsist an army of Arabs, to march 
from Derne to Tripoli, and to carry on a land war at 
such a distance from our resources. . . . While, there- 
fore, an impression from the capture of Derne might 
still operate at Tripoli, and an attack on that place 
from our squadron was daily expected, Colonel Lear 
thought it the best moment to listen to overtures of 
peace then made by the pasha. He did so, and while 
urging provisions for the United States, he paid at- 
tention also to the interests of Hamet, but was able 
to effect nothing more than to engage the restitution 
of his family. ... In operations at such a distance 
it becomes necessary to leave much to the discretion 
of the agents employed. ... In all these cases the 
purity and patriotism of the motives should shield the 
agent from blame and even secure a sanction where 
the error is not too injurious. Should it be thought 
by any that the verbal instructions, said to have been 
given by Commodore Barron to Mr. Eaton, amount to 
a stipulation that the United States should place 
Hamet on the throne of Tripoli, a stipulation so en- 
tirely unauthorized, so far beyond our views and so 
erroneous, could not be sanctioned by our Government. 
. . . Something equivalent to the replacing him in his 



PEACE WITH TRIPOLI 263 

former situation might be worthy its consideration. A 
nation, by establishing a character of liberality and 
magnanimity, gains in the friendship and respect of 
others more than the worth of mere money." 1 

As usual in such cases, the discussion of this ques- 
tion at the time took a political turn, and the adminis- 
tration and its agents were warmly attacked by the 
opposition. The following extract from a letter written 
March 21, 1806, by Timothy Pickering, then in the 
Senate, serves to show this feeling : " Lear's conduct 
is inexcusable, and can be resolved into nothing but 
the basest treachery on the basest principles. The 
President in his message on the subject labored to 
justify him, but in vain." 2 

The situation of the unfortunate Haniet was by no 
means befitting a royal exile. In a letter to Eaton, 
dated June 29, 1805, he acknowledges that everything 
had been done for him which he had any reason to 
expect, but suggests " some small assistance to enable 
me to subsist myself and suite." Accordingly, by 
order of Commodore Rodgers, he was allowed two 
hundred dollars a month for the support of himself and 
his twelve or fifteen dependents in Syracuse. A few 
weeks later he appealed to the President and to the 
people of the United States for relief. He was 
allowed for a time to suffer in neglect. In April, 1806, 
Congress appropriated twenty-four hundred dollars for 
his benefit, but it was not delivered to him until more 
than a year later. The allowance authorized by Com- 
modore Rodgers was then stopped. In the mean time, 
February 18, 1807, he had addressed a memorial to 
Congress in which he says : " I will not, like the world, 

1 St. Pap. v, j). 159 ; For. Rel. ii, p. 695. 

2 Pickering, xxxviii, p. 105 ; see also xlvi, pp. 41-— 115, lv, p. 210. 



264 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

reproach the representatives of the American nation 
with ingratitude. I rather implore their commiseration 
towards me ; at least so far as to restore to me my 
family and to grant me a competence." In May, 1807, 
Dr. George Davis, who had been for some years charge 
d'affaires of the United States at Tunis, went to Tri- 
poli as consul, and one of his first acts was to demand 
of the pasha the fulfillment of the third article of the 
treaty of June 4, 1805, which provided for the restora- 
tion to Hamet of his wife and children. It was now 
learned that Colonel Lear had agreed to a secret arti- 
cle of that treaty, 1 allowing the pasha four years to 
comply with this stipulation. This fact had never been 
communicated to the state department nor to Con- 
gress, although Eaton had stated his suspicion of some 
such secret agreement in a letter to the chairman of 
the Senate committee on Hamet's application. The 
President, in his message of November 11, 1807, ex- 
presses surprise at this affair, and says : " How it has 
happened that the declaration of June 5th has never 
before come to our knowledge cannot with certainty be 
said. But whether there has been a miscarriage of it 
or a failure of the ordinary attention and correctness 
of that officer in making his communications, I have 
thought it due to the Senate, as well as to myself, to 
explain to them the circumstances which have with- 
held from their knowledge, as they did from my own, 
a modification which, had it been placed in the public 
treaty, would have been relieved from the objections 
which candor and good faith cannot but feel in its 
present form." Dr. Davis, however, prevailed upon 
the pasha to restore his brother's family without 
further delay, and this was done in October, 1807. 
1 See Appendix II. 



PEACE WITH TRIPOLI 2G5 

December 18, 1807, a committee of the House of 
Representatives recommended further pecuniary aid 
for Hamet. In 1808 provision was made by the pasha 
for his brother's residence in Morocco, with a pen- 
sion ; and in the following year, through the influence 
of Consul Davis, Hamet was appointed by the pasha 
to the government of Derne. Two years later he was 
again expelled by his brother and fled with his family 
to Egypt, where he died. 1 

Upon his return to America, Eaton was received 
with marked distinction. The legislature of Massa- 
chusetts made him a grant of ten thousand acres of 
land in Maine. But he could never get over his chagrin 
and disappointment at the inglorious termination of 
his expedition, which he had hoped and believed would 
end with the capture of Tripoli, the restoration of 
Hamet, a brilliant victory for the United States forces 
afloat and ashore, and an honorable peace. The 
remainder of his life was embittered. Towards those 
who, he believed, had in any degree thwarted his plans, 
Lear especially, he was unsparing of his reprobation. 
He therefore not unnaturally made enemies, and a 
resolution to present him a medal was defeated in 
Congress by a small majority. He was embarrassed by 
long delay in settling his claims against the govern- 
ment, especially the twenty-two thousand dollars ex- 
pended in 1803 for the furtherance of his plans regard- 
ing Hamet,' 2 which had not yet been allowed. Finally, 
in February, 1807, a bill passed in Congress authoriz- 
ing the state department to settle the accounts accord- 

1 St. Pap. v, pp. 196 203, in:;. 489-493; vi, pp. 51-57; x, pp. 496- 
502 ; Rep. Sen. Com. viii, p. 17 ; Eaton, pp. 420-425 ; Gruenhow, p. 33 ; 
Pickering, xxix, p. 12 ; Nat. Intell. June 25, 1800. 

' 2 See above, p. 122. 



266 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

ing to equity. Many years later his heirs applied to 
Congress for relief. The total expense of the Derne 
expedition was a little less than forty thousand dollars ; 
Eaton would accept for his own services during this 
campaign only enough to cover his personal expenses. 
His relations with Hainet continued cordial, and for 
years they kept up a friendly correspondence. Eaton 
died in 1811, at the age of forty-seven. 1 

1 Claims, pp. 299-307, 323-332 ; Mil. Aff. vi, p. 1 ; Eaton, pp. 243- 
256, 267, 405, 406 ; Felton, pp. 339, 354. 



CHAPTER XVI 
FURTHER TROUBLE WITH THE BARBARY STATES 

After the peace, the squadron rendezvoused at Syra- 
cuse, and on June 29, 1805, the inquiry into the loss 
of the Philadelphia was held. 1 One of the first things 
to engage the attention of Commodore Rodders was 
a threatened difficulty with Tunis. It has been men- 
tioned 2 that on April 24 Rodgers captured a Tuni- 
sian xebec with two prizes attempting to run the 
blockade of Ti'ipoli. The bey of Tunis, who either 
would not or could, not understand the law of block- 
ades, was much incensed, and demanded of Dr. Davis, 
the United States charge d'affaires, that the vessels 
should be given up to him. Davis assured him that 
this would not be done. May 28, he made the same 
demand of the commodore. Early in June, Rodgers 
sent the crew of the xebec to Tunis by the Essex, re- 
taining the vessels, and in a letter to Davis announced 
his intention of taking the squadron to Tunis as soon 
as possible. On her return the Essex brought infor- 
mation that the bey still insisted on the surrender of 
the captured vessels. July 1, Rodgers wrote to him 
" that a compliance with your demands to deliver up 
the xebec and her two prizes is totally inadmissible." 
The bey felt himself affronted, assumed a menacing 
attitude towards Davis, and threatened war against 
the United States. 3 

1 See above, p. 148. 2 See above, p. 222. 

3 For thia difficulty with Tunis, see Nav. Chron. pp. 279-287 ; Cap- 
tains' Letters, i, no. 59 (Rodgers to Davis, Juno 11 and 29, 1805). 



268 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

Rodgers at once sent the Congress and Vixen to 
Tunis, and on July 23 followed with the Constitution, 
Constellation, Essex, John Adams, Siren, Nautilus, 
Enterprise, Hornet, and several gunboats. All these 
vessels anchored in Tunis Bay August 1, and the next 
day the commodore wrote to the bey asking whether 
his intentions were peaceful or otherwise, and declar- 
ing his purpose to begin hostilities if he did not re- 
ceive a reply within thirty-six hours. Rodgers waited, 
however, until the 5th, when he sent Captain Decatur 
ashore to demand a reply. The bey refused to receive 
Decatur, who at once returned to the squadron. The 
bey's discretion then got the better of his valor, and 
he sent off a messenger in such haste that he arrived 
on board the flagship before Decatur. He bore a con- 
ciliatory letter from the bey, inviting the commodore 
and Consul-General Lear to a friendly conference with 
him. At the same time he complained of the whole 
squadron's being anchored before the city, which, he 
said, constituted an act of hostility. 

Lear went on shore and remained several days. 
August 11, Rodgers demanded " a guarantee for the 
maintenance of peace, to be witnessed by the English 
and French consuls ; " and to the bey's complaint of all 
the squadron's being present, replied that he was mis- 
taken, that a frigate, a brig, two bomb-vessels, and 
eight gunboats had not yet arrived. The bey appeared 
to be waiting only for the departure of the squadron 
in order that he might send out his cruisers. August 
15, Rodgers wrote to Lear that the bey " must do one 
of three things, by simple request, or else must do all 
three by force. He must give the guarantee already 
required, or he must give sufficient security for peace 
and send a minister to the United States, or he must 



FURTHER TROUBLE 269 

make such alterations in the treaty as you may require 
and as may satisfy you that there is confidence to be 
placed in what he does. I have only to repeat that if 
he does not do all that is necessary and proper, at the 
risk of my conduct being disapproved by my country, 
he shall feel the vengeance of the squadron now in 
this bay." But the bey had already yielded, and Lear 
returned to the flagship with his letter of the 14th, 
in which he declared his intention of sending an 
ambassador to the United States to claim the captured 
vessels, and promised to keep the peace until the 
result of this mission should be known. This solution 
of the difficulty was accepted by the commodore, but he 
kept the squadron before Tunis until September. The 
envoy, whose name was Mellimelni, was then ready, 
and embarked on the Congress, Captain Decatur. 
These proceedings astonished the European consuls 
at Tunis, who said that " no other nation has ever 
negotiated with the present bey on such honorable 
terms." 

In a letter to the secretary of the navy, dated 
August 21, 1805, Rodgers says : " Peace on honorable 
terms is always preferable to war, and if Government 
thinks proper to overlook the late unfriendly conduct 
of the Bey of Tunis, I think I can almost with certainty 
say that he never will again attempt to behave in 
a similar manner, as I feel satisfied this lesson has 
not only changed his opinion of our maritime strength, 
but has caused him to discover more distinctly his 
own weakness in every sense. However, should the 
Government determine to chastise him for what has 
passed, permit me to solicit the honor of bearing the 
standard of their vengeance, and as a guarantee for 
the fulfillment of their wishes, I will pledge all that 



270 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

is sacred and dear to me in this world, provided such 
intention is made known to me by the first of March 
next, that before the ensuing first of September fol- 
lowing that my country shall not only obtain an 
honorable peace, but make him pay the expenses of 
the war, and this too with no more force than what 
remains this winter in the Mediterranean." 1 

After the affair with Tunis had been settled, Com- 
modore Rodgers sailed for Algiers, where Consul- 
General Lear was landed. About this time Mustapha, 
who had been dey of Algiers since 1798, was murdered 
by the soldiery, and a new dey named Achmet was 
chosen. 2 

The squadron was gradually reduced as the vessels 
composing it returned to the United States. The Presi- 
dent, with Commodore Barron, Captain Bainbridge, 
and most of the officers recently released from captiv- 
ity in Tripoli, had already sailed from Malta home- 
ward bound, July 13. In the Straits of Gibraltar she 
was fired upon by Spanish gunboats, to which she 
replied only by hoisting the Spanish flag under her 
own. Late in August the Constellation sailed for 
America under Captain Stewart, Captain Campbell 
having been transferred to the Essex. About the same 
time the John Adams was ordered home by way of 
Syracuse and Malta, where she took on board the 
invalids of the squadron. The brig Franklin, Captain 
Robinson, with Eaton on board, was also sent home 
by way of Tunis and Gibraltar. No other vessels 
sailed until the following year. One of the late cap- 
tives, Lieutenant Porter, remained with the squadron, 
and was given command of the Enterprise, having 
served for a time as acting captain of the Constitution. 
1 Captains' Letters, ii. 2 Greenhow, p. 37. 



FURTHER TROUBLE 271 

In April, 180G, lie was promoted to tlie grade of 
master-commandant. 1 

December 7, 1805, the American brig Friendship 
was sent into Algiers, having been seized by one of 
the dey's cruisers. The reason given for this was that 
the brig had no passport, and it was not considered an 
act of hostility, especially as she was promptly released. 
Consul Lear believed that she would have been con- 
demned as a prize, had it not been for the impression 
produced by the American conduct of affairs at Tri- 
poli and Tunis. 2 

The Congress upon her arrival in the United States 
landed the Tunisian ambassador in Washington, and 
he forthwith presented the bey's claim to the three 
vessels captured before Tripoli. They were of small 
value, and the administration, as a matter of policy, 
thought best to restore them. The ambassador then 
demanded a supply of naval stores as a condition of 
peace for three years, and threatened war as an alter- 
native. This met with a prompt and decisive refusal. 
In the Senate, however, there appears to have been a 
more conciliatory sentiment, judging by a report made 
by the committee on foreign relations. Whether or 
not in deference to this feeling, the administration, in 
the summer of 180G, determined to send the brig 
Franklin to the bey as a present, and the ambassador 
was to return home in her ; but he declined to do so, 
and the brig was not sent. He remained in the United 
States nearly a year altogether, and then sailed in the 

1 For movements of vessels in this chapter, see Porter, pp. 67-69; 
C. Morris, pp. 37-40 ; Perry, pp. 69-73 ; Emmons, pp. H>, 22, 90-93 ; 
Life and Adventures of James 11. Durand (Rochester, N. Y., 1820), 
pp. 34-71 ; MSS. in Xavy Dept. 

- Captains' Letters, iii, no. 51 (Lear to Rodgers) ; Nat. Intell. May 
19, 1806. 



272 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

ship Two Brothers, chartered by the government, 
without retracting his demands or his threat of war. 1 
War, however, did not follow. The bey had become 
involved in a difficulty with Algiers, and the impression 
produced by the American squadron anchored before 
his city had not wholly faded. It may have been 
strengthened by his ambassador's accounts of the size 
and resources of the United States. 

In the spring of 1806 the Hornet, 18, Captain Dent, 
a new sloop-of-war, arrived in the Mediterranean. Her 
namesake, the ten-gun sloop, seems to have left for 
the United States about the same time. In the summer 
Commodore Rodgers sailed home in the Essex, leav- 
ing the Constitution and the squadron under the 
command of Captain Campbell. The Argus, Siren, 
Nautilus, Vixen, Spitfire, Vengeance, and the Ameri- 
can gunboats also returned to the United States in 
the summer of 1806 ; the boats procured in the Medi- 
terranean were disposed of there. After this there 
remained in the Mediterranean only the Constitution, 
Hornet, and Enterprise. On the 15th of August, while 
beating to the eastward through the Straits of Gib- 
raltar, the Enterprise was attacked by seven Spanish 
gunboats. Captain Porter hoisted his colors and hailed 
the gunboats, but received no reply. They kept up 
a running fight for some time, but were finally driven 
off by the fire of the Enterprise. 2 

In the summer of 1807, an incipient mutiny took 
place on the Constitution on account of the period of 
enlistment of most of her crew having long elapsed. 3 

1 St. Pap. v, p. 452 ; For. Rel. ii, p. 799 ; Rep. Sen. Com. viii, p. 20 ; 
Letter Book ( 1799-1807), pp. 170-174, 177-180 ; see Nat. Intell. March 
20 and May 27, 1807. 

2 Comdrs'. Letters, ii, no. 51 (Porter to Sec. of Navy, Aug. 19, 1806). 
8 Hollis's Constitution, p. 120 ; Durand, p. 59 et seq. 



FURTHER TROUBLE 273 

It was quickly quelled, and she soon sailed for home, 
arriving at Boston in October. The Enterprise had 
already sailed, and the Hornet soon followed, being 
the last to leave. Meanwhile the Wasp, 18, Captain 
Smith, another new sloop-of-war, having been to 
Europe, touched at Gibraltar in August, but almost 
immediately returned to America. As relations be- 
tween the United States and England became more 
strained, the navy was kept at home as much as pos- 
sible. It seems to have been not uncommon for vessels 
visiting Europe to look into the Mediterranean, and 
the Argus and Enterprise did so in 1809. Except for 
such brief and infrequent cruises, American interests 
in the Mediterranean were left unguarded for several 
years. If the navy had been enlarged at this time, 
as it should have been, in view of the likelihood of 
a collision with England, further complications with 
Barbary might have been prevented. 

No sooner had the Hornet departed than difficulty 
with Algiers began. Two years' supplies of naval 
stores, stipulated by treaty, were due, and the dey 
refused to accept their equivalent in cash, although 
it was repeatedly offered by Consul Lear. The dey 
preferred warlike measures, and sent out a frigate on 
a cruise for Americans. October 26, 1807, the schooner 
Mary Ann of New York, Captain Ichabod Sheffield, 
and the brig Violet of Boston were captured in the 
Straits of Gibraltar, and the ship Eagle of New York 
was taken about the same time. The Mary Ann sailed 
for Algiers in charge of a prize crew of eight men 
and a boy. Three days later the crew of the schooner 
recaptured her, after a struggle in which four of the 
Algerines were thrown overboard ; they then set four 
others adrift in a boat, keeping the boy. The Mary 



274 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

Ann was brought safely into Naples, arriving there 
November 4. Notice of the hostilities was at once sent 
to American consuls and shipmasters in the Mediter- 
ranean. At about the same time the other two prizes 
arrived at Algiers. The captives were well treated, and 
in about six weeks Lear succeeded in settling the 
affair. The dey, apparently satisfied with the commo- 
tion he had stirred up, consented to receive the arrears 
in cash, released the vessels and crews, and promised 
that American commerce should be no further mo- 
lested. At this time it was believed that the Mary 
Ann had been taken into some other port by her prize 
crew. Yet when it was learned that she had escaped, 
it made no difference, at first, with the dey's decision. 
He still assured the consul that there would be no 
further trouble. 1 

Three months later, however, the dey suddenly 
demanded of Lear the payment of eighteen thousand 
dollars for his nine subjects, the prize crew of the 
Mary Ann. Lear declined to pay without authority 
from his government. The dey threatened him with 
imprisonment. On the same day the Danish consul 
was arrested and put to work with the slaves, loaded 
with chains, because his government was behindhand 
with its tribute ; he was released, however, on the 
intercession of the other consuls. Lear expected the 
same treatment, but firmly persisted in his refusal to 
pay. But a week later, March 31, 1808, two frigates, 
which had been fitting out, were ordered to sea. Lear 
was formally notified that they had orders to cruise 
against Americans, and he had " other indubitable 
evidence " that such was the fact. In order, therefore, 

1 St. Pap. vi, pp. 69-72 ; For. Rel. iii, pp. 32, 33. 



FURTHER TROUBLE 275 

to prevent a piratical raid on his countrymen, he con- 
sented, under protest, to pay the money. 1 

In 1810 the ship Liberty of Philadelphia was seized 
by a French privateer, acting under the Berlin and 
Milan decrees, and taken into Tunis. She was there 
sold at auction by the French consul to the first min- 
ister of the bey. She was subsequently sent to Malta 
under the Tunisian flag. United States Consul Pulis 
thereupon claimed her for her American owners, and 
applied to the Maltese court for judgment. When the 
bey of Tunis heard of this he threatened to arrest all 
the Americans in Tunis and sequester their property. 
Another American ship, the Holla, had also been cap- 
tured by the French and bought by the bey's agents, 
and he made the same threat in case she should be 
given up to her American owners. He declared that 
he had always released American vessels taken within 
his jurisdiction, but the case of " those taken on the 
high seas was an affair between the American and 
French governments," and he claimed the right to 
purchase such prizes and dispose of them as he pleased. 
The United States consul at Tunis, C. D. Coxe, having 
remonstrated in vain, proceeded to Malta and consulted 
with Consul Pulis, who finally withdrew his claim and 
surrendered the Liberty to the bey's representative. 2 
The claim was no doubt ultimately settled with the 
many other cases of French spoliation. 

In 1812 the dey of Algiers was a ferocious old man 
named Hadji Ali. His two immediate predecessors, 
Achmet and Ali, had been assassinated by the soldiery, 
the first in November, 1808, the second in 1809. 3 Early 

1 St. Pap. vii, pp. 70-7.1; For. Rel. iii, pp. 34. :',:>. 
- St. Pap. vii. pp. 4*8-490; For. Rel. iii, p. 394. 
3 Greenhow, p. .'!7. 



276 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

in 1812 a British envoy was sent to Algiers with a 
letter which says : " The Prince Regent in the name 
of his father George III . . . expresses the strongest 
friendship for the Dey ; . . . assures the Dey that he will 
protect his capital with his fleets so long as the present 
friendship shall subsist between the two nations ; de- 
clares that the British fleets are masters of every sea 
and are the terror of all maritime states and that who- 
ever attempts to oppose them will be subdued ; . . . 
begs the Dey not to permit those who are enemies of 
Great Britain to lessen the harmony now subsisting 
between the two nations and that he will not hearken 
to their evil sayings." 2 This letter was shown to 
Consul Lear, and is supposed to have encouraged the 
dey in the aggressive attitude that he soon afterwards 
assumed towards the United States. 

July 17, the ship Alleghany arrived from the United 
States loaded with naval stores for Algiers. On the 
20th, when they were partly unloaded, the dey ex- 
pressed dissatisfaction with the articles sent, ordered 
them reshipped, and demanded of Colonel Lear the 
instant payment of twenty-seven thousand dollars in 
liquidation of all arrearages of tribute to that time. 
Since the treaty was signed, September 5, 1795, about 
three hundred and fifty thousand dollars in annuities 
had been paid, and the amount that would actually be 
due September 5, 1812, was less than sixteen thousand 
dollars. But the dey claimed that, reckoning according 
to the Mohammedan calendar, three hundred and fifty- 
four days to the year, the time elapsed was seventeen 
and a half instead of seventeen years. He also com- 
manded Lear, with all other Americans in Algiers, to 
embark on the Alleghany and leave his dominions 
1 Shaler, p. 118. 



FURTHER TROUBLE 277 

within three days. If the money was not paid and 
the Americans not ready to depart by that time, he 
threatened to seize the ship, enslave Lear and his 
countrymen, over twenty in all, including the crew of 
the Alleghany, and declare war against the United 
States. In vain Lear protested and endeavored to 
arrange the matter. The dey was obdurate ; he ex- 
tended the time limit to the 25th, allowing two more 
days, but would grant no other concession. With 
difficulty the Jew broker Bacri was persuaded to 
advance the money, charging a commission of twenty- 
five per cent. On the morning of July 25, the money 
was paid, and Lear embarked with his wife and son 
and three other American citizens. The affairs of the 
United States were left in the hands of Mr. John 
Norderling, the Swedish consul. 1 

The Alleghany sailed at once for Gibraltar. On 
the passage she fell in with a British brig-of-war, but 
was not detained, the fact of war having been declared 
by the United States against England about six weeks 
before being still unknown in the Mediterranean. In 
his report Lear says : " Should our differences with 
Great Britain be so accommodated as to admit of 
sending a naval force into this sea, I am sure there 
is only one course which the government will pursue, 
and what has now taken place may be a happy and 
fortunate event for the United States, by relieving 
them from a disgraceful tribute and an imperious and 
piratical depredation on their commerce. If our small 
naval force can operate freely in this sea, Algiers will 
he humbled to the dust. ... I shall proceed in the 
Alleghany to Gibraltar, where I shall dispose of her 

1 For the events of 1812 at Algiers, see Lear's report of July 29 
to the Sec. of State, St. Pap. ix, pp. 127-144. 



278 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

cargo, which has been refused by the Dey of Algiers, 
to meet, as far as it will go, the bill before mentioned 
[due to Bacri], and for the remainder shall draw 
upon the honorable the Secretary of State." 

The Alleghany arrived at Gibraltar August 4. On 
the 8th, news of the declaration of war against Eng- 
land having come, the ship was seized. The captain 
was allowed to go on parole, but the crew were put on 
a prison ship and later sent to England. Lear, with 
his family, remained at Gibraltar until December, 
then went to Cadiz on a British transport, and there 
procured a passage to the United States. 1 

Before the Alleghany's arrival in Algiers, the dey 
had sent to sea a squadron of five frigates and several 
smaller vessels, heavily manned and carrying many 
guns, but not formidable, on account of the small 
calibre of the guns, the inefficiency of the crews, and 
the poor condition of the ships. Lear says : " I am 
sure that our brave officers and seamen would rejoice 
to meet them with only half their force." 2 

On the 25th of August, 1812, the brig Edwin of 
Salem, Captain George C. Smith, with a crew of ten 
men, including the mate, while proceeding from Malta 
to Gibraltar, was captured and sent into Algiers. 
This was the dey's only American prize, although 
a vessel under the Spanish flag was also taken, on the 
ground that she was an American under false colors, 
and an American citizen on board of her, named Pol- 
lard, was detained. The crew of the Edwin were 
" subjected to the well known horrors of Algerine 
slavery," but the captain and mate and Pollard were 

i Niles's Register, iv, p. 128, April 24, 1813. 
2 St. Pap. ix, pp. 141-143. 



FURTHER TROUBLE 279 

not made to work nor kept in confinement. 1 The war 
between the United States and Great Britain kept 
American merchantmen out of the Mediterranean for 
three years, which accounts for the small returns 
derived by the dey from his enterprise. He chose 
the wrong time for his hostile demonstration. 

In 1813, Mordecai M. Noah was appointed United 
States consul to Tunis, and was instructed to attempt 
the release of the American captives in Algiers, being 
allowed to offer for them a ransom of three thousand 
dollars apiece. At Cadiz, on his way to Tunis, Noah 
engaged the services of Richard R. Keene, an Amer- 
ican in business at that place, who proceeded to 
Algiers in February, 1814. He represented himself 
as a Spanish subject and " as the bearer of despatches 
from the Spanish Regency to their consul." Upon 
his arrival he consulted with the Spanish consul, and 
it was agreed to inform the dey that he had come in 
the interest of the American merchants of Cadiz 
and under the auspices of the Spanish government, 
to offer a ransom for the American captives ; at the 
same time insinuating that the United States govern- 
ment was indifferent to the fate of the captives, as 
any hindrances to commerce were an aid to the em- 
bargo policy of the administration. Keene was shown 
great attention and courtesy by the British consul, 
Mr. McDonell, who, with the Spanish consul, did all 
in his power to influence the dey in favor of the 
project, but without success. His reply was : " My 
policy and my views are to increase, not to diminish 
the number of my American slaves ; and not for 
a million dollars would I release them." The Swedish 
consul, Norderling, also tried, but could make no 
1 St Pap. ix, pp. 435-438; For. Rel. iii, p. 748. 



280 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

impression on the dey. About this time an American 
who had been impressed on an English frigate de- 
serted at Algiers, and to prevent arrest turned Mo- 
hammedan. He was claimed by the British consul, 
but was protected by the dey, then fled into the 
interior, and could not be found. The consul threat- 
ened to impress two Algerines ; but as a favor to 
Keene, he finally consented to accept in exchange' two 
of the Edwin's crew ; to save the dey's pride they 
were claimed as British subjects. They were there- 
upon turned over to Keene, who paid for them a ran- 
som of two thousand dollars each. The dey picked 
out the two poorest workmen in the crew for libera- 
tion. Four other Americans impressed on a British 
frigate which came into Algiers were also turned 
over to Keene by the consul, for a consideration of 
six thousand dollars, without the dey's knowledge. 
With these six Americans Keene returned to Gibral- 
tar, leaving ten others in captivity at Algiers : Captain 
Smith, Mr. Pollard, and the mate and seven of the 
crew of the Edwin. 1 

i Noah, pp. 69-76, 109, 141-152, 159-161, 369, 370, 386, 412-414, 
app. ii-v. 



CHAPTER XVII 
WAR WITH ALGIERS — FINAL PEACE 

As soon as the war with Great Britain was over, it 
was possible for the government to turn its attention 
to Algiers, and on February 23, 1815, President Madi- 
son sent a message to Congress recommending a 
declaration of war. Congress thereupon passed an act, 
which was approved March 2, declaring war against 
Algiers. 1 

Two squadrons were organized, one at Boston under 
Commodore William Bainbridge, the other at New 
York under Commodore Stephen Decatur. The latter 
was ready first and sailed May 20, 1815. It comprised 
the frigates Guerriere, 44, flagship, Captain William 
Lewis ; Constellation, 36, Captain Charles Gordon, 
and Macedonian, 38, Captain Jacob Jones ; the sloops- 
of-war Epervier, 18, Captain John Downes, and On- 
tario, 16, Captain Jesse D. Elliott ; the brigs Firefly, 
Spark, and Flambeau, each 14, Lieutenants George 
W. llodgers, Thomas Gamble, and John B. Nichol- 
son ; and the schooners Torch and Spitfire, 12, Lieu- 
tenants Wolcott Chauncey and Alexander J. Dallas. 
Mr. William Shaler, who had been appointed consul- 
general for the Barbary States, to reside at Algiers, 
and joint commissioner with Commodores Bainbridge 
and Decatur to treat for peace, was a passenger on the 
Guerriere. A few days after sailing, the squadron 

1 St. Pap. ix, p. 4.°,f> ; For. Rel. iii, p. 748 ; Rep. Sen. Com. iv, p. 8 ; 
Niles's Register, viii, p. 24, March 11, 1815. 



282 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

encountered a heavy gale, in which the Firefly sprung 
her masts and was obliged to put back to New York 
for repairs. 1 

Before entering the Mediterranean, Decatur com- 
municated with the United States consuls at Cadiz 
and Tangier, in order to learn, if possible, whether or 
not there was an Algerine squadron in the Atlantic. 
He was informed that a squadron under the command 
of Reis Hammida had been outside, but had passed 
up the Mediterranean. Decatur arrived at Gibraltar 
June 15, where his squadron attracted much attention. 
Dispatch vessels were at once sent by partisans of 
Algiers to warn the dey and Hammida. Decatur was 
informed that Hammida was probably off Cape de 
Gat, and remaining only long enough to communicate 
with the American consul, he proceeded in search of 
the Algerine, hoping to take him by surprise. 

On the morniug of the 17th, the squadron being 
much scattered in search of strange sails, the Constel- 
lation sighted a large frigate under topsails twenty 
miles or more southeast of Cape de Gat and signaled 
an enemy. Decatur, thinking that the Algerine would 
believe his squadron to be English, wished to avoid 
any appearance of being in chase, so as to carry out 
the deception until he was within striking distance of 
the enemy. But the Constellation, through the mistake 
of a quartermaster, hoisted the American ensign ; and 
although the other vessels, following the Guerriere's 
example, immediately showed British colors, the Al- 

1 This chapter is based on Decatur, ch. xiii, xiv, app. viii ; Bain- 
bridge, ch. ix ; Perry, ch. xii ; Life of Farragut, by his son (New 
York, 1879), ch. vi ; Cooper (New York, 1853), iii, ch. i ; Shaler, ch. v, 
app. I), E, G. See also Naval Monument (Boston, 1830), pp. 296-314 ; 
Naval Temple (Boston, 181(5), pp. 214-224; Analectic Magazine (Jan. 
and Feb. 181G) ; Mrs. Decatur, pp. 25, 20, 51-50. 



WAR WITH ALGIERS 283 

gerine at once took alarm, and, rapidly spreading all 
sail, headed for Algiers. The Constellation was nearest 
the stranger and about a mile from her. Half a mile 
astern of the Constellation was the Epervier, with the 
Guerriere on her starboard quarter and the Ontario 
on her port beam. The other vessels were scattered 
far behind. The Constellation opened fire on the 
enemy, who returned it and then wore ship and headed 
for the Spanish coast, evidently in despair of escaping 
in the long chase to Algiers and hoping to make a 
neutral port. The Ontario crossed her bow, and the 
Guerriere, passing between the Constellation and Eper- 
vier, approached so close to the Algerine as to receive 
a musketry fire from her tops which wounded several 
of the crew. Without returning this fire, Decatur 
brought his ship close up alongside the enemy and gave 
her a broadside, which caused great havoc on her deck. 
Hammida had already been wounded by a shot from 
the Constellation and was seated in an exposed position 
on the quarter-deck directing the working of his ship 
with great fortitude. He was now cut in two by a 
forty-two pound shot from one of the Guerriere's car- 
ronades. A second broadside drove all the Algerines 
below, except a few musketeers, who with cool courage 
kept up the fight. Wishing to prevent unnecessary 
loss of life, Decatur ceased firing and drew ahead out 
of range, although the Algerine had not struck her 
colors. The Epervier now came up on the starboard 
quarter of the enemy, who seemed to be attempting to 
escape. The little brig manoeuvred skillfully about the 
big frigate and gave her nine broadsides, receiving 
only musketry fire in return. At last the Algerine 
brought her head to the wind and surrendered. 

She was the frigate Mashuda of forty-six guns and 



284 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

the flagship of Reis Hammida. Four hundred and 
six prisoners were taken in her, many of whom were 
wounded. About thirty had been killed, most of 
them by the Guerriere's two broadsides ; very few of 
her crew were on deck during the Epervier's fire. The 
Guerriere lost one killed and three wounded by the 
enemy's fire, three killed and seven wounded by the 
bursting of a gun. The Mashuda was sent into Car- 
thagena under convoy of the Macedonian. Hammida 
was a remarkable man and one of the greatest of the 
race of Barbary corsairs. He was a member of a tribe 
of Kabyles, warlike mountaineers of southern Barbary. 
He had come to Algiers when a boy to seek his fortune 
and, going to sea, had risen from the lowest to the 
highest rank. 

Decatur continued his cruise in the hope of falling 
in with the remainder of the Algerine squadron, and 
on June 19, off Cape Palos, a brig was discovered and 
chased. After three hours she got into shoal water 
near the shore, where the frigates could not follow. The 
Epervier, Spark, Torch, and Spitfire kept up the chase. 
The brig ran aground, and part of her crew escaped 
in boats, one of which was sunk by the fire of the 
squadron, and the others reached the shore in safety. 
The remainder of the brig's crew, eighty in number, 
surrendered, and when she was boarded twenty-three 
dead were found on her deck. She proved to be the 
Algerine brig Estedio, of twenty-two guns, and was 
floated and sent into Carthagena with most of the pris- 
oners from both prizes. No other Algerine cruisers 
were found, and Decatur decided to proceed at once 
to Algiers, so as to intercept any of the enemy who 
should attempt to get back there. He called a council 
of his captains, and to them expressed his hope that 



WAR WITH ALGIERS 285 

what had already been accomplished would bring the 
dey to terms, and his determination, should the dcy 
be unwilling to treat, to attack the batteries and 
destroy the shipping in the harbor. The squadron 
arrived off Algiers on the 28th of June. 

The old dey, Hadji Ali, as well as his immediate 
successor, had been murdered by the soldiery a few 
months before, and the present dey was a Lesbian 
by birth named Omar, a man of courage and deter- 
mination and of more character than most Algerine 
rulers. 

On the morning after his arrival, Decatur hoisted 
a white flag at the foremast head of the flagship and 
Swedish colors at the main, meaning that he wished 
to negotiate through the Swedish consul, Mr. Norder- 
ling. Thereupon Norderling came off to the Guerriere, 
with the captain of the port, who was astonished and 
distressed to learn of the capture of two vessels and 
the death of Reis Hammida. He would not believe the 
news until it was confirmed by an Algerine officer 
on board the Guerriere. A letter from the President 
to the dey, dated April 12, 1815, was delivered ; it 
announced that war had been declared against Algiers 
by Congress, and expressed a hope that the dey 
would choose peace rather than war. " But peace, to 
be durable, must be founded on stipulations equally 
beneficial to both parties, the one claiming nothing 
which it is not willing to grant to the other ; and on 
this basis alone will its attainment or preservation by 
this government be desirable." * Shaler and Decatur 
sent with this a letter signed by themselves as com- 
missioners, dated June 29, in which they say that 
" they are instructed to treat upon no other principle 

1 Shaler, app. D. 



286 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

than that of perfect equality and ou the terms of the 
most favored nations. No stipulation for paying any 
tribute to Algiers under any form whatever will be 
agreed to." 1 The captain of the port suggested that 
the commissioners should go on shore to negotiate, 
and that an amnesty should be declared, any Algerine 
cruisers that might return being unmolested ; but 
the commissioners insisted that negotiations should 
be conducted on board the Guerriere, and Decatur 
declared his intention to seize any Algerine vessel that 
should appear before the conclusion of peace. 

The Swedish consul and the captain of the port 
then went ashore, and the next day, June 30, came 
aboard the flagship again with the authority of the 
dey to negotiate. The draft of a treaty was presented 
to them, from which the American commissioners 
declared that they would not depart in any essential 
particular. It provided for the total abolition forever 
of tribute in any form ; for the release of the Americans 
in the dey's power and also of the Algerines recently 
captured by Decatur ; for the payment by the dey of 
ten thousand dollars as compensation for the Edwin 
and other American property seized by him, and for 
the restoration of certain American property still in 
his hands ; for the emancipation of any Christian 
slave in Algiers who should escape to a United States 
man-of-war ; for the treatment of captives in case 
' of future war, not as slaves, but as prisoners of war 
exempt from labor. In other respects, also, the treaty 
was liberal and enlightened. The captain of the port 
feared that it could not be ratified. The Algerines 
were not prepared to surrender their system of exact- 
ing tribute, and the dey would not dare to defy public 
1 Shaler, app. D ; Decatur, p. 3S3 ; For. Rel. iv, p. 7. 



WAR WITH ALGIERS 287 

opinion. On this point the commissioners intimated 
that, in accordance with the custom of all other na- 
tions, a present might be expected upon the arrival of 
a consul. It was further objected that the payment 
of indemnity for property seized by the dey's pre- 
decessor and already distributed would be unprece- 
dented in Algiers. The commissioners, however, stood 
firmly by these conditions. The Algerine then begged 
for the restoration of the vessels lately captured by 
Decatur. This also was refused, but after some de- 
liberation, the commissioners agreed to return the 
vessels. This provision, however, was not to be incor- 
porated in the treaty. The dey's commissioners then 
requested a truce until peace should be finally con- 
cluded. This was refused. They begged for three 
hours. The reply was : " Not a minute. If your 
squadron appears in sight before the treaty is actually 
signed by the dey, and the prisoners sent off, ours will 
capture them." It was agreed, however, that hostili- 
ties should cease when a boat should be seen coming 
from the shore with a white flag hoisted ; it being 
understood that this signal should mean that the 
treaty had been signed and that the American cap- 
tives were in the boat. 

This being settled, the Swedish consul and the cap- 
tain of the port went ashore ; and although the dis- 
tance to the landing was five miles, they returned with 
a white flag, the captives, and the treaty signed and 
sealed within three hours. Meanwhile, an Algerine 
cruiser had hove in sight, making for the port. Deca- 
tur signaled a general chase, and bore down on her in 
tin' Guerriere. He was determined to capture her if 
possible, but the boat of the dey's commissioners with 
the flag of truce was sighted just in time to save her. 



288 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

The boat came alongside the flagship, the ten liberated 
captives stepped aboard, and the treaty was delivered 
into Decatur's hands. 

In a letter to the secretary of the navy, Benjamin 
W. Crowninshield, dated July 5, 1815, Decatur says 
of the treaty : " It has been dictated at the mouths of 
our cannon, has been conceded to the losses which 
Algiers has sustained and to the dread of still greater 
evils apprehended. And I beg leave to express to you 
my opinion that the presence of a respectable naval 
force in this sea will be the only certain guarantee for 
its observance. Having concluded the treaty, I have, 
in conformity with your instructions to dispose of 
such vessels we might capture as would be unsafe to 
send home in such manner as should seem to me most 
expedient, restored them in their present state to 
the Dey of Algiers. This was earnestly requested by 
the Dey, as it would satisfy his people with the con- 
ditions of the peace, and it was determined by Mr. 
Shaler and myself that, considering the state of those 
vessels, the great expense which would be incurred 
by fitting them for a voyage to the United States, 
and the little probability of selling them in this part 
of the world, it would be expedient to grant the re- 
quest." 1 

Consul-General Shaler went ashore the same day, 
June 30, and was received with the honors due to his 
office. The ten thousand dollars stipulated in the 
treaty and all the American property that could be 
recovered was delivered to him. The dey's minister 
said to the British consul : " You told us that the 
Americans would be swept from the seas in six months 
by your navy, and now they make war upon us with 
1 Captains' Letters, xlvii, 110. 22 ; Analectic, February, 1816. 



WAR WITH ALGIERS 289 

some of your own vessels which they have taken." 1 
This treaty 2 was much the most advantageous that 
had ever been made by any Christian nation with 
Algiers, and it contributed more than had anything 
else up to that time to the breakdown of the system of 
piracy and white slavery in the Barbary States. 3 It 
undoubtedly hastened the action taken by Great 
Britain the following year. 

The peace was concluded in less than six weeks 
after the departure of the squadron from New York. 
The Epervier, under the command of Lieutenant John 
T. Shubrick, was at once sent back to the United 
States with the treaty. Captain Downes of the Eper- 
vier was transferred to the command of the Guerriere, 
relieving Captain Lewis, who, with Lieutenant B. J. 
Neale, took passage in the Epervier; Lewis was bearer 
of the treaty. These two officers had recently married 
sisters, and they were granted leave by the commodore 
to return home. Two other officers and the liberated 
captives also sailed as passengers with Lieutenant 
Shubrick. The Epervier passed Gibraltar on her 
homeward passage July 12, and was never heard of 
again. She was supposed to have foundered in a vio- 
lent gale which raged off the American coast about 
the time she should have arrived. 

The presence of the squadron was now needed at 
Tunis and Tripoli. Early in the year 1815 the Amer- 
ican privateer Absellino 4 of Boston had captured a 
number of British vessels in the Mediterranean, one 
of which had been sold in Tunis at the request of 
Consul Noah and against the protest of the British 

1 Decatur, p. 269. 2 Appendix II. 

8 St. Pap. xi. p. 5 ; For. Rel. iv, pp. 4-7. 

4 For an account of her cruise, see Nat. Iutell. Aug. 17, 1815. 



290 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

consul. Later, two prizes had been taken into Tunis 
and two into Tripoli. The bey of Tunis and the 
pasha of Tripoli had each allowed British men-of- 
war to retake these prizes of the Abaellino in vio- 
lation of their treaties with the United States and 
against the protests of the American consuls. Consul 
Noah demanded of the first minister of the bey the 
value of the prizes seized at Tunis, but this propo- 
sition was treated with ridicule. Consul Richard B. 
Jones at Tripoli, where the Abaellino had not only 
been robbed of her prizes, but was blockaded by a 
British brig-of-war, after vain remonstrance hauled 
down his flag. As these facts were unknown in Amer- 
ica when Decatur sailed, he had no instructions in the 
matter, but decided to act on his own responsibility. 
He accordingly took his departure from Algiers July 8 
with all his squadron except the Epervier and the 
Spark and Torch, the two latter having been sent to 
Carthagena for the Algerine prizes. After touching 
at Sardinia for fresh provisions and water, he sailed 
for Tunis, and anchored in the bay on the 26th. Hav- 
ing consulted with Mr. Noah, Decatur demanded the 
instant payment of forty-six thousand dollars, at 
which sum the two prizes of the AbEellino were valued. 
The bey of Tunis at this time was Mahmud, the old 
bey, Hamuda, having died in 1814, after a reign of 
thirty-two years. Mahmud did not consider that he 
was treated with due respect because the commodore 
refused to come on shore until the dispute was settled. 
At first he assumed indifference, then proposed to 
defer payment for a year, but soon yielded, and the 
money was turned over to the consul. 1 

The squadron left Tunis August 2, and arrived at 
1 Noah, pp. 2G4-268, 2S5-2SS, 318, 337, 338, 377, 378, 382-385. 



WAR WITH ALGIERS 291 

Tripoli on the 5th. Here Decatur demanded thirty 
thousand dollars as indemnity for the loss of the two 
prizes given up to the British. Yusuf, who was still 
pasha and reigned many years longer, was inclined to 
reject the terms and declare war against the United 
States ; but on learning what had just taken place 
at Algiers and Tunis and reflecting on his previous 
acquaintance with Decatur, he decided to yield. Nego- 
tiations took place on hoard the Ghierriere. On the 
representation of Consul Jones that the vessels seized 
were worth no more than twenty-five thousand dollars, 
Decatur agreed to reduce his demand to that sum, on 
condition, however, that the pasha would liberate ten 
of his Christian captives. Two of these were young 
Danes who were to be released in remembrance of the 
kindness of their countryman, Consul Nissen, to the 
Philadelphia's crew. The other eight captives were 
a Sicilian family, consisting of husband, wife, and chil- 
dren, and were liberated by Decatur in consideration 
of the aid given to Commodore Preble by the king of 
the Two Sicilies. The money was paid to the Ameri- 
can consul, acting as agent for the owners of the 
Ab?ellino. 

The squadron sailed from Tripoli August 9, and 
after touching at Syracuse arrived off Messina on the 
20th. The wind was not favorable for entering: the 
harbor, and the pilot refused to take in the Guerriere, 
whereupon Decatur, being assured that his chart was 
correct and not wishing to throw on Captain Downes 
the responsibility of going against the pilot's advice, 
took the ship in himself. The liberated Sicilians were 
here put ashore, and Decatur received the thanks of 
the king. The commodore next proceeded to Naples, 
where the young Danes he had freed were turned over 



292 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

to the consul-general of their country. After a short 
stay the squadron sailed for Carthagena, and thence 
all proceeded immediately to Malaga, except the Guer- 
riere, which followed a few days later. As the flag- 
ship was beating down alone from Carthagena, she fell 
in with the Algerine squadron, of seven vessels. Half 
expecting and perhaps hoping that they might be 
tempted to attack him, with such odds in their favor, 
in spite of the peace, and confident of his ability to 
handle them all, Decatur cleared ship for action, but 
the Algerines prudently let him pass unmolested. He 
arrived at Malaga October 2. 

Having been informed that Commodore Bainbridge 
was at Gibraltar, Decatur sent all the vessels then at 
Malaga to that place, and followed in the Guerriere 
a few days later. He arrived off Gibraltar October 6, 
just as Bainbridge was leaving that place with his 
squadron, homeward bound. Having communicated 
with his superior, Decatur went into port for neces- 
sary supplies. He sailed for home the next day, and 
arrived at New York November 12. He was received 
with honor by the administration and with enthu- 
siasm by the people. It was the first time that the 
Barbary States had been dealt with in a manner that 
met with the unqualified approval of every one. Con- 
gress appropriated one hundred thousand dollars to 
indemnify Decatur and the officers and men of his 
squadron for the prizes that had been restored to 
Algiers. 

Commodore Bainbridge sailed from Boston July 3, 
1815, and arrived at Carthagena August 5. His squad- 
ron, part of which sailed with him and part joined 
him in the Mediterranean, consisted of the Independ- 
ence, 74, flagship, Captain William M. Crane, the 



WAR WITH ALGIERS 293 

first ship of the line to show the American flag in the 
Mediterranean ; the frigates United States, 44, Cap- 
tain John Shaw, and Congress, 36, Captain Charles 
Morris ; the sloop-of-war Erie, 18, Captain Charles 
G. Ridgely ; the brigs Chippewa, Saranac, Boxer, 
and Enterprise, each 14, commanded by Lieutenants 
George C. Read, John H. Elton, John Porter, and 
Lawrence Kearney; and the schooner Lynx, 6, Lieu- 
tenant George W. Storer. The Enterprise was the 
old schooner of that name altered into a brig. The 
Firefly, which had started with Decatur and put back 
for repairs, joined Bainbridge at Carthagena, and 
he found there on his arrival the Spark and Torch, 
also of Decatur's squadron. The Congress had come 
out by way of Holland, and arrived at Carthagena 
August 9. David G. Farragut, then fourteen years 
old, was a midshipman and captain's aide on board 
the Independence. 

Although Bainbridge had learned on his arrival that 
peace had already been concluded with Algiers, he 
soon sailed for that place with the Independence, Con- 
gress, Erie, Chippewa, and Spark, as his orders were 
to show his squadron at the various Barbary ports. 
From Algiers he proceeded to Tripoli and thence to 
Tunis. The appearance of a second powerful squadron 
so soon after the first had a very salutary effect on the 
Barbary powers. The Independence produced a de- 
cided impression, as it had been represented to them 
that the United States were bound by treaty with Eng- 
land not to build vessels of this class. Baiubridge then 
sailed for Malaga, where he arrived September 13, 
and later proceeded to Gibraltar. Here he was joined 
by the United States, which arrived from home Sep- 
tember 25, and by all of Decatur's squadron except 



294 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

the Guerriere. After making some changes among 
the officers, a small squadron made up of the United 
States, Captain Shaw, senior officer, Constellation, 
Captain Gordon, Erie, Captain Crane, and Ontario, 
Captain Downes, was left in the Mediterranean for the 
protection of American interests. The John Adams, 
28, Captain Edward Trenchard, Alert, 20, Lieutenant 
Walter Stewart, and the schooner Hornet, 5, Lieu- 
tenant Alexander Claxton, arrived a little later with 
stores ; this was the third Hornet to serve in the 
Mediterranean. Commodore Bainbridge sailed for the 
United States October 6, as has been mentioned, with 
all the other vessels of both squadrons, except Deca- 
tur's flagship, the Guerriere, which shortly followed. 
Bainbridge arrived at Newport November 15, 1815. 

Commodore Shaw sailed from Gibraltar October 30, 
and on the 5th of November arrived at Port Mahon, 
on the island of Minorca, which he made his winter 
quarters. Here the United States remained until 
spring, except for a visit to Gibraltar and Malaga 
in December and January. The other vessels cruised 
a little, but spent most of the winter at Mahon. 1 
. The frigate Java, 44, Captain Oliver H. Perry, 
sailed from Newport for the Mediterranean January 
22, 1816, with the ratified treaty with Algiers and 
dispatches for Consul-General Shaler. She arrived off 
Gibraltar February 13, and joined Commodore Shaw 
at Port Mahon March 7. On the 31st the United 
States sailed for Algiers, followed on April 5 by the 
rest of the squadron. They found there a powerful 

1 The movements of vessels in this chapter have been traced, as far 
as possible, in the authorities already named, in the log- of the United 
States and other manuscripts in the navy department, and in the 
National Intelligencer. 



WAR WITH ALGIERS 295 

British squadron under Admiral Lord Exrnouth, who 
was negotiating a treaty with the dey. The English 
historian Brenton says : " It was not to be endured 
that England should tolerate what America had 
resented and punished ; " 1 and Perry wrote home : 
" The Algerines arc extremely restive under the treaty 
made with Decatur, considering it disgraceful to the 
Faithful to humble themselves before Christian dogs. 
These feelings are encouraged and their passions are 
fomented by the consuls of other powers, who consider 
the peace we have made a reflection upon them." 2 
Exrnouth had been instructed to make the best terms 
possible for the Mediterranean powers under Eng- 
land's protection, and he agreed to the payment of 
a heavy ransom for twelve hundred Neapolitans and 
Sicilians. This won him no respect at Algiers, and, 
together with other circumstances, caused such dis- 
satisfaction among his countrymen that he was soon 
sent back with a still more powerful fleet to compel 
submission. 

Apparently, the dey of Algiers had not taken his 
treaty with the United States very seriously, after 
the danger, which threatened his navy at the time 
he signed it, had passed. Consul-General Shaler was 
informed more than once that the Algerines expected 
to force the United States again into the position of 
a tributary nation. When the ratified treaty was pre- 
sented to the dey by Commodore Shaw and the consul, 
he declared the document null and void on the ground 
that one of his vessels captured by Decatur had not 
been restored to him as had been promised. The 
frigate had been returned, but the brig, having been 

1 Naval History of Great Britain (London, 1837), ii, p. 559. 

2 Perry, ii, p. 1 15. 



296 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

captured in neutral waters on the Spanish coast, had 
been seized by the Spanish government. Negotiations 
were at that time being carried on for her release. As 
the dey refused absolutely to yield, Shaler hauled 
down his flag and retired aboard the flagship. 

Plans were then laid for a night attack by twelve 
hundred men in the boats of the squadron, under the 
command of Captain Gordon. One party was to land 
and spike the guns of the batteries while another was 
to destroy the Algerine navy by boarding and firing 
the ships. Preparations were actively pushed, scaling 
ladders for carrying the batteries were made, and 
arms got ready for service. There was some discussion 
as to whether the attack would be justifiable, as the 
treaty bound both parties to give three months' notice 
of projected hostilities ; but Shaler was evidently of 
the opinion that, as the dey had rejected the treaty, 
it was no longer binding on the United States. How- 
ever, the preparations were discovered by a French 
frigate and reported to the dey, which made a surprise 
impossible. The attempt, therefore, was abandoned, 
as it would certainly have been attended with a great 
loss of life, and as there were still doubts as to the 
obligation of giving the three months' notice. These 
warlike preparations, however, won the respect of the 
dey; and when Perry was sent ashore under a flag of 
truce to attempt further negotiations, he was well 
received. The dey declared that the treaty was at an 
end, but that he would allow the commodore time to 
communicate with his government and receive instruc- 
tions, in which case the consul might continue his 
residence at Algiers ; or hostilities might be begun 
at once. It was decided to wait, and Shaler returned 
to the consulate and hoisted his flag. The dey wrote 



WAR WITH ALGIERS 297 

a letter to the President proposing to renew the treaty 
of 1795. 1 Perry found that the British, French, and 
Spanish consuls were unfriendly, and endeavored so 
far as they could to influence the dey. 

The John Adams was sent to America with dis- 
patches and the dey's letter. The United States 
sailed April 19 for Barcelona, thence to Marseilles. 
She returned to Port Mahon June 9. The Constella- 
tion, Java, Erie, and Ontario visited Tripoli and Tunis, 
to see that everything was quiet at those places, and 
also touched at Sicilian ports. These vessels then 
separated, and the Java returned down the Mediter- 
ranean, arriving at Gibraltar early in July. The other 
vessels came in later. On the first of that month there 
had arrived from the United States, after a passage 
of twenty-two days, the ship of the line Washington, 
74, Captain John O. Creighton, bearing the broad 
pennant of Commodore Isaac Chauncey, who had 
come out to take command of the squadron. The 
sloop-of-war Peacock, 18, Captain G. W. Rodgers, 
also arrived about this time, having come by way of 
France. Most of the squadron sailed for Naples about 
the middle of July. The Washington arrived there 
on the 22d, and United States Minister William 
Pinkney was landed. The different vessels gradually 
assembled at Naples. The United States arrived 
August 20, and Commodore Shaw reported to his 
superior. 2 About the end of August Commodore 
Chauncey sailed with the squadron for Messina, and 
at this place Captain Gordon of the Constellation died 
from the effects of an old wound. From Messina the 

1 See Appendix VII. 

2 Captains' Letters, 1, nos. 4, 70, Chauncey to Sec. of Navy (July 3, 
and Aug. 24, 181G). 



298 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

ships proceeded to Tripoli late in September, thence 
to Tunis and to Algiers, where they arrived in Octo- 
ber. The United States left the squadron here, and 
sailed direct to Port Mahon. 

In August a combined British and Dutch fleet under 
Lord Exmouth had appeared off Algiers, and in a 
terrific bombardment, with heavy losses on both sides, 
had nearly destroyed the Algerine navy and severely 
damaged the fortifications. Consul Shaler viewed the 
battle from his house, which was partially destroyed 
by shells. The dey was compelled to submit, and 
signed a treaty with England which provided for the 
total abolition of Christian slavery. Upon the arrival 
of the American squadron, so soon after this disaster, 
the Algerines, in their helpless condition, were appre- 
hensive of being attacked. The dey's fears were 
quieted when Shaler assured him that the visit was 
a peaceful one. Shaler embarked on the flagshi]) in 
order that he and the commodore might be together 
upon the receipt of their instructions aud the Presi- 
dent's reply to the dey's letter. The squadron then 
sailed for Gibraltar, and there found the brig Spark, 
Lieutenant Gamble, with the President's letter, 1 and 
orders appointing Chauncey and Shaler commissioners 
to treat for peace. 

The Washington and Spark thereupon sailed for 
Algiers and arrived December 8. The weather was so 
very boisterous that the commodore did not venture to 
anchor in the bay. Midshipman Farragut, who was on 
the Washington, says : " We lay off Algiers during 
the whole month of December, and were I to say in 
one continual gale, it would scarcely be an exagger- 
ation." It was therefore decided that Shaler should 
1 See Appendix VII. 



FINAL PEACE 299 

land and represent the United States alone in the 
negotiations. Conditions had changed since Commo- 
dore Shaw's visit in the spring. In the first place the 
brig captured by Decatur hail been given up by Spain 
and restored to Algiers, so that the dey no longer had 
a pretext for rejecting the treaty. Then the bombard- 
ment in August had left him almost defenseless, 
although he had shown extraordinary energy in re- 
building his navy and fortifications. A letter signed 
December 9, 181G, by Shaler and Chauncey was pre- 
sented to the dey and contained their ultimatum. It 
stated that their instructions were not to admit his 
pretended right to reject the treaty, and called atten- 
tion to the fact that both of his vessels had been re- 
stored, and that the delay was not chargeable to the 
neglect or indifference of the United States. They 
proposed a modification of the eighteenth article * of 
the treaty, by which the United States disclaimed 
" any advantage in the port of Algiers over the most 
favored nations," because this article was supposed to 
be incompatible with an old treaty between England 
and Algiers. The subject of presents was made clear 
by the following : " The Regency of Algiers having 
misunderstood the liberal principles upon which the 
treaty of June, 1815, was concluded, and, contrary to 
a distinct understanding between them and the Ameri- 
can commissioners, having introduced into the trans- 
lation of that treaty an obligation on the part of the 
United States to pay to the Regency a present on the 
presentation of their consuls, the same is formally de- 
nied ; and the undersigned declare in the most distinct 
and formal manner, that no obligation binding the 
United States to pay anything to the Regency or to 

1 Appendix II. 



300 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

its officers, on any occasion whatsoever, will be agreed 
to." The letter further states that "the undersigned 
believe it to be their duty to assure his Highness that 
the above conditions will not be departed from ; thus 
leaving to the Regency of Algiers the choice between 
peace and war. The United States, while anxious to 
maintain the former, are prepared to meet the latter." 
The negotiations were begun December 17. The dey 
was driven into a corner. He used every art to evade 
the issue and vainly sought some avenue of escape. 
When finally forced to yield, he begged Shaler for 
a certificate that he had accepted the treaty under 
compulsion. Shaler agreed to this and gave the dey 
a note certifying " that in conference with him on the 
19th instant the proposition of his Highness to delay the 
negotiation for eight months and a day was repeatedly 
rejected, the undersigned always replying that he 
could not depart from the tenor of the note which he 
had the honor to address to his Highness, conjointly 
with his colleague under date of the 9th current, and 
that if those propositions were rejected, he should 
consider himself in duty bound to embark immediately, 
leaving the Regency of Algiers in the predicament of 
declaring war." This certificate may have prolonged 
the dey's life a few months, but his ill luck pursued 
him, and he finally fell a victim to assassination in 
September, 1817. The treaty was signed December 
23, 1816. 1 

Having settled this business, the Washington sailed 
for Port Mahon, where the squadron went into winter 
quarters. According to Farragut it was not until this 
time that the command was formally turned over by 

1 For these negotiations see Shaler, pp. 149-153, app. G ; see also 
Appendix II. 



FINAL PEACE 301 

Commodore Shaw to Commodore Chauncey. Early in 
January, 1817, the Java, Captain Perry, was sent 
home with the treaty, and arrived in Newport March 
3. The Ontario also returned to the United States 
during - the winter. 

Trouble with the Barbary States, so far as concerned 
the United States, was now at an end, except occasional 
trivial difficulties with consuls. But it was considered 
prudent to keep a naval force in the Mediterranean 
for several years. The need of this is alluded to in 
nearly all the annual messages of the presidents down 
to 1830. In 1818 Commodore Chauncey was relieved 
by Commodore Charles Stewart, who came out in the 
Franklin, 74. 

It was hardly to be expected in the early days, with 
the country exhausted and impoverished by the struggle 
for independence, that a correct course governing our 
relations with Barbary should have been laid out and 
pursued. It was easier and more natural to follow in 
the footsteps of Europe. A few wise and far-seeing 
men knew what ought to be done, and urged it ; but as 
always happens in such cases, the politicians and the 
people were slow to follow, giving the matter little 
thought, with an exaggerated idea of the power of the 
corsairs, and preferring measures which seemed easiest 
and cheapest at the moment. Time was required to 
form a healthy, self-respecting public opinion. Mean- 
while the wrong course was entered upon and led to 
a succession of later false steps and complications. 

The first treaty with Algiers was on a level with 
the worst European practice, and its only excuse was 
the urgency of redeeming the unfortunate captives. 
It was followed by an awakening sense of national 



302 OUR NAVY AND THE BARBARY CORSAIRS 

dignity, and each of the later negotiations and treaties 
marked an advance upon old world precedents. Their 
favorable terms, however, were to a great extent nul- 
lified, during the earlier years, by the necessity, im- 
posed by the bad example set in the case of Algiers, 
of maintaining peace by a system of concessions and 
gratuities which practically constituted a sort of trib- 
ute. But the insolent demands of the Barbary rulers 
were resisted to a great extent and war was preferred 
to servile compliance. 

The barbarians themselves hastened the settlement 
of the difficulty by their overreaching arrogance, which 
culminated in the declaration of war by Tripoli and 
later by Algiers. In each case an opportunity was 
presented of improving existing conditions by vigor- 
ous offensive action ; opportunities turned to good 
advantage by the Navy. 



APPENDIX 



APPENDIX 



SOURCES OF INFORMATION 

This list includes most of the authorities consulted. 
The abbreviations used in the footnotes are here indi- 
cated. Other works, cited only once or twice, are also 
referred to in footnotes. 

The Barbary Corsairs. By Stanley Lane-Poole. New York, 
1902. [Poole.] 

White Slavery in the Barbary States. By Charles Sumner. 
Boston, 1853. [Sumner.] 

These books cover the history of Barbary and the sys- 
tem of Christian slavery. They give copious references. 

The Captives. By James Leander Cathcart, Eleven Years 

a Prisoner in Algiers. Compiled by his Daughter, J. B. 

Newkirk. La Porte, Ind. [1897 ?]. [Cathcart, I.] 

This is an account of conditions at the time of the first 

American captures. 

Tripoli. First War with the United States. Letter Book. 
By James Leander Cathcart, First Consul to Tripoli. 
Compiled by his Daughter. La Porte, Ind., 1901. 

[Cathcart, II.] 

Journal of the Captivity and Sufferings of John Foss, Sev- 
eral Years a Prisoner in Algiers. [First Edition.] New- 
buryport [1797 ?]. [Foss.] 

A Short Account of Algiers and its Several Wars. [By 
Mathew Carey. Second Edition.] Philadelphia, 1794. 

[Carey.] 



30G APPENDIX 

Historical and Geographical Account of Algiers. By James 
Wilson Stephens. Second Edition. Brooklyn, 1800. 

[Stephens.] 
These three books relate the experiences of the cap- 
tives of 1793. 

History and Present Condition of Tripoli. By Robert Green- 
how. Richmond, 1835. [Greenhow.] 
A history of all the Barbary States and of their rela- 
tions with the United States to about 1830. Greenhow 
was librarian to the State Department. 

Travels in England, France, Spain, and the Barbary States. 
By Mordecai M. Noah, Late Consul at Tunis. New York, 
1819. [Noah.] 

Sketches of Algiers, Political, Historical, and Civil. By 
William Shaler, Consul-general. Boston, 1826. [Shaler.] 

American Captives in Tripoli, or Dr. Cowdery's Journal. 
Boston, 1806. [Cowdery.] 

Horrors of Slavery ; or, The American Tars in Tripoli. By 
William Ray. Troy, 1808. [Ray.] 

Cowdery was an officer and Ray a private marine on 
the frigate Philadelphia, lost at Tripoli. 

History of the War between the United States and Tripoli. 
[By Stephen C Blyth.] Salem, 1806. [Blyth.] 

Includes a general history of Barbary. This book, 
although contemporary, is unreliable. 

The Works of John Adams. By Charles Francis Adams. 
Boston, 1853. [Adams.] 

Writings of Thomas Jefferson. Edited by H. A. Washing- 
ton. Washington, 1853. [Jefferson.] 

Writings of Thomas Jefferson. Collected and Edited by 
Paul Leicester Ford. New York, 1892. 

[Ford's Jefferson.] 

Life and Letters of Joel Barlow. By Charles Burr Todd. 
New York, 1886. [Barlow.] 

Notes upon the Treaties of the United States. By J. C B. 
Davis. Washington, 1873. [Davis.] 



AIT^NDIX 307 

Contains a summary of negotiations with the Barbary 
powers, which are also treated in Lyman's Diplomacy of 
the United States (Boston, 1828) and Schuyler's Ameri- 
can Diplomacy (New York. 188G), each of which lias a 
chapter devoted to the subject. 
Secret Journals of Congress. [1774-1789.] Boston, 1820. 

[Seer. Jour.] 
The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolu- 
tion. Edited by Jared Sparks. Boston, 1830. 

[Dipl. Corr. Rev.] 

The Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States of 

America. From Sept. 10, 1783, to March 4, 1789. 

Washington, 1837. [Dipl. Corr. U. S.] 

There is much important official correspondence in 

these publications. 

State Papers and Publick Documents of the United States. 

[Edited by T. B. Wait] Third Edition. Boston, 1819. 

[St. Pap.] 
American State Papers. Edited by Lowrie and Clarke. 
Class I. Foreign Relations. Class v. Military Affairs. 
Class vi. Naval Affairs. Class rx. Claims. Class x. Mis- 
cellaneous. Washington, 1832. 

[For. Rel., Nav. Aff., etc.] 
These papers, both series published by authority of 
Congress, are indispensable. The papers in Wait's se- 
ries are generally duplicated in Class I of Lowrie and 
Clarke. Vol x of Wait's series comprises confidential 
documents. 
Compilation of Reports of Committee on Foreign Relations, 
U. S. Senate, 1789-1901. Washington, 1901. 

[Rep. Sen. Com.] 
The National Intelligencer, a newspaper published in Wash- 
ington, contains many letters, papers, and reports, some of 
them not elsewhere published ; also news items of value. 

[Nat. Intell.] 
Narrative and Critical History of America. Edited by 



308 APPENDIX 

Justin Winsor. Vol. vii, chap. vi. Wars of the United 
States. By James R. Soley. Boston, 1888. 

[Narr. and Cvit. Hist.] 
Contains an extensive bibliography with critical dis- 
cussion of authorities. 

United States Naval Chronicle. By Charles W. Golds- 
borough. Vol. i. Washington, 1824. [Nav. Chron.] 
One volume only was published. The author, who was 
forty-four years in the navy department and therefore 
had easy access to original material, has presented much 
valuable and reliable information. 

Statistical History of the Navy of the United States. By 
Lieutenant George F. Emmons, U. S. N. Washington, 
1853. [Emmons.] 

Useful for statistics and movements of vessels. 

History of the Navy of the United States of America. By 
J. Fenimore Cooper. London, 1839. [Cooper.] 

Lives of Distinguished American Naval Officers. By J. 
Fenimore Cooper. Auburn, N. Y., 1846. 

[Amer. Nav. Off.] 
Cooper was in the navy for a time and doubtless had 
a personal acquaintance with several of the officers who 
served in the Mediterranean. His statements are occa- 
sionally inaccurate. The Lives include Dale, Preble, 
Bainbridge, Somers, Shaw, and Perry. Cooper also 
published in Putnam's Magazine, vol. i, nos. 5 and 6 
(May and June, 1853), an article on the frigate Consti- 
tution. 

Life of the Late General William Eaton. [By Charles 
Prentiss.] Brookfield, 1813. [Eaton.] 

Life of William Eaton. By Cornelius C. Felton. New 
York, 1840. [Felton.] 

Prentiss's book is composed chiefly of Eaton's letters 
and papers. Felton's is one of Sparks's Library of Amer- 
ican Biography, and is based partly upon Prentiss and 
partly upon other original material. 



APPENDIX 309 

Life of Edward Preble. By Lorenzo Sabine. Boston, 1847. 

[Preble.] 

Commodore Preble and Tripoli. American Historical 
Record, vol. i, no. 2 (Feb. 1872). [Am. Hist. Rec] 

Operations of tbe Mediterranean Squadron under Commo- 
dore Edward Preble, in 1803-04. By Prof. James R. 
Soley, U. S. N. Record of U. S. Naval Institute, vol. v, 
no. 2 (wbole number 7), 1879. [Nav. Inst.] 

Sabine's Life, also in Sparks's Library, is based on 
Preble's letters and papers. Tbe Historical Record article 
contains a memorandum diary of the commodore, from 
June, 1803, to April, 1805. Soley's article contains several 
of Preble's letters and his journal of the operations before 
Tripoli in 1804. The latter was also published in the 
Magazine of American History, vol. iii, no. 3 (March, 
1879). The Port Folio, for May and December, 1810, 
contains a good biographical sketch of Preble. 

Life and Services of Commodore William Bainbridge, 
U. S. N. By Thomas Harris, M.D., Surgeon U. S. N. 
Philadelphia, 1837. [Bainbridge.] 

Life of Stephen Decatur. By Alexander Slidell Mackenzie, 
U. S. N. Boston, 1846. [Decatur.] 

This book is in Sparks's Library. The author was a 
naval officer and served with Perry in the Mediterranean 
in 1816. He had Decatur's papers at his disposal, and 
obtained first-hand information from officers who served 
in the Tripolitan and Algerine wars. 

Documents Relative to the Claim of Mrs. Decatur. George- 
town, D. C, 1827. [Mrs. Decatur.] 

Memoir of Commodore David Porter. By Admiral David 
D. Porter. Albany, 1875. [Porter.] 

Life of Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry. By Alexander 
Slidell Mackenzie, U. S. N. New York, 1843. [Perry.] 

A Defence of the Conduct of Commodore Morris during his 
Command in the Mediterranean. New York, 1804. 

[Morris.] 
This is the chief authority for the operations of Commo- 



310 APPENDIX 

dore R. V. Morris in 1802-03 ; it contains many official 
letters not elsewhere published. 
Autobiography of Commodore Charles Morris. Boston, 
1880. [C. Morris.] 

This is reprinted from Naval Institute, vol. vi, no. 2 
(whole number 12), 1880. Morris was a midshipman 
under Preble. 

MANUSCRIPT SOURCES. 

Massachusetts Historical Society. Pickering Papers. 

[Pickering.] 
Timothy Pickering was secretary of state from 1795 
to 1800, during the most important of the earlier negotia- 
tions with the Barbary States. 

Navy Department. The correspondence consists of letters 
received and letters sent. Tbe former are classed as Mis- 
cellaneous Letters, Officers' Letters, Masters' Command- 
ant Letters [Comdrs'. Letters], and Captains' Letters. 
Among the letters sent are Instructions to Officers of 
Ships of War and a volume entitled Letter Book, 15 
May, 1799, to 18 July, 1807, which relates chiefly to 
Barbary affairs. There are also a few Log Books, a 
volume called Ships' Service, which gives details relating 
to the movements of vessels, a Letter Book of Captain 
Alexander Murray, etc. 

Library of Congress. Preble Papers. The Papers relating 
to Barbary are contained in four volumes marked Letters, 
besides one volume of Autograph Letters, 1799 to 1807, 
one of Navy Department Letters, 1799 to 1807, an 
Order Book, 1803 to 1805, three Letter Books for the 
years 1803 and 1804, and a Log Book, containing the log 
of the Constitution from May 21, 1803, to October 27, 
1804, and that of the John Adams from October 30, 1804, 
to Februaiy 23, 1805. At the end of this volume is in- 
serted a manuscript Journal of Preble, extending from 
March 19, 1803, to August 21, 1804 ; this differs from 



APPENDIX 311 

either of his two published journals. As in most of the 
volumes neither the letters nor the pages are numbered, 
the letters, which are arranged chronologically, are gen- 
erally referred to by date only. 



II 

TREATIES 

On account of their great length, the treaties are here con- 
densed. The full text is given in volume viii of Peters's 
Public Statutes at Large, Boston, 1848. 

1. France. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, February 6, 

1778. 
Art. viii. The Most Christian King will employ his 
good offices and interposition with the King or Emperor of 
Morocco or Fez, the regencies of Algier, Tunis, and Tripoli, 
or with any of them ; and also with every other Prince, 
State, or Power of the coast of Barbary, in Africa, and the 
subjects of the said King, Emperor, States, and Powers, 
and each of them, in order to provide as fully and effica- 
ciously as possible for the benefit, conveniency, and safety of 
the said United States, and each of them, their subjects, 
people, and inhabitants, and their vessels and effects, 
against all violence, insult, attacks, or depredations, on the 
part of the said Princes and States of Barbary or their 
subjects. 

2. Morocco. Treaty of Peace and Friendship, June 28, 

1786. Ratified by Congress July 18, 1787. 
Art. I. Treaty agreed upon. 

Art. II. Neither party shall take commissions from an 
enemy of the other. 

Art. in. Citizens or property of either party, found on a 



312 APPENDIX 

prize taken by the other party from an enemy of the latter, 
shall be released. Property of an enemy of either party, 
loaded on vessels of the other, shall pass free. 

Art. iv. Vessels of both parties to be given passes. 

Art. v. Either party, being at war, shall board a vessel 
of the other with two or three men only and shall make 
good any damage. 

Art. vi. American citizens or goods seized by a Moor 
shall be released. 

Art. vii. Vessels of either party shall be furnished with 
necessary supplies in ports of the other. 

Art. viii. American vessels undergoing repairs in Mo- 
rocco may land and reload their cargoes without paying 
duty. 

Art. rx. American vessels may take refuge from the 
weather in Morocco, and if wrecked shall be protected by 
the Emperor. 

Art. x. A vessel of either party engaged with any Chris- 
tian vessel, within gunshot of a fort of the other party, 
shall be protected. 

Art. xi. When a vessel of either party sails from a port 
of the other, enemies shall not follow within 24 hours. 

Art. xii. United States ships of war in Morocco shall not 
be examined, even for fugitive slaves, nor shall payment be 
demanded for such. 

Art. xhi. Ships of war of both parties shall be saluted. 

Art. xiv. Commerce shall be on the footing of the most 
favored nation. 

Art. xv. Regulations in the interest of merchants. 

Art. xvi. In case of war between the parties, prisoners 
are not to be made slaves, but exchanged. 

Art. xvn. Merchants may buy and sell all goods except 
those prohibited to other Christian nations. 

Art. xviii. Goods to be examined before sent on board, 
and not after, unless in case of fraud. 

Art. xix. Vessels not to be detained, and commanders 
may decline to ship any article. 



APPENDIX 313 

Art. xx. Disputes between Americans to be settled by 
the consul. 

Art. xxi. If an American kill or wound a Moor, or vice 
versa, the law of the country shall take place, the consul 
assisting at the trial. 

Art. xxii. If an American die intestate, the consul shall 
take charge of his effects. 

Art. xxiii. American consuls may live in any seaport and 
shall not be liable for debts of Americans. 

Art. xxiv. In case of disputes between the parties, peace 
shall continue until they can be arranged if possible. If war 
follow, citizens of both parties shall be allowed nine months 
to retire with their property. 

Art. x.xv. Treaty shall be in force for fifty years. 

Supplementary to Article x. American vessels in Morocco 

shall be protected and their enemies shall not be permitted 

to follow them. „ . „, 

Taiier ben Abdelkack Tennish, 

Thomas Barclay. 



3. Algiers. Treaty of Peace and Amity, September 5, 1795. 
Ratified by the President and Senate, March 2, 1796. 

Art. i. Declaration of friendship. 

Art. il. American vessels may trade on paying usual 
duties. Naval and military stores free. 

Art. ill. Vessels of both nations shall pass unmolested. 

Art. IV. Algerine cruisers to be given passports by 
American consul ; and on meeting American merchantmen 
shall send two men only to examine passports. 

Art. v. Commanders of Algerine cruisers shall not remove 
any person from American vessel or molest him. 

Art. VI. Stranded vessels to be assisted. 

Art. vn. Algerines not to sell vessels of war to enemies 
of United States. 

Art. vin. When a prize condemned by Algiers becomes 
property of American citizen, certificate of consul shall serve 
as passport. 



314 APPENDIX 

Art. ix. No Barbary State, at war with United States, 
may sell American prizes in Algiers. 

Art. x. United States, at war with any nation, may sell 
prizes in Algiers, free of duty. 

Art. xi. United States ships of war in Algiers shall receive 
usual hospitalities. Slaves escaping to such vessels shall be 
returned. 

Art. xn. Redemption and sale of slaves to be arranged 
by agreement. Americans taken by Algerines on enemy's 
ships, and having passports, to be released. 

Art. xiii. Property of Americans dying intestate to be 
delivered to consul. 

Art. xrv. Americans not compelled to purchase goods. 
Consul not responsible for debts of Americans. The dey, 
wishing to freight American vessel not engaged, shall have 
preference on paying full freight. 

Art. xv. Disputes between Americans and Algerines to 
be decided by the dey ; between Americans, by the consul. 

Art. xvi. An American, having killed an Algerine, shall 
be punished as a Turk ; should he escape, consul shall not 
be answerable for him. 

Art. xvn. Consul shall have security and religious free- 
dom, and may board any vessel. 

Art. xviii. In case of war between the parties, consul 
and other Americans may depart unmolested. 

Art. xix. Citizens of either nation captured by the other, 
on vessels of an enemy, shall be released. 

Art. xx. Vessels of war to be saluted with 21 guns. 

Art. xxi. Private property of consul free of duty. 

Art. xxn. In case of dispute, war not to be declared 
until after investigation and attempt at adjustment. 

The dey will observe the treaty on consideration of the 
United States paying annually the value of 12,000 Algerine 
sequins [21,600 dollars] in maritime stores. 

Hasan Pasha, 
Josepii Donaldson, Jr. 



APPENDIX 315 

4. Tripoli. Treaty of Peace and Friendship, November 4, 

1796, and January 3, 1797. Ratified June 10, 1797. 

Art. I. Declaration of perpetual peace guaranteed by the 
dey of Algiers. 

Art. II. Enemies' goods on vessels of either party shall 
pass free. 

Art. in. Citizens and property of either party on a prize 
taken by the other party shall be released. 

Art. iv. All vessels of both parties shall be given passports. 

Art. v. Condemnation and bill of sale of prize available 
as passport for one year. 

Art. VI. Parties shall furnish each other's vessels with 
supplies or repairs when needed. 

Art. vn. Parties shall assist and protect each other's 
vessels and citizens in case of shipwreck. 

Art. vm. Parties shall defend each other's vessels against 
an enemy when in port or within gunshot of a fort ; and 
enemy not allowed to pursue within 24 hours. 

Art. ix. Relations of parties on footing of most favored 
nations. 

Art. x. Pasha acknowledges receipt of money and pre- 
sents demanded by him for the treaty. No pretense of any 
periodical tribute or farther payment is ever to be made by 
either party. 

Art. xi. As the United States government is not founded 
on Christianity nor opposed to Mohammedanism, religious 
differences shall never disturb the harmony of the parties. 

Art. xii. Disputes between the parties which the consul 
cannot settle shall be referred to the dey of Algiers. 

Tripoli. Yusuf Pasha, 

Algiers. Hasan Pasha, 

Joel Baklow. 

5. Tunis. Treaty of Peace and Friendship, August, 1797. 

Ratification advised by Senate March 0, 1798, on con- 
dition that Article xiv be suspended. Alterations in 



31G APPENDIX 

Article xi, xii, and xiv agreed to March 26, 1799. 
Ratified January 10, 1800. 

Art. I. Declaration of peace. 

Art. il. Citizens and goods of either party, found in 
enemy's vessel, to be restored. 

Art. in. Goods of enemy of one party, on board vessel 
of other party, to pass free. 

Art. IV. Passports to be given to vessels of both parties. 

Art. v. Commander of convoy to be believed on bis word, 
in order to exempt it from search. 

Art. vi. War vessels of neither party shall exact anything 
from merchantmen of tbe other. A slave taking refuge on 
any American vessel shall be restored ; tbe same with pris- 
oners escaping to Tunisian vessels. 

Art. VII. Prizes purchased at Tunis by Americans shall 
be given passports good for one year. 

Art. viii. Parties to extend hospitality to each other's 
vessels in need of supplies or repairs. 

Art. ix. Parties shall assist each other's vessels when 
wrecked. 

Art. x. Parties shall defend each other's vessels, near 
forts, against enemies ; and shall not permit an enemy to 
pursue within 48 hours of departure. 

Art. xi. The war vessels of the parties shall be saluted in 
each other's ports, on request ; and for each gun fired the 
vessel shall pay one barrel of powder. But salutes shall not 
be fired if not requested. 

Art. xii. Merchants of the parties shall enjoy the same 
privileges as those of other nations. A Tunisian, freighting 
an American vessel, shall not remove his cargo until dis- 
putes are decided by other merchants. Merchant vessels 
may be detained only when ports are shut for those of all 
nations. Parties shall protect each other's citizens. 

Tunis may freight any American merchant vessel, in case 
of need, upon paying a suitable freight. 

Art. xiii. Enemies of Tunis among crews of American 






APPENDIX 317 

merchant vessels shall he free, if less than one third of crew 
in numher ; if more, they shall he made slaves. Passengers 
shall in no case be molested. 

Art. xiv. A merchant of either party, trading in the coun- 
try of the other with goods of his country, shall pay the 
lowest duty paid in United States hy merchants of other 
nations. But American goods under a foreign flag and 
foreign goods under the American flag shall pay six per 
cent, in Tunis. 

Art. xv. Americans may trade as they please in Tunis, 
except in prohibited articles. 

Art. xvi. Prescribes anchorage fees. 

Art. xvn. Consuls may import free of duty articles for 
their own use, and shall be protected. 

Art. xviii. Neither party responsible for debts of its 
citizens in country of the other. 

Art. xix. Consuls to take charge of property of citizens 
of either party dying intestate in country of the other. 

Art. xx. Consul shall settle all disputes between his fel- 
low countrymen. 

Art. xxi. A citizen of either party, killing or injuring 
one of the other party, shall be punished according to law 
of the country ; consul shall be present at trial. 

Art. xxil. In civil disputes consul shall be present. 

Art. xxiii. Disputes between the parties shall not disturb 
peace until an attempt at adjustment has failed ; if war 
follow, citizens of both parties shall be allowed one year to 
arrange their affairs and withdraw. 

Hamuda Pasha, 
William Eaton, 
James Leander Cathcart. 

6. Tripoli. Convention between the United States and Hamet 
Karamanli. Alexandria, Egypt, February 23, 1805. 1 
Art. I. Declaration of peace. 

1 St. Pap. v, p. 171 ; For. Rel. ii, p. 706 ; Eaton, p. 297. 



318 APPENDIX 

Art. II. The United States shall use their utmost exer- 
tions, so far as comports with their own honor and interest, 
their subsisting treaties, and the law of nations, to reestablish 
Hamet Bashaw in the possession of Tripoli, against the pre- 
tensions of Joseph Bashaw. 

Art. in. The United States shall furnish Hamet on loan, 
cash, ammunition, and provisions, and debark troops, if nec- 
essary, to aid his operations. 

Art. iv. American prisoners in Tripoli to be released 
without ransom. 

Art. v. The United States to be indemnified from tribute 
of certain nations. 

Art. vi. For that purpose existing treaties between Tri- 
poli and those nations are to be observed. 

Art. vn. Peace to be offered to king of the Two Sicilies. 

Art. vin. William Eaton shall be commander-in-chief of 
land forces serving against the common enemy. 

Art. ix. Amnesty granted to those in service of usurper 
who return to their allegiance. 

Art. x. In case of war between the parties, captives shall 
be treated as prisoners of war and not as slaves, and shall be 
exchanged. Neither ransom nor tribute shall be required as 
a condition of peace. 

Art. xi. United States consulate in Tripoli shall be 
asylum to all persons, except for crimes of treason and 
murder. 

Art. XII. Hamet to be left in possession of Tripoli. 

Art. xin. Future articles to be on footing of most favored 
nations. 

Art. xiv. This convention to be submitted to President 
of United States for ratification, and meanwhile is to go into 
effect. 

In presence of HAMET KARAMANLI, 

P. N. O'Bannon, William Eaton. 

Francisco Mendrici, 
Pascal Paoli Peck. 



APPENDIX 319 

Additional Article, secret. Hamet will endeavor to de- 
liver to United States commander-in-chief in Mediter- 
ranean Joseph Bashaw and Murad Reis, to be held as 
hostages. 

7. Tripoli. Treaty of Peace and Amity, June 4, 1805. 
Ratified April 12, 1806. 

Art. I. Peace on terms of most favored nation. 

Art. II. Prisoners of the two parties to be exchanged, 
and tor balance in favor of Tripoli, United States is to pay 
60,000 dollars. 

Art. in. United States forces in Derne to be withdrawn 
and no supplies given Tripolitan subjects in rebellion. Ameri- 
cans will endeavor to persuade Hamet to withdraw, but will 
not use force ; and his family will be restored to him. 

Art. IV. Goods of an enemy of one party, on vessel of 
the other, shall pass free. 

Art. v. Citizens of either party, taken on a prize by the 
other party, shall be released. 

Art. vi. All vessels shall have passports, and upon show- 
ing them may pass unmolested. Tripolitan war vessels shall 
board American merchantmen with two men only. 

Art. vii. For prizes purchased by citizens of either party, 
certificate of condemnation and bill of sale shall serve as 
passport for two years. 

Art. vin. Vessels of both parties shall be furnished with 
necessary supplies and repairs in each other's ports, and 
may land and reload cargo without duty. 

Art. ix. Parties shall protect each other's vessels and 
crews in case of shipwreck. 

Art. x. Parties shall defend each other's vessels against 
enemies within gunshot of forts, and enemy not to be 
allowed to pursue vessel within 24 hours of departure. 

Art. xi. Commerce on footing of most favored nations. 

Art. XII. Consul not answerable for debts of his country- 
men. 



320 APPENDIX 

Art. xin. War vessels to receive and return salute of 21 
guns. 

Art. xiv. Religious differences not to disturb harmony. 

Art. xv. Disputes between the parties shall be settled if 
possible, one year being allowed. If war follow, consuls 
and citizens may depart unmolested. 

Art. xvi. In case of war, prisoners shall be exchanged 
and not made slaves. 

Art. xvn. American vessels, prizes of any nation, shall 
not be sold in Tripoli ; but Americans may sell their prizes 
in Tripoli, duty free. 

Art. xviii. Disputes to be settled by consuls. 

Art. xix. If citizens of the parties kill or wound each 
other, the law of the country shall take place. Consul not 
answerable for escape of criminal. 

Art. xx. Consul shall take charge of property of Ameri- 
can dying intestate. Yusuf Pasha, 

Tobias Lear. 

Additional Article or Declaration, secret, in modification 
of Article in. 1 The pasha believes that his brother Hamet, 
should his wife and children be immediately restored to 
him, would renew hostilities against him. Therefore the 
pasha is allowed four years within which to deliver up his 
brother's family. Tobias Leak. 

Tripoli, June 5, 1805. 

8. Algiers. Treaty of Peace and Amity, June 30, 1815. 
Ratified Dec. 26, 1815. 

Art. I. Peace on terms of most favored nations. 

Art. ii. No tribute, either as biennial presents or under 
any other form, shall ever be required by Algiers from the 
United States on any pretext. 

Art. in. All prisoners now in possession of either party 
shall be immediately released without ransom. 

i St. Pap. x, p. 500. 



APPENDIX 321 

Art. IV. As compensation for American citizens and pro- 
perty detained by the dey, he shall deliver to consul Ameri- 
ican property left by late consul and also pay 10,000 dollars. 

Art. V. Enemy's goods on vessels of either party to pass 
free. 

Art. VI. Citizens of either party, on a prize taken by the 
other party, shall be released. 

Art. vn. All vessels shall be given passports and upon 
showing them may pass unmolested. Algerine war vessels 
shall board American merchantmen with two men only, who 
shall be punished if they give offense. 

Art. viii. For prizes purchased by either party certificate 
and bill of sale shall serve as passport for six months. 

Art. ix. Vessels of both parties shall be furnished with 
necessary supplies and repairs free of duty. 

Art. x. Citizens and property of both parties, in case of 
shipwreck, shall be assisted and no duties exacted. 

Art. xi. Neutrality of ports to be enforced. Enemy not 
allowed to pursue vessel within 24 hours. 

Art. xn. Commerce on footing of most favored nations. 

Art. xin. Consul not answerable for debts of his country- 
men. 

Art. xrv. Same salutes exchanged as with most favored 
nations. Christian slaves escaping to United States war 
vessels shall be free without ransom. 

Art. xv. Harmony not to be interrupted by religious dif- 
ferences. Consul may board any vessel. 

Art. xvi. Disputes between the parties shall be settled 
if possible, three months being allowed ; if war follow, con- 
suls and citizens may depart unmolested. 

Art. xvn. In case of war, prisoners shall be exchanged 
and not enslaved. 

Art. xvin. American vessels, prizes of any nation, shall 
not be sold in Algiers. Americans may sell their prizes in 
Algiers, paying customary duties. 

Art. xix. Disputes of Americans with each other or 



322 APPENDIX 

with other foreigners shall he settled by the consuls ; with 
Algerines, by the (ley. 

Art. xx. If a citizen of either party kill or wound one of 
the other party, the law of the country shall take place. 
Consul not answerable for escape of criminal. 

Art. xxi. Consul's private property free of duty. 

Art. xxu. Consul shall take charge of property of Ameri- 
can dying intestate in Algiers. 

Omar Pasha, 
William Shaler. 

9. Algiers. Treaty of Peace and Amity, December 23, 1816. 

Ratified February 11, 1822 (late date due to its being 
overlooked). 
Practically identical with treaty of 1815, except that 
Articles hi and IV, having been executed, had become obso- 
lete, and that the treaty was modified by 

Article Additional and Explanatory. The United States 
agree to annul so much of Article xvill as gives to United 
States any advantage in Algiers over the most favored 
nations. 

Omar Pasha, 
William Shaler, 
I. Chauncey. 

10. Tunis. Convention for Amendment of Treaty of 1799, 

February 24, 1824. Ratified January 13, 1825. 
Amended articles : 

Art. vi. Tunisians shall board American vessels with two 
men only, who shall exact nothing. A slave escaping to 
a United States war vessel shall be free. 

Art. xi. Salutes of 21 guns shall be given and returned, 
and no powder will be given. 

Art. xii. Tunis, being in need of the service of an Ameri- 
can vessel, not previously engaged, shall have the prefer- 
ence, on paying customary freight. 



APPENDIX 



323 



Art. xiv. Vessels of either party may trade in ports of 
the other, paying same duties paid by nations most favored 
by the latter. 

S. D. Heap, 
Sim Mahmud. 



Ill 



SQUADRONS 

The following list, it is believed, includes all the vessels of 
war of the United States which served in the Mediterranean 
before the year 1818 : 

I. Dale. President, 44, J. Barron. 

1801-1802. Philadelphia, 36, S. Barron. 

Essex, 32, Bainbridge. 

Enterprise, 12, Sterrett. 

Boston, 28, McNeill. 

George Washington, 24, Shaw. 
II. Morris. Chesapeake, 36, Chauncey, J. Barron. 

1802-1803. Constellation, 36, Murray. 

John Adams, 28, Rodgers. 

New York, 36, J. Barron, Chauncey. 

Adams, 28, Campbell. 

Enterprise, 12, Sterrett, Hull. 

Boston, 28, McNeill. 

George Washington, 24, Shaw. 
III. Preble. Constitution, 44, Dent, Robinson. 

1803-1804. Philadelphia, 36, Bainbridge. 

Siren, 16, Stewart. 

Argus, 16, Hull. 

Vixen, 12. Smith. 

Nautilus, 12, Somers. 

Enterprise, 12, Decatur. 

Jolm Adams, 28, Chauncey. 



324 APPENDIX 

Scourge, 16, Dent, Izard. 

Intrepid, 4, Decatur, Somers. 

Two bomb-vessels. 

Nine gunboats. 
IV. Barron. President, 44, Cox. 

1804-1805. Constitution, 44, Decatur, Rodgers. 

Constellation, 36, Campbell. 

Congress, 36, Rodgers, Decatur. 

Essex, 32, J. Barron. 

John Adams, 28, Chauncey. 

Siren, 16, Stewart. 

Argus, 16, Hull. 

Vixen, 12, Smith. 

Nautilus, 12, Dent. 

Enterprise, 12, Robinson. 

Hornet, 10, Evans. 

Two gunboats. 
V. Rodgers. Constitution, 44, Porter, Blake. 
1805-1806. President, 44, J. Barron. 

Constellation, 36, Campbell. 

Congress, 36, Decatur. 

Essex, 32, Cox. 

John Adams, 28, Shaw. 

Siren, 16, Stewart. 

Argus, 16, Hull. 

Vixen, 12, Smith. 

Nautilus, 12, Dent. 

Enterprise, 12, Robinson, Porter. 

Hornet, 10, Evans. 

Franklin, 8, Robinson. 

Vengeance, 3, Lewis. 

Spitfire, 3, McNeill. 

Sixteen gunboats. 
VI. Campbell. Constitution, 44, Ludlow. 
1806-1807. Hornet, 18, Dent. 

Wasp, 18, Smith. 



APPENDIX 



325 



VII. Decatur. 

1815. 



VIII. Bainbridge. 
1815. 



IX. Shaw. 

1815-1816. 



X. Chauncey. 
1816-1818. 



Guerriere, 44, Lewis, Downes. 
Constellation, 36, Gordon. 
Macedonian, 38, Jones. 
Epervier, 18, Downes, Shubrick. 
Ontario, 16, Elliott. 
Firefly, 14, Rodgers. 
Spark, 14, Gamble. 
Flambeau, 14, Nicholson. 
Torch, 12, W. Chauncey. 
Spitfire, 12, Dallas. 
Independence, 74, Crane. 
United States, 44, Shaw. 
Congress, 36, Morris. 
Erie, 18, Ridgely. 
Chippewa, 14, Read. 
Saranac, 14, Elton. 
Boxer, 14, Porter. 
Enterprise, 14, Kearney. 
Lynx, 6, Storer. 
United States, 44, Gregory. 
Constellation, 36, Gordon. 
Java, 44, Perry. 
Erie, 18, Crane. 
Ontario, 16, Downes. 
John Adams, 28, Trenchard. 
Alert, 20, Stewart. 
Hornet, 5, Claxton. 
Washington, 74, Creighton. 
United States, 44, Shaw. 
Constellation, 36, Gordon. 
Java, 44, Perry. 
Erie, 18, Crane. 
Ontario, 16, Downes. 
Peacock, 18, Rodgers. 
Spark, 14, Gamble. 



326 APPENDIX 

IV 

OFFICERS IN COMMODORE PREBLE'S SQUADRON 3 

U. S. Frigate Constitution, Flagship. 

Edward Preble, captain, commanding squadron. 
Thomas Robinson, lieutenant, acting captain. 
Charles Gordon, lieutenant. 
Joseph Tarbell, lieutenant. 
Samuel Elbert, lieutenant. 
Nathaniel Harraden, sailing-master. 
James Wells, surgeon. 
Noadiah Morris, purser. 
Peter Leonard, chaplain. 
John Hall, captain of marines. 
Robert Greenleaf, lieutenant of marines. 
Hethcote J. Reed, master's mate. 
David Deacon, master's mate. 
Patrick Simms, surgeon's mate. 
Louis Alexis, midshijmian. 
Charles G. Ridgely, midshipman. 
Daniel S. Dexter, midshipman. 
Alexander Laws, midshipman. 
Henry P. Casey, midshipman. 
John M. Haswell, midshipman. 
Joseph Israel, midshipman. 
William Lewis, midshipman. 
Francis C. Hall, midshipman. 
Leonard Hunnewell, midshipman. 
Joseph Nicholson, midshipman. 
John N. Cannon, boatswain. 
William Sweeny, gunner. 
Thomas Moore, carpenter. 
Isaac Steel, sailmaker. 
John Thompson, acting midshipman. 
1 Preble Papers (April 19, 1804). 



APPENDIX 327 

V. S. Brig Siren. 

Charles Stewart, lieutenant commandant. 
James R. Caldwell, lieutenant. 
Michael B. Carroll, lieutenant. 
Joseph Maxwell, acting lieutenant. 
William Burrows, acting sailing-master. 
Samuel R. Marshall, surgeon. 
Nathan Baker, purser. 
John Howard, lieutenant of marines. 
Thomas O. Anderson, midshipman. 
John Dorsey, midshipman. 
Frederick C. de Krafft, midshipman. 
William R. Nicholson, midshipman. 
Thomas Brown, midshipman. 
John Unsworth, boatswain. 
James Willman, gunner. 
John Felt, carpenter. 
Thomas Crippen, sailmaker. 

U. S. Brig Argus. 

Isaac Hull, lieutenant commandant. 
Joshua Blake, lieutenant. 
Sybrant Van Schaick, lieutenant. 
Samuel B. Brooks, sailing-mastex*. 
Nathaniel Weems, surgeon. 
Timothy Winn, purser. 
John Johnson, lieutenant of marines. 
John W. Dorsey, surgeon's mate. 
William G. Stewart, midshipman. 
John Pettigrew, midshipman. 
Samuel G. Blodget, midshipman. 
Pascal Paoli Peck, midshipman. 
George Mann, midshipman. 
George Nicholson, boatswain. 



328 APPENDIX 

U. S. Schooner Vixen. 

John Smith, lieutenant commandant. 
John Trippe, lieutenant. 
William M. Crane, lieutenant. 
Richard Butler, sailing-master. 
Michael Graham, surgeon. 
Thomas Hunt, purser. 
Lewis Warrington, midshipman. 
William Ballard, midshipman. 
John D. Henley, midshipman. 
John Nevitt, midshipman. 
John Clark, boatswain. 



U. S. Schooner Nautilus. 

Richard Somers, lieutenant commandant. 

James Decatur, lieutenant. 

George W. Reed, lieutenant. 

Stephen Cassin, acting sailing-master. 

Gershom R. Jacques, surgeon. 

James Tootell, purser. 

Octavius A. Page, master's mate. 

William Miller, midshipman. 

James Pinkerton, gunner. 

William Johnson, boatswain. 

Robert Fell, carpenter. 

U. S. Schooner Enterprise. 

Stephen Decatur, lieutenant commandant. 
James Lawrence, acting lieutenant. 
Joseph Bainbridge, acting lieutenant. 
Jonathan Thorn, acting lieutenant. 
Seth Cartee, sailing-master. 
Lewis Heermann, surgeon. 



APPENDIX 329 

Samuel Robertson, purser. 
Thomas Macdonough, midshipman. 
George Mitchell, midshipman. 
Walter Boyd, midshipman. 
William Hook, gunner. 
John Newman, boatswain. 
Patrick Keogh, sailmaker. 
John Williams, carpenter. 

U. S. Brig Scourge. 

John H. Dent, lieutenant commandant. 
Henry Wadsworth, acting lieutenant. 
Ralph Izard, acting lieutenant. 
Charles Morris, acting sailing-master. 
Thomas Marshall, acting surgeon. 
John Green, acting purser. 
John Davis, midshipman. 
John Rowe, midshipman. 

U. S. Frigate Philadelphia (Oct. 31, 1803). x 

William Bainbridge, captain. 
David Porter, lieutenant. 
Jacob Jones, lieutenant. 
Theodore Hunt, lieutenant. 
Benjamin Smith, lieutenant. 
William S. Osborne, lieutenant of marines. 
John Ridgely, surgeon. 
Keith Spence, purser. 
William Knight, sailing-master. 
Jonathan Cowdery, surgeon's mate. 
Nicholas Harwood, surgeon's mate. 
Bernard Henry, midshipman. 
James Gibbon, midshipman. 
1 Nav. Chron. p. 252. 



330 APPENDIX 

James Biddle, midshipman. 
Richard B. Jones, midshipman. 
Daniel T. Patterson, midshipman. 
William Cutbush, midshipman. 
Benjamin F. Reed, midshipman. 
Wallace Wormeley, midshipman. 
Robert M. Gamble, midshipman. 
Simon Smith, midshipman. 
James Renshaw, midshipman. 
Joseph Douglass, sailmaker. 
George Hodge, boatswain. 
Richard Stephenson, gunner. 
William Godby, carpenter. 
William Anderson, captain's clerk. 
Minor Fontaine, master's mate. 



THE CREW OF THE INTREPID (Feb. 16, 1804) 

List of the officers and men who took part in the destruction 
of the Philadelphia : 

Stephen Decatui*, commander. 
James Lawrence, lieutenant. 
Joseph Bainbridge, lieutenant. 
Jonathan Thorn, lieutenant. 
Lewis Heermann, surgeon. 
Thomas Macdonough, midshipman. 
John Rowe, midshipman. 
Ralph Izard, midshipman. 
Alexander Laws, midshipman. 
Charles Morris, midshipman. 
John Davis, midshipman. 
Thomas O. Anderson, midshipman. 



APPENDIX 331 

"William Wiley, boatswain. 
William Hook, gunner. 
George Crawford, quartermaster. 
George Brown, quartermaster. 
John Newman, quartermaster. 
Paul Frazier, quartermaster. 
James Metcalf, boatswain's mate. 
Nicholas Brown, boatswain's mate. 
Edward Kellen, master's mate. 
Samuel Endicott, quarter gunner. 
James Wilson, quarter gunner. 
John Ford, quarter gunner. 
Richard Uoyles, quarter gunner. 
Joseph Boyd, ship's steward. 
Edward Burk, seaman. 
Peter Munell, seaman. 
Richard Ormond, seaman. 
Samuel Jackson, seaman. 
James Pasgrove, seaman. 
Joseph Goodwin, seaman. 
John Boyles, seaman. 
Augustus C. Fleur, seaman. 
Charles Berryman, seaman. 
Daniel Frazier, seaman. 
William Graham, seaman. 
Reuben James, seaman. 
Robert Love, seaman. 
John Williams, seaman. 
Joseph Fairfield, seaman. 
George Fudge, seaman. 
James Robinson, seaman. 
Matthew Yeates, seaman. 
William Ducket, seaman. 
Andrew Espey, seaman. 
William Tumbo, seaman. 
Thomas James, seaman. 



332 APPENDIX 

Joseph Numond, seaman. 
George Murray, seaman. 
Robert Mc Knight, seaman. 
William Dixon, seaman. 
Henry Davenport, seaman. 
Joseph Parker, seaman. 
Dennis O'Brian, ordinary seaman. 
Jacob Kurgen, ordinary seaman. 
John Burtson, ordinary seaman. 
William Rodgers, ordinary seaman. 
Charles Robinson, ordinary seaman. 
William Trippet, ordinary seaman. 
John Joseph, ordinary seaman. 
Michael Williams, ordinary seaman. 

Marmes : 

Solomon Wren, sergeant. 
Duncan Mansfield, corporal. 
Noble James, private. 
John Quin, private. 
Isaac Camfield, private. 
Reuben O'Brian, private. 
William Pepper, private. 
John Wolsfrandorf, private. 

Salvadore Catalano, pilot. 

VI 

CASUALTIES IN COMMODORE PREBLE'S SQUADRON 

" Names of the officers, seamen, and marines, killed and 
wounded, on board the squadron of the United States, 
under command of Commodore Edward Preble, in the 



APPENDIX 333 

several attacks made on the city and harbor of Tripoli in 
Barbary, in July, August, and September, 1804, with the 
names of the vessels they belonged to." x 

Killed. 

July 7. Siren, William Williams, marine, boat attack. 
Aug. 3. Nautilus, James Decatur, lieutenant, gunboat 

No. 2. 
Aug. 7. Siren, James R. Caldwell, lieutenant, gunboat 
No. 9. 
Siren, John Dorsey, midshipman, gunboat No. 9. 
Siren, William Davis, boatswain's mate, gunboat 

No. 9. 
Siren, James Farrell, quarter gunner, gunboat 

No. 9. 
Siren, John Spear, quartermaster, gunboat No. 9. 
Siren, John Robinson, seaman, gunboat No. 9. 
Siren, John Holmes, seaman, gunboat No. 9. 
Siren, George Irving, seaman, gunboat No. 9. 
Siren, Jonathan Meredith, sergeant marines, gun- 
boat No. 9. 
Siren, Nathaniel Holmes, private marines, gunboat 

No. 9. 
Vixen, John Brown, seaman, gunboat No. 8. 
Vixen, John Jones, seaman, gunboat No. 8. 
Aug. 28. John Adams, Thomas Macdonough, seaman, in 
ship's boat. 
John Adams, William Fountain, seaman, in ship's 

boat. 
John Adams, John Bartlett, seaman, in ship's boat. 
Sept. 4. Nautilus, Richard Somers, captain, Intrepid. 
Nautilus, James Simms, seaman, Intrepid. 

1 Nav. Chron. p. 240. The list varies slightly from the returns 
given in Preble's report of September 18, 1804. A few obvious errors 
have been corrected. 



334 APPENDIX 

Sept. 4. Nautilus, Thomas Tompline, seaman, Intrepid. 
Nautilus, James Harris, seaman, Intrepid. 
Nautilus, William Keith, seaman, Intrepid. 
Constitution, Henry Wadsworth, lieutenant, In- 
trepid. 
Constitution, Joseph Israel, lieutenant, Intrepid. 
Constitution, William Harrison, seaman, Intrepid. 
Constitution, Robert Clark, seaman, Intrepid. 
Constitution, Hugh McCormick, seaman, Intrepid. 
Constitution, Jacob Williams, seaman, Intrepid. 
Constitution, Peter Penner, seaman, Intrepid. 
Constitution, Isaac W. Downes, seaman, Intrepid. 

Wounded. 

July 7. Siren, William Cooper, marine, boat attack. 

Siren, Thomas Eiveness, marine, boat attack. 

Siren, Samuel Henry, marine (mortally), boat 
attack. 
Aug. 3. Enterprise, Stephen Decatur, captain, gunboat 
No. 4. 

Enterprise, Thomas James, seaman, gunboat No. 4. 

Enterprise, Daniel Frazier, seaman, gunboat No. 4. 

Enterprise, Solomon Wren, sergeant marines, gun- 
boat No. 4. 

Vixen, John Trippe, lieutenant, gunboat No. 6. 

Vixen, C. Allen, boatswain's mate, gunboat 
No. 6. 

Vixen, M. Cannon, marine, gunboat No. 6. 

Vixen, J. Ryan, marine, gunboat No. 6. 

Constitution, Charles Young, marine, on board 
ship. 

Nautilus, Samuel Rodney, marine, gunboat No. 1. 

Nautilus, Neapolitan, seaman, gunboat No. 1. 

Nautilus, , seaman, gunboat No. 2. 

Nautilus, , seaman, gunboat No. 2. 



APPENDIX 335 

Aug. 7. Siren; Francis Roclgers, seaman (mortally), gun- 
boat No. 9. 
Siren, James Uesney, seaman, gunboat No. 9. 
Siren, Antbony Currin, seaman, gunboat No. 9. 
Siren, Thomas Deven, seaman, gunboat No. 9. 
Siren, William Mitchell, seaman, gunboat No. 9. 
Siren, John Lamott, seaman, gunboat No. 9. 
Siren, Antonio Morrell, seaman, gunboat No. 9. 
Siren, Isaac Happs, seaman, gunboat No. 9. 
Total : 30 killed, 24 wounded. 



VII 



THE DEY'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT MADISON AND 
REPLY 

The Dey of Algiers to the President of the United States : 
With the aid and assistance of Divinity, and in the reign of 
our sovereign, the asylum of the world, powerful and great 
monarch, transactor of all good actions, the best of men, the 
shadow of God, director of the good order, king of kings, 
supreme ruler of the world, emperor of the earth, emulator 
of Alexander the Great, possessor of great forces, sovereign 
of the two worlds, and of the seas, king of Arabia and Per- 
sia, emperor, son of an emperor and conqueror, Mahmoud 
Khan, (may God end his life with prosperity, and his reign 
be everlasting and glorious,) his humble and obedient ser- 
vant, actual sovereign Governor and Chief of Algiers, sub- 
mitted forever to the orders of his Imperial Majesty's noble 
throne, Omar Pashaw (may his government be happy and 
prosperous). 

To his Majesty, the Emperor of America, its adjacent 
and dependent provinces and coasts, and wherever his gov- 
ernment may extend, our noble friend, the support of the 
kings of the nation of Jesus, the pillar of all Christian sov- 



336 APPENDIX 

erelgns, the most glorious amongst the princes, elected 
amongst many lords and nobles, the happy, the great, the 
amiable James Madison, Emperor of America, (may his 
reign be happy and glorious, and his life long and prosper- 
ous,) wishing him long possession of the seal of his blessed 
throne, and long life and health, Amen. Hoping that your 
health is in good state, I inform you that mine is excellent, 
thanks to the Supreme Being, constantly addressing my 
humble prayers to the Almighty for your felicity. 

After many years have elapsed, you have at last sent a 
squadron, commanded by Admiral Decatur, your most hum- 
ble servant, for the purpose of treating of peace with us. 
I received the letter of which he was the bearer, and under- 
stood its contents ; the enmity which was between us having 
been extinguished, you desired to make peace as France and 
England have done. Immediately after the arrival of your 
squadron in our harbor, I sent my answer to your servant 
the Admiral, through the medium of the Swedish Consul, 
whose proposals I was disposed to agree to, on condition 
that our frigate and sloop of war, taken by you, should be 
returned to us, and brought back to Algiers ; on these con- 
ditions we would sign peace according to your wishes and 
request. Our answer having thus been explained to your 
servant the Admiral by the Swedish Consul, he agreed to 
treat with us on the above mentioned conditions ; but having 
afterwards insisted upon the liberation of all American citi- 
zens, as well as upon a certain sum of money, for several 
merchant vessels made prizes of by us, and of other objects 
belonging to the Americans, we did not hesitate a moment 
to comply with his wishes, and in consequence of which we 
have restored to the said Admiral, your servant, all that he 
demanded from us. In the mean time, the said Admiral 
having given his word to send back our two ships of war, 
and not having performed his promise, he has thus violated 
the faithful articles of peace which were signed between us, 
and by so doing a new treaty must be made. 



APPENDIX 337 

I inform you, therefore, that a treaty of peace having 
been signed between America and us, during the reign of 
Hassan Pashaw, twenty years past, I propose to renew the 
said treaty on the same basis stipulated in it, and if you 
agree to it, our friendship will be solid and lasting. 

I intended to be on higher terms of amity with our 
friends the Americans than ever before, being the first 
nation with whom I made peace ; but as they have not been 
able to put into execution our present treaty, it appears 
necessary for us to treat on the above mentioned conditions. 
We hope that with the assistance of God you will answer 
this our letter, immediately after you shall have a perfect 
knowledge of its contents. If you agree, according to our 
request, to the conditions specified in the said treaty, please 
to send us an early answer. If on the contrary, you are 
not satisfied with my propositions, you will act against the 
sacred duty of man, and against the laws of nations. 

Requesting only that you will have the goodness to re- 
move your Consul as soon as possible, assuring you that it 
will be very agreeable to us, these are our last words to 
you, and we pray God to keep you in his holy guard. 

Written in the year of the Hegira, 1231, the 20th day of 
the moon, Dge Mazirl Covel, corresponding to 1816, April 
24th. Signed in our well beloved city of Algiers. 

(Signed) Omar, son of Mohammed, 

Conqueror and great. 



The President of the United States to the Dey of Algiers : 

I have received your letter, bearing date the twenty-fourth 
of April last. You represent that the two vessels of war cap- 
tured by the American squadron were not restored, accord- 
ing to the promise of its Commodore, Decatur, and inferring 
that his failure violated the treaty of peace, you propose as 
an alternative, a renewal of the former treaty, made many 
years ago, or a withdrawal of our Consul from Algiers. The 



338 APPENDIX 

United States being desirous of living in peace and amity 
with all nations, I regret that an erroneous view of what has 
passed, should have suggested the contents of your letter. 

Your predecessor made war without cause on the United 
States, driving away their Consul, and putting into slavery 
the captain and crew of one of their vessels, sailing under 
the faith of an existing treaty. The moment we had brought 
to an honorable conclusion our war with a nation the most 
powerful in Europe on the sea, we detached a squadron 
from our naval force into the Mediterranean, to take satis- 
faction for the wrongs which Algiers had done to us. Our 
squadron met yours, defeated it, and made prize of your 
largest ship, and of a small one. Our commander proceeded 
immediately to Algiers, offered you peace, which you ac- 
cepted, and thereby saved the rest of your sbips, which it 
was known had not returned into port, and would otherwise 
have fallen into his hands. Our commander, generous as 
brave, although he would not make the promise a part of 
the treaty, informed you that he would restore the two cap- 
tured ships to your officer. Tbey were accordingly so re- 
stored. The frigate, at an early day, arrived at Algiers. 
But the Spanish government, alleging that the capture of 
the brig was so near the Spanish shore as to be unlawful, 
detained it at Cartbagena, after your officer had received it 
into his possession. Notwithstanding this fulfilment of all 
that could be required from the United States, no time was 
lost in urging upon that government a release of the brig, 
to which Spain could have no right, whether the capture 
were or were not agreeable to the law of nations. The 
Spanish government promised that the brig should be given 
up, and although the delay was greater than was expected, 
it appears that the brig, as well as the frigate, has actually 
been placed in your possession. 

It is not without great surprise, therefore, that we find 
you, under such circumstances, magnifying an incident so 
little important as it affects the interests of Algiers, and so 



APPENDIX 339 

blameless on the part of the United States, into an occasion 
for the proposition and threat contained in your letter. I 
cannot but persuade myself, that a reconsideration of the 
subject will restore you to the amicable sentiments towards 
the United States which succeeded the war so unjustly com- 
menced by the Dey who reigned before you. I hope the 
more that this may be the case, because the United States, 
whilst they wish for war with no nation, will buy peace with 
none. It is a principle incorporated into the settled policy of 
America, that as peace is better than war, war is better than 
tribute. 

Our Consul, and our naval Commander, Chauncey, are 
authorized to communicate with you, for the purpose of 
terminating the subsisting differences by a mutual recog- 
nition and execution of the treaty lately concluded. And 
I pray God that he will inspire you with the same love of 
peace and justice which we feel, and that he will take you 
into his holy keeping. 

Written at the city of Washington, this twenty-first day 
of August, 1816. 

(Signed) James Madison. 

By the President. 

(Signed) James Monroe, 

Secretary of State. 



INDEX 



INDEX 



Abjellino, American privateer, 
289 291. 

Abdurrahman, Tripolitan ambas- 
sador, 32, 33. 

Achmet, deyof Algiers, '270, 273-275. 

Acton, sir John, 131. 

Adams, John, commissioner in 
Paris, 25, 27 ; appointed to treat 
with Barbary powers, 28; negotia- 
tions with Morocco and Algiers, 
29, 30 ; minister to England, inter- 
virws with Abdurrahman, 32, 33; 
favors peace with Barbary, 35; 
correspondence with Jefferson, 
36-38; president, advises building 
cruisers for Algiers, HO; letter to 
the bey of Tunis, 70. 

Adams, U. S. frigate, in Morris's 
squadron, 106, 107 ; at Gibraltar, 
114, 115, 118; sails for Malta, 123 ; 
oil Tripoli, attack on gunboats, 
128 ; on blockade, 129 ; at Tunis, 
132 ; in the Straits, 133, 144; sails 
home with Commodore Morris, 
134. 143. 

Alert. U. S. sloop-of-war, 294. 

Alexandria, 228-231. 

Algiers, 1; early history, 3-5; gov- 
ernment, 6 ; in 17th and 18th cen- 
turies, 7, 8; French conquest, 11; 
attacks American commerce, 14- 
17; slavery in, 19-22 ; negotiations 
with, 29-31, 51-55; truce with 
Portugal, 47, 48; first treaty with 
United States, 23, 53, 56, 313 ; ves- 
sels built for, 60-62 ; new diffi- 
culties with, 271, 273, 274, 276- 
280 ; United States declares war 
against, 281 ; vessels of, captur- 
ed, 283, 284; negotiations with, 
285-287; second treaty with, 288, 
289, 320; repudiated by, 295, 296; 
bombarded by the British, 298; 
renewed negotiations with, 299; 
third treaty with, 300, 322. 

Alleghany, ship, 276-278. 

Amazon, British frigate, 159. 

Anderson, Thomas O., midshipman, 
168, 169. 

Anna .Maria, ship, 71. 

Arabs, 229; mutinous, 233-238; Ea- 
ton's description of, 235; at Derne, 
241-243. 

Arago, 8. 

Argus, U. S. brig, built, 136 ; in 
Preble's squadron, 139; at Gibral- 



tar, 158, 159 ; cruising, 180 ; cap- 
tures a prize off Tripoli, 181; at 
Tunis, 182; on blockade, 183 ; be- 
fore Tripoli, 185, 1S7 ; supports 
gunboats, 193, 194, 206; struck by 
a shot, 201; attacks the batteries, 
203, 205; supports Intrepid, 207 ; 
on blockade, 211 ; convoys a prize, 
219; sent to Egypt, 220, 228; in 
Kodgers's squadron, 223; at Alex- 
andria, 229; returns to Malta, 231 ; 
at Bomba, 238 ; at Derne, 239 ; 
bombards the town, 240; and the 
enemy, 242, 243 ; returns to United 
States, 272; and to Mediterranean, 
273. 

Bacri, broker in Algiers, 23, 51 ; aids 
negotiations, 52; lends money for 
ransom, 54; demands indemnity, 
55; unfriendly to American inter- 
ests, 73; lends money to Lear, 
277. 

Bagnio Baleck, prison in Algiers, 
17, 19; described, 20. 

Bainbridge, Joseph, midshipman, 
fights a duel, 120; lieutenant, takes 
part in burning the Philadelphia, 
167, 169 ; commands a gunboat, 
188, 189. 

Bainbridge, William, captain, in 
command of the George Wash- 
ington, 75; ordered by the dey to 
Constantinople and forced to go, 
76-79 ; arrives, 80 ; well treated, 
81-84 ; returns to Algiers, 84 ; au- 
dience with the dey, 85; returns 
home, 86 ; in command of the 
Essex, 94; at Barcelona, 99 ; of- 
fended with Eaton, km ; com- 
mands the Philadelphia, 139; cap- 
tures The Mirboka, 140, 141; at 
Gibraltar, 142; off Tripoli, 145; 
wrecked, 146; his efforts to save 
his ship, 147-149; surrenders, 148; 
acquitted by court, 149, 150 ; his 
captivity, 151-157; receives a let- 
ter from his officers, 151, 152; his 
letters to Preble, MS, 152, 154, 159, 
164, 165, 179, 1*2; writes to Smith, 
Kilt ; receives letters and supplies, 
162, 163; suggests dcst roving the 
Philadelphia, 161, 173; "injured 
in bombardment, 204; sees dead 
bodies from Intrepid, 209; favors 
peace, 247, 252, 253; on parole. 250 



344 



INDEX 



released, 251; returns home, 270; 
commodore, in command of squad- 
ron, 281; arrives at Carthagena, 
292; visits Barbary ports, 293; re- 
turns home, 294. 

Ball, Sir Alexander, governor of 
Malta, 120, 162, 214, 229. 

Barbarossa. See Horuk and Khair- 
ed-Din. 

Barbary, 1, 2. 

Barca, 1. 

Barclay, Thomas, negotiates treaty 
with Morocco, 28, 29; appointed 
consul, 44; death of, 46. 

Barlow, Joel, to assist in negotia- 
tions, 23, 52, 53 ; in Algiers, 54-56, 
59 ; ransoms captives, 54 ; super- 
vises negotiations with Tunis and 
Tripoli, 59-61 ; reports captures, 
59. 

Barney, Joshua, 8. 

Barron, James, captain, commands 
the President, 94 ; the New York, 
106; at Malta, 118; takes the Ches- 
apeake to the United States, 123; 
on the court for trial of Bain- 
bridge, 148; commands the Essex, 
199; at Gibraltar, 218, 219; com- 
mands the President, 223; off Tri- 
poli, 248. 

Barron, Samuel, captain, commands 
the Philadelphia, 94; criticises 
Eaton, 104; on the court for trial 
of Morris, 134; commodore, to 
supersede Preble, 198-200; his ar- 
rival delayed, 201,202, 204; at Gib- 
raltar, 218; off Tripoli, 211, 219; at 
Syracuse and Malta, sick, 220, 221; 
surrenders command to Rodgers, 
223 ; his instructions from navy de- 
partment, 227, 246, 258, 261; his or- 
ders to Hull, 228, 255, 259; favors 
peace, 248; his health, 252, 256; his 
letter to Eaton concerning Hamet, 
260; his responsibility, 261,202; re- 
turns home, 270. 

Bastinado, the, 21. 

Beaussier, French consul at Tripoli, 
179, 180, 195, 201, 202, 217. 

Betsey, brig, 13, 26, 28. 

Betsy, ship, 59, 67. 

Bey of Tunis. See Hamuda and 
Mahmud. 

Blake, admiral, 7. 

Blake, Joshua, lieutenant, 188, 189, 
195, 230. 

Blockade, d'Estaing's views of, 39 ; 
Barbary opinion of, 98; Eaton's 
proclamation of, 100 ; Preble's 
proclamation of, and orders of 
administration, 158. 

Bomba, 231, 234, 236-238. 

Bomb-vessels, borrowed by Preble, 
181, 184; in bombardment of Tri- 
poli, 187, 188, 193, 196, 202-206; 
bombs procured in United States, 



218; join the squadron, 224; re- 
turn home, 272. 

Bonaparte, 75, 86, 163, 179. 

Boston, U. S. frigate, at Gibraltar, 
100; off Tripoli, 102, 104, 108; en- 
gages gunboats, 108; returns to 
the United States, 108, 115. 

Bounds, Joseph, captain, 102. 

Boxer, U. S. brig, 293. 

Brooks, Samuel B., sailing-master, 
196. 

Caille, M., 26. 

Caldwell, James R., lieutenant, in 
boat attack, 183; commands a gun- 
boat, 196; killed, 197; monument, 
210. 

Campbell, Hugh G., captain, com- 
mands the Adams, 106; his letter 
about the Meshuda, 115; at Gib- 
raltar, 118 ; transferred to the 
John Adams, 134 ; on courts for 
trial of Morris and Bainbridge, 
134, 148; commands Constellation, 
199, 218, 223 ; off Tripoli, 211 ; at 
Derne, 244; transferred to the Es- 
sex, 270; and to the Constitution, 
in command of squadron, 272 ; re- 
turns home, 273. 

Cape Bon, 1, 146. 

Cape de Gat, 140, 282. 

Cape Palos, 27, 111, 284. 

Cape St. Vincent, 14, 142. 

Captives in Barbary, 2, 6, 7; redemp- 
tions and escapes, 8; galley slaves, 
9 ; conditions on shore, 10, 11; 
American captives, 13, 14, 16; cap- 
tures described, 14, 16-18; treat- 
ment and condition, 19-22, 41; 
petition Congress, 43; liberated, 
23, 54; arrive home, 55; captives 
of Tripoli in 1802, 111, 112; in 1803, 
150, 151; their captivity, 153-157; 
liberated, 251 ; captives of Algiers 
in 1812, 278-280 ; liberated, 287, 
288 ; lost at sea, 289. 

Capudan-pasha, Turkish admiral, 
81, 82, 84, 85. 

Carmichael, William, United States 
charge d'affaires in Spain, 15, 29, 31. 

Cartee, Seth, lieutenant, 225. 

Cassin, John, lieutenant, 134. 

Castijon, admiral, 8. 

Catalano, Salvadore, pilot, 167, 170, 
174. 

Catbalan, Stephen, U. S. consul, 55. 

Catharine, brig, 90. 

Cathcart, James L., seaman, cap- 
tive in Algiers, 14 ; describes the 
prison, 20, 21; secretary to dey, 
52 ; aids negotiations, 53 ; sent to 
United States, 54; consul to Tri- 
poli, 62; in Algiers, 63; in Tunis 
and assists Eaton in negotiations, 
64, 65 ; arrives at Tripoli and sat- 
isfies demands of pasha, 66, 67 ; 



INDEX 



Ml 



more trouble with pasha, 88, 89; his 
protest and warning letters, 90, 
:il ; retires to Leghorn, 91 ; advises 
aid to Hamet, 101; complains of 
merchantmen, 111; authorized to 
treat with Tripoli, 114 ; opposes 

Fiayment, 115; dey of Algiers re- 
uses to receive him, 118, 123; at 
Tunis, 121, 122; his instructions as 
to Harriet, 124,257; and as to terms 
for Tunis and Tripoli, 132 ; bey 
refuses to receive him, 133 ; re- 
turns to Leghorn, 15'J, 162. 

Celia, brig, 141, 142. 

Cervantes, S. 

Charles V, 4, 5. 

Chauncey, Isaac, lieutenant, com- 
mands Chesapeake, 106, 118; trans- 
ferred to the New York, 123 ; ex- 
tinguishes a fire on the ship, 125 ; 
mentioned, 140 ; promoted to 
master commandant, 176 ; arrives 
off Tripoli in the John Adams, 198, 
218 ; reconnoitres the harbor, 202 ; 
serves on the flagship, 203, 204, 206 ; 
returns home, 213 ; commodore, 
in command of squadron, 297 ; 
cruising, 298 ; at Algiers, 299 ; re- 
lieved by Stewart, 301. 

Chauncey, Wolcott, lieutenant, 281. 

Chesapeake, U. S. frigate, Morris's 
flagship, 105, 106; at Gibraltar, 
113, 114 ; at Leghorn, 115; at Malta, 
116-120; ordered home, 117; bad 
weather prevents approach to 
Tripoli, 119 ; at Tunis, 121 ; at 
Algiers, 122 ; at Gibraltar, home- 
ward bound, 123. 

Chippewa, U. S. brig, 293. 

Church, Edward, U. S. consul at 
Lisbon, 47, 48. 

Clarke, Edward 1)., 83. 

Claxton, Alexander, lieutenant, 294. 

Climate of Mediterranean, 1. 

Congress, foresees trouble, 25 ; ap- 
points commissioners, 28 ; thanks 
king of Spain, 29 ; recommends 
Lamb, 30 ; weakness of, 34 ; slow 
to act, 42; receives reports, 43; 
makes appropriations, 44, 45; fa- 
vors a navy, 48; provides for it, 
49; orders* completion of three 
ships, 58 ; thanks Sterrett, 96; 
rif,dit to declare war, and passes 
act, '.17 ; authorizes small cruisers, 
136 ; action in regard to Intrepid, 
177 ; in regard to Preble's officers, 
214 ; indifferent to navy, 216 ; 
action for relief of Hamet, 263 ; 
refuses a medal to Eaton, 265 ; de- 
clares war against Algiers, 281 ; 
votes prize money for vessels re- 
stored, 292. 

Congress, U. S. frigate, in Barron's 
squadron, 199; at Gibraltar, 218; 
Tangier, 219; Tripoli, 220; in Rod- 



gers's squadron, 223; atTunis,268; 
returns to United States, 269, 271; 
in Bainbridge's squadron, 293. 

Constantinople, 4, 34, 75, 79-84. 

( oust e nation, u. s. frigate, launch- 
ed, 58; at Tunis, 73, 108; in .Mor- 
ris's squadron, 105; at Gibraltar, 
108; blockades Tripoli and engages 
gunboats, 109, 110 ; at Leghorn, 111 ; 
ordered to Toulon, 115 ; to Malta, 
116 ; and to the United States, 117, 
121, 136; in Barron's squadron, 
199, 218; off Tripoli, 211, 219-221; 
at Malta, 222; in Rodgers's squad- 
ron, 223; at Derne, 244; at Syra- 
cuse, 245 ; at Tunis, 268; returns 
home, 270 ; in Decatur's squadron, 
281; in action with Mashuda, 282, 
283 ; in Shaw's squadron, 294; cruis- 
ing, 297. 

Constitution, U. S. frigate, launch- 
ed, 5«; Preble's flagship, 138 ; men- 
tioned, 140; in the Straits, 142; at 
Gibraltar, 143, 145; at Tangier, 144 ; 
at Cadiz, 158 ; at Algiers and Malta, 
159; off Tripoli, 160, 161; at Syra- 
cuse, 161, 175; cruising, 178-182; 
off Tripoli, 184 ; her battery, 185 ; 
cannot reach enemy's gunboats, 
186 ; in a gale, 187 ; in the first at- 
tack, 193, 194 ; second attack, 198; 
fourth attack, 203; fifth attack, 
206; on blockade, 211; convoys 
prizes to Malta, 211, 219 ; refitting, 
213; in Barron's squadron, 220; 
cruising, 221; off Tripoli, 222; 
Rodgers's flagship, 223 ; off Tri- 
poli, 248 ; peace concluded on, 
250 ; at Syracuse, 251; at Tunis, 
268; mutiny on, 272; returns to 
United States, 273. 

Cooper, J. F-, 174, 308. 

Corsairs of Barbary, in the 16th cen- 
tury, 3-6 ; in the 17th, 6, 7 ; their 
treatment of galley slaves, 9 ; 
mode of attack, 9, 10 ; they capture 
Americans, 13-18, 55, 59, 111, 148, 
278; exaggerated ideas of their 
formidability, 192. 

Cortes, Hernando, 5. 

Cowdery, Jonathan, surgeon's mate, 
captive in Tripoli. 153; sees siren 
and Intrepid, 168 ; and bodies of 
latter's crew, 210; informed that 
captives might be put to death, 
256. 

Cox, George, master commandant, 
176; commands the President, 199, 
218; on blockade, 220; transferred 
to the Essex, 223. 

Cox, John, lieutenant, 143. 

Coxe, C. D., U. S. consul at Tunis, 
275. 

Crane, William M., lieutenant, 196; 
captain, 292, 294. 

Creighton, John O., captain, 297. 



346 



INDEX 



Crocco, M., 2G. 
Cromwell, Oliver, 7. 
Crowninshield, B. W., secretary of 
the navy, 288. 

Dale, Richard, commodore, in com- 
mand of squadron, 73, 92 ; his 
orders, 92,93; at Gibraltar, 94; off 
Tripoli, 95 ; not allowed to take 
prizes, 97 ; captures Tripolitans 
and negotiates for exchange of 
prisoners, 97, 98 ; nearly loses his 
ship, 99; returns to United States, 
100; arrives at Norfolk, 107. 

Dallas, Alexander J., lieutenant, 
281. 

Danielson, Eli E., midshipman, 229. 

Dardanelles, 79, 81, 84. 

Dauphin, ship, 14, 29. 

Davis, George, U. S. charge^ d'affaires 
at Tunis, 122, 126, 177, 180, 267; 
U. S. consul at Tripoli, 264. 

Davis, John, midshipman, 167, 169. 

Decatur, James, lieutenant, com- 
mands a gunboat, 188, 189 ; is shot, 
190; dies, 195; monument, 210. 

Decatur, Stephen, lieutenant, on 
the Essex, 94; at Barcelona, 99; 
on the New York, 106 ; second in 
a duel, 120 ; returns home, 123 ; 
takes out the Argus, 139 ; men- 
tioned, 140, 210 ; on the court for 
trial of Bainbridge, 148 ; takes 
command of the Enterprise, 158 ; 
volunteers to cut out the Philadel- 
phia, 165 ; his orders, 166; sails for 
Tripoli, 167 ; driven off by gale, 
167; arrives, 168; in the harbor, 
170 ; burns the Philadelphia, 171 ; 
retreats, 172; believed he could 
have saved her, 174 ; promoted, 
175 ; receives a sword, 177 ; at 
Messina, 178 ; off Tripoli, 185; com- 
mands division of gunboats, 188 ; 
attacks gunboats, 189 ; captures 
two of them, 190, 191; his casual- 
ties, 192 ; in second attack, 196 ; 
receives commission, 198 ; recon- 
noitres harbor, 202 ; in fourth at- 
tack, 202, 203 ; in fifth attack, 204; 
commended, 212 ; commands the 
Constitution, 213 ; transferred to 
the Congress, 220, 223 ; at Tunis, 
268 ; returns to United States, 
269; commodore, in command of 
squadron, 281; at Gibraltar, 282; 
captures two Algerine vessels, 
282-284 ; off Algiers, 285 ; nego- 
tiating, 285-287 ; concludes treaty, 
288 ; sends it home, 289 ; at Tunis, 
290 ; at Tripoli, 291 ; returns to 
United States, 292. 

Decatur, Susan, 174. 

Denmark, 12, 40, 71; consul of, see 
Nisst'ii. 

Dent, John H., lieutenant, on the 



Constitution, 143; at Messina, 178; 
commands the Scourge, 179, 185; 
and a bomb-vessel, 187, 196, 204; 
bombards Tripoli, 193, 202, 206; 
master commandant, commands 
the Nautilus, 223 ; bombards 
Derne, 239 ; opinion of Barron's 
health, 255, 256 ; commands the 
Hornet, 272. 

Derne, Hamet's connection with, 
102, 116, 123, 227; blockade of, ad- 
vised, 221; expedition against, 
231-238; attack upon, 239, 240; cap- 
ture of, 241 ; defense of, 242 243 ; 
evacuation of, 244; effect of cap- 
ture of, on terms of peace, 257. 

Despatch, schooner, 16. 

Dey of Algiers. .See Mohammed, 
Hasan, Mustapha, Achniet, Hadji 
Ali, Omar. 

Dghies, Mohammed, prime minister 
of Tripoli, 89, 129, 151, 247, 250. 

Donaldson, Joseph, 23, 52-55. 

Doria, Andrea, admiral, 4, 5. 

Dorsey, John, midshipman, 197, 
211. 

Downes, John, midshipman, 127; 
master commandant, 281, 289, 294. 

Duquesne, admiral, 7. 

Eagle, ship, 273. 

Eaton, William, U. S. consul at Tu- 
nis, 9, 62 ; describes dey of Algiers, 
63 ; audience with the bey of Tu- 
nis, 64; secures amendment of 
treaty, 65, 66; resists demands of 
bey, 67-69; chastises Famin, 70; 
befriends the Danes, 71 ; resists 
fresh demands, 72,73; leaves Tu- 
nis, 74, 122; criticises Bainbridge, 
78, 104 ; proclaims blockade of 
Tripoli, 100; urges restoration of 
Hamet, 101, 102; interviews bey's 
minister, 103 ; relations with naval 
officers, 104 ; complains of mer- 
chantmen, 111 ; not allowed to 
see captives, 112 ; relations with 
Morris, 118, 119, 121, 122; returns 
home, 123; is instructed regard- 
ing Hamet, 124; at trial of Bain- 
bridge, 148; quotes opinion as to 
explosion of Intrepid, 210; navy 
agent, 219, 227; sails for Egvpt, 
220, 228, 229 ; at Alexandria and 
Cairo, 229 ; audience with the 
viceroyand search for Hamet, 230; 
convention with Hamet, 231, 317 ; 
organizes his force and begins 
march to Derne, 232; difficulties 
with the Arabs, 233-238; arrives at 
Bomba and before Derne, 238 ; 
attacks Derne and captures it, 
239-241 ; occupies and defends the 
town, 242, 243; evacuates Derne, 
244; returns to United States, 245, 
270; opinions of his expedition, 



INDEX 



347 



•255-257; his instructions regard- 
ing Hamet, 257-262; reception in 
United States, 205; liis death, 
266. 

Edwin, brig, 278, 280, 286. 

Elbert, Samuel, lieutenant, 225. 

Elgin, Lord, 81. 

Elliott, Jesse 1>., master command- 
ant, '-'SI. 

Elton, John H., lieutenant, 293. 

England, relations of, with the Bar- 
bary States, 7, 11, 20, 27, 31, 47, 270, 
295, 298. 

Enterprise, l*.S. schooner, at Tunis, 
73,95; in Dale's squadron, 94; en- 
gages and captures the Tripoli, 
95, 96 ; returns to United States, 
100; in Morris's squadron, 105; 
overhauls Tunisian xebec, 107, 
108; on convoy duty, 114-116; at 
Malta, 11* ; captures' the Paulina, 
110; at Algiers, 122 ; changescom- 
manders, 123; reeoppered, 125; off 
Tripoli, 120; takes part in de- 
struction of a polacca, 129-131 ; at 
Malta, 132; in Preble's squadron, 
139; on coast of Morocco, 143; 
Changes commanders, 158; sails 
lor Syracuse, 159 ; captures the 
Mastico, 160; and takes her to 
Syracuse, 101 ; furnishes crew for 
Intrepid, 107; at Messina, 178; on 
blockade, 181; at Tunis, 182; be- 
fore Tripoli, 184, 185, 187, 193, 194, 
190, 203, 205; sent to Malta, 202; 
and to Syracuse with gunboats, 
211 ; in Rodgers's squadron, 223; 
in the Adriatic, 225; at Tunis, 
268; changes commanders, 270; 
attacked by Spanish gunboats, 
272; returns to United States, 273; 
brig, in Bainbridge's squadron, 
2;.:;. 

Epervier, U. S. sloop-of-war, in 
Decatur's squadron, 281; helps 
capture Algerine vessels, 283, 284; 
lost at sea, 289. 

Erie, U. S. sloop-of-war, 293, 294, 
297. 

Espilly, Count d\ 31. 

Essex, U. S. frigate, at Tunis, 73, 
95; in Dale's squadron, 94; on 
convoy. 95, 99; at Barcelona, 99; 
blockading cruisers at Gibraltar, 
100, 107, 113; returns to United 
States, 113; in Barron's squadron, 
199,218; ;it Tangier,219; at Malta, 
220; i ii Rodgers's squadron, 223; 
oil' Tripoli. 248: at Tunis, 208; re- 
turns to United States, 272. 

Estaing, admiral d', 39. 

Estedio, Algerine brig,284, 295, 299, 
338. 

Europe, attitude of, towards Bar- 
bary, 1 1. 

Evans, Samuel, lieutenant, 224, 239. 



Exmouth, Lord, admiral, 11, 295, 
298. 

Famin, Joseph, French resident in 
Tunis, negotiates for United 
States a truce, 59; and a treaty, 
60; favorable to his own interests, 
01; receives Eaton, 64; intrigues 
against him, 09; and is chastised 
by him, 70. 

Farquhar, English volunteer, 232. 

Farragut, David G., midshipman, 
29;; 298 300. 

Firefly, U. S.'brig, 281, 282, 293. 

Flambeau, U. S. brig, 281. 

Fort America, 186. 

Fort English, 203, 206. 

Fortunata Barbara, brig, 177. 

Fortune, ship, 24, 55, 87. 

Foss, John, seaman, narrative of, 
17, 18. 

France, expedition of, against Al- 
giers, 7; subdues Algiers, 11, 12; 
attitude of, towards United States 
regarding Barbary, 25, 31, 32, 52; 
consuls of, unfriendly to United 
States, 31, 53, 180, 297. 

Franklin, Benjamin, 25-28, 81. 

Franklin, U. S. ship of the line, 
301. 

Franklin, brig, HI, 112, 221, 223, 245, 
270, 271. 

Frazier, Daniel, seaman, 191, 192. 

Friendship, brig, 271. 

Gamble, Thomas, lieutenant, 281, 
298. 

Gavino, John, U. S. consul at Gib- 
raltar, 98, 107, 115. 

Geddes, Henry, captain, 62, 66. 

George, brig, 10. 

George Washington, U. S. frigate, 
at Tunis, 73; at Algiers, 75; im- 
pressed by the dey, 70-78; sails for 
Constantinople, 79; arrives, 80; 
salutes eapielan-pasha, si ; enter- 
tainment on board of, 83; returns 
to Algiers, 84; and to United 
States, 86 ; on convoy duty, 101 ; 
sails home, 107. 

Gibraltar, as a base of supplies for 
squadron, 92, 107, 136, 139; Straits 
of, opened to corsairs, 14, 15, 29, 
17. 

Gloria, ship, 73, 102. 

Goldsborough, Charles W., 170, 308. 

1 rOlel ta, port of Tunis, 4, 68. 

Gordon, Charles, lieutenant, 196; 
captain, 281,294, 2:10, 297. 

Grand Turk, ship, 73, 95. 

Grenville, Lord, 47. 

Guerriere, U. S. frigate, Decatur's 
flagship, 281; action with Ma- 
Shuda, 282-284; at Algiers, 285; 
chases cruiser, 287; at Messina, 
291; meets Algerine squadron, 



348 



INDEX 



292 ; returns to United States, 
292. 
Gunboats, borrowed by Preble, 181; 
off Tripoli, 184-187; engage enemy 
and capture three boats, 188-192 ; 
attack batteries, 196-198 ; one 
blows up, 197 ; night attacks, 202, 
203 ; last attack, 204-206 ; sent to 
Syracuse, 211; American gun- 
boats, 218, 224, 225, 272 ; gunboats 
from Adriatic, 225. 

Hadji Ali, dey of Algiers, 275-279, 
2S5. 

Hamdullah, schooner, 62. 

Hamet, ex-pasha, 88 ; scheme for 
his restoration, 101 ; at Malta, 102; 
at Derne, 116, 123 ; attitude of 
administration towards him, 124, 
257-259,261,262; retires to Egypt, 
227 ; plans for assisting him, 228; 
with the Mamelukes, 229, 230 ; con- 
vention with Eaton, 231, 317 ; his 
army, 232; his irresolute character, 
233, 234, 238 ; his mutiny, 230, 237 ; 
at capture of Derne, 240, 241 ; in 
its defense, 242, 243; evacuates 
Derne, 244; his hopes too far en- 
couraged, 259-261 ; aided by Con- 
gress, 263-265; his death, 265. 

Hammida, Algerine admiral, 282- 
285. 

Hamuda, bey of Tunis, peace with, 
60; receives Eaton, 64, 65; accepts 
amendments to treaty, 66; his de- 
mands, 67-73; orders'Eaton away 
from Tunis, 74, 122 ; protects 
Hamet, 88; objects to blockade, 
98 ; withdraws protection from 
Hamet, 102; offers mediation, 103; 
accuses Sterrett of piracy, 108 ; 
buys the Franklin, 112 ; demands 
property seized, 121; terms offered 
to, 132; rejects them, 133; demands 
and threats, 180, 182 ; further 
trouble with, 267-270, 275; sends 
envoy to United States, 271 ; death 
of, 290. 

Hannah, brig, 144, 145. 

Harraden, Nathaniel, lieutenant, 
224. 

Harrison, Alexander, lieutenant, 
225. 

Hasan Pasha, dey of Algiers, 18, 47, 
52-56, 60, 62. 

Hassan Bashaw, brig, 62. 

Heermann, Lewis, surgeon, 167, 169, 
192. 

Henley, John D., midshipman, 192 ; 
lieutenant, 225. 

Hero, ship, 62, 63, 66, 71. 

Higgins, William, navy agent, 163, 
164, 202. 

Hope, ship, 16, 18. 

Ilni net, IT. S. schooner, 294. 

Hornet, U. S. sloop, 221 ; in Rod- 



gers's squadron, 224 ; at Bomba, 
238 ; at Derne, 239-241, 243 ; at 
Tunis, 268; sails for United 
States, 272. 

Hornet, U. S. sloop-of-war, 272. 

Horuk Barbarossa, 3, 4. 

Hospitals in Barbary, 2, 22. 

Hull, Isaac, lieutenant, 106; com- 
mands the Enterprise, 123, 139 ; in 
action with Tripolitan cruiser, 
129, 130 ; mentioned, 140 ; com- 
mands the Argus, 158, 185, 223 ; 
master commandant, 176 ; his 
orders regarding Hamet, 228, 259, 
261 ; at Alexandria, 231 ; at 
Bomba, 238 ; at Derne, 239. 

Humphreys, David, U. S. minister 
to Portugal, interested in captives, 
22, 23 ; secretary to commission, 
28 ; forwards allowance, 44 ; ap- 
pointed to treat, 46 ; opinion of 
truce with Portugal, 47 ; advises 
force, 48 ; aids in procuring 
peace, 51-55 ; approves treaty 
with Tunis, 60. 

Humphreys, Joshua, shipbuilder,50. 

Hunt, Theodore, lieutenant, 149. 

Huntress, ship, 216. 

Iceland, raided by corsairs, 7. 

Independence, U. S. ship of the 
line, 292, 293. 

Intrepid, U. S. ketch, prize, 161; 
chosen for burning the Philadel- 
phia, 165, 166; sads for Tripoli, 
167; enters the harbor, 168, 169; 
alongside the frigate, 170-172 ; re- 
treating, 172, 173 ; arrives at Syra- 
cuse, 175; supply-ship, 202; fire- 
ship, 207 ; blows up, 208 ; theories 
of the explosion, 208-210. 

Ireland, raided by corsairs, 7. 

Israel, Joseph, lieutenant, 208, 211. 

B;ard, Ralph, midshipman, 167, 169, 
179 ; lieutenant, 187, 203, 225. 

Jane, brig, 16. 

Jason, ship, 113. 

Java, U. S. frigate, 294, 297, 301. 

Jay, John, 26, 32-35. 

Jay, schooner, 16. 

Jefferson, Thomas, intercedes for 
captives, 15; commissioner, 28; 
minister to France, 28; negotiates, 
29-31; interviews Abdurrahman, 
33 ; consults Vergennes, 34 ; ad- 
vises war, 35-41; corresponds with 
Adams, 36-38 ; negotiates through 
the Mathurins, 41 ; secretary of 
state, his reports, 43; instructions 
to Paul Jones, 44-46; president, 
views on impressment of the 
Washington, 86,87; his letter to 
the pasha, 93; views on Barbary 
affairs, 94, 222 ; on power of waging 
war, 97; his letter to the bey, 133; 



INDEX 



349 



on Morris's dismissal, 134, 135: 
thanks Bainbridge, Decatur, and 
Preble, 142, 175, 199; sends rein- 
forcements, 198; commends Pre- 
ble, 214; views on Hamet's case, 
261, 262, 264. 

John Adams, ( T . S. frigate, in 
Morris's squadron, 106; brings 
dispatches, 116, 117; at Malta, 117, 
118; at Gibraltar, 123; captures 
the Mesnuda, 126; attacks gun- 
boats, 128; on blockade, 129; de- 
stroys Tripolitan cruiser, 129, 130; 
sails with convoy, 132; at Gibral- 
tar, 133, 134, 143; at Tangier, 144; 
returns to United States, 145; on 
Tripoli, 19S, 201, 203, 218; tows 
gunboats to Syracuse, 211; re- 
turns to United states, 213; in 
Rodgers's squadron, 224; at Tu- 
nis, 268; returns to United States, 
270 : store-ship, 294; sent home 
with dispatches, 297. 

Jones, Jacob, lieutenant, 140; cap- 
tain, 281. 

Jones, Paul, admiral, 44, 46, 92. 

Jones, Richard B., U. S. consul at 
Tripoli, 290, 291. 

Jones, Walter, 134. 

Jupiter, ship, 55. 

Kaliusa reef, 150. 

Karanianli, family name of pashas 
of Tripoli, 88. 

Kearney, Lawrence, lieutenant, 293. 

Keene. Richard R., 279, 280. 

Khair-ed-Din Barbarossa, 3, 4, 5. 

King, Kul us, U. S. minister to Eng- 
land, 69. 

Knox, Henry, secretary of war, 50. 

Lamb, John, 30, 31. 

Lawrence, James, lieutenant, in 
boat attack, 127; mentioned, 140; 
at burning of the Philadelphia, 
167, 169 ; commands the Enter- 
prise, 197; sent to Malta, 202 ; com- 
mands a gunboat, 203 ; returns 
borne, 213; takes agunboat across 
the ocean. 225. 

Laws. Alexander, midshipman, 167, 
169. 

Lear, Tobias, consul-general to Bar- 
bary, 138; boards the Maimona, 
142; at Tangier, 144; at Algiers, 
159, 162; advises large ransom, 182, 
217; joins the squadron, 220; oil' 
Tripoli. 223, 248; his instructions, 
246, 254, 259; receives proposals, 

217; favors peace, 248, 252; negoti- 
ates, 249, 250 ; conclui Les treat v . 251, 
264; his influence with Barron ami 
opposition to Baton's plans, 255, 
256: criticised by Pickering, 263; 
by Eaton, 265; at Tunis, 268, 269; 
at Algiers, 270, 271 ; difficulties 



with the dey, 273, 274, 276, 277; or- 
dered away from Algiers, 276; 
sails for Gibraltar, 277; advises 
force, 277; returns home, 278. 

Lee, Arthur, 25. 

Leghorn, 101, ill, 115, 132, 159. 

Leitensdorfer, Johann, colonel, 230, 
2::2. 

Lelab Eisha, schooner, 02. 

Lewis, William, lieutenant, 221; 
master commandant, 281, 289. 

Liberty, ship, 275. 

Lisle, Peter. Si < Murad Reis. 

Livingston, Robert R., 27 ; ('. S. min- 
ister to France, 100, 179. 

Logic, Charles, British consul at 
Algiers, 14, 15, 31, 47. 

Lubarez, Ibrahim. 141. 

Lyman, Samuel, loo. 

Lynx, U. S. schooner, 293. 

Macdonough, Thomas, midship- 
man, 140, 143, 167, 109, 190, 191. 

Macedonian, U. S. frigate, 281, 284, 

Mackenzie, A. S., 174, 309. 

Madison, James, opposes navy bill, 
49; secretary of state, opposes use 
of American vessels as carriers, 
87 ; letters to consuls, etc., 93 ; let- 
ters regarding Hamet, 124, 257-259; 
offers terms to Tunis and Tripoli, 
132; orders to Lear, 246, 254,259 ; 
president, advises war against Al- 
giers, 281; his letters to the dey, 
285, 298, 337. 

Madona Catapoliana, polacca, 178. 

Mahmud, bey of Tunis, 290. 

Mahon, Port, 99, 117, 294, 298, 300. 

Maimona, Moorish frigate, 142, 145. 

Malta, 40, 95, 102; rendezvous of 
Morris's squadron, 116-121, 125, 
131 ; Preble at, 159-163; Barron at, 
221-223, 248 ; ship Liberty at, 275. 

Mamelukes, 229,230. 

Mann, George, midshipman, 229, 
230, 238, 240. 

Maria, schooner, 13, 14, 29. 

Mary Ann, schooner, 273, 271. 

Maslmda, Algerine frigate, 2S2-284, 
295,338. 

Mason, Daniel, 13. 

Mastico, Tripolitan ketch, 160, 163. 
See Intrepid. 

Mathurins, 2, 41, 42. 

Maxwell, Joseph, lieutenant, 224. 

Mel >onell, British consul at Algiers, 
279. 

McDonough, Bryan, British consul 
at Tripoli, 66, 163. 

McKnight, James, captain of ma- 
rines, 120. 

McNeill, Daniel, captain, 100, 102, 
his. 113. 

McNeill, Daniel, Jr., lieutenant, 
224. 

McShane, John, captain, 16. 



350 



INDEX 



Mellimelni, Tunisian envoy, 269, 
271. 

Mendrici, Francisco, 229, 230, 232. 

Meshuda, Tripolitan ship, at Gib- 
raltar, 91, 94 ; blockaded, 95, 98, 
100 ; claimed by emperor of Mo- 
rocco, 113, 115;'given up to him, 
123 ; captured, 126 ; with the 
squadron, 131 ; restored to Mo- 
rocco, 145 ; alleged ill treatment 
of crew, 153. 

Minerva, brig, 10. 

Minerva, ship, 16. 

Mirboka, Moorish ship, 140-142, 144, 
145. 

Mohammed, dey of Algiers, 14, 18. 

Monroe, James, 39 ; U. S. minister 
to France, 52. 

Morocco, 1 ; government and piracy 
of, 6 ; seizes American vessel, 13 
friendly to United States, 13, 26 
treaty with, 29, 44, 56, 145, 311 
civil war in, 44, 56 ; difficulties 
with, 107, 113, 140-145, 219 ; emperor 
of, see Muley Soliman. 

Morris, Andrew, captain, 111, 112. 

Morris, Charles, midshipman, 140; 
at burning of the Philadelphia, 
167-173; quotations from his jour- 
nal, 167, 170, 172, 173; lieutenant, 
commands a gunboat, 204; cap- 
tain, commands the Congress, 293. 

Morris, Richard V., commodore, 
commands squadron, 105 ; his or- 
ders, 106; sails, 107; at Gibraltar, 
113; trouble with Morocco, 113, 
114; at Leghorn, 115; at Malta, 
116-121; fails to reach Tripoli, 119; 
at Tunis, 121, 122; at Algiers, 122; 
at Gibraltar, 123; opposes Hamet's 
plans, 124 ; fire on his ship, 125 ; at 
Malta, 125; off Tripoli, 126-129; 
sends in boat party, 127; attacks 
gunboats, 128 ; negotiates, 128, 129 ; 
returns to Malta, 129 ; raises 
blockade, 131 ; at Naples and con- 
fers with minister, 131, 132; sus- 
pended, 133 ; returns home, 134, 
143; tried and dismissed, 134, 135; 
his qualifications, 135, 136. 

Morris, Robert, 50. 

Mortar-boats. See Bomb-vessels. 

Muley Soliman, emperor of Mo- 
rocco, 56; his demands, 113-115; 
his gun carriages, 117; the Me- 
shuda given up to him, 123; he 
resents her capture, 131, 144; his 
ship Mirboka captured, 141 ; meets 
Preble and ratifies treaty, 144, 145 ; 
again active, 219. 

Murad Reis, Tripolitan admiral, 59, 
67, 89, 91, 94, its. 

Murray, Alexander, captain, com- 
manfls the Constellation, 104, 105; 
at Gibraltar, 108; off Tripoli and 
attacks gunboats, 109; his views 



of the blockade, 110; cruising, 115, 
116; returns home, 117, 118. 
Mustapha, dey of Algiers, 62 ; 
Eaton's description of, 63; im- 
presses the Washington, 75-78; re- 
quests her for a second voyage, 
84; his rage, 85; threatens French 
residents, 86; requests passports, 
98; refuses to release the Frank- 
lin, 112; refuses to receive Cath- 
cart, 123 ; is assassinated, 270. 

Nautilus, TJ. S. schooner, 133, 137; in 
Preble's squadron, 139 ; at Gibral- 
tar, 140 ; cruising off Morocco, 
143-145; sails east, 159; returns 
to Gibraltar, 100 ; at Syracuse, 
162; atTunis, 177; captures a prize, 
177 ; damaged by storm, 178 ; off 
Tripoli, 184, 185, 187; at the attacks 
on Tripoli, 193, 194, 196, 203, 205- 
208 ; returns to Syracuse, 211 ; on 
blockade, 220; in Rodgers's squad- 
ron, 223; at Derne, 239; bombards 
the town, 240 ; and the enemy, 
242 ; sails with dispatches, 243 ; at 
Tunis, 268 ; returns to United 
States, 272. 

Naval administration, defects of, 
135, 136, 159, 160, 215-217. 

Navy, beginning of the, 48-51, 57, 
58. 

Navy, secretary of. See Crownin- 
shield, Knox, and Smith (R. 
and S.). 

Neale, B. J., lieutenant, 289. 

Nelson, Lord, admiral, 155, 160, 173. 

New York, U. S. frigate, in Mor- 
ris's squadron, 106; at Malta, 117, 
118; flagship, 123; fire on, 125; off 
Tripoli, 126 ; attacks gunboats, 128 ; 
sails for Malta, 129; cruising, 131- 
134; at Gibraltar, 143; at Tangier, 
144 ; returns to United States, 145. 

Nicholson, John 1?., lieutenant, 281. 

Nissen, Nicholas C, Danish consul 
at Tripoli, in charge of American 
affairs, 91 ; negotiations through 
him, 95, 98, 128, 250; kindness to 
captives, 151, 153, 155,291 ; thanked 
by Congress, 156; during bombard- 
ment, 193. 

Noah, M. M., U. S. consul at Tunis, 
279, 289, 290. 

Norderling, John, Swedish consul 
at Algiers, 277, 279, 285-287. 

O'Bannon, Presley N., lieutenant of 
marines, 229, 232, 237, 240, 244. 

O'Brien, Richard, captain, cap- 
tured by Algerines, 14; letter, 31; 
advises force, 48; assists in nego- 
tiations, 52,53; captive in Tripoli, 
55,59; obtains treaty, 60; consul at 
Algiers, 61, 63; promise to Tripoli, 
66; business affairs, 73; connec- 



INDEX 



351 



tion with impressment of the 
Washington, 75-78, 84, 85 ; receives 
instructions, 87; on arrival of 
Dale, 95; refuses passports, 98; 
demands release of the Franklin, 
112; receives money for (ley, 117; 
which is refused, lis, 122; at Syra- 
cuse, 177; at Tunis, 180; negotiates 
at Tripoli, 182, 201; returns to 
United States, 213. 

Ogilvie, Peter S., lieutenant, 224. 

Olive Branch, brig, 16. 

Omar, (ley of Algiers, 285; his agents 
treat for peace, 286; signs treaty, 
287; repudiates it, 295; his letter, 

296, 297, 335; renews treaty, 299, 
300 ; is assassinated, 300. 

Ontario, U. S. sloop-of-war, 281, 

283, 294, 297. 
Oran, 3, 4. 
O'Reilly, Count, 8. 
Otto, M., 31. 

Pasha of Tripoli. See Yusuf. 
Paulina, polacca, 119, 121. 
Peace and Plentv, ship, 73, 101. 
Peacock, U. S. stoop-of-war, 297. 
Peck, Pascal P., midshipman, 232. 
Penrose, William, captain, 16. 
Perry, Oliver H., midshipman, 106; 
lieutenant, 219 ; captain, 294, 296, 

297, 301. 
Perseverance, ship, 123. 
Philadelphia, U. S. frigate, in 

Dale's squadron, 94; blockading 
Tripolitans at Gibraltar, 95; cruis- 
ing. 99 ; at Syracuse, 100 ; off Tri- 
poli, 103, 104; returns to United 
States, 107; in Preble's squadron, 
139; at Gibraltar, 140, 142; captures 
the Mirboka, 141; ordered to Tri- 
poli, 143; on blockade, 145 ; 
wrecked, 146-150; saved by Tripol- 
itans, 152; effect of her loss, 157 ; 
becomes known to Preble, 159; her 
destruction planned, 164-166, 169; 
destruction accomplished, 170- 
173; as to possibility of saving her, 
173, 174 ; news of her loss in United 
States, 198. 

Pickering, Timothy, secretary of 
state, 55 ; senator, 263. 

Pinckney, Thomas, 46, 47. 

Pinkney, William, 297. 

Piracy. See Corsairs. 

Polly, brig, 16, 17. 

Pope, 214. 

Porter, David, lieutenant, on the 
Enterprise, 94; in action with the 
Tripoli, 96; on the New York, 123; 
helps put out fire, 125; commands 
boat party, 127, 128; mentioned, 
140; ]oins the Philadelphia, 143; 
his testimony, 148, 149; instructs 
young officers, 154; commands 
Constitution, 223; and Enterprise, 



270; promoted, 271; attacked by 
Spanish gunboats, 272. 

Porter, John, lieutenant, 293. 
Portugal, 12, 15, 40, 47,48. 
Preble, Edward, commodore, 134, 
138; his squadron, 139; his char- 
acter, 139, 140; overhauls the Mai- 
mona, 142; at Gibraltar, 143; nego- 
tiates with Morocco, 144, 145; 
learns of loss (if the Philadelphia, 
157, 159; proclaims blockade, 158; 
at Syracuse, 159; trouble with 
deserters, 159, 160; captures the 
Mastico, 160, 161; his letters to 
Bainbridge, 162-164; negotiates 
with Tripoli, 164, 179, 180, 182, 201, 
217; plans destruction of the 
Philadelphia, 164, 165; his orders 
to Decatur, 166 ; believed she could 
not be saved, 173, 174; recom- 
mends Decatur's promotion, 175; 
promotes midshipmen, 177; com- 
missions the Scourge, 179; his 
activity, 180; at Naples and bor- 
rows gunboats, 181 ; at Tunis, 182; 
before Tripoli, 184; his force, 185; 
driven off by a gale, 187; gives 
orders for attack, 187, 188 ; ex- 
tracts from his report, 193, 194, 
197, 198, 200, 205, 206; praises offi- 
cers and men, 195, 212; learns that 
he is to be relieved, 198; his com- 
ments, 200 ; reconnoitres the har- 
bor, 201, 202; fits out a fire-ship, 
207; sends her into the harbor, 
208; his opinion of the explosion, 
209, 210; relieved by Barron, pro- 
ceeds to Malta, 211; returns to 
United States, 213; receives con- 
gratulations, 213, 214; and a gold 
medal, 214; should not have been 
relieved, 215; his difficulties, 215- 
217; reception in United States, 
217, 218 ; fits out bomb-vessels and 
gunboats, 218; his death, 218 ; his 
opinion of treaty with Tripoli, 
253, 254; and of Eaton, 256. 

President, U. S. frigate, Dale's 
flagship, 73, 94 ; off Tripoli, 
95 ; overhauls a Greek ship, 97 ; 
has a narrow escape, 99 ; returns 
to United States, 100 ; Barron's 
flagship, 199, 218 ; off Tripoli, 211, 
219 ; on blockade, 222, 248 ; in 
Rodgers's squadron, 223 ; returns 
to United States, attacked by 
Spanish gunboats, 270. 

President, ship, 16. 

Pulis, U. S. consul at Malta, 162, 164, 
275. 

Quincy, Josiah, chairman of con- 
gressional committee, 214. 

Ray, William, marine, 148, 155, 156, 
168. 



352 



INDEX 



Read, George C, lieutenant, 293. 

Reed, George W., lieutenant, 197. 

Ridgely, Charles G, lieutenant, 208 ; 
captain, 293. 

Ridgely, John, surgeon, consul at 
Tripoli, 251. 

Robinson, Thomas, lieutenant, on 
the Constitution, 139, 143 ; com- 
mands a mortar-boat, 187, 188, 196, 
204, 206 ; his boat disabled, 206 ; 
master commandant, commands 
the Enterprise, 223 ; convoys gun- 
boats from the Adriatic, 225 ; 
takes the Franklin to the United 
States, 270. 

Rodgers, George W., lieutenant, 
281 ; master commandant, 297. 

Rodgers, John, captain, commands 
the John Adams, 106; at Malta, 
118; at Tunis, 121; captures the 
Meshuda, 126; destroys Tripolitan 
polacca, 129-131 ; commands 
squadron, 133, 134 ; assists Preble 
in dealing with Morocco, 143-145; 
returns home, 145 ; commands the 
Congress, 199, 218 ; at Tangier, 219 ; 
off Tripoli, 220; transferred to the 
Constitution, 220; at Lisbon, 221; 
captures three vessels, 222; com- 
modore, in command of squadron, 
223; orders regarding impress- 
ments, 225; orders evacuation of 
Derne, 244; opinion of the peace, 
252, 253 ; and as to safety of cap- 
tives, 257; grants allowance to 
Hamet, 263; negotiates with 
Tunis, 267-269; his letter on the 
subject, 269; returns to United 
States, 272. 

Rolla, ship, 275. 

Rowe, John, midshipman, 167, 169. 

Ruyter, de, admiral, 7. 

Sallee, 6, 7, 13, 26, 219. 

Salva, M., 27. 

Sapitapa, the, Tunisian minister, 
67, 68, 70, 71, 180. 

Saranac, U. S. brig, 293. 

Sartine, M. de, 25. ^^ 

Schomberg, captain, 214. C . >" ' 

Scourge, U. S. brig, prize, 179 ; on 
blockade, 181; before Tripoli, 185; 
sent to Malta, 187; off Tripoli, 201, 
203; at Syracuse, 211; sails for 
United States, 220. 

Shaler, William, U. S. consul at Al- 
giers, 281; treats for peace, 285- 
287 ; received by dey, 288 ; in- 
formed that treaty is null, 295; 
withdraws, but allowed to re- 
turn, 296; negotiates, 298-300 ; con- 
cludes peace, 300. 

Shaw, Dr., 69, 70. 

Shaw, John, lieutenant, 101; master 
commandant, 176, 224; captain, 
293; commodore, 294, 295, 297, 301. 



Sheffield, Ichabod, captain, 273. 

Sheffield, Lord, 26. 

Short, William, U. S. charge d'af- 
faires at Paris, 41. 

Shubrick, John T., lieutenant, 289. 

Simpson, James, U. S. consul at Gib- 
raltar, 50; and at Tangier, 113-115, 
141, 144, 219. 

Siren, U. S. brig, 136; in Preble's 
squadron, 139; at Gibraltar, 144, 
145; cruising, 159, 162; at burning 
of the Philadelphia, 166-168; re- 
turns to Syracuse, 173,175; takes 
two prizes, 178, 179; cruising, 180 ; 
on the blockade, and sends in 
boats, 181, 183; before Tripoli, 
185, 187; in attacks on Tripoli, 
193, 194, 197, 203, 205-207; returns 
to Syracuse, 211 ; at Gibraltar, 
220 ; at Tangier, 221 ; in Rodgers's 
squadron, 223; at Tunis, 268; re- 
turns to United States, 272. 

Skjiildebrand, M. and P. E., 22, 51- 
53, 61. 

Skjoldebrand, schooner, 62. 

Slavery. See Captives. 

Smith, George C, captain, 278, 280. 

Smith, John, lieutenant, commands 
Vixen, 139, 223; sails for Gib- 
raltar, 160; master commandant, 
176; off Tripoli, 185; changes rig of 
Vixen, 220 ; commands Wasp, 273. 

Smith, Robert, secretary of the 
navy, 92 ; instructions to Morris, 
106,* 107, 114, 117, 258; his orders 
suspending Morris and dismissing 
him, 133, 135; instructions to 
Preble, 138, 139, 158 ; thanks Bain- 
bridge, 142; sends Decatur's pro- 
motion, 175 ; letters to Preble, 198, 
200; character, 216; instructions 
to Barron, 227, 246, 258. 

Smith, Samuel, acting secretary of 
the navy, instructions to Dale, 
92. 

Somers, Richard, lieutenant, com- 
mands the Nautilus, 139; master 
commandant, 176; off Tripoli, 185; 
commands division of gunboats, 
188, 189, 196, 203, 204; commands 
fire-ship, 207; killed by explosion, 
208; monument, 210. 

Sophia, brig, sent to London, 53; 
to America and back, 55 ; cap- 
tured, 55, 59; sails for Algiers, 62; 
arrives, 63; at Tunis, 64, 70; at 
Tripoli, 66, 67. 

Soulanges, M., 32. 

Sous, Mahomet, 96. 

Spain, expels Moors, 3, 6 ; expedi- 
tions of, 3-5, 7, 8; peace with Al- 
giers, 14, 29; interposition of, 28; 
consuls of, 14, 31, 247-250, 279, 297; 
cruiser of, 216 ; gunboats of, at- 
tack United States vessels, 225, 270, 
272 ; holds Estedio for breach of 



INDEX 



353 



neutrality, 295, 290,338; releases 
her, 299, 338. 

Spark, r. S. brig, 281, 284,290,293, 
294, 298. 

Spence, Keith, purser, 197. . 

Spence, Roberl T., midshipman, 197. 

Spitfire, U. S. bomb-vessel, 218,224, 
272. 

Spitfire, U. S. schooner, 281, 284. 

Stale, secretary of. Set Jefferson, 
Madison, and Pickering. 

Sterrett, Andrew, lieutenant, com- 

. mandsthe Enterprise, '.14, 105, 11*; 
captures the Tripoli, 95, 96; ac- 
cused of piracy, 108; returns to 
the United States, 123; master 
commandant, 170. 

Stewart, Charles, lieutenant, 105 ; 
commands the Siren, 139, 223; 
mentioned, 140 ; cruising, 159 ; has 
trouble with deserters, 160; on 
expedition to burn the Philadel- 
phia, 105, 16G, 108, 173; master com- 
mandant, 170; captures two prizes, 
178, 179; senior officer on blockade, 
181, 183; reports boat attack, 183, 
184; before Tripoli, 185, 190; at 
Tangier, 221; takes the Constella- 
tion home, 270; commodore, 301. 

Stewart, Walter, lieutenant, 294. 

Storer, George \V., lieutenant, 293. 

Sultan of Turkey, 4, 0, 75, 80, 81, 
84. 

Sweden, 12, 40, 90, 100, 108, 111; con- 
sul of, si e Nbrderling. 

Syracuse, 118, 148 ; rendezvous, 159- 
163, 173, 175, 178, 179, 182, 211,213, 
224, 225, 245, 267, 270. 

Tahib, Sheik el, Arab chief, 232-235, 
238. 

Talleyrand, 179. 

Tangier, 13, 113, 114,141, 144,219, 221. 

Thomas, ship. 16. 

Thorn, Jonathan, lieutenant, 107, 
169, 190, 196. 

Torch, U. S. schooner, 281, 284, 290, 
293. 

Transfer, Tripolitan brig, 170, 178, 
179. See Scourge. 

Treaties with Algiers, 23, 52-57, 270, 
285-289, 295-297, 299, 300, 313, 320, 
322 ; with France, 25, 311 ; with 
Morocco, 29, 44, 56, 143-145, 311 ; 
with Tripoli, 00, 00, 07, 88 91, 231, 
248-251, 204, 290, 315, 317, 319, 320; 
with Tunis, 59, 00, 01, 05, 00, 70, 72, 
208, 209, 290, 315. 322. 

Trenehard, Edward, captain, 294. 

Tripoli, 1; government, 0; ambas- 
sador of, 32, 33; peace with, 60, 
250, '-'.".1 ; trouble with, 66, 88 91, 
290, 291 : pashas of, 88 ; war with, 
91; blockade of, 98, LOO, 158; force 
of, 186; violates treaty, 290. See 
Treaties. 



Tripoli, polacca, captured, 95, 90. 

Tripoli monument-, 210. 

Trippe, John, lieutenant, 188, 192, 
204. 

Truxtun, Thomas, commodore, 105, 
135. 

Tunis, 1, 3; taken by Charles V, 4; 
government, 6; piracy of, 6, 12, 
59; chastisement of , 7 ; truce with, 
59; peace with, 00, 66, 209; condi- 
tions in, 07-73; trouble with, 121, 
122, 180, 182, 267-270, 271, 275, 289, 
290 ; violates treaty, 290. See 
Treaties. 

Turkey, 75, 80-84. 

Turner, William, surgeon, 101. 

Two Brothers, ship, 272. 

Two Sicilies, 40; king of, 132, 181, 291. 

United States, U. S. frigate, 
launched, 58 ; in Bainbridge's 
squadron, 293 ; Shaw's flagship, 
294; at Naples, 297 ; at Mahon, 298. 

Valenzin, David, 119. 

Vengeance, U. S. bomb-vessel, 218, 
224 272. 

Vergennes, Comte de, 25, 31, 34. 

Vincent de Paul, 8. 

Violet, brig, 273. 

Vixen, U. S. schooner, 137; in 
Preble's squadron, 139; at «iili- 
raltar, 143; off Tripoli and Cape 
Bon, 145, 146, 150; cruising, 160, 
162, 177, 180; on blockade. 181,183; 
before Tripoli, 185, 187; in attacks 
on Tripoli, 193, 194, 197, 203, 205- 
207; blockading, 211, 219, 221; al- 
tered toa brig, 220 ; atMalta,222; 
in Kodgers's squadron, 223; off 
Tripoli, 250 ; at Tunis, 208 ; returns 
to United States, 272. 

Vixen battery, 186. 

Wadsworth, Henry, lieutenant, 
commands a gunboat, 196; killed 
by explosion, 207, 208; monument, 
210. 

Washington, George, 30; president, 
messages of, 43, 45, 57, 58; advo- 
cates a navy, 58; receives letter 
from Morocco, 50; his secretary, 
138. 

Washington, U. S. ship of the line, 
297, 298, 300. 

Wasp, U. S. sloop-of-war, 273. 

Weld, William <;., captain, 113. 

Wilson, seaman, 155-157. 

Wormeley, Wallace, lieutenant, 257. 

Ximenes, cardinal, captures Oran, 
3. 

Yusuf, pasha of Tripoli, 55; signs 
treaty, on, 88-; his demands, 00, 
67; his accession, 88; threatening, 



354 



INDEX 



88-91; declares war, 91; wishes 
to treat for peace, 95, 98, 103; 
enraged at loss of the Tripoli, 9(5 ; 
objects to blockade, 98 ; his nego- 
tiations and demands, 128, 129, 
164, ISO, 1S2, 201 ; receives captives, 
151; forbids their ill treatment, 
155; punishes renegades, 156, 157; 
promises amnesty to Derne, 245 ; 



negotiates and concludes peace, 
248-251 ; his threats, 256, 257; re- 
leases Hamet's family, 264; and 
provides for him, 26*5 ; violates 
treaty, 290; yields to Decatur's 
demands, 291. 

Zacbe, secretary to capudan-pasha, 
81. 



fltbe fiitocrjsibe $tc0 

Electrotyped ayid printed by H. O. Houghton &r> Co. 
Cambridge, Mtiss., U. S. A. 



DEC -0 



